CourtListener 10588321•Nunn v. Student Loan Solutions CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 5/21/25 Nunn v. Student Loan Solutions CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BRETT HAROLD NUNN et al., H051678
(Santa Cruz County
Cross-Complainants and Super. Ct. No. 22CV02376)
Appellants,
v.
STUDENT LOAN SOLUTIONS, LLC,
et al.,
Cross-Defendants and
Respondents.
This case concerns a student loan taken out by Brent Harold Nunn in 2008. Four
payments were made, the last in December 2012. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC
(SLS) purchased the loan, and in 2022 it sued Nunn and his mother Martinette Angie
Luna Nunn, who co-signed the loan, for non-payment. In response, the Nunns filed
cross-claims against SLS and four others for violating state and federal debt collection
statutes. Cross-Defendants in turn filed motions to strike the cross-claims under Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.
The Nunns now appeal. On appeal, the Nunns do not dispute that their cross-
claims arose out of protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. Instead, the
Nunns argue that they satisfied their burden under the anti-SLAPP statute of showing a
probability of prevailing.
Relying on the court’s decision in Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions, LLC (May
20, 2025, H051407) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Guracar)), which was argued with this appeal,
we conclude that the Nunns have standing to bring their cross-claims. We also conclude
that the Nunns have shown a probability of prevailing on their cross-claims for suing to
collect a time-barred debt and for making false or misleading representations. However,
we conclude that the Nunns have failed not shown a probability of prevailing on their
remaining cross-claim that the complaint failed to allege the statute of limitations had not
expired.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Loan at Issue and the Nunns’ Default
In April 2008, Brent Nunn was enrolled as an art student and took out a private
student loan, co-signed by his mother, from Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America)
for $30,000. The loan required the Nunns to make 240 monthly payments of $481.55.
An associated credit agreement required Bank of America to send monthly statements
showing “the Monthly Payment Amount and the monthly due dates.” The agreement
also contained an acceleration clause granting the bank the option, if the Nunns failed to
make a payment, to accelerate repayment of the loan by providing “notice that the whole
outstanding principal balance, accrued interest, and all other amounts payable . . . are due
and payable at once.”
Because of family financial problems, Brent Nunn dropped out of school in 2011,
and while his father made several monthly payments, the last payment on the Nunns’
loan was in December 2011. On June 25, 2012, Bank of America charged off
$45,063.23, consisting of $43,510.08 in principal and $1,553.15 in interest, on the loan.
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B. Bank of America’s Efforts to Collect in Full
In declarations, Brent Nunn and his mother averred that, after Bank of America
charged off their loan in June 2012, they received letters from the bank, which they were
now unable to locate, demanding that the loan “ ‘be paid in full immediately.’ ” They
also averred that, over the next five years, they received letters from debt collectors
seeking payment of $45,0623.23, the amount charged off by the bank.
C. The Sale to SLS and the 2017 and 2018 Letters
On October 31, 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased a group of
loans from Bank of America, including the loan to the Nunns.
In November 2017, the next month, Williams and Fudge, Inc. (Williams & Fudge)
sent Brent Nunn a letter on behalf of SLS. The letter listed $45,063.23 as the amount due
and informed Mr. Nunn that Williams & Fudge had been hired to collect the amount
owed. The letter also stated that, “[i]f your account(s) is currently in repayment, your
payment schedule will remain intact.” Finally, the letter stated that “[t]he law limits how
long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for
it.” Brent Nunn’s mother received an identical letter.
On May 31, 2018, Williams & Fudge sent Brent Nunn a second letter on behalf of
SLS. The letter once again listed the amount due as $45,063.23. It told Mr. Nunn that
Williams & Fudge wanted to continue trying to find a way “to clear this outstanding
amount” and proposed 61 monthly payments of $751.05.
D. The May 2022 Letters
On May 3, 2022, Williams & Fudge sent Brent Nunn a third letter on behalf of
SLS. Although this letter contained the same consumer identification and pin numbers as
the 2017 and 2018 letters to Mr. Nunn, it listed the amount due as $16,828.80 rather than
$45,063.21. The May 2022 letter stated that Mr. Nunn had “failed to pay installments
due as required,” that “SLS hereby accelerates the loan and demands all payments due,”
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and that “$16,828.80 is now immediately due and owing to SLS.” The following week,
on May 11, 2022, Williams & Fudge sent Mr. Nunn’s mother a similar letter.
E. The Proceedings Below
SLS sued the Nunns in Santa Cruz County Superior Court in October 2022. The
complaint alleged that the Nunns took out a loan with Bank of America, that in June 2010
Bank of America charged off $45,063.23 on the loan, and that the last payment on the
loan was in December 2011. The complaint also alleged that Bank of America sold the
Nunns’ loan to SLS. Finally, the complaint alleged that, since November 2018, the
Nunns became indebted to SLS for $16,828.80, representing the payments missed in the
last four years and, because SLS accelerated the loan, the remaining principal. The
complaint attached an affidavit from Christopher Rue, SLS’s general manager, which in
turn attached copies of the Nunns’ credit agreement with Bank of America and a
statement disclosing the amount of the loan and the monthly payments.
In December 2022, the Nunns, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated persons, filed cross-claims against SLS, Rue, and Williams & Fudge, as well as
Stephen Goldsmith and Goldsmith & Hull, one of the lawyers representing SLS and his
firm. The Nunns alleged that cross-defendants violated four debt collections statutes:
Fair Debt Buying Practices Act (Debt Buyers Act) (Civ. Code, § 1788.50 et seq.), and the
Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act (PSLCRA) (Civ. Code, § 1788.200 et
seq.), and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) (Civ. Code,
§ 1788-1788.337), as well as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 et seq.). The two Goldsmith cross-defendants demurred and filed a motion to
strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground
that the Nunns failed to allege any injury and therefore lacked standing to assert statutory
violations. Because the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, it did not
reach the anti-SLAPP motion.
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The Nunns amended their cross-complaint. In the amended cross-complaint, they
alleged that they were misled by the complaint into believing that their debt was legally
enforceable. As a result, they allegedly attempted to settle the suit and, when those
attempts failed, they engaged legal counsel to defend themselves, incurring attorney’s
fees and costs. The Nunns also alleged that cross-defendants violated the Debt Buyers
Act, the PSLCRA, and the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA by suing or otherwise seeking
to collect a time-barred debt. The Nunns further claimed that cross-defendants violated
the Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA by making misleading representations and
misrepresenting the character, amount or status of the debt owed. Finally, the Nunns
claimed that cross-defendants violated the PSLCRA because the complaint filed against
them failed to allege that the statute of limitations had not expired.
Cross-defendants, in one motion by the Goldsmith defendants and another by the
remaining cross-defendants, moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. After holding
that the debt collection statutes invoked by the Nunns do not preclude application of the
anti-SLAPP statute, the trial concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the Nunns’
claims because the claims arise out of protected litigation activity. The court also ruled
that the Nunns failed to show a probability of prevailing on their claims. In particular,
the trial court concluded that the Nunns had failed show that they were likely to prevail
on their claim that cross-defendants sought to collect a time-barred debt because their
loan was an installment contract and repayment of it was not accelerated until 2022. The
trial court did not address standing or explain why it concluded that the Nunns failed to
show a probability of prevailing on the remaining cross-claims.
After the trial court granted the motion to strike, the Nunns filed a timely notice of
appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (i); id., § 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)
II. DISCUSSION
The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to combat strategic lawsuits against public
participation (SLAPPs): “ ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
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constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’ ”
(Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1242, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
subd. (a).) The statute authorizes special motions to strike in which the merits of a
party’s claims are evaluated, pre-discovery, in “ ‘a summary-judgment-like procedure.’ ”
(Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 324; see id. at pp. 321-322; but
see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g) [permitting trial courts to order specified
discovery “for good cause shown”].) If a claim arises out of an “act . . . in furtherance of
a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue,” the claim
must be stricken unless the non-moving party establishes “a probability that [it] will
prevail on the merits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish a
probability of prevailing, the non-moving party must demonstrate that the claim is
“legally sufficient and factually substantiated”—that is, the claim has “ ‘minimal merit’ ”
and the factual showing supporting it, if accepted, “would be sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 385, 391, 396.)
The Nunns argue that the trial court erred in striking their cross-claims because
they established a probability of prevailing on each. We review the trial court’s rulings
on this issue de novo. (See, e.g., Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) However, before doing so, we consider an alternative
ground for affirmance urged by cross-defendants: standing.
A. Standing
Cross-Defendants argue that the Nunns lack standing because they have not
presented evidence that they suffered concrete harm. Following the Guracar decision,
we reject these arguments and conclude that Nunn has standing to seek statutory damages
under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA even in the
absence of concrete harm. (Guracar, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at pp. __ [pp. 8-16]; see also
Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1038-1041)
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We also note that the Nunns have alleged concrete harm. In their amended cross-
complaint, the Nunns alleged that, because the complaint misled them into believing that
their debt was legally enforceable, they attempted to settle SLS’s lawsuit and, when that
attempt failed, incurred attorney’s fees and costs in defending themselves. Moreover,
when cross-defendants moved to strike, the Nunns submitted declarations substantiating
these allegations. This evidence is sufficient to establish standing at this stage. As the
Guracar decision observed, the expense and distress of defending against a wrongfully
initiated lawsuit is a traditionally recognized harm that satisfies standing requirements
under Article III of the United States Constitution. (Guracar, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at
p. __ [pp. 8-9].) This evidence also satisfies Article III’s standing requirements for the
Nunns’ claims that cross-defendants made false or misleading representations. While
federal courts have required reliance causing harm for misrepresentation claims (ibid.
[Opn., p. 9]), the Nunns presented evidence that, in reliance on misrepresentations in the
complaint about the statute of limitations, they engaged in settlement negotiations and
incurred attorney’s fees. By any standard, these injuries are sufficient to establish
standing. (See, e.g., Bouye v. Bruce (6th Cir. 2023) 61 F.4th 485, 490.)
B. Time-Barred Debt
It is clear that the Nunns’ cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt are
legally sufficient. Both the Debt Buyers Act and the PSLCRA expressly prohibit debt
buyers and private student loan collectors from suing to collect debts that are time-barred.
(Civ. Code, § 1788.56 [“A debt buyer shall not bring suit . . . to collect a consumer debt if
the applicable statute of limitations on the debt buyer’s claim has expired.”]; id.,
§ 1788.204 [“A private education . . . loan collector shall not bring suit . . . to collect a
private education loan if the applicable statute of limitations for the . . . private education
loan collector’s claim has expired.”].) In addition, the FDCPA—and, by extension the
Rosenthal Act, which incorporates provisions of the FDCPA (Civ. Code, § 1788.17)—
has been interpreted to prohibit suing or threatening to sue to collect a time-barred debt.
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(See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC (7th Cir. 2014) 744 F.3d 1010, 1020;
McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 637 F.3d 939, 947-
948.)
However, the trial court held that the Nunns did not factually substantiate their
cross-claims, and therefore failed to establish a probability of prevailing on their cross-
claims for suing to collect based on a time-barred debt because their loan was not
accelerated until May 2022 and therefore SLS’s suit to collect on the payments owed
after that date was timely filed. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 337.) The Nunns argue that they
presented evidence sufficient to establish that Bank of America accelerated repayment of
their loan shortly after charging it off in June 2010—a dozen years before the complaint
and therefore well outside the limitations period. As explained below, we agree with the
Nunns.
The Nunns’ loan required them to make monthly payments for 20 years. Under
the continuous accrual doctrine, when a contractual obligation arises on a recurring basis,
as with an installment contract or a lease, “ ‘a [new] cause of action accrues each time a
wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’ ” (Aryeh v. Canon Business
Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1199.) Consequently, under the ordinary
operation of their loan, each time the Nunns failed to make a monthly payment, a new
claim for breach arose, and a new limitations period on that new claim began to run.
(Piedmont Capital Management, LLC v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 970;
Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375,
1388.)
However, the Nunns’ credit agreement contained an acceleration clause. If the
Nunns failed to make a monthly payment, this clause gave the holder of the loan the
option, after providing notice, to make the whole loan, any accrued interest, and all other
amounts “due and payable at once”: “[Y]ou”—which the promissory note defined to
mean Bank of America or another holder of the loan—“have the right to give me [the
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Nunns] notice that the whole outstanding principal balance, accrued interest, and all other
amounts payable to you under the terms of this Credit Agreement are due and payable at
once (subject to any applicable law which may give me a right to cure my default) if . . . I
fail to make any monthly payment to you when due . . . .”
If a party exercises the option granted by an acceleration clause to require
immediate full payment, the statute of limitations on all amounts due under the loan
begins to run upon failure to make that payment. (See Garver v. Brace (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 (Garver); see 13 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2022) § 79:18,
pp. 337-340, id. (2024 supp.) § 79:18, pp. 1-2.) However, an acceleration clause requires
“ ‘some affirmative act’ ” manifesting the election to exercise it. (Garver, supra, 47
Cal.App.4th at p. 1000; see also Jones v. Wilton (1938) 10 Cal.2d 493, 500 [“If the
creditor fails to act affirmatively to mature the indebtedness, the statute of limitations is
not set in motion.”].)
The Nunns presented evidence of such an affirmative act. Their declarations and
cross-defendants’ records showed that between 2008 and 2011 only four monthly
payments were made on their loan, and that Bank of America charged off the loan in June
2012. Afterwards, both the Nunns received at least one letter from Bank of America
demanding payment of their loan “ ‘in full immediately’ ” and debt collectors demanded
payment of $45.063.23, the full balance on the loan when it was charged off.1 Although
the Nunns could not locate this letter, they submitted later letters from Williams & Fudge
seeking to collect the loan. The first set of these letters were sent separately to Brent
Nunn and his mother on November 21, 2017. Rather than demanding a monthly payment
1
The Nunns also asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a declaration
submitted by the plaintiff in the Guracar case containing a 2010 letter from Bank of
America requesting that his account “be paid in full immediately.” However, the trial
court denied the request, and the Nunns have neither appealed from that denial nor filed a
request for judicial notice in this court. Accordingly, we do not consider the Guracar
declaration or the letter attached to it.
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or even the previously missed monthly payments, these letters listed the amount due as
$45,063.23, the full balance on the loan. In addition, they stated that “[t]he law limits
how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue
you for it.” In May 2018, Williams & Fudge sent letters to both Mr. Nunn and his
mother, again listing the amount due as $45,063.23. These letters informed the Nunns
that SLS was seeking “to collect the total amount from you in connection with the above
delinquent account(s).”
In light of this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Bank of America
notified the Nunns that it was exercising its option to accelerate their loan. As noted
above, if the Nunns failed to make any monthly payment, their credit agreement gave
Bank of America the option to accelerate repayment by providing notice that “the whole
outstanding principal balance, accrued interest, and all other amounts payable . . . are due
and payable at once.” Evidence showed that the Nunns failed to make monthly payments
from 2008 to 2010 and only four payments in 2011. In 2012, Bank of America charged
off the loan as a bad debt, and afterwards it sent the Nunns a letter demanding payment of
the loan “ ‘in full immediately.’ ” And, in 2017 and then in 2018, Williams & Fudge sent
the Nunns letters demanding payment of $45.063.23, the full balance of the loan. Based
on the evidence in the record, a reasonable trier of fact could find that sometime after
writing off the Nunns’ loan in May 2012 but before Williams & Fudge’s November 2017
letter, Bank of America exercised its option to accelerate repayment of the loan by
notifying the Nunns that the whole outstanding balance of their loan was due and payable
at once.
This conclusion is supported by the disclosure included in the November 2017
letters that Williams & Fudge sent to the Nunns on behalf of SLS. These letters stated
that “[t]he law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your
debt, we will not sue you for it.” This statement is, word-for-word, the one that the Debt
Buyers Act requires debt buyers to include in their initial written communication with a
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debtor when attempting to collect a time-barred debt. (Civ. Code, § 1788.52, subd. (d)(2)
[“ ‘The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt,
we will not sue you for it.’ ”].) As these letters demanded the entire balance due on the
Nunns’ loan, which would have been due only if the loan had accelerated, and as there is
no suggestion that that only a portion of this debt was time-barred, it may reasonably be
inferred that Williams & Fudge believed that the Nunns’ loan had been accelerated more
than four years earlier, outside the relevant limitations period.
Courts have found loans accelerated based on similar evidence. For example, in
Sharpe v. Brotzman (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 354, the plaintiffs purchased a sawmill
financed in large part by a promissory note, which contained an acceleration clause. (Id.
at pp. 356, 360.) After the plaintiff failed to make payments (id. at p. 357), the sellers
sent the plaintiff a notice of foreclosure containing the following statement: “I herewith
demand of you all the unpaid balance plus taxes plus the percentages allowed me under
the mortgage as foreclosure costs.” (Id. at p. 359, italics omitted.) The Court of Appeal
held that this statement was “clearly an exercise of the option . . . to declare all payments
due upon a default, and was notice to the purchasers of the exercise of that opinion.” (Id.
at p. 360.) The evidence here is indistinguishable: Bank of America demanded that the
Nunns’ loan be paid in full immediately, and subsequent collection letters sought
payment of the full amount of the loan.
The conclusion that Bank of America accelerated the Nunns’ loan is also
supported by a case involving SLS and William & Fudge. In Shadrin v. Student Loan
Solutions LLC (D. Md. 2022) 2022 WL 971183 (Shadrin)), as here, SLS bought two
student loans from Bank of America and later sued the debtors for nonpayment. (Id. at
pp. *1-*2.) The debtors in turn sued SLS and Williams & Fudge for violating the
FDCPA and related state statutes by seeking to collect a time-barred debt. (Id. at pp. *1,
*3.) SLS and Williams & Fudge moved to dismiss, but the district court denied the
motion. Applying California law, the court held that the loans at issue had been
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accelerated before SLS purchased them in 2017. (Id. at pp. *5-*6.) In 2016, Bank of
America sent one of the debtors a letter stating that her account balance was $17,683.79,
which was much more than any monthly payment or the previously missed payments,
and that this balance was due. (Ibid.) The letter did not include any installment schedule
or information about making regular installment payments. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the
district court concluded that the letter constituted “an affirmative act necessary to
accelerate an unsecured loan” because it “contained demands for the entire balance of the
borrower’s loan, coupled with the lack of information about or subsequent notices of
installment payments.” (Id. at p. *7.)
Similarly, here, on behalf of Bank of America Williams & Fudge sent the Nunns
collection letters stating that their balance was $45.063.23, the full amount of the loan
charged off by the bank, and demanded payment of this amount rather than a $481.55
monthly payment or the monthly payments that were missed. As the Goldsmith cross-
defendants point out, the 2018 collection letters express a desire to “continue to find a
way to work with you in order to clear this outstanding balance” and propose a monthly
payment plan. However, this proposal is not for making monthly payments or repaying
missed monthly payments. Instead, it seeks 61 payments of $751.05, totaling
$45,811.61, or slightly more than the amount charged off by Bank of America. Thus, as
in Shadrin, the collection letters sought the entire balance rather than monthly installment
payments and therefore by themselves constituted an affirmative act providing notice of
acceleration.
Despite their involvement in the Shadrin case, SLS and Williams & Fudge do not
even mention the case in their briefing. Instead, they contend that in Beal Bank v. Crystal
Properties, Ltd. (In re Crystal Properties, Ltd.) (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 743 (Beal Bank),
the Ninth Circuit held that a letter demanding repayment in full was not a notice of
acceleration. While that is technically correct, they fail to mention what else the letter in
Beal Bank said. In Beal Bank, a letter from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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(FDIC) informed a debtor that “ ‘there is a 5% default interest due on all remaining
principal and unpaid interest,’ ” and “ ‘[u]nless we receive payment in full of all principal
and accrued interest by May 31, 1995 . . . we will be filing a Notice of Default.’ ” (Id. at
p. 752.) However, the FDIC’s letter also stated that that “ ‘we will be filing a Notice of
Default’ ” and threatened future action, which, the Ninth Circuit observed, “demonstrates
that the acceleration option had not been exercised.” (Ibid., italics added) Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the letter “merely advised the debtors that the FDIC
could invoke the default interest clause in the future.” (Ibid.)
This case is different. The 2017 and 2018 collection letters do not calculate
interest using the contractual rather than the default interest rate. Indeed, as they list the
amount ($45,063.23) charged off by Bank of America in 2012, they do not seek any
interest. Nor do the letters threaten to take any future action. Consequently, in sharp
contrast to Beal, nothing in the collection letters indicates that Bank of America had not
accelerated the Nunns’ loan when it demanded payment of the whole principal balance
on the Nunns’ loan. To the contrary, as the collection letters could not have sought
immediate payment of the entire balance of the loan absent acceleration, the collection
letters implicitly confirm that the Nunns’ loan was accelerated.
Cross-Defendants cite several other cases, but these cases are also distinguishable.
First Bank Investors’ Trust v. Tarkio College (8th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 471 (Tarkio) is
inapposite for the same reason as Beal Bank. The letter in Tarkio stated that the debtor
was in default and requested “ ‘full payment of the unpaid principal . . . and unpaid and
accrued interest.’ ” (Tarkio, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 474.) However, the letter also
calculated the interest due at the contractual rather than the default interest rate, thereby
indicating that the bank was not yet exercising its right to accelerate the loan. (Id. at
pp. 475-476.) In another case cited by cross-defendants, a bank warned a debtor that it
“ ‘ha[d] the option of accelerating and declaring immediately due and payable all of the
liabilities owing the Bank,’ ” but did not indicate that in fact it was exercising that option.
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(In re Zamani (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) 390 B.R. 680, 689.) In still other cases, there was
not even a warning that the note in question would be accelerated. (See Green v.
Carlstrom (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 240, 243-245; Bird v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc.
(N.D.Cal. 2016) 183 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1063.) Consequently, none of the cases cited by
cross-defendants suggests that Bank of America did not accelerate the Nunns’ loan.
Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact could find that no later than November
2017 Bank of America gave the Nunns notice it was exercising its option to accelerate
repayment of their loan. In light of such a finding, any claim concerning the Nunns’ loan
would have accrued shortly thereafter when the Nunns failed to repay the entire loan,
which in turns means that the four-year statute of limitations on the holder’s claims
would have begun to run and expired before SLS sued in 2022. The Nunns therefore
have established a probability of defeating cross-defendants’ statute of limitations
defense and of prevailing on their cross-claims that cross-defendants violated the the
Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA by suing to collect a
time-barred debt.
C. The Misrepresentation Claims
The Nunns claim that cross-defendants violated both the FDCPA, and by way of
the FDCPA incorporated into it, the Rosenthal Act by making false or misleading
representations in trying to collect their debt. These cross-claims are supported by the
same evidence that supports the Nunns’ cross-claims that cross-defendants sued to collect
a time-barred debt. The complaint alleged that the claim against the Nunns was timely
because the applicable statute of limitations is four years, the Nunns’ loan was an
installment contract, and the loan was accelerated in May 2022. However, as shown
above, the Nunns presented evidence that their loan was accelerated before it was sold to
SLS in 2017. As this was more than four years before the complaint was filed in 2022, a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the statements in the complaint concerning the
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statute of limitations were either false or deceptive and that these statements
mischaracterized the legal status of the claims against the Nunns.
We therefore conclude that the Nunns have established a reasonable probability of
prevailing on their cross-claims under the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act for false and
misleading representations.
D. Pleadings
In addition to claiming that cross-defendants violated the PSLCRA and other
collections statutes by suing to collect a time-barred debt, the Nunns claimed that cross-
defendants violated the PSLCRA by failing to allege that the statute of limitations had not
expired. (Civ. Code, § 1788.205, subd. (a)(a)(1) [“The complaint shall allege . . .
(2) [t]hat the applicable statute of limitations has not expired.”].) We disagree. Although
the complaint did not expressly state that the statute of limitations had not expired, as
discussed above, it contained other allegations that taken together, asserted that the debt
was not time-barred. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly struck the
Nunns’ PSLCRA cross-claim that cross-defendants failed to allege that the statute of
limitations had not expired.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court, which is
directed to reinstate (1) all of appellants’ cross-claims to the extent that they are based
upon suing to collect a time-barred debt and (2) appellants’ cross-claims under the
Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA for making false or misleading representations. The order
striking appellants’ cross-claim for violating the PSLCRA by failing to allege that the
statute of limitations had not expired is affirmed. Appellants are entitled to recover costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (3).)
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
LIE, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
WILSON, J.
Nunn et al. v. Student Loan Solutions, LLC, et al.
H051678
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