CourtListener 10587380•In re Joel A. CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 5/20/25 In re Joel A. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re JOEL A., A Person Coming B342611
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
23PSJP00055A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RAQUEL A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Dismissed.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
In this juvenile dependency case, Raquel A. (mother)
purports to challenge the juvenile court’s decision not to place her
infant with a family friend, claiming its decision violates Welfare
and Institutions Code section 361.3.1 We dismiss this appeal
because mother lacks standing to challenge the court’s placement
decision in light of the court’s subsequent termination of mother’s
parental rights over the infant. Mother’s appeal lacks merit in
any event because section 361.3 applies only to placement with
relatives (rather than family friends), and because the court’s
placement decision was not an abuse of discretion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Mother gave birth to Joel A. in May 2023 while she was
incarcerated.2 At the time of birth, both mother and Joel tested
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Joel’s father is unknown. Over the course of the
proceedings, mother identified a number of different men as the
alleged father of Joel, none of whom was confirmed to be the
father.
2
positive for fentanyl.3
II. Procedural Background
A. Petition, detention and initial placement of Joel
On May 23, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over
Joel because (1) mother has a “history of substance abuse,
including methamphetamine, and is a current abuser of
fentanyl,” and (2) Joel was born with “a positive toxicology screen
for fentanyl.” The petition further alleged that mother’s conduct
“endanger[ed] [Joel’s] physical health and safety and place[d]
[Joel] at risk of serious physical harm and damage,” warranting
the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).
On May 24, 2023, the juvenile court ordered Joel detained
from mother and gave the Department discretion to place him
with any appropriate relative or nonrelative extended family
member (NREFM). Mother did not identify anyone who could
care for Joel at the time of detention, so the Department placed
him in the foster home of Ms. C. and Mr. P.
B. Jurisdiction and disposition hearings
On November 1, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the
allegations of the petition as pled and exerted dependency
jurisdiction over Joel.
At the time of that hearing,4 mother offered the juvenile
3 Mother has four other children who are not at issue in this
appeal.
4 Prior to the hearing, mother had identified as possible
placement options (1) her maternal grandmother, who lived in
Mexico, (2) her former roommate Edwin G. and his girlfriend, and
3
court two possible placement options for Joel. In October 2023,
mother identified Nancy and her husband Jose as maternal
relatives living in Mexico. At the November 1, 2023, hearing,
mother for the first time identified Claudia A. as a family friend
“[i]n case the relative in Mexico doesn’t work out.”5
On December 6, 2023, the juvenile court held a disposition
hearing. The court removed Joel from mother’s custody, but
bypassed any reunification services because mother’s parental
rights over one of Joel’s siblings had been terminated due to
mother’s substance abuse issues (rendering bypass appropriate
under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5) and
because of the six-year prison sentence mother was serving
(rendering bypass appropriate under subdivision (e) of section
361.5). The court set the matter for a permanency planning
hearing, but in the interim ordered the Department to continue
investigating Nancy and Claudia as possible placements for Joel.
C. The Department’s placement investigation
pending the permanency planning hearing
The Department identified adoption as the most
appropriate permanent plan for Joel.
Consistent with mother’s preference and the statutory
preference for placement with relatives, the Department initially
(3) her former roommate’s sister-in-law. The maternal
grandparents had drug and alcohol abuse histories, and the
others ultimately withdrew from consideration.
5 The record notes that Claudia contacted a social worker
“regarding placement of Joel,” in mid-September 2023, but
mother at that time told the Department she was not familiar
with Claudia at all.
4
focused its efforts on investigating whether placement with
Nancy was appropriate. The Department asked the Consulate of
Mexico to conduct an international home study of Nancy’s home
in Mexico. The Consulate was nonresponsive, and the parallel
social services agency in Mexico did not conduct the home study
the Department requested. At an August 12, 2024, hearing, the
court noted the nonresponsiveness of the Mexican authorities and
set a special hearing for October 7, 2024, regarding placement of
Joel with this relative pursuant to section 361.3. The Mexican
authorities had still not conducted the home study by September
17, 2024. Mother acknowledged that the Department had “done
everything correctly” “technically” “under the notice provisions”
to secure the home study in Mexico.
Seeing the lack of progress with placing Joel with his
relative, the Department began to investigate the family friend,
Claudia. The Department spoke with Claudia, and later learned
that Claudia was a close friend of mother’s sister (rather than
mother). Although mother initially expressed a lack of closeness
to Claudia (going so far as to ask “who [Claudia] was”), mother
later explained that she wanted Claudia to have custody because
mother believed Claudia would “allow” mother “to have physical
access to” Joel once mother was released from prison. In
September 2024, the Department assessed Claudia’s home.
While the Department conducted these investigations, Joel
remained fostered in the home of Ms. C. and Mr. P.
D. The combined relative placement and
permanency planning hearing
The juvenile court held a combined relative placement and
permanency planning hearing on October 7, 2024.
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1. Placement
Regarding placement, mother asked that Joel be removed
from the foster family and placed with Claudia. In support of her
request, she called Claudia as a witness. Claudia testified that
(1) she was “best friends with [mother’s] younger sister,” (2) she
had helped care for one of mother’s older children in years past,
but had stopped nearly all contact with them thereafter, and (3)
she lived near other maternal relatives. Claudia testified she last
had contact with mother three years prior to mother’s
incarceration, had not visited Joel at all, and had not even asked
about visiting Joel until September 2024.
The court declined to alter Joel’s placement. At the outset,
the court noted that Claudia was not a “relative” entitled to
preference under section 361.3; instead, she was a nonrelated
extended family member (NREFM) as defined in section 362.7.
The court nevertheless applied the factors enumerated in section
361.3 for examining whether to place a child with a relative.
Although mother’s desire to place Joel with Claudia counseled in
favor of placement with Claudia, several of the factors—such as
whether Joel would be placed with any siblings, the good moral
character of the persons seeking placement, both placement
options’ desire to adopt, and the safety and stability of each
placement—favored neither placement. In the court’s view, the
“relationship” between the child and potential placements heavily
favored keeping Joel in the foster family’s custody: Claudia had
no relationship with Joel whatsoever (and had not tried to seek
one until a month before the hearing) and had only the vaguest
sense of his special needs, while Joel had been with the foster
family since birth, had a “very strong bond” with the foster
parents and their relatives, and had been having special needs
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attended to by the foster parents for his entire life.
2. Permanency planning
The court rejected mother’s argument that the beneficial
parental relationship exception to adoption applied. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The court found clear and convincing evidence
Joel was adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied,
and terminated mother’s parental rights.
The court designated Ms. C. and Mr. P. as Joel’s
prospective adoptive parents.
E. Appeal
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The sole ground for mother’s appeal is that the juvenile
court “erred when it declined to place Joel with Claudia” under
section 361.3.
I. Mother Lacks Standing
Only a party whose “rights or interests are injuriously
affected by [a] decision in an immediate and substantial way”
may appeal that decision. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236
(K.C.).) We review de novo this question of standing. (Sirott v.
Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 371, 380 [“Standing is a
question of law . . . reviewed de novo”].)
Mother lacks standing. Where, as here, a parent on appeal
attacks a juvenile court’s pre-termination decision where to place
a child, that parent has standing to appeal only if that placement
decision somehow undermines the subsequent order terminating
her parental rights; absent a link between placement and
termination, the parent is not injuriously affected by the
placement decision and thus lacks standing to challenge that
decision. (K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 238 [standing exists “only
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if the placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument
against terminating parental rights”]; In re Cody R. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 381, 390.) Mother does not challenge the juvenile
court’s termination decision on appeal. Nor has she otherwise
articulated any link between the juvenile court’s decision not to
place Joel with Claudia on the one hand, and the court’s decision
to terminate mother’s parental rights on the other. We must
accordingly dismiss her appeal. (Cody R., at pp. 383-384.)
II. The Juvenile Court’s Placement Decision Was Also
Not an Abuse of Discretion
Even if we were to assume mother had standing, mother
has not demonstrated that the court’s decision not to place Joel
with Claudia was an abuse of discretion. (See In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
As a threshold matter, mother is incorrect that section
361.3 governs the court’s placement decision. That section grants
“preferential consideration” to placement of a dependent child
“with a relative.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) “Relative” is a statutorily
defined term (id., subd. (c)(2)); more to the point, it does not
include persons, like Claudia, who are nonrelated extended
family members. (Samantha T. v. Superior Court (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 94, 111, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in In re Joshua A. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 208, 215-217
(Joshua A.).)
Placement decisions outside of section 361.3 are to be made
according to the best interests of the child. (Joshua A., supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213, 218; cf. In re N.J. (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 96, 128 (N.J.) [when section 361.3 applies, court
must apply statutorily mandated best interest inquiry rather
than “generalized ‘best interest inquiry’” applicable in other
8
contexts].) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that placing Joel with his foster family—who had cared for
him since birth, who were familiar with his special needs, and
with whom he had bonded significantly—was in his best interest
rather than placing him with a family friend with whom Joel had
no relationship and who had no familiarity with Joel’s special
needs.
Mother resists this conclusion with what boils down to two
arguments. First, she argues that the juvenile court and the
Department erred in not making an “emergency placement” of
Joel with Claudia. But mother did not even mention Claudia
until nearly six months after his birth and, even then, did not ask
for him to be immediately placed in Claudia’s custody.6 Second,
mother argues that Joel’s bond with the foster parents cannot be
considered because that bond was able to develop only because
the Department dragged its feet in investigating Claudia; had the
Department moved with more alacrity, mother insists, Claudia
would have had the opportunity to develop a bond as well. In
support, mother cites N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 96 and In re
Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792. But this argument ignores
that mother did not first mention Claudia until November 2023,
ignores that mother simultaneously named a relative—who has
statutory preference—for placement, ignores that mother
acknowledged that Claudia was an option “[i]n case the relative
in Mexico doesn’t work out,” and ignores that the delay in
6 Thus, mother’s argument that she has standing because
she could have requested emergency placement is doubly wrong:
Not only did mother not ever request such placement, but such
placement also had no impact on the decision whether to
terminate mother’s parental rights.
9
evaluating the relative having preference was the fault of the
Mexican authorities rather than the Department. Thus, the
Department did not unreasonably drag its feet. The cases mother
cites are inapt: N.J. held that a social services agency had
dragged its feet in failing to investigate a relative who had
immediately requested placement of the child and actively sought
and developed a relationship with the child (N.J., at pp. 125-126),
and Mia M. held that a bond that developed with a caregiver
while a parent was not properly notified of the proceedings in
accordance with due process could not be counted against the
parent (75 Cal.App.5th at p. 811).
DISPOSITION
Mother’s appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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