CourtListener 10586729•People v. Ayala CA2/4
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Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Ayala CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336401
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA111663
v.
JOSE MIGUEL AYALA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with instructions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Kristen J. Inberg,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION1
The trial court denied Defendant-Appellant Jose Miguel
Ayala’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.2 We reverse, based in part on the People’s agreement
that reversal is warranted.
Ayala’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
erred by relying on a preliminary hearing transcript in
concluding that he was prima facie ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The People note (accurately) that
this contention is now incorrect as stated. Under our Supreme
Court’s recent decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549,
564 (Patton), the trial court could properly rely on the
preliminary hearing transcript as part of the record of conviction
in determining whether Ayala was ineligible for section 1172.6
relief at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
Nonetheless, the People agree with Ayala that reversal is
warranted, as do we. As explained below, because the
preliminary hearing transcript does not conclusively foreclose the
possibility that Ayala pleaded no contest to attempted murder
under an imputed-malice theory that would no longer be
available under current law, and because the People concede that
Ayala has made a sufficient prima facie showing, we too conclude
that a sufficient prima facie showing has been made. We
therefore remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
BACKGROUND
In 2009, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
information charging Ayala, as well as codefendants Vincent
David Mendoza and Edward Meraz, with kidnapping (§ 207,
subd. (a); count one); attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count two);
aggravated mayhem (§ 205; count three); and assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count four). The information
also alleged that Ayala and codefendant Mendoza (1) personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of
counts one, two and three (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and (2) inflicted
great bodily injury upon the victim in the commission of counts
two, three, and four (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The information
alleged Ayala sustained two prior strike and prior serious felony
convictions. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds (b)-(i); 667,
subd. (a).)
At Ayala’s preliminary hearing on December 17, 2009, the
People presented testimony from Christina Martinez, the victim.
Martinez was the sole witness who testified. She testified that
she was at her boyfriend’s house at 2:00 a.m. on August 4, 2009,
when Ayala and his two codefendants arrived. Ayala told
Martinez they were going to take her home after they went to the
beach. Martinez got into Ayala’s car with the three men. While
they were driving, codefendants Mendoza and Meraz tied
Martinez’s hands. When Martinez resisted, Ayala pulled over to
the side of the road near a canyon, held a knife to Martinez’s
neck, and, according to Martinez, said he was going to kill her if
she did not stop moving.
According to the victim, Martinez, codefendant Mendoza
pulled out a syringe and injected Martinez in the neck five to ten
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times. Martinez started choking and gagging. The men took
Martinez out of the car and threw her to the ground. They hit
her in the ribs, then hit her in the head with what she assumed
was a bat though she did not see the weapon. Martinez blacked
out when she got hit in the head, then when she woke up, the
men threw her down into the canyon.3
The three men followed Martinez down into the canyon.
Ayala approached Martinez from behind and said, “you try to kill
me, you try to threaten me and this is what happens,” then he cut
her throat twice with a knife. As the men climbed out of the
canyon, Martinez got up and asked why they were doing this to
her. Meraz said “she’s still talking,” so Mendoza came back down
into the canyon and stabbed Martinez twice in her neck with a
pocketknife. Martinez decided to play dead and wait for the men
to leave, which they did after a few minutes.
The parties stipulated that the police recovered shovels,
ropes, and paper towels from the car where they found the
codefendants.
Following the preliminary hearing, on March 17, 2011,
Ayala pleaded no contest to attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, admitted he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon and inflicted great bodily injury in the
commission of the offense, and admitted the prior conviction
allegations were true. The trial court sentenced Ayala to 39
years to life in state prison.
3 Martinez testified inconsistently about who threw her down
into the canyon. She testified that Ayala and Mendoza threw her
into the canyon; that she was not sure which of the men threw
her into the canyon because she was still partially blacked out;
and that it was Ayala who threw her into the canyon.
4
On January 13, 2022, Ayala submitted a petition under
section 1172.6. The petition was a form petition, and its
allegations for relief made conclusory claims that Ayala was
convicted of attempted murder under a now invalid imputed-
malice theory of liability. The trial court appointed counsel on
Ayala’s behalf.
On December 18, 2023, after allowing briefing from both
parties, the trial court considered Ayala’s petition and denied it.
Ayala timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“In 2018, the Legislature amended the law of homicide,
eliminating several theories of liability based on imputed malice.
It has also offered relief to those convicted under certain homicide
theories, such as murder or attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, whose convictions are now
tainted. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Petitioners seeking
relief under section 1172.6 must, first, file a facially valid petition
that states the statutory requirements for relief (id., subd. (b)),
and second, make a ‘prima facie showing’ (id., subd. (c)), before a
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing on the ultimate question of resentencing at which the
People will bear the burden of defending a conviction under the
amended law (id., subd. (d)).” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
556, fn. omitted.)
The question here is whether Ayala properly made the
requisite “prima facie showing” at the second stage of the
proceedings. We review the trial court’s determination of that
issue de novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Patton clarified the requirements for a section 1172.6
petitioner’s prima facie showing in cases—like this one—where
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the petitioner’s conviction was the result of a no contest plea
following a preliminary hearing. Our Supreme Court explained
that “the prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 [is] ‘analogous’
to the prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) As in habeas cases, “‘“‘the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if [those] factual allegations were proved. If
so, the court must issue an order to show cause.’”’” (Ibid.)
While “the habeas corpus process does not seamlessly map
onto the section 1172.6 process,” as in the habeas process, the
1172.6 process reflects “discomfort” at the prima facie stage with
“conclusory allegations.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 565, fn
omitted.) More specific factual allegations at the prima facie
stage help to “identify ‘material issues of disputed fact’” and
provide “‘a measure of frankness in disclosing [the relevant]
factual situation’ supporting relief,” and thus may be required.
(Ibid.)
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that “a section 1172.6
petitioner who, despite having access to counsel upon submission
of a facially sufficient petition, offers only conclusory allegations
of entitlement to relief, in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid
theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 565, fn. omitted.) Notably, Patton
involved a case where the facts in the record of conviction were
“undisputed” and the record of conviction “demonstrate[d] [that]
relief [was] unavailable.” (Id. at pp. 566-567.)
Applying Patton to this case, we first note a key difference.
Unlike Patton, the record of conviction does not foreclose the
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possibility that, due to the actions of a codefendant, the
conviction for attempted murder arose under an application of
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a now-invalid
imputed-malice theory of liability.4
Here, the information charged not only Ayala but also two
other codefendants, Mendoza and Meraz, with attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. All three men were also
charged with kidnapping, mayhem, aggravated assault, and
assault with a deadly weapon. The information alleged that both
Ayala and codefendant Mendoza personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon and inflicted great bodily injury upon the
victim in the commission of the attempted murder.5 Based on the
record of conviction that is before us as expressed in the
preliminary hearing, it is possible to impute the malice element
of attempted murder to Ayala from another codefendant in a way
now prohibited under current law. As one example, the
preliminary hearing testimony does not foreclose an inference
4 As all parties agree, when Ayala pleaded no contest in
2011, before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine was still a viable imputed-
malice theory of liability for attempted murder.
5 Although Ayala admitted he used a knife and inflicted
great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted murder,
these admissions, standing alone, do not demonstrate as a matter
of law that he is guilty of attempted murder under the theory
that he harbored the intent to kill. (See, e.g., People v. Estrada
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338 [“Estrada’s bare admission of the
enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) and infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a)) do not establish that he acted with the intent to kill or refute
that he was convicted on a theory of imputed malice”].)
7
that Ayala lacked the intent to kill the victim, but that
codefendant Mendoza, whom the victim testified also stabbed
her, did intend to kill. Ayala thus may have pled no contest on
the theory that Mendoza’s intent to kill was imputed to him
because both were coparticipants in crimes of kidnapping,
mayhem, aggravated assault and assault with a deadly weapon,
in a situation where Ayala knew or reasonably should have
known that attempted murder was a natural and probable
consequence of those other crimes.6
A second, critical difference from Patton is the People’s
concession that a prima facie showing was made. As Patton
emphasizes, the purpose behind the prima facie showing
requirement in section 1172.6 petitions is to provide something
akin to a pleading requirement—it is a means of helping to
identify for the courts and for the People material facts and “‘[the
relevant] factual situation’ supporting relief.” (Patton, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 566.) Where, as here, the People have conceded that a
petitioner has met the requirements of a prima facie showing,
that is a strong indication that the purpose of a prima facie
showing has been met, and that the parties have a sufficient
6 We provide this example for purposes of illustration only,
not as a favored reading of the evidence or as an indication that
there is in fact reasonable doubt as to whether Ayala could be
convicted of attempted murder under current law. Nor do we
intend this example to be a limitation on other ways in which
Ayala might have been prosecuted under a now-invalid imputed-
malice theory, or for it to any way control the presentation of
evidence or the trial court’s determination at a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing.
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factual understanding to proceed to the evidentiary hearing
stage.7
Taken together, these considerations compel reversal.
Although Ayala made only conclusory allegations supporting
relief, the People have not contended that those conclusory
allegations were insufficient to meet his prima facie burden.
And, unlike Patton, the conclusory allegations are not contrasted
with a record of conviction that conclusively excludes the
possibility that Ayala was convicted of murder based on a now-
invalid imputed-malice theory.
We therefore remand the matter to the trial court with
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Ayala is guilty of attempted murder beyond a reasonable
doubt under current law. We express no opinion concerning what
finding the trial court should reach in making that factual
inquiry.8 Because we conclude remand is warranted under state
7 We note that neither party raised an argument that Patton
could be read to require that something more than conclusory
allegations supporting relief be provided at the prima facie stage
even in a case with a preliminary hearing transcript similar to
this one—an issue which we do not address and offer no opinion
upon.
8 The record indicates that there was a factual basis hearing
for Ayala’s plea, though that factual basis hearing is not
contained in this appellate record. At Ayala’s plea hearing, his
attorney requested that the factual basis hearing be sealed for
purposes of protecting Ayala, and the trial court granted that
request. We presume the trial court reviewed the sealed factual
basis hearing, as well as the rest of the record of conviction, when
denying Ayala relief as a matter of law. On remand, the trial
court may again, if appropriate, consider the contents of the
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statutory law, we need not address Ayala’s contention that
remand is required because the trial court’s order denying him
relief violated his constitutional rights.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Ayala relief, and
remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, Acting P.J.
MORI, J.
factual basis hearing in determining whether Ayala is eligible for
section 1172.6 relief.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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