People v. Brown CA2/4

CourtListener 10588318Calctapp21 mai 2025

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Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Brown CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B328067

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA043917)

v.

DANIEL ANTONIO BROWN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Robert C. Vanderet, Judge. Remanded with instructions; otherwise affirmed.
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Kenneth C. Byrne, Jonathan M. Krauss and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 1992, appellant Daniel Brown pled no contest to voluntary
manslaughter. In 2022, Brown filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition for failing to make a
prima facie showing. On appeal, Brown challenges the trial court’s order. He
contends that the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding in
concluding that he was the actual shooter and thus ineligible for relief. We
affirm, but remand to allow appellant an opportunity to file an amended
petition, in accordance with People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton).

BACKGROUND
In 1991, an information charged Brown with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special allegation that he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Brown
subsequently pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Brown to the low term of three years in
prison.
In 2022, Brown filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The court appointed counsel for Brown and the parties submitted briefs. The
People’s response argued that Brown was not entitled to relief because he
was the actual shooter and the sole perpetrator and thus could not have been
convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or a felony
murder theory.
In contesting Brown’s prima facie showing, the People relied on the
transcript from Brown’s preliminary hearing to demonstrate why relief was
unavailable as a matter of law. In particular, a witness testified at the
preliminary hearing that he did not say anything to the police about the
incident. However, the investigating detective testified that the witness gave
details about the shooting a few weeks after the incident. According to the
detective, the witness stated that he saw his acquaintance, “Toushay,” in a

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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physical fight with several other men. Toushay then took out a gun and
fatally shot the victim. The detective testified that he identified Toushay as
Brown through “automated resources, department records and witnesses’
statements,” including from Brown’s girlfriend, who identified him as
Toushay.
In reply, Brown argued that he had met his prima facie burden and
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. He contended that any use of the
preliminary hearing transcript would constitute improper factfinding at the
prima facie stage. He offered no factual counterweight to the evidence cited
by the People.
The trial court initially found that Brown made a prima facie showing
and set an evidentiary hearing. However, the People moved for
reconsideration of the court’s prima facie finding. The court ultimately found
that Brown had not made his prima facie showing and thus denied the
petition. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on the preliminary
hearing transcript. The court found that the witness’s statements to the
detective who testified at the preliminary hearing was admissible as a prior
inconsistent statement and established that Brown was the sole shooter as a
matter of law. Thus, Brown’s conviction did not implicate an invalid theory
of liability.
Brown timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The Legislature eliminated “natural and probable consequences
liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) In turn, the Legislature created a
procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be convicted of murder
under the amended laws to seek retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3);
Lewis, supra, at p. 957.) The Legislature then expanded the class of
defendants entitled to relief to those convicted of manslaughter under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. ( § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.)

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The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court engaged in improper
factfinding by relying on the preliminary hearing transcript. While this
appeal was pending, our Supreme Court decided Patton, supra, which held
“that a petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to
relief under section 1172.6, in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner's conviction was under a still-valid theory, has
not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
600.) Although the “‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very
low’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), it is not on the floor. A petitioner
“confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable
ha[s] the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert
the prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would
entail.” (Patton, supra, at p. 607.) A petitioner may satisfy this burden by,
for instance, pointing to “specific facts that identify someone else as the direct
perpetrator.” (Ibid.) “But absent specific facts, no such dispute arises, ...
from mere latent, speculative possibilities; that is, a hypothetical alternate
direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from thin air or a legal conclusion.”
(Id. at p. 608.)
The court in Patton made clear “there is no dispute that the record of
conviction the parties may consult at the prima facie stage includes a
preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 608.) In Patton, as in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to
make a prima facie showing because he “offered only conclusory allegations of
entitlement to resentencing relief under section 1172.6 in response to a
record of conviction.” (Id. at p. 609.) In light of the preliminary hearing
transcript, the court held that the petitioner's “conclusory checkbox
allegations alone could not create a factual dispute.” (Ibid.) However, in
response to the petitioner’s belated request at oral argument, the court in
Patton remanded the matter back to the superior court to permit the
petitioner to plead additional facts.
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing
Patton. Brown submitted a letter brief arguing that he met his prima facie
burden and, if not, requesting a remand for the opportunity to plead
additional facts. Consistent with the disposition in Patton, and in an
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abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions
for that court to consider an amended petition should Brown, within 30 days
of that remand, seek to file one. “We express no opinion on the viability of
any additional facts [appellant] might allege.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 569.)

DISPOSITION

We remand this matter to the trial court with directions for that court
to consider an amended petition should Brown, within 30 days of that
remand, seek to file one. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.

MORI, J.

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