People v. Xavier CA4/1

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Filed 5/20/25 P. v. Xavier CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083589

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD291005)

JENNIFER RAE XAVIER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick Morgan Ford, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Eric Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

A jury convicted Jennifer Rae Xavier of a second degree Watson1
murder and other crimes for driving drunk on the freeway, crashing her
vehicle upside down into a creek, then leaving to go home while her

1 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson).
passenger drowned. She appeals from the judgment, asserting: one claim of
evidentiary error relating to the admission of a text message from the victim;
one claim of instructional error relating to the implied malice element of a
Watson murder; two claims of insufficient evidence, one as to her conviction
for implied malice murder and the other as to her conviction for fleeing the
scene of an accident causing death; six instances of prosecutorial misconduct;
and cumulative error. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of March 4, 2021, Xavier went out in Pacific Beach with
her friend Sidnie Waller. Xavier was driving. Before they left, Xavier drank
an alcoholic beverage. The two went to a bar for drinks, to dinner, and then
back to the bar for more drinks.
At around 8:50 p.m., Xavier and Waller left Pacific Beach, and Xavier
drove south on the I-5 freeway. Between 9:02 and 9:04 p.m., about one
minute before the vehicle crashed, Waller exchanged the following messages
with her boyfriend, Jacob Mendez:
“[Waller:] Omg she’s so sketch this is not okay
“[Mendez:] Uhhh I’m stressing out
I don’t want you to get hurt
“[Waller:] Please pray for me
I’m so scared
“[Mendez:] Sidnie
“[Waller:] I’m not joking
“[Mendez:] Just drive
Tell her
“[Waller:] She’s not okay
“[Mendez:] Dude
She can kill you
“[Waller:] She’s not listening
“[Mendez:] That’s not okay
“[Waller:] Please fucking pray
“[Mendez:] Babe, tell her!!
[You’re] stressing me out

2
Call me when [you’re] home”

Waller did not respond to Mendez’s further messages.
Waller also exchanged messages with her brother, but they were not
time stamped:
“[Waller:] I’m so scared
“[Brother:] Y
“[Waller:] Jacob, I might get into an accident
Pray for me
“[Brother:] Why
“[Waller:] I’m fucking terrified
Jenny drank so much and took a bar2
“[Brother:] Drive her car
Tell her
“[Waller:] No I can’t I drank too
She won’t listen
“[Brother:] Uber dude
“[Waller:] Oh my god
“[Brother:] Your [sic] okay
Make sure she’s doing okay
Make sure you[’re] wearing your seatbelt sid
please
Be careful be smart
“[Waller:] I am
I’m gonna be sick holy shit this is so scary
I have no control over anything
“[Brother:] Is she driving okay?
“[Waller:] No
She’s swerving all over
“[Brother:] Ughhh
“[Waller:] Almost ran into five cars.
“[Brother:] How [far] are you . . .
“[Waller:] Like 3 min

2 “A bar” is a slang term that refers to Xanax, which is controlled
substance and requires a prescription. It is a central nervous system
depressant that causes similar effects to alcohol, such as slurred speech and
loss of coordination. When mixed together, the effects of Xanax and alcohol
add to each other.
3
According to a witness, Xavier drove in an “Exit Only” lane before
making an “extreme” and “aggressive” lane change at a high speed back onto
the main freeway. At around 9:05 p.m., the vehicle made an abrupt right
turn at a high speed near the freeway exit and drove off the road into
adjacent vegetation. The witness called 911 because the vehicle’s erratic
driving was so shocking. Based on his observation, the witness believed the
driver might be drunk because “[n]o one in their right state of mind would
decide, unless they were suicidal or something, to turn like that off the
freeway.”
After missing the freeway exit, the vehicle went airborne, turned over,
and landed upside down in a creek, mostly submerged in water. Xavier
managed to escape the car, returned to the freeway, ran into a lane, and
waved at traffic. One driver swerved to avoid Xavier, spun around, and
crashed on the side of a hill.
Meanwhile, Waller remained in the passenger seat of the overturned
vehicle, submerged in water. Emergency personnel extricated Waller from
the passenger side of the vehicle. No other individual was present at the
scene. Waller was not breathing and had no pulse. Emergency personnel
performed CPR and brought her to the hospital. Although Waller was
successfully resuscitated, she had already suffered brain damage due to lack
of oxygen and died three days after the crash. The cause of death was
complications of drowning with contributing blunt force head injury.
Rodrigo Maia testified as to Xavier’s whereabouts following the crash.
He was driving on the freeway as Xavier desperately waved and asked for
help. Xavier entered his car and asked him to take her home. She was wet,
had a bit of blood on her face, smelled of alcohol, and was not carrying a
purse or cell phone. Despite asking him to take her home, Xavier did not tell

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Maia her address. Maia said he would call the police if she did not give him
her address; she told him not to call the police and screamed at him to take
her home. Eventually, Maia brought Xavier to the home of his girlfriend,
Katie Nicoletti, an operating room nurse.
Nicoletti tried to help by offering to call a ride and to provide dry
clothes. Xavier did not coherently answer questions and snapped when
Nicoletti offered assistance. Nicoletti believed Xavier either had a
psychologic issue or was on drugs, but saw no sign of a head injury.
Nicoletti called the police. According to Nicoletti, Xavier’s reaction to
the police arriving was “alarming” making Nicoletti think “there’s something
more to the story.” Xavier lied to the police about how Maia picked her up.
During the interaction Maia and Nicoletti had with Xavier, she did not
mention a car crash or a passenger in the car who might need assistance.
Police officer Andrew Thorpe and his partner responded to Nicoletti’s
call for service at about 9:40 p.m. During the encounter, Xavier was initially
pleasant and “seemed like she knew mostly where she was, what she was
doing” despite being tipsy. She was able to stand up on her own. She told
the officers she had three drinks that night and had gotten into a fight with
Waller. She was crying and stated that she was emotional. Xavier also
explained she had a cut on her lip from falling or biting it but told the officers
she did not need a medic.
The officers offered Xavier a courtesy transport home. During the ride,
she began continuously throwing up with the odor of alcohol, and Officer
Thorpe realized she was extremely intoxicated, more so than he initially
thought and more than she told him. Officer Thorpe commented that Xavier
could go to jail for her behavior, meaning for being drunk in public and

5
unable to care for herself under Penal Code3 section 647, subdivision (f). In
his opinion, she was definitely too intoxicated to drive a vehicle. He did not
notice any signs of a head injury. At no point did Xavier inform the officers
that she had been driving, crashed her car, or left her passenger.
At 10:04 p.m., the officers returned Xavier to her apartment complex.
Xavier returned to her apartment at 10:31 p.m., leaning left as she walked
and holding her shoes, leaving wet footprints along the way.
The next day, Xavier told her friend Athena N. she was looking for
Waller. Xavier explained she and Waller had gone out in Pacific Beach and
drank a lot the night before. Xavier said “she blacked out and . . . stopped
remembering things,” which Athena N. understood to have occurred due to
excess drinking. Xavier stated “the last memory she had was leaving Sidnie
in Pacific Beach,” and she had “splotchy memories of . . . a ditch and flagging
someone down on the road.” Athena N. did not recall any signs that Xavier
had suffered a head injury and understood that her lack of recollection was
related to drinking.
The day after the incident, Xavier also sent messages over social media
to another friend. When asked what happened, Xavier wrote, “We just got
really drunk I got in trouble with the cops and then went over to sidnies this
morning cause I couldn’t remember how she got home.”
On March 8, 2021, Xavier met with California Highway Patrol
investigators. She had a cut inside her lip but did not have any other visible
head injuries. She had a red mark on her left shoulder consistent with a
driver’s side seatbelt, and some other minor abrasions.
Based on the events of March 4, 2021, the prosecution charged Xavier
with: (1) second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a) [count 1]); (2) gross vehicular

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a) [count 2]); (3) driving
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (g) [count 3]); and (4) fleeing the scene of an accident that
resulted in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2) [count 4]). The amended
information also made special allegations as to counts 2, 3, and 4.
At trial, in addition to evidence of the events of March 4, 2021, the
prosecution introduced prior communications from Xavier. About two weeks
before the fatal incident, Xavier discussed going out in Pacific Beach with her
friend Tatiana S. Xavier wrote, “I might Uber us. I feel like driving with a
car full scares me from PB,” and later, “I just am stupid for last time I drove
home. So I’d rather be safe.” On November 28, 2019, Xavier and Tatiana S.
discussed an incident in which Xavier drank, drove, and was involved in a
vehicle collision. As is relevant, the text message exchange was as follows:
“[Tatiana S.:] You cannot keep driving drunk.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] I know. I fucked up.
”[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] I don’t know man. I sobered up after like
three hours and was like what the fuck did I
do. Such a terrible feeling. At least it’s over.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] I know. It’s just like I fucked. I really really
fucked up. I just need to chill and like have
someone hide my keys.
“[Tatiana S.:] From now on, not even buzzed driving. It’s
canceled because this shit is more serious
than we think.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] Exactly. And yes please.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Tatiana S.:] Everything happens for a reason. Like who
knows. Maybe in a month or something, if
this didn’t happen, and you kept drinking

7
and driving, you could have got pulled over
and got an actual DUI or hurt someone.
“[Xavier:] [Loved message]
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Tatiana S.:] Like it’s shady now, but this version is a lot
better than if cops were involved.
“[Xavier:] I really hope so. And honestly just thinking
about it. And I feel like I could have killed
myself. Like what if the reason I crashed
was because if I would have gotten on the
freeway, I could have literally killed
someone or myself
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Tatiana S.:] The freeway. Jesus. Thank God you never
got on that. That shits crazy especially late
at night. People fly through that shit. It
definitely happened for a reason.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] I’m glad too.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Xavier:] Like that could have been re[ally] bad. I
don’t even want to think about it anymore.
I’m never getting in the car after drinking
again. Like never again.

The prosecution called a law enforcement investigator who was both
experienced in traffic safety and a certified drug recognition expert. He
opined that Xavier was “extremely impaired” based on her appearance in
Officer Thorpe’s body-worn camera, witness statements, and the
circumstances of the crash. Based on his investigation and experience, a
California Highway Patrol (CHP) investigator opined, “Jennifer Xavier
caused this collision by driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a
depressant.”
A defense expert, who had not examined Xavier or viewed her medical
records, opined that concussions are very common in high-velocity rollover
accidents, the symptoms of an individual with a concussion can appear

8
similar to those of an individual under the influence of alcohol and other
central nervous system depressants, and diagnosis of a concussion requires a
medical examination of the patient, as opposed to watching a video of the
individual. The expert stated that an injury to the brain takes two to three
weeks to fully heal, with the “peak of symptoms . . . usually at three to five
days, so not immediately all there at once.” He acknowledged that he could
not determine whether Xavier suffered from a concussion, but opined that the
circumstances indicated, more likely than not, she experienced a traumatic
brain injury, with alcohol possibly playing a part. He would expect an
individual with alcohol induced amnesia to have heavily slurred speech and
to be walking unsteadily.
Following the presentation of evidence, the court instructed the jury
using the version of CALCRIM No. 520 on implied malice then in effect,
stating:
“The defendant had implied malice if:

“1. She intentionally committed the act;
“2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time she acted, she knew [her] act was
dangerous to human life;
“AND
“4. She deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.”

The jury convicted Xavier on counts 1, 2, and 4 and found all related
allegations true. However, the jury did not reach a verdict as to count 3. The
trial court declared a mistrial as to count 3 and granted the prosecution’s
motion to dismiss that count.
The court sentenced Xavier to 19 years to life in state prison consisting
of 15 years to life for count 1, second degree murder, plus a consecutive four

9
years for count 4, fleeing the scene of an accident that resulted in death. The
court stayed the punishment on count 2 under section 654.
DISCUSSION
We begin by addressing whether the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting Waller’s message to her brother that Xavier drank a lot and
consumed Xanax. Next, we consider whether the trial court properly
instructed the jury on the elements of implied malice. We then examine
Xavier’s argument that insufficient evidence existed for the jury to convict
her of implied malice murder and fleeing the scene of an accident. Finally,
we analyze each instance of claimed prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude
no prejudicial error occurred, and thus there was no cumulative error.
I.
Admission of Text Messages as Spontaneous Statements
Xavier contends the trial court erred by admitting Waller’s text
message to her brother, “Jenny drank so much and took a bar” because: (1)
the prosecution failed to establish a foundation that the text message was
made at the time of stress, and (2) the text did not involve the stressful event
but described an event that had occurred earlier in the evening.
Hearsay evidence, or “evidence of a statement that was made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated,” is inadmissible unless the law provides an
exception. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a) & (b).) One such exception exists
for “spontaneous statements” that: “(a) Purport[ ] to narrate, describe, or
explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b)
W[ere] made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by such perception.” (Evid. Code, § 1240.)

10
For hearsay to be admissible under the spontaneous statement
exception, “ ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce
this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and
unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to
contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be
supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance;
and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence
preceding it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Spontaneous statements are deemed
sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence because ‘ “ ‘in the stress
of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance
may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual
impressions and belief.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th
789, 809–810 (Gutierrez).) “The crucial element in determining whether an
out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration is the
mental state of the speaker.” (Id. at p. 811.) “[T]he larger picture of the
prosecution’s evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it” are
relevant to the speaker’s mental state. (People v. Rincon (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 738, 752.)
“Whether an out-of-court statement meets the statutory requirements
for admission as a spontaneous statement is generally a question of fact for
the trial court, the determination of which involves an exercise of the court’s
discretion. [Citation.] We will uphold the trial court’s determination of facts
when they are supported by substantial evidence and review for abuse of
discretion its decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous statement
exception.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65.) “[W]e will not
disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that

11
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Goldsmith (2014)
59 Cal.4th 258, 266.)
A. Foundation as to Timing of Messages
Prior to trial, the defense sought to exclude a portion of Waller’s
messages to her brother for lack of foundation because they did not have
timestamps. The trial court concluded that the message exchange was
admissible, including the statement, “Jenny drank so much and took a bar.”
The court later confirmed the admissibility of that message, stating, “Well,
and I’m looking at the context of the texts, and even though it’s not time-
stamped, the context is pretty clear that this is— this is after they’ve left the
bar and now they’re driving,” like the other messages sent by Waller with
time stamps.
On appeal, Xavier again contends the context of the statement, “Jenny
drank so much and took a bar,” was not clear because Waller had previously
texted “Oh hahahaha” and because her brother suggested she drive instead
or take an Uber. According to Xavier, then, the message may have occurred
prior to the stressful event creating nervous excitement, which Xavier agrees
was the dangerous driving.
Xavier has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. Contrary to her
suggestion, the context of the “Jenny drank so much and took a bar” message
is sufficiently clear despite the lack of timestamps. Waller sent four text
messages between “Oh hahahaha” and “Jenny drank so much and took a
bar”: “I’m so scared,” “[Brother], I might get into an accident,” “Pray for me,”
and “I’m fucking terrified.” Given this direct evidence of Waller’s fearful
mental state, no timestamp correlating with Xavier’s driving was necessary
for the trial court to reasonably find sufficient foundation that Waller was in
a state of nervous excitement when she wrote, “Jenny drank so much and

12
took a bar.” Likewise, Waller’s messages thereafter, including “I’m gonna be
sick holy shit this is so scary,” “She’s swerving all over,” and “Almost ran into
five cars,” demonstrate the stressful event had not yet ended.
Further, as noted by the trial court, Waller’s messages to her brother
prior to the Xanax message were similar in content to the timestamped
messages to Mendez that occurred minutes before the crash. In both sets of
messages, Waller expressed fear, requested that the recipient pray for her
safety, and commented on Xavier’s state.
B. Relationship of the Statement to the Stressful Event
Xavier next asserts Waller’s statement that Xavier consumed “a bar” of
Xanax was inadmissible under the spontaneous statement hearsay exception
because it was unrelated to the erratic driving that caused nervous
excitement. According to Xavier, any act of taking a Xanax would have
occurred earlier in the day with time for reflection by Waller.
When considered with the prior text messages, “I’m so scared,” “Jacob, I
might get into an accident,” “Pray for me,” and “I’m fucking terrified,” the
trial court reasonably understood that Waller was doing more than simply
describing Xavier’s earlier actions drinking alcohol and taking Xanax. The
trial court reasonably determined that Waller was “terrified” not by Xavier’s
act of drinking and taking Xanax, but rather by her act of driving Waller
after having done so. In other words, Waller was describing her present
impression that Xavier was currently driving dangerously while impaired by
the effects of alcohol and Xanax.
The cases cited by Xavier do not persuade us that the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting the text message at issue.
In People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461 (Corella), the trial court
admitted the appellant’s wife’s statements to a 911 operator and to police

13
that (1) the appellant had hit her after she hid his car keys because he had
drunk alcohol, and (2) she also had told him not to smoke marijuana because
it would violate his probation. (Id. at p. 465.) The Second District concluded
the first statement was admissible and the second was inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1240:
“Mrs. Corella’s statements that she hid the car keys to
prevent Corella from leaving their home in an intoxicated
condition were a description of the event that culminated in
Corella’s violent act and were closely connected with the
occurrence at issue. The statements were also an
unreflective explanation of her perception of the reasons
why Corella hit her. There was no abuse of discretion in
admitting the evidence under section 1240. [Citation.]

“Mrs. Corella’s statements that Corella was smoking
marijuana and was on probation, however, did not
“narrate, describe, or explain” the commission of the offense
or any relevant circumstance under which the offense was
committed.” (Corella, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)

Like the first statement in Corella, the statement that Xavier had consumed
alcohol and Xanax was “closely connected with the occurrence at issue” and
“an unreflective explanation of [Waller’s] perception of the reasons why”
Xavier was driving dangerously, resulting in Waller’s terror. (Corella, supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) Consuming alcohol and Xanax is plainly relevant
to the act of driving under the influence.
Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th 789, People v. Lozano (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 366, 379 (Lozano), and People v. Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1512, 1526 (Ramirez) each addressed whether the passage of time allowed for
reflection by the speaker such that he or she was no longer in an excited state
from the startling event. Unlike those cases, Xavier’s case does not involve
the question whether the speaker remained under the stress of excitement
after the passage of time. There is no dispute whether Waller had time to
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deliberate after the startling event, as that event eventually rendered her
unconscious. The questions are whether Waller’s statements occurred prior
to the startling event and whether the content of the message stating “Jenny
drank so much and took a bar” related to the startling circumstance. As
discussed above, the trial court reasonably determined, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the text message exchange beginning with “I’m so scared” to
“She’s swerving all over . . . Almost ran into five cars” occurred while Waller
was under the stress of excitement during Xavier’s reckless driving under the
influence. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by finding that Waller’s
statements, including her perception of Xavier’s intoxicated state, related to
the reckless driving causing Waller’s fear.
II.
Implied Malice Murder Instruction
Xavier contends her murder conviction must be reversed because the
version of CALCRIM No. 520 given, since modified following People v. Reyes

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes),4 lowered the burden on the prosecution by
merely requiring an act that was dangerous to human life, as opposed to an
act that carries a high probability of death. According to Xavier, Reyes
settled courts’ prior “confusion” between the “dangerous to human life”
language and “high probability” of death required to establish implied malice.
She asserts the error in using the “dangerous to human life” language

4 Since Xavier’s trial, CALCRIM No. 520 has been modified to state in
relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of the (act/[or] failure
to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/[or] failure to act)
involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death.” (Italics
added.) In making this modification, however, the CALCRIM committee did
not suggest that it was legal error to give the prior version, the substance of
which was approved in People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103–104,
110–111 (Nieto Benitez) and People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219,
1221–1222 (Dellinger).
15
amounted to federal and state constitutional error by lowering the
prosecution’s burden below the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and was
preserved without the need for objection.
The Attorney General first contends that Xavier has forfeited this
contention by failing to request any such clarifying instruction at trial. The
People next assert the instruction given properly states the law even after
Reyes because cases have established that “dangerous to human life” is
synonymous with a “high probability of death.”
As described in Xavier’s opening brief, courts historically used two
different formulations for the definition of implied malice: (1) “ ‘an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life,’ ” (quoting People
v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 (Phillips)) and (2) “ ‘ “an act [committed]
with a high probability that it will result in death” ’ ” (quoting People v.
Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 (Thomas)). (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th
at pp. 103–104, 110–111.) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly explained,
however, “that the two linguistic formulations . . . are equivalent and are
intended to embody the same standard.” (Id. at p. 111; see also Dellinger,
supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1221–1222 [approving CALJIC definition of
implied malice without any “high probability” language and noting
that Watson “made it abundantly clear that the two definitions of implied
malice” in the case law “articulated one and the same standard”].)
In Nieto Benitez, the defendant argued, similarly to Xavier,
that CALJIC No. 8.31 “misstates the law because the instruction omits a
requirement that defendant commit the act with a high probability that

16
death will result.”5 (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 110–111.) The
Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that “the present CALJIC No. 8.31
correctly distills the applicable case law.” (Ibid.) Later, in People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 157 (Knoller), the Supreme Court stated that,
to the extent the implied malice tests differ, courts should properly instruct

the jury using the language from Phillips.6 Xavier does not dispute that her
arguments on appeal run contrary to both Nieto Benitez and Knoller.
We disagree with Xavier that these cases have been impliedly
overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes. There, the court was
reviewing a trial court’s denial of a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.) The Supreme Court concluded
there was insufficient evidence to support a theory that the defendant was
guilty of murder as a direct perpetrator who harbored implied malice. (Id. at
pp. 988–990.) The court based its decision primarily on the lack of
substantial evidence of proximate cause, but it also took issue with the trial
court’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was “ ‘dangerous to human
life.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court explained: “To suffice for implied malice
murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some
vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “ ‘involve[ ] a high degree of probability

5 The version of CALJIC No. 8.31 given in Nieto Benitez stated in
relevant part: “ ‘Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a
human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2.
The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3.
The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and
conscious disregard for, human life.’ ” (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 100.)

6 The Knoller court discussed the “high probability” language because
the trial court relied on the Thomas language when ruling on the defendant’s
motion for new trial. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 157.)
17
that it will result in death.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 152.) The court concluded that the defendant’s conduct in
traveling to rival gang territory with other gang members did “not by itself
give rise to a high degree of probability that death will result.” (Reyes, at p.
989.)
Reyes did not involve a jury instruction issue, and the court did not
suggest that either Nieto Benitez or Knoller was wrongly decided. The Reyes
court’s reference to the “high probability of death” standard in deciding a
sufficiency of evidence question under section 1172.6 does not amount to a
holding that trial courts must include such language in the jury instructions
defining implied malice. Reyes did not call into question prior holdings that
the “high probability” and “natural consequences” standards of implied
malice are one and the same, and that it is proper to instruct the jury solely
on the latter. (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111; Dellinger, supra, 49
Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1221–1222.) To the contrary, Reyes quoted with approval
language from Knoller reaffirming that “under the objective component of
implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the same thing as a ‘ “high
degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will result in death.” ’ ”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989, citing Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
152.) Because Reyes did not decide this instructional issue and did not
overrule or disapprove any of its own prior case law, we remain bound by its
decisions in Nieto Benitez and Knoller. We therefore find no error in the
implied malice instruction given at Xavier’s trial.

18
III.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Xavier contends insufficient evidence existed to support her convictions
for implied malice murder and fleeing the scene of an accident that resulted
in death.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “ ‘the relevant inquiry
is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citation.] We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably
could infer from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘A reviewing court neither reweighs the evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s
credibility.’ [Citation.] Reversal is not warranted ‘unless it appears “that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 377–
378.)
A. Implied Malice Murder
Xavier argues: (1) objectively, there is not a high probably that drunk
driving will result in death, and (2) subjectively, there is not sufficient
evidence that Xavier had conscious disregard to human life because she had
not previously suffered a drunk driving conviction and her earlier text
messages did not suffice as knowledge of the high probability of death.

19
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “[M]alice may be express or implied.”
(§ 188, subd. (a).) Implied malice exists “when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2).) Because of the lack of clarity in
the statutory definition of implied malice, the Phillips and Thomas
definitions of implied malice developed. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
152.) In sum, “[t]o support a finding of second degree murder based on
implied malice, the evidence must establish that the defendant deliberately
committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life,
with knowledge of its danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger.”
(People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 514
(Chagolla).)
It has long been established that “[m]alice may be implied when a
person willfully drives under the influence of alcohol.” (People v. Wolfe (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 673, 681, citing People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290
(Watson).) “Thus, ‘killing a person while driving intoxicated is second degree
murder if ‘a person, knowing that his [or her] conduct endangers the life of
another, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard of life.’ ”
(Chagolla, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 511.) This test involves an objective
component—an intentional act endangering the life of another—and a
subjective component—knowledge and disregard of the danger. (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 299.)
1. Objective High Probability of Death
By asserting that drunk driving statistically does not involve a “high
probability” of causing death, Xavier in essence asks us to conclude that
Watson murder no longer exists after Reyes. But, just as Reyes did not

20
overrule the cases approving of the prior jury instruction on implied malice
murder using the “dangerous to human life” language, the court there did not
indicate that malice can no longer be implied in intoxicated driving killings.
Reyes only concluded that the defendant’s act of entering territory of a rival
gang with his fellow gang members, one of whom was armed, did not suffice
to establish implied malice on the part of the defendant. (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 989–990.)
Contrary to the implication of Xavier’s argument, the concept of an act
causing “high probability” of death is not a new one requiring reconsideration
of implied malice murder in the drunk driving context. In Watson, the court
explained that the definition of implied malice, “an act with a high
probability that it will result in death and [done] with a base antisocial
motive and with a wanton disregard for human life,” is merely “[p]hrased in a
different way” from the definition “ ‘ “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person
who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life’ ” . . . .’.” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
Thus, the Supreme Court established the concept of implied malice murder in
this context considering the “high probability language.” And, as noted
above, Reyes approved of the equivalence between the variations of implied
malice, quoting with approval language from a prior opinion that both
definitions “mean[ ] the same thing.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
Consequently, we remain bound by the Watson rule that intentionally driving
while intoxicated suffices as the act required for implied malice murder.
2. Subjective Knowledge
As for the subjective component of implied malice murder, Xavier
contends there was insufficient evidence that she subjectively acted with

21
conscious disregard for human life. According to Xavier, the prosecution
failed to establish “knowledge of the high likelihood that drunk driving will
result in death” that “[a] Watson murder requires.” As explained in Knoller,
however, it is not required that the defendant have knowledge of high
probability of death, which is the objective component: “But ‘high probability
of death’ is the objective, not the subjective, component of the Thomas test,
which asks whether the defendant’s act or conduct ‘involves a high
probability that it will result in death.’ [Citation.] The subjective component
of the Thomas test is whether the defendant acted with ‘a base, antisocial
motive and with wanton disregard for human life.’ [Citation.] Nor does the
Phillips test require a defendant’s awareness that his or her conduct has a
high probability of causing death. Rather, it requires only that a defendant
acted with a ‘conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Knoller, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 157.)
Here, a rational trier of fact could conclude Xavier acted with conscious
disregard for human life because there was direct evidence that she was
aware that driving while intoxicated risked killing someone. She disregarded
that risk by driving while intoxicated. After admitting to driving drunk
before crashing her vehicle in 2019, Xavier stated, “I could have literally
killed someone or myself.” Then, weeks before the collision in this case, she
again acknowledged the dangers of drinking and driving, stating that the
“last time” she did so, it was “stupid” and unsafe. Despite that knowledge,
she drove while intoxicated, causing the death of Waller. Xavier cites no
authority suggesting that Watson murder convictions are possible only after a
prior drunk driving conviction resulting in an educational class on the
dangers of drunk driving. Although subjective knowledge can be inferred
from an educational program (People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673,

22
683), we need not rely on an inference where, as here, direct evidence of
Xavier’s knowledge of the danger exists.
B. Leaving the Scene of an Accident
Xavier also disputes that sufficient evidence exists to support her
conviction under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2). Vehicle Code
section 20001, subdivision (a) requires “[t]he driver of a vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury . . . or in the death of a person [to] immediately
stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident” and to “provide identification
and render aid to the victim, as well as to report the accident to authorities if
there is no police officer present.” (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093,
1102.) Subdivision (b) of that section makes such fleeing the scene of an
accident a criminal offense, with subdivision (b)(2) providing the punishment
in the case of death or serious injury. (People v. Nordberg (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236–1237 (Nordberg).) This offense is a general intent
crime. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019.) It requires the
offender to have knowledge of injury, which is “ ‘[u]sually . . . derived from
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the accident’ ” because “ ‘the
driver who leaves the scene of the accident seldom possesses actual
knowledge of injury.’ ” (Nordberg, at p. 1237.) Thus knowledge of the injury
can be actual or based on “ ‘the accident [being] of such a nature that one
would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.’ ” (Ibid.)
Xavier claims the evidence does not support the requisite intent for this
conviction because she was “dazed and incoherent” and appeared to be “in a
state of shock” after the crash. But viewing the evidence most favorably to
the prosecution, a rational jury could conclude that Xavier knew that
overturning her vehicle in a creek would likely result in injury to a passenger
and that she intended to leave the scene. Xavier managed to climb out of the

23
overturned vehicle in the creek and return to the main road. She then
flagged down assistance for herself, asking Maia to take her home. We agree
with the Attorney General that the jury could reasonably infer knowledge of
likelihood of injury and intent to leave the scene from Xavier’s ability to
escape and obtain assistance. Further, the jury viewed the video of police
officers speaking to Xavier shortly thereafter, during which she was standing
and appeared coherent, telling the officers where she lived. Officer Thorpe
and Nicoletti also testified Xavier was able to stand and respond to the police
officers. She explained that she was emotional, which was consistent with
being aware of a crash destroying her vehicle.
We conclude sufficient evidence supports Xavier’s conviction under
Vehicle Code section 20001.
IV.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, Xavier asserts several instances of prosecutorial misconduct
throughout the trial.
“Under state law, ‘ “[a] prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct . . . .” ’ [Citation.]
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the federal Constitution when it results in
a fundamentally unfair trial. [Citation.]” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th
332, 350 (Steskal).) “It is well settled that making a timely and specific
objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury is not
waived), is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct for appeal.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328
(Seumanu).) “ ‘The reason for this rule, of course, is that “the trial court
should be given an opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible,

24
prevent by suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the
jury.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1341.)
“As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling
on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Alvarez (1996)
14 Cal.4th 155, 213.) In addition, “reversal for prosecutorial misconduct
requires prejudice manifested by a reasonable possibility of an effect on the
outcome.” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 467.) “[R]eversal under
the federal Constitution also requires prejudice, although prejudice ‘is
presumed unless the government shows that the defect was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 467.)
A. Athena N.’s Reference to Xavier Blacking Out
Xavier first contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by
questioning Athena N. about Xavier blacking out, asserting that the trial
court had excluded the use of that term. We conclude the prosecutor’s
conduct was not in violation of the court’s in limine order, and, regardless,
the curative instruction given by the court rendered any misconduct
harmless.
1. Additional Relevant Facts
This motion was in reference to Xavier’s text message, “I might Uber
us. I feel like driving with a car full scares me from Pb,” and later, “And idk I
just am stupid for last time I drove home [redaction] so I’d rather be safe.”
Prior to trial, defense counsel orally brought “a motion in limine . . . that we
preclude the prosecution’s use of the word ‘blacked out’ unless there’s
evidence that she blacked out.” Defense counsel later explained, “All I’m
asking is the part ‘I don’t remember’ be removed. It still gets the prosecution
to where they need to be, and it’s not overly prejudicial to the defendant at
that point by creating insinuations of a blackout that don’t exist.” The court

25
ruled: “Okay. All right. And so I’ll sanitize it so that ‘I don’t remember’ is
excluded.”
At trial, the prosecution’s relevant questioning of Athena N. went as
follows:
“Q. And what did she tell you they did when they went
back to the bar?
“A. And continued to drink, and that’s where she said
that she blacked out and started—like, stopped
remembering things.
“Q. What does the term ‘blacked out’ mean to you?
“A. Stop remembering things, drink to an excess to where
There’s just spots in your memory or completely just
nothing in your memory.
“Q. Was there anything shocking about this when she told
you that?
“A. Not necessarily.
“Q. What did she tell you happened after the two girls
went back to Open Bar and continued to drink?
“A. She said that’s where her memory really started to go
away, and the last memory she had was leaving Sidnie in
Pacific Beach.
“Q. Did she tell you anything else that she remembered
about that night?
“A. Later on, she had, like, splotchy memories of, like,
a ditch and flagging someone down on the road. Yeah. But
other than that, no.
“Q. Did she tell you that she drove home blacked out?
“A. Yes.”

Defense counsel did not object. Instead, defense counsel proceeded to
question Athena N., extensively about Xavier blacking out:
“Q. Now, in your conversations with Jenny that day --
with Ms. Xavier, she told you that she had blacked out;
correct?
“A. Yes.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Q.—the term “blacked out” —that, in your

26
vernacular, means that’s somebody who’s really, really
drunk?
“A. Correct.
“Q. Have you seen other people that you would call
“blackout drunk”?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And how—how would they—how would you describe
what they would look like to you, or to any of us, as
someone who is blackout drunk?
“A. Extremely incoherent.
“Q. How about their ability to stand up, for example?
“A. Yeah. Barely.
“Q. How about their ability to walk a straight line?
“A. Definitely not.
“Q. How about their speech? Would you be able to hear
them—
“A. Slurring, yeah.
“Q. And, again, that’s not just somebody who’s had a few
drinks.
That’s somebody who’s extremely intoxicated; true?
“A. Yes.
“Q. To be the point where they’re blacked out; right?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. And she then said she had a vague memory of sitting
on a curb, talking to some cops before walking to her car
and driving home blacked out; correct?
“A. Yes.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Q. And this is shortly after she’s told you that she doesn’t
remember how she got home; correct?
“A. Yeah.”

On redirect, the prosecution questioned Athena N. about her prior
experiences of Xavier blacked out from drinking, establishing that Xavier
would not necessarily be “falling-down drunk.” And on recross, the defense
followed up on the distinction between being “really drunk” and “blackout
drunk,” and whether Athena N. had “seen [Xavier], quote, blackout drunk to

27
the point where she was unable to recall anything from the night before.”
Athena N. could not confirm for sure.
The next morning, defense counsel moved for a mistrial due to the
prosecutor questioning Athena N. about Xavier blacking out, stating the
court made “a prior ruling on May 9th that we were not to use that term in
this trial absent the door being opened by the defense and their experts prior
to the introduction of any such evidence.” Defense counsel explained that he
declined to object due to “jury optics” so as to not appear as “trying to hide the
ball” or “trying to stifle a witness.” The court permitted briefing at the
prosecution’s request and determined that a curative instruction to the jury
not to consider Xavier’s past drinking habits or past “blackouts” would
remedy the issue. As to Xavier’s statements to Athena N. that she was
blacked out on the night of the collision, the court specified that the motion in
limine ruling and limiting instruction did not apply. Thus, the court
instructed the jury, “Regarding yesterday’s last witness Athena N[.], you are
to disregard any and all testimony of this witness as it relates to any past
conduct of Jennifer Xavier occurring prior to March 4th, 2021, as
inadmissible evidence.”
2. Analysis
We conclude the prosecutor’s questioning was not misconduct because
it did not violate the trial court’s order. While “[i]t is misconduct for a
prosecutor to violate a court ruling by eliciting or attempting to elicit
inadmissible evidence in violation of a court order” (People v. Crew (2003) 31
Cal.4th 822, 839), the prosecutor did not do so here. The trial court did not
entirely preclude the use of the term “black out” as implied in the appellant’s
opening brief. When making the motion, the defense first requested that the
term blackout be excluded unless there was evidence that Xavier blacked out

28
and later clarified that he was asking that the specific text message be
sanitized to remove the “I don’t remember” to avoid follow up questions on
whether Xavier blacked out in that instance. The trial court ruled that the
text message would be so sanitized, not that any use of the term “black out”
would be excluded when raised by a witness.
Furthermore, any misconduct was harmless because the trial court
gave a curative instruction to the jury when the defense finally objected. We
presume the jury followed the curative instruction. (People v. Horn (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 672, 686.) Additionally, the trial court made clear that its ruling
and instruction applied only to evidence of prior instances, not to Xavier
telling Athena N. that she blacked out on the night of the collision. Any
testimony of prior blackouts was inconsequential compared to the properly
admitted testimony by Athena N. that Xavier stated she was blacked out on
the night the collision occurred. Because there was no prejudicial
misconduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the
curative instruction for the past blackouts rather than declaring a mistrial.
B. Tatiana S.’s Reference to Counsel
Xavier next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking a
witness if and when she sent Xavier an attorney’s contact information, and
the trial court erred by declining to give a curative instruction.
1. Relevant Facts
Prior to trial, the defense moved to exclude mention of the fact that,
when she met with CHP on March 8, Xavier brought a lawyer, who had also
set up the meeting with CHP. While the court did not explicitly rule on the
motion, the court stated: “Well, why don’t we just say—I mean the way to
say it is that she was contacted by CHP, and . . . she voluntarily agreed to

29
meet with them on some day. And she met with them, and they just—they
took photos and fingerprints and boom, and that’s it.”
At trial, the prosecution asked Xavier’s friend and roommate Tatiana
S., “You also on your own ended up sending her a lawyer’s number; correct?”
Tatiana S. responded in the affirmative, stating that she did so on March 6.
The defense did not object at this point.
Later, on redirect examination, the prosecutor questioned Tatiana S. as
follows:
“Q[.] When was it that you talked to Officer Clinkscales?
“A[.] March 8, 2021.
“Q[.] Two days after you had already sent the lawyer’s
number to Jennifer Xavier?
“[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, this is improper
questioning.”

The court sustained the objection and struck the question. The defense
later requested a curative instruction, and the court declined.
2. Analysis
We conclude the initial question whether Tatiana S. sent an attorney’s
number did not violate the court’s in limine ruling, which related to the
attorney setting up and attending the meeting with CHP. Nor did defense
counsel object. As to the latter question, the trial court sustained the
defense’s objection before any testimony associating the attorney with the
CHP meeting. Therefore, no prejudicial conduct occurred, and the court
properly declined to give a curative instruction to the brief questioning
stopped quickly by the trial court. (See Steskal, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 353
[alleged prosecutorial misconduct based on prosecutor’s comment to the jury
about failure to call logical witnesses was harmless because “the comment
was brief, ‘defendant’s objection was immediately sustained . . . and the
prosecutor did not return to the subject’ ”].)

30
C. Daniel K.’s Belief the Driver Was Under the Influence
Next, Xavier contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
eliciting testimony from a witness that Xavier appeared to be driving under
the influence based the vehicle’s movements. We conclude the prosecutor’s
questioning did not violate the trial court’s ruling.
1. Relevant Facts
The defense brought a motion in limine to exclude opinions by lay
witnesses regarding whether Xavier was intoxicated. The court ruled that
lay witnesses were permitted to testify as to what they observed and whether
“she appeared to be drunk, based on [their] experience.”
At trial, the prosecution questioned Daniel K., a driver who witnessed
Xavier’s car veer off the road, as follows:
“Q. We talked about the speed estimation, and you’re not
an expert.
As an estimate, what makes you say—you know, can
you describe how this car was traveling, without using a
number? What was your takeaway and your perception as
you saw this car?
“A. What—what kind of takeaway? Like, the speed?
Describe the style of driving or—
“Q. Yes, please. The style of driving.
“A. Erratic. I just—right away, like, drunk driver
or, you know—

And later, the prosecutor asked Daniel K.:
“Q. At this point, to clarify defense’s questions, when
we’re saying ‘no logical reason,’ do you account for a person
being impaired?
“MR. CASEY: Foundation, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Well, he’s already said that it looked like a
person was drunk. So—
“MR. CASEY: I think we need foundation.
“THE COURT: Well—okay. Well, I think that’s an opinion
he can—I think it’s an opinion he can offer based on his
observations.
31
And so go ahead.
“[¶] . . . [¶]Q. When you say there’s no logical reason that a
driver would do that, does that account for a drunk driver
doing that?
A. I could rephrase that. No one in their right state of mind
would decide, unless they were suicidal or something, to
turn like that off the freeway.
Q. And when you say ‘right state of mind,’ does that
mean ‘sober’?
A. Yeah. Like, a sober driver that’s not under the
influence of anything.

2. Analysis
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting
the prosecutor’s questioning of Daniel K. Daniel K. testified as to his
observations of Xavier’s erratic driving and his opinion based on those
observations that someone in the “right state of mind,” meaning not under
the influence of something or suicidal, would not drive that way. This
testimony was specifically permitted under the trial court’s ruling, including
whether the driver appeared drunk based on the witness’s observations and
experience.
Xavier admits any misconduct was not prejudicial on its own, but only
as part of “the prosecutor’s pattern of misconduct.” We agree that no
prejudice would result even if the prosecutor’s questioning of Daniel K.
amounted to misconduct. The record is replete with evidence that Xavier was
driving while intoxicated at the time of the crash, including Waller’s
messages immediately before the collision, testimony that Xavier was
drinking at a bar before driving home, testimony that Xavier’s vomit after the
collision smelled strongly of alcohol, and Xavier’s admission the following day
that she got “really drunk” the night before. Nor do we see any pattern of
misconduct.

32
D. Police Investigator Clinkscales’ Statement Regarding Tatiana S.
Xavier next asserts that the prosecutor’s questioning of an investigator
regarding inconsistent statements of another witness was misconduct.
1. Relevant Facts
The defense also moved prior to trial to exclude peace officers’ opinions
on the veracity of witnesses. Counsel clarified that he referred to opinions
that the officer interviewed a witness and found him to be either credible or
not believable. The court granted the motion.
At trial, the prosecutor engaged in the following conversation with a
police investigator, Officer Clinkscales:
“Q. And did you also have an opportunity to review other
text messages between Tatiana S[.] and Jennifer
Xavier?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Without getting into her statements, can you tell me
how Tatiana S[.] behaved in that interview of her?
“A. Yes. I spoke with her over the phone, and she
provided a lot of information, but there was also a lot of
information that wasn’t entirely truthful or had pieces
that were missing.
“Q. How was it that you were able to determine that the
information she was providing you wasn’t truthful?
“A. They were contradicted in text message conversations.”

Later, the prosecutor asked, “Were there things in that portion of the
conversation with Tatiana S[.] that were in direct contradiction to the
things she told you during her phone interview?” Officer Clinkscales
responded affirmatively.
2. Analysis
We conclude the prosecutor’s questioning of Officer Clinkscales did not
violate the court’s in limine ruling. The prosecutor’s questioning elicited
testimony that the information the investigator received from Tatiana S.’s

33
interview was less than or different from the information in her text
messages that he reviewed. We agree with the Attorney General that Officer
Clinkscales was permitted to comment on the evidence he received. The
prosecutor did not ask for, nor did the investigator provide, an opinion on
whether Tatiana S. was generally credible or not, as was excluded by the in
limine order.
To the extent that the testimony may have been problematic for other
evidentiary reasons, the defense did not object to the testimony and thus
forfeited any further arguments.
Finally, Xavier does not point to any prejudice from this brief
questioning, such as testimony that Tatiana S. provided that, if believed,
might have changed the jury’s conclusion. And the jury viewed the actual
text messages between Tatiana S. and Xavier regarding her prior drunk
driving experiences. Again, Xavier admits that no prejudice flowed from this
questioning but claims it was part of the “pattern of misconduct,” which we
conclude does not exist.
E. Misrepresentation of Law at Sidebar and Questioning of Defense Expert
Xavier also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by

misrepresenting Evidence Code section 721, subdivision (b)(3),7 at a sidebar

7 Evidence Code section 721, subdivision (b) provides:
If a witness testifying as an expert testifies in the form of
an opinion, he or she may not be cross-examined in regard
to the content or tenor of any scientific, technical, or
professional text, treatise, journal, or similar publication
unless any of the following occurs:
(1) The witness referred to, considered, or relied upon
such publication in arriving at or forming his or her
opinion.
(2) The publication has been admitted in evidence.
34
so that the court would permit her to question the defense expert on two
articles provided by the prosecution during cross-examination.
1. Relevant Facts
During cross examination, the prosecutor stated on the record that she
was providing defense counsel and the expert a copy of two articles. When
presenting these articles, the prosecutor stated, “I’m not going to ask what
your opinion is on the articles. I’m just going to use it for guidance in my
understanding.” The prosecutor proceeded to question the expert on the
concept of alcohol-induced memory loss or amnesia without referencing the
articles. During the questioning about amnesia, the expert raised the article,
leading to the following exchange with the prosecutor:
“A. I think you’re referring to this article here now.
“Q. Is that—are you familiar with the terms?
“A. I am. I’m just asking if you’re reading from the article.
It—it—you can have different types. There can be
fragmentary amnesia.
“Q. And have you ever seen this article before?
“A. No, I have not. And I don’t know if you want to talk
about the article, if we can or not, but I could have
several comments about it, if you’d like.
“Q. I’m using the article because I don’t know all of these
medical terms. So I’m going to use this as sort of a
guideline about what we talk about with alcohol-
induced amnesia.
“A. The thing that I want to point out about this article, to
be fair, is that this is not a research article. This is a
compendium of other research articles. There was no
direct research done by these people that published
this.
Secondly, it was not published in the—by Health and
Human Services. That’s who gave access to it. It was

(3) The publication has been established as a reliable
authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice.
35
published in a journal called ‘Alcohol: Clinical and
Experimental Research’ in 2016.
“Q. I’m going to give you a different article then. You could
just tell me what you’d prefer.”

After an unreported sidebar, the following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: All right. Have you had an opportunity to
read the article?
“THE WITNESS: I’ve scanned it, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Okay. Well, all right.
“THE WITNESS: So, you know, when reviewing literature,
there’s various important things. One is to first read
the article in depth. Secondly is to look at future journal
articles that are what we call letters to the editor,
which often are critical of the article itself by other
experts in the field. And then thirdly is to look at the
references.
So you’ve handed me two articles that I’ve not seen
before. I’ve scanned them. And with that caveat in
mind, I’m ready to answer your questions.
“[The prosecutor]:
“Q. And I’m—again, I’m not going to ask what your opinion
is on the articles. I’m just going to use it for guidance in
my understanding—”

After some additional questioning on alcohol-induced amnesia by the
prosecution, defense counsel moved to strike any cross-examination deriving
from the articles as impermissible under Evidence Code section 721,
subdivision (b)(3). In response, the court determined the prosecutor “can ask
him questions from,” meaning “inspired by” the contents of, “the articles but
not cite the articles or quote the articles.” With agreement by the parties, the
court struck the prior cross-examination, instructed the jury to disregard the
prior examination, and required the prosecution to start over without
providing the articles to the witness or mentioning them.
Xavier also notes that the prosecutor used the term “blackout” multiple
times while questioning the defense expert. Each time, the court sustained
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the defense objection to the term, struck it from the record, and instructed
the jury to disregard it.

2. Analysis
Related to this argument, Xavier moved to augment the record with an
unsigned request for a settled statement regarding the sidebar and the
transcript from the hearing regarding the request. We grant the motion as to
the transcript and deny the motion as to the unsigned settled statement.
Because the sidebar was unreported, it is not clear from the record how
the prosecutor represented Evidence Code section 721, subdivision (b)(3), or
that she violated that section by using information she learned from the
articles to inform her questions. Regardless, the trial court struck the entire
cross-examination of the expert after the sidebar and instructed the jury to
disregard the prior testimony. We presume the jury followed the instruction.
Additionally, nothing in the stricken testimony regarding the articles had the
potential to change the outcome of the trial. The expert, in fact, called into
question the value of the articles. Xavier contends prejudice existed because
the prosecution “used [the articles] to suggest appellant had not suffered a
concussion, but rather lost her memory after the accident because of her
excessive drinking.” However, questioning the expert regarding potential
loss of memory due to alcohol consumption, without reference to the articles,
was unquestionably permissible, and the prosecutor did so upon re-
examination of the expert.
F. Photograph of Xavier Drinking
Finally, Xavier contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
including a photo of her holding a beer with another exhibit.

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1. Relevant Facts
During the testimony of an officer, the People published as Exhibit 7C
Xavier’s passport, found inside the vehicle, along with an overlayed
photograph showing Xavier, with a friend (not Waller), holding a bottle of
beer. Defense counsel did not object to the passport and photograph exhibit
when displayed, nor did the prosecution’s witness discuss the photograph.
After the conclusion of the officer’s testimony and a lunch break, in the
middle of another witness’ testimony, the defense attorney objected to the
photograph that was shown with the passport, noting that it showed Xavier
holding a beer. The court agreed that the photograph was inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative and
determined that an amended copy of the passport would be admitted without
the additional photograph.
2. Analysis
There is no suggestion in the record that the prosecutor intended to use
reprehensible or deceptive methods by showing this photograph, rather than
it being inadvertent. Additionally, the defense forfeited any argument
related to the brief display of the photograph to the jury by failing to object at
the time it was displayed. And as soon as the defense objected, the trial court
required the photo be excluded from the exhibit.
Nor did the jury seeing the photo of Xavier drinking a beer at some
other time, with someone other than the victim in this case, not while
driving, have any possibility of affecting the outcome of the case. In light of
the evidence of Xavier drinking and driving on multiple occasions, including
on the night of the collision involved here, the jury’s brief view of the photo of
Xavier holding a beer bottle was inconsequential.
V.

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Cumulative Error
We have concluded that there was no prejudicial error, and “in the
absence of error, there is nothing to cumulate.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58
Cal.4th 527, 562.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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