CourtListener 10586680•People v. Miller CA1/1
Texte intégral
Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Miller CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff, A168248
v.
(San Mateo County
TONIKA LYNETTE MILLER,
Super. Ct. No. 18-SF-014403-B)
Defendant;
LION SHARE INVESTMENTS, LLC
et al.,
Claimants and Appellants;
SELENE FINANCE LP et al.,
Respondents.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff, A168336
v.
(San Mateo County
TONIKA LYNETTE MILLER, Super. Ct. No. 18-SF-014403-B)
Defendant;
SARA JANSOHN et al.,
Claimants and Appellants;
SELENE FINANCE LP et al.,
Respondents.
1
The People charged Tonika Lynette Miller with several felonies for
defrauding Lion Share Investments, LLC (Lion Share) and Sara Jansohn via
real estate transactions. Separate from the criminal case, the trial court
levied Miller’s property under Penal Code section 186.11 — an enhancement
that aids enforcement of restitution awards in certain white collar
criminal cases by seizing assets and liquidating them to pay restitution.
(Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) But the property was
also subject to a mortgage loan from Selene Finance LP and Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB doing business as Christiana Trust, not
individually but as trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust
(collectively, Selene), secured by a deed of trust.
While marketing the property for liquidation under section 186.11,
Selene also collected $168,000 in rent from Miller’s tenant and used those
funds to pay down Miller’s loan. According to Lion Share and Jansohn, this
setoff violated the security-first rule in Code of Civil Procedure section 726,
which prohibits a creditor’s “extrajudicial appropriation of the debtor’s assets
before foreclosure.” (Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990)
51 Cal.3d 991, 999, italics omitted (Security Pacific).) They argued Selene
thereby forfeited its right to the security and was not entitled to proceeds
from the sale of the property. The trial court disagreed — concluding the
security-first rule does not apply with respect to real property seized under
section 186.11 — and distributed approximately $1.9 million to Selene from
the sale proceeds. Lion Share and Jansohn appeal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, Miller purchased real property in Studio City (property) after
obtaining a $1,445,000 loan from a bank, secured by a deed of trust. The
following year, the bank assigned its interest in the deed of trust to
2
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and Deephaven Mortgage, LLC (collectively,
prior lenders).
In August 2019, the People charged Miller with multiple felonies —
such as procuring and offering a false or forged instrument, grand theft of
real property, and money laundering — related to transactions defrauding
Lion Share and Jansohn. Miller allegedly participated in a scheme to
fraudulently induce Jansohn, an elderly victim, to convey her Redwood City
property to Justin Hall, Miller’s codefendant. Hall then paid Jansohn $2,000
before reselling the house to Lion Share for $997,000. Upon the People’s
August 2019 petition for a temporary restraining order under section 186.11,
the trial court temporarily enjoined Miller and other entities acting in concert
with her from transferring or disposing of the property, thus preserving it
and other assets to pay fines and restitution.
Miller defaulted on her loan and the prior lenders issued a notice
of default in September 2019, claiming an outstanding balance of
$1,527,292.55 — past due loan payments in addition to the full loan principal
amount. The People subsequently recorded a lis pendens on the property.
Pursuant to the trial court’s order, prior lenders also filed a claim regarding
their interest in Miller’s property. Later that month, the court replaced the
temporary restraining order with a preliminary injunction, restraining Miller
and other entities from disposing of the property. (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2).)
Relevant here, the injunction would remain in effect throughout the criminal
proceedings until the court could determine whether a portion of the property
should be levied upon to pay fines or restitution to the victims of the crimes.
Ultimately, Miller pled no contest to three felonies, admitted the offenses
constituted aggravated white collar crimes, and waived any challenge to the
court’s levy. (Id. subd. (a)(2).)
3
Pursuant to a November 2019 stipulation, the prior lenders would
facilitate the management and sale of the property in lieu of appointing a
receiver to liquidate it. The lenders had the right to market and sell the
property within 120 days of a court order approving the stipulation. The
stipulation prioritized distributing sale proceeds as follows: “proceeds will
first be applied to pay off the outstanding indebtedness due under the Loan
(including the entire outstanding loan balance, all accrued interest, fees and
costs etc. as set forth in the note and deed of trust).” Any remaining proceeds
would be distributed as restitution to alleged victims or as otherwise ordered
by the court.
The prior lenders failed to sell the house in the allotted timeframe.
Tenants claiming rights under a lease occupied the property. The beginning
of the Covid-19 pandemic further hampered the prior lenders’ ability to
market and sell the property. And by mid-2020, the state restricted evictions
due to the pandemic — evicting the tenants was not viable. In September
2020, the prior lenders and the People renewed the stipulation regarding the
marketing and sale of the property, and they noted the outstanding loan
balance was $1,621,318.89. To address the tenants’ presence, the prior
lenders had “the right to enforce the provisions of any lease or rental
agreement between remaining tenants or occupants.” The stipulation also
stated, “Lenders are hereby deemed the appropriate parties to accept any
rent due or to enforce backpayment of unpaid rent under such an agreement.”
The prior lenders were given 180 days to market and sell the property in good
faith.
In October 2020, the prior lenders transferred their interest in the
property, and Selene began servicing the loan. Because the property had not
yet been sold, Selene entered into a renewed stipulation with the People in
4
January 2021 to market and sell the property; it contained the same
provisions regarding rent. For more than a year, the tenants provided back
payment as well as ongoing rent to Selene, totaling $168,000. Selene applied
these payments to the outstanding escrow balance (Selene’s expenses to meet
Miller’s obligations with regard to the property, including property taxes and
hazard insurance); corporate advances (expenses Selene incurred while
servicing the loan that were recoverable from Miller); fees, late charges, and
attorney fees; and principal on the loan.
Selene ultimately agreed to sell the property to the tenants for $1.75
million. In October 2021, over Lion Share’s and Jansohn’s objection that the
price was approximately $500,000 less than the appraised value, the trial
court approved the sale for $1.75 million. The proceeds would first be applied
to the sale expenses, including $17,500 to Selene’s real estate broker. Next,
proceeds would pay the outstanding loan balance, accrued interests, and fees
and costs, which totaled approximately $1.72 million. Selene also agreed to a
$100,000 discount from the loan payoff amount. Any remaining proceeds
were to be deposited in the district attorney’s asset forfeiture account to
distribute as restitution to the victims or otherwise ordered by the court.
Jansohn did not approve of the sale. In a motion to vacate the order,
she argued the sale price was inadequate, Selene failed to adequately market
the property, and it improperly retained rent payments to reduce the
principal loan amount without providing any legal justification.1 She also
obtained a writ of attachment on the property in a related civil case against
Miller for elder financial abuse. Although the trial court denied the motion to
vacate, the tenants nonetheless canceled the sale due to the attachment
1 We express no opinion about any civil claims appellants might allege
against Selene.
5
order. As a result, the court approved a later stipulation vacating its
approval of the sale and appointing a receiver to market and sell the
property. The People, Selene, and the receiver agreed to distribute the sale
proceeds to Selene first and the receiver second, despite the default order of
distribution in section 186.11 — i.e., the receiver first, and holder of a valid
lien, mortgage, or security interest second.
In December 2022, the trial court ordered Miller to pay Jansohn
$182,653.82 and Lion Share $1,429,850.19 in victim restitution. The same
month, the receiver secured an agreement to sell the property for $2.13
million. The parties submitted a stipulation to approve the sale, which the
court entered the next day. After sales commissions and seller’s credits, the
People held in escrow the $1,949,677.78 in sale proceeds. Selene argued the
court should distribute the proceeds to it first since it had the first priority
lien recorded prior to the People’s lis pendens on the property. Lion Share
and Jansohn argued the court’s orders authorized the lenders to collect rent
from Miller’s tenants, but they could not use the rent to offset the loan
principal. Doing so — paying themselves at least $168,000 from the rents
collected — violated the security-first rule, thus waiving their security
interest. According to Lion Share and Jansohn, lenders were not entitled to
any portion of the sale proceeds.
The trial court determined the deed of trust did not entitle Selene to
the rent payments. Nor did, the court noted, the stipulations authorize
Selene to receive the rent as its own property. The court nonetheless
determined the security-first rule did not apply here because it was “legally
impossible” for Selene to foreclose on property that had been seized under
section 186.11. It further underscored section 186.11 authorized the seizure
of the rent payments because they were Miller’s assets. By applying the rent
6
collected each month to the outstanding debt, Selene significantly reduced
Miller’s unpaid balance. For that reason, the court ordered the rent to be
retroactively applied as setoffs against Miller’s loan rather than awarding
Lion Share and Jansohn the $168,000 in rent — ordering “the lender apply
all rents collected from the tenants at the [property] to the unpaid balance of
the loan at the time those rent payments were received, and that this order
be ordered nunc pro tunc as of January 6th of 2021.”
Ultimately, the trial court ordered $1,905.341.96 disbursed to Selene,
$39,223.66 disbursed to the receiver, and $5,112.16 disbursed to the
victims — $4,532.95 to Lion Share, and $579.21 to Jansohn.
DISCUSSION
Lion Share and Jansohn contend the trial court erred by failing to
apply the security-first rule. They argue Selene made a unilateral setoff
using Miller’s unsecured assets — applying the $168,000 in rent to offset the
loan principal secured by her real property — before foreclosing on the
property. As a result, they reason, Selene forfeited its approximately $1.9
million security interest in the property and any entitlement to sale proceeds.
In response, Selene primarily argues the security-first rule does not apply
here because the court seized and froze Miller’s assets under section 186.11,
thus precluding it from pursuing foreclosure of the real property.
Interpreting a statute requires ascertaining and effectuating
the Legislature’s purpose. (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1223–1224.) We focus on the statute’s words, giving
them their plain, ordinary meaning and construing the language in the
context of the whole statutory framework. (Id. at p. 1224.) “When multiple
statutory schemes are relevant, we evaluate each scheme and seek to
7
harmonize them to carry out their evinced intent.” (Ibid.) After
independently reviewing this issue of law, we conclude Selene has the
better argument. (Walker v. Physical Therapy Bd. of California (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 [de novo standard of review for questions of law].)
I.
Criminal victims have the right to restitution for their losses from
persons convicted of crimes. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b); § 1202.4,
subd. (a)(1).) Defendants charged with committing two or more related
felonies involving fraud and taking more than $100,000 may also be charged
with an aggravated white collar crime enhancement. (§ 186.11, subd. (a).) A
true finding on the enhancement exposes defendants to, among other things,
additional prison time and paying victim restitution. (Id., subds. (a)–(d).)
Section 186.11 provides a “procedural mechanism to freeze a
defendant’s assets and following a conviction, seize those assets to pay victim
restitution.” (People v. Shah (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 879, 896; § 186.11, subd.
(d)(2).) The prosecution may file a petition to freeze and seize property and
assets, thus commencing a proceeding pendent to the criminal proceeding.
(§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2); Shah, at p. 902.) The prosecution must promptly
record a lis pendens providing formal notice of the pending criminal action,
and it may seek a temporary restraining order to preserve the property.
(Shah, at p. 888, fn. 2; § 186.11, subds. (d)(2), (4).) The court may preserve
any asset or property in the defendant’s control via a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction — seized assets need not be traceable to, or
the product of, the alleged criminal activity. (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(1)–(2);
People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 86–87.) Persons with interest in the
seized property may file a claim with the court noting the nature and amount
of their interest in the seized assets. (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(3).) Upon a
8
conviction, the court must continue the preliminary injunction until
sentencing to determine the portion of property or assets that shall be levied
upon to pay fines and restitution. (Id., subd. (h)(1)(A).) But orders imposing
restitution “shall not affect the interest in real property of any third party
that was acquired prior to the recording of the lis pendens . . . .” (Id., subd.
(h)(2).)
Lion Share and Jansohn do not challenge this statutory scheme.
Rather, they contend the section 186.11 provisions regarding the liquidation
of property or assets are subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 726. That
provision states, in relevant part, there “can be but one form of action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage
upon real property” — judicially construed as the “ ‘security-first’ and ‘one-
action’ rule” — and the action must be in accordance with Chapter 1, “Actions
for Foreclosure of Mortgages.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 726, subd. (a); O’Neil v.
General Security Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 587, 597 (O’Neil).) The one-
action rule requires a secured creditor in a single action — a foreclosure
action that is either judicial or nonjudicial — to exhaust the security before
obtaining “a monetary ‘deficiency’ judgment against the debtor.” (O’Neil,
at p. 597; Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 542, 545.) Suing on
the security instead of pursuing foreclosure of the mortgage or deed of trust
violates the rule. (O’Neil, at p. 597.) By electing to sue, the creditor waives
the right to foreclose or sell the security under a power of sale. (Ibid.)
Relevant here, a creditor who extrajudicially appropriates a debtor’s
assets before foreclosing on the security also violates Code of Civil Procedure
section 726. (Security Pacific, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 999.) An offset “is
analogous to an action against property of the debtor . . . which has resulted
in [the property’s] seizure and transfer” to the creditor’s possession.
9
(Kirkpatrick v. Westamerica Bank (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 982, 989, italics
omitted.) Security Pacific explained that, because the security-first rule
prohibits “a bank from bringing a judicial action before foreclosing the
security, the rule must equally prohibit a bank’s extrajudicial appropriation
of the debtor’s assets before foreclosure.” (Security Pacific, at p. 999, italics
omitted.) A creditor forfeits its right to the security by taking a setoff from a
borrower’s bank account and applying it to the loan principal. (Id. at
pp. 1001–1002.)
II.
For the first time on appeal, Selene contends Lion Share and Jansohn
lack standing to invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 726. Although
challenges to standing may be raised at any time, Selene’s is meritless.
(Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438.) The
“sanction aspect of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 726 operates for the
benefit of both the primary debtor and third parties claiming an interest in
the property, whether as successors-in-interest or third party lienholders.”
(O’Neil, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 600.) Both Lion Share and Jansohn have
judgment liens on Miller’s property. (Integrated Lender Services, Inc. v.
County of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 867, 875 [“order to pay
restitution is deemed a money judgment, fully enforceable as if it were a civil
money judgment” and the “holder of a money judgment may record it to
create a judgment lien on real property”].) “[T]hird party lienholders,” such
as Lion Share and Jansohn, “have standing to assert” the security-first
protections. (O’Neil, at p. 601.)
Next, we agree Selene initially had no right to apply the $168,000 in
rent to outstanding escrow, corporate advances, and the unpaid loan balance.
The deed of trust securing the loan does not include language assigning the
10
rent to lenders. And as Selene concedes, it collected the rent as assets under
the trial court’s section 186.11 jurisdiction and pursuant to stipulations. The
stipulations named Selene as the appropriate party “to accept any rent due,
to enforce backpayment of unpaid rent . . . or to have received and/or to
enforce or collect payment of any rent which was or may have already been
paid to Miller.” (Italics added.) But they did not authorize use of the rent.2
But we conclude the security-first rule does not apply here because the
section 186.11 proceeding halted Selene’s foreclosure. (Security Pacific,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 999 [security-first rule prohibits “a bank’s extrajudicial
appropriation of the debtor’s assets before foreclosure”], second italics added.)
By its own terms, Code of Civil Procedure section 726 requires instituting a
civil foreclosure action for recovering the amount named in a deed of trust or
mortgage rather than liquidating “those assets to pay restitution to victims.”
(People v. Shah, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; Code Civ. Proc., § 726;
§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2).) It “is not an isolated statute;” it “is part of the
statutory protections and procedures which restrict the secured creditor’s
remedies for notes secured by real property.”3 (O’Neil, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th
2 The trial court subsequently ordered Selene to apply the rent to the
unpaid balance of the loan at the time the payments were received nunc pro
tunc to when Selene first started collecting rent — which may be a pendente
lite order to maintain and preserve the property under section 186.11,
subdivision (e). (Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
493, 501 [“A judgment entered nunc pro tunc gives effect to the ruling
retroactively from the date cited in the nunc pro tunc order”].) But we
express no opinion as to whether such an order was properly entered, as that
issue is not before us.
3 Implementing the security-first rule requires the creditor to “elect his
course.” (O’Neil, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 603.) “In a judicial foreclosure, if
the property is sold for less than the amount of the outstanding indebtedness,
11
at pp. 603, 597.) That statute is intended “to prevent multiplicity of actions,
to compel exhaustion of the security before any deficiency judgment is
permitted, and to require that the fair value of the secured property be
utilized before any personal judgment is entered against the debtor” or before
the creditor resorts “to the debtor’s unencumbered assets.” (Id. at p. 603;
Security Pacific, at p. 1005.) Lion Share and Jansohn fail to identify — and
we cannot find — any case law imposing the security-first rule in a section
186.11 proceeding. (Kirkpatrick v. Westamerica Bank, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th
at p. 986 [“Section 726 does not prescribe a sanction for violation of the one
form of action rule. Rather, the courts have fashioned common law remedies
to advance its purposes”].)
The possibility of a creditor exhausting the security does not exist in a
section 186.11 proceeding where transferring and disposing of property is
supervised by the criminal court. Any property in the defendant’s control
may be subject to a levy to pay restitution, and the court may order
the creditor may seek a deficiency judgment, or the difference between the
amount of the indebtedness and the fair market value of the property, as
determined by a court, at the time of the sale.” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v.
Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1236.) The debtor, however, “has a
statutory right of redemption, or an opportunity to regain ownership of the
property by paying the foreclosure sale price, for a period of time after
foreclosure.” (Ibid.) “In a nonjudicial foreclosure, also known as a ‘trustee’s
sale,’ the trustee exercises the power of sale given by the deed of trust.”
(Ibid.) The process is “less expensive and more quickly concluded than
judicial foreclosure, since there is no oversight by a court, ‘[n]either appraisal
nor judicial determination of fair value is required,’ and the debtor has no
postsale right of redemption.” (Ibid.) But in a nonjudicial foreclosure, “the
creditor may not seek a deficiency judgment.” (Ibid.) “Thus, the
antideficiency statutes in part ‘serve to prevent creditors in private sales
from buying in at deflated prices and realizing double recoveries by holding
debtors for large deficiencies.’ ” (Ibid.)
12
immediate transfer of property to satisfy any judgment under section 186.11.
(Id., subds. (d)(1), (h)(1)(A).) Section 186.11 expressly addresses liquidating
property secured by a mortgage. (Id., subds. (h)(2), (i).) It prioritizes
distributing “[t]o any holder of a valid lien, mortgage, or security interest up
to the amount of his or her interest in the property or proceeds” before
distributing proceeds to victims for restitution. (Id., subds. (i)(2)–(3).) While
an “order imposing fines and restitution shall not affect the interest in real
property of any third party that was acquired prior to the recording of the lis
pendens,” the levy order essentially stripped Selene of its ability to freely
elect to institute judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the real
property. (Id., subd. (h)(2), italics added; Kirkpatrick v. Westamerica Bank,
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 989 [the security-first rule is an election of
remedies doctrine].)
Here, the prior lenders issued a notice of default in September 2019
and claimed an outstanding balance of past due loan payments as well as the
full loan principal amount before transferring their security interest in the
property to Selene. (Civ. Code, § 2924, subds. (a)(1), (6) [requiring mortgagee
to first file for record notice of default before foreclosure]; cf. FirstMerit Bank,
N.A. v. Reese (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 408, 413 [“ ‘The assignee “stands in the
shoes” of the assignor, taking his or her rights and remedies, subject to any
defenses that the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the
assignment’ ”].) But the trial court had already issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining the transfer or disposal of the property. By the
time the prior lenders transferred their interest to Selene, the court’s order
effectively precluded continuing with foreclosure. Under the circumstances of
this case, we do not consider Selene’s use of the rent to offset the loan
principal as “manifesting an election to not foreclose pursuant to the one-
13
form-of-action rule of section 726.” (Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1506.)
None of Lion Share’s and Jansohn’s arguments persuade us otherwise.
First, that the appointed receiver ultimately sold the property does not
demonstrate Selene could have foreclosed on the property before seeking to
recover from Miller’s unsecured assets. The court controlled Selene’s ability
to sell or foreclose on the property. Second, the approved stipulations
authorizing the prior lenders and Selene to market and sell the property did
not authorize them to foreclose, as Lion Share and Jansohn insist. True, a
stipulation included a provision referencing foreclosure: “the Parties shall
return to the Court for further instructions and/or to address next steps in
the process including but not limited to the potential appointment of a
receiver or foreclosure” if the property did not sell within an allotted
timeframe. This passing reference merely suggested foreclosure was one of
several possibilities the parties could consider when addressing the failure to
sell the property. While foreclosure may not have been “legally impossible,”
Lion Share and Jansohn fail to identify anything in the record indicating the
parties discussed this option.4 Finally, we find no merit in Lion Share’s and
Jansohn’s assertion that the security-first rule is violated when a creditor
4 This makes sense. “[A]t forced sales such as a trustee’s sale the full
potential value of the property being sold is rarely realized.” (Strutt v.
Ontario Savings & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866, 876.) A property’s
price at a trustee’s sale “is not deemed the equivalent of the property’s fair
market value.” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th
at p. 1236.) Presumably, allowing Selene to engage in a nonjudicial
foreclosure would further diminish the proceeds for distribution and result in
an even less favorable outcome for Lion Share and Jansohn, who originally
objected to the proposed sale to the tenant because it was approximately
$500,000 below the property’s market value.
14
obeys a court order — in a section 186.11 proceeding — to use an asset to
offset the principal on a loan secured by a deed of trust on seized property.
Accepting this argument would mean a creditor would be forced to choose
between willfully disobeying a valid court order and forfeiting its security.
(In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014.) Indeed, Lion Share and
Jansohn do not challenge the court’s authority to order a creditor to engage in
offsets. Nor can they — section 186.11 proceedings are intended to prevent
the dissipation of property to pay for restitution. (Id., subd. (d)(1)–(2).)
Paying the principal and other costs of the loan prevented the principal from
growing before the property was liquidated. Otherwise, the sale proceeds
would have been insufficient to satisfy the growing debt, leaving little if any
proceeds for victim restitution.
In sum, the trial court properly concluded the security-first rule did not
apply here. 5
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall
bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
5 At our request, the parties addressed the post-liquidation distribution
of the proceeds of the sale in the context of any entitlement to the $168,000 in
rents under section 186.11, subdivision (i) at oral argument. But at oral
argument, Lion Share and Jansohn expressly disavowed any argument in the
alternative that they are entitled to that asset. For that reason, we express
no opinion on that point.
15
_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A168248 & A168336; People v. Miller
16
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.