CourtListener 10585110•People v. Martinez CA2/5
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Filed 5/15/25 P. v. Martinez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B336031
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA088341)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
LUIS MARTINEZ, AND DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on April 22, 2025, is
modified as follows:
On page 10, after the heading “Procedural History”,
delete third full paragraph.
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing is denied.
There is no change in judgment.
______________________________________________________
BAKER, Acting, P. J. MOOR, J. KIM, J.
Filed 4/22/25 P. v. Martinez CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B336031
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. KA088341)
LUIS MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Luis Martinez appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for vacatur of his conviction and resentencing for the
murder of Marquise Le Blanc. The trial court denied Martinez’s
petition following an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to Penal
Code1 section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). On appeal, Martinez
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for directly aiding and abetting the murder with
implied malice. We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS
A. The Murder
On April 17, 2009, eighteen-year-old Le Blanc went to a
large party in Pomona with friends.2 The boys were not familiar
with Pomona. They learned about another party in Pomona
through a “party text.” They were not able to find the party, but
as they were driving they saw a bunch of kids parking cars and
walking down the street. The boys asked if there was a party and
were told there was, so they decided to park and go to the party.
The party was held at Leslie C.’s house. She asked her
adult cousin, Deborah M., to help her set up the party and to
arrange for security. Leslie C. wanted to exclude certain boys
from the party, including Martinez, Adam Delgado, Victor
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The party was attended by teenagers mostly between the
ages of 13 and 19 years old, so we refer to the party-goers using
terms that describe minors. Martinez was 15 years old at the
time. No disrespect is intended.
2
Guillen, Edgar Cisneros, and “their . . . crowd” because they were
“troublemakers.” Deborah M.’s boyfriend, Joshua R., who worked
as a security guard at a nightclub, provided security along with
two other people. The party was held in Leslie C.’s back yard.
The kids entered through the front gate where security was
stationed. No one was allowed inside the house. Deborah M.
mostly stayed inside with her young son and Leslie C.’s mother.
Deborah M. was at the front gate talking to Joshua R.
when Le Blanc arrived. Le Blanc seemed cheerful and excited to
go to the party. Le Blanc was one of the few Black people there.
The majority of the party-goers were Hispanic. By the time
Le Blanc arrived, the backyard had become very crowded.
Martinez and the other boys that Leslie C. had intended to
exclude tried to enter through the front door of the house, but a
girl slammed the door shut. The boys went to look for another
entrance. Leslie C. called security, but security was unable to
find Martinez and the other boys.
Le Blanc tried to dance with several girls unsuccessfully. A
Hispanic boy who was wearing a jacket with “Pomona” written on
it walked up to Le Blanc. The boy pointed to a tattoo on his neck
and asked Le Blanc if he had seen it. Le Blanc told the boy he
did not want any problems and then walked away.
Later, Le Blanc was in the dance area of the backyard
surrounded by Martinez, Guillen, Cisneros, and Ralph Alfaro.
The boys started arguing with Le Blanc. The argument escalated
and Delgado punched Le Blanc in the face. Le Blanc pulled out a
gun and waved it around. Le Blanc then asked “if anyone wanted
to fuck with him now.” People began to run and yell “He has a
gun.”
3
Someone in the crowd yelled “He can’t shoot us all. Get
him.” Multiple people yelled “Get that [derogatory racial
epithet]!” and “Kill that [derogatory racial epithet]!” several
times. Delgado grabbed a piece of construction wood and shouted
“Fuck that [derogatory racial epithet]!” Le Blanc ran toward the
front gate. A large group of people, including Martinez, Delgado,
and Alfaro chased Le Blanc. The mob knocked Le Blanc down on
the front stairs, and punched and kicked him.
Deborah M. had seen Le Blanc waving the gun in the
backyard through the window. She was afraid for her son and
ran to the side door to lock it. Deborah M. initially saw
approximately 10 to 13 guys attacking Le Blanc. More people
were behind them, rushing forward to join the attack. Le Blanc
was hunched over on the front steps. He was on his knees
surrounded by a group of male Hispanics. Deborah M. testified
that “[t]hey were around him punching him, kicking him, just
beating the life out of him.” Martinez admitted that he was in
the group. He participated in the beating and punched Le Blanc
more than twice while Le Blanc was cowering on the stairs.
Deborah M. went outside, “because here’s this guy on the front
steps covering himself, and it’s just so many guys just beating the
life out of him.” She testified that they were yelling “Oh, get that
[derogatory racial epithet]. Get that [derogatory racial epithet].
Get that [derogatory racial epithet]. That’s what he gets. Get
him. Get him. Don’t let him get away.” “They were punching
him with closed fists, to the point where you could hear as they
were punching him the thud sounds. Like, when you hit
somebody really hard and it just makes that sound on flesh, you
could hear it. And they were just kicking and just beating him
really bad.” Deborah M. saw the mob stomping on Le Blanc.
4
Le Blanc had his hands over his head. Deborah M. could see Le
Blanc’s hands clearly. He was not holding the gun.
Deborah M. screamed for the mob to stop, but the beating
continued. She was able to push some people back and help
Le Blanc. The males were hitting her as she was trying to free
Le Blanc from the crowd. Leslie C.’s mother came outside and
tried to help Deborah M. One of the males swung his fist at
Deborah M.’s head. She moved her face out of the way and the
blow hit her arm and her aunt’s thigh. Deborah M. was able to
pull Le Blanc up and push the gate open. She screamed at
Le Blanc to run. The crowd pushed Deborah M. back. Le Blanc
looked exhausted, but he was able to run down the street. A
group of males, including Martinez, chased after him. Deborah
M. later identified for the police approximately 20 of the people
who were involved in the beating. All of the people she identified
were Hispanic males.
As Le Blanc fled, someone called Deborah M. a “[derogatory
racial epithet] lover” and another person threw a glass bottle at
her and hit her feet. Deborah M. testified, “I got scared, because
I thought that what had happened to [Le Blanc], they would start
doing to me. So I backed off.” She was afraid that the mob was
so angry that they would come back and turn on her after they
“got” Le Blanc. Deborah M. went to close and lock the gate so
that no one could get in or out. As she did so, she tripped over
the gun that Le Blanc had been waving in the back yard. Joshua
R. picked up the gun and took it away. Deborah M. saw a male
running back from the direction the mob had gone. He retrieved
what looked like a gun from a car parked across the street and
ran back toward the mob.
5
Sandra A. lived down the street from Leslie C. She and her
husband, Pablo A., heard screaming and looked out the window
to see what was happening. Sandra A. saw a group of 20 to 30
kids running in the street toward her house. They gathered in
one area and a fight broke out. Everyone in the group was
attacking one kid—Le Blanc—kicking and hitting him. Pablo A.
estimated that there was a group of 20 to 25 people beating
Le Blanc. Sandra A. testified, “They were . . . hitting him, just—
there was just so many of them, and again, it was just shocking
to see all that happening.” Le Blanc was lying on the ground and
appeared unconscious. Sandra A. saw a male pull out a gun and
shoot Le Blanc. The male got into a dark SUV and drove away.
Party-goer Arturo C. followed the mob down the street.
Arturo C. saw Alfaro knock Le Blanc to the ground. Le Blanc
was defenseless and unable to fight back. Le Blanc got “stomped”
by 15 to 20 people after he was on the ground. Arturo C. stole
Le Blanc’s shoes as Le Blanc was being beaten. He saw Delgado
stab Le Blanc in the chest. Earlier in the evening, Delgado had
shown Arturo C. a pocket knife and told him not to worry if
anything happened because he had the knife. As Arturo C. was
leaving he heard gunshots.
Deborah M. also heard a gunshot. She heard someone yell,
“Pomona, Pomona.” Several people were yelling, “ ‘They’re
coming back. They’re come back. They have a gun. They have a
gun.’ ” Girls were screaming and running.
When he arrived at the scene, City of Pomona Police Officer
Melvon Bird saw 30 to 40 kids running away. Le Blanc was lying
face down on the side of the road with his feet up on the sidewalk.
Le Blanc did not appear to be breathing and did not respond to
the officer. There was a bullet casing next to his head. Officer
6
Bird felt for a pulse and found none. He saw that there was blood
in Le Blanc’s ears and a puddle of blood under his head. The
officer called for paramedics.
B. Cause of Death and Injuries
Deputy Medical Examiner Dr. Lisa Scheinin of the Los
Angeles County Coroner’s Office determined that the cause of
Le Blanc’s death was a combination of stabbing and gunshot
wounds. He was stabbed three times, including a stab to the
heart. After the stabbing, Le Blanc was turned face down and
shot once through the back of the head. In addition to the
stabbing and gunshot wounds, Le Blanc suffered multiple head
injuries, including abrasions, contusions, and shallow lacerations.
His nasal bridge and ear cartilage were fractured. Dr. Scheinin
opined that Le Blanc likely suffered the injuries as a result of
being kicked in the head and stomped on the face. She opined
that it requires significant force to break cartilage.
C. Gang Evidence
City of Pomona Police Officer Greg Freeman testified that
the 12th Street gang (12th Street) is the largest Hispanic gang in
Pomona. Officer Freeman explained that the Hispanic gangs in
Pomona are “very territorial,” and that the party was within 12th
Street territory. 12th Street is notorious for its hatred of Black
people. The officer explained that members of a gang are people
who live for the gang. They have no other job and are focused on
bettering the gang at all times. Associates are people who have a
life outside the gang that may include a job or school but “when
7
they’re called upon by the gang, they drop everything” and go to
assist the gang. Tagging crews are bonded groups of younger
people who operate within a gang’s territory and are a source of
future recruits for the gang. Tagging crews commit crimes that
benefit the gang. The Tinto Killers (Tinto Killers) or TK is a
tagging crew that operates within 12th Street’s territory. “Tinto
Killers” means Black Killers. MBK is another tagging crew that
feeds into 12th Street. 12th Street engages in a wide variety of
criminal offenses; one of their major activities is murder. Gang
members increase respect for their gang by committing crimes. A
12th street member would garner the most respect for killing a
Black person. 12th Street is also known as “Pomona 12th Street”
and “The Sharkies Gang.” Their symbols include sharks, the
letter “P”, the number “12”, and “P-12.”
Given hypothetical facts that mirror this case and a prior
contact that Officer Freeman had with Martinez, Officer
Freeman opined that the person in the hypothetical was “at least
an associate” of the hypothetical gang. Guillen and Cisneros
were both members of 12th Street. Delgado was a member of
MBK in 2009, but belonged to 12th Street by the time of trial.
Alfaro was a member of Tinto Killers in 2009, and later became a
12th Street member.
Arturo C. also knew Alfaro to be a member of Tinto Killers.
He said that many people involved in the beating were members
of Tinto Killers.
D. Martinez’s Interview with Police
In an interview with police, Martinez initially said that he
did not go into the back yard when he arrived at the party
8
because there was a fight starting. After he was confronted with
information about his participation in the beating, Martinez was
more forthcoming.
Martinez confirmed that there was a Black male in the
dance area and that people around the Black male (Le Blanc)
were starting a fight. Delgado, Guillen, Cisneros, and Alfaro
were part of the group fighting with Le Blanc. Things became
heated and Le Blanc pulled out a gun. Delgado punched Le
Blanc in the face. Someone in the crowd yelled “He can’t shoot us
all. Get him.” Le Blanc ran for the gate.
Martinez, Delgado, and Alfaro gave chase. Le Blanc was
knocked down on the stairs, punched, and kicked. Martinez
admitted that he punched Le Blanc more than twice while
Le Blanc was cowering on the stairs. He described the beating in
the same terms that Deborah M. had—he said that Le Blanc was
kicked, punched, and “stomped out.”
Martinez admitted that he was part of the mob that chased
Le Blanc after he fled through the gate. Martinez, Alfaro,
Delgado, Cisneros, and Prado led the pack. Alfaro knocked Le
Blanc to the ground and the beating continued. Le Blanc
appeared to be unconscious to Martinez as Le Blanc’s eyes were
closing. Delgado stabbed Le Blanc twice in the upper torso.
Alfaro stood over Le Blanc and shot him once.
Martinez denied assaulting Le Blanc after he chased him
from the stairs. He told police that Delgado was a member of
12th Street and Alfaro was a Tinto Killer.
9
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People tried Martinez for first degree murder on two
theories—(1) direct aiding and abetting and (2) aiding and
abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The People did not allege that Martinez stabbed or shot Le Blanc.
He was charged based on his role in the mass beating.
The jury found Martinez guilty of the first degree murder.
The jury further found that the murder was committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and
that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
proximately causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d),
(e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Martinez to 50 years to life in
state prison. Another panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
Following our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Chiu
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, which held that an aider and abettor may
not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, this court reversed
Martinez’s convictions and permitted the prosecution to retry
Martinez or accept a reduced conviction of second degree murder.
(People v. Prado et al. (Jan. 13, 2015, B243204 [nonpub. opn.].)
The People elected not to retry Martinez, and his conviction was
reduced.
In February 2019, Martinez, in pro. per., petitioned to be
resentenced under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.
The People opposed the petition.
On March 22, 2019, the trial court denied Martinez’s
petition because the court concluded that, based on the facts as
10
recited in our unpublished opinions, Martinez intended to kill Le
Blanc.
On appeal, this court concluded that Martinez was not
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, and that the trial court had
improperly decided the petition without appointing counsel. We
reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for
further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court appointed counsel, and the
parties briefed the matter. Based on the fact that Martinez had
been tried under a legally valid theory (direct aiding and
abetting) and an invalid theory (natural and probable
consequences aiding and abetting), the trial court issued an order
to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
Following the hearing, the trial court again denied
Martinez’s petition. The court found that the People had met
their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez
was guilty of aiding and abetting implied malice murder.
Martinez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
1. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
11
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).)” People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) As
relevant here, the bill eliminated second degree murder liability
predicated on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707, fn. 1.)
“ ‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of
natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990 (Reyes).) “[A]
defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder.
(See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 588–591;
People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485,
499; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710–714,
(Powell); see also People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979–
983.)” (Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95,
now section 1172.6, to provide a procedure for those convicted of
murder to seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c).) If the
sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder
12
. . . under California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
“[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is
reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this
standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty [of murder under a still-valid theory] beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
We will not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon
which sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial
court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We
must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies
when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
2. Implied Malice Murder
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ (People
13
v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller).)” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) “[T]he defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it
must ‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.” ’ (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; see ibid. [under
the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’
means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the
act in question ‘ “will result in death” ’]; People v. Cravens (2012)
53 Cal.4th 500, 513 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [‘Although an act that
will certainly lead to death is not required, the probability of
death from the act must be more than remote or merely
possible[]’].)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
3. Direct Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice
Murder
“ ‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea. ([People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.]) In
the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the
direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the
life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea,
which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
14
conscious disregard for human life.’ [Citations.]” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.)
In contrast, “ ‘the natural and probable consequences
doctrine did not require that the aider and abettor intend to aid
the perpetrator in committing a life-endangering act . . . . What
was natural and probable was judged by an objective standard
and it was enough that murder was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the crime aided and abetted.’ (Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 711, fn. 26.)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 990–991.)
B. Analysis
Martinez argues that the evidence is not sufficient to
support the additional elements required for directly aiding and
abetting implied malice murder. He asserts there is not
substantial evidence that (1) he aided and abetted a life-
endangering act rather than a mere assault, (2) he knew that the
perpetrators would stab and shoot Le Blanc; and (3) he intended
to aid and abet the shooting and the stabbing.
Martinez likens this case to Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981,
which he argues is factually similar. Reyes is readily
distinguishable. Reyes was a teenage gang member. (Id. at
p. 985.) He was in a park with fellow gang members when
Francisco Lopez showed the group a revolver he was carrying.
(Ibid.) A couple of hours later, some members of the gang rode
their bicycles into rival gang territory. (Ibid.) Someone in the
group called out to people in a passing car, “ ‘Hey, Homey, stop.
We want to talk to you.’ ” (Ibid.) The car sped up and the gang
members on bicycles followed it. (Ibid.) The car then made a U-
15
turn and drove back past the group. (Ibid.) A single gunshot
sounded, and the group dispersed. (Ibid.) The bullet struck the
driver of the vehicle in the head and killed him. (Ibid.) Reyes
was involved in a separate assault about 40 minutes later, and he
personally used the murder weapon in that separate assault.
(Ibid.)
At trial, the People argued that Reyes was guilty of aiding
and abetting murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because he intended to aid Lopez in either
committing an assault or disturbing the peace, or alternatively,
because he had conspired with Lopez to commit one of those two
target offenses. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.) Reyes was
convicted of second degree murder. (Ibid.)
Years later, Reyes petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code former section 1170.95. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 986.)
Reyes argued that the evidence was not sufficient to show that he
committed an act that helped, encouraged, or facilitated Lopez in
the shooting. (Id. at pp. 986–987.) The resentencing court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes was guilty of implied
malice murder. The court specifically found that “(1) Reyes
intentionally committed the act of traveling ‘along with several
other gang members, one of which [was] armed, . . . to rival gang
territory’; (2) ‘[t]he natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life’; (3) Reyes knew his act of traveling
to rival gang territory was dangerous to human life; and (4) he
acted deliberately and with conscious disregard of that danger.”
(Id. at p. 987.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s
order. (Id. at p. 984.)
The Supreme Court observed that although the
resentencing court found Reyes guilty as a direct perpetrator of
16
implied malice murder, at trial the prosecution relied exclusively
on aiding and abetting principles. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 988.) In an abundance of caution, the Supreme Court
addressed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both
theories. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient
to show that Reyes directly perpetrated implied malice murder,
stating: “On this record, it cannot be said that Reyes committed
an act that ‘proximately caused’ [the victim’s] death. [Citation.]
The prosecutor proceeded on the theory that Lopez shot [the
victim], and no evidence was presented that Reyes’s conduct was
a ‘substantial factor’ that contributed to the shooting. [Citation.]
The evidence established that Reyes proceeded to an area on the
edge of territory belonging to a rival gang and, alongside the
other bikers, chased after [the victim’s] car. But acts that merely
create a dangerous situation in which death is possible depending
on how circumstances unfold do not, without more, satisfy this
causation requirement. There was no evidence that Reyes’s acts
precipitated or provoked the shooting. And there is no reason to
believe that the killing of [the victim] would not have occurred if
Reyes had not accompanied his fellow gang members on the ride
or participated in the chase. [Citation.] Reyes’s acts of bicycling
into rival territory and chasing after [the victim’s] car with Lopez
and other fellow gang members were too attenuated in the chain
of events to have proximately caused the killing; any causal link
between Reyes’s conduct and [the victim’s] death is tenuous at
best.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 988–989.) Additionally,
the court held that there was insufficient evidence that “ ‘the act
in this case[—]the defendant, along with several other gang
members, one of which [was] armed, traveled to rival gang
17
territory’—was dangerous to life such that it satisfied the actus
reus element of implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 990.)
Next, the Supreme Court held that the resentencing court’s
finding that Reyes directly aided and abetted implied malice
murder was based on an error of law. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 990.) Specifically, the resentencing court failed to recognize
that “implied malice murder requires, among other elements,
proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and intent with regard
to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act.” (Id. at p. 991.)
“[A]ssuming the life-endangering act was the shooting, the trial
court should have asked whether Reyes knew that Lopez
intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid him in the
shooting, knew that the shooting was dangerous to life, and acted
in conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at p. 992.) The Supreme
Court held that the murder conviction could not be sustained on a
direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder.
(Ibid.) However, because it was “ ‘uncertain whether the trial
court would have reached the same result using correct legal
standards[]’ ” the court reversed the judgment and directed the
Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court for
further proceedings. (Ibid.)
Here, Martinez attempts to analogize his case to Reyes’s
case by confining the life-endangering acts that occurred in this
horrific attack to the final fatal stabbing and shooting. He points
to the medical examiner’s testimony—that the stabbing and the
shooting caused Le Blanc’s death—as evidence that the mass
beating before the stabbing and shooting was not life-
endangering. Martinez posits that “[f]ist-fighting among
teenagers, even when one individual is greatly outnumbered,
cannot be considered an act the natural consequences of which
18
are dangerous to life. . . . Otherwise, every schoolyard would
routinely be the site of incidents involving implied malice, an
obvious overextension of that concept.” “According to the medical
evidence . . . the victim would have survived the attack had it not
been for the subsequent actions of the two individuals who
stabbed and shot him.”
Implied malice murder, as explained in Reyes, is not so
limited. “ ‘[A]n act that will certainly lead to death is not
required[.]’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) Rather, the act
“ ‘ “must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result,
rather than insignificant or merely theoretical.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id.
at p. 988.) The question is not whether Le Blanc would have
actually survived the attack if not for the stabbing and
shooting—the questions are whether there was a high probability
that the mass beating would lead to Le Blanc’s death, and
whether it did in fact contribute substantially to his death. We
answer both those questions in the affirmative.
We agree with the People that unlike the act in Reyes—
bicycling into rival gang territory with other gang members, one
of whom was armed—in this case the mass beating of Le Blanc
was a life-endangering act. This was no schoolyard fist-fight.
This case bears striking similarities to People v. Schell (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 437 (Schell). There, the defendant appealed
following the trial court’s denial of his section 1172.6 petition.
(Id. at p. 440.) After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided and abetted
implied malice murder. (Ibid.) The defendant was one of at least
eight attackers who participated in a mass beating of a lone
victim. (Ibid.) While some of the other attackers used a bat and
a shovel to strike the victim, the defendant did not supply or
19
wield a weapon, but used his hands and feet in the “vicious
assault.”3 (Id. at pp. 440, 443.) The killing was committed in
retaliation for perceived “disrespect” of the attackers, who were
gang members. (Id. at p. 440.) The appellate court concluded
that the defendant’s presence at the scene, his companionship
with the other attackers, his participation, his motivation, and
his conduct before and after the fatal attack constituted
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant
aided and abetted an implied malice murder. (Id. at p. 443.) In
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court stated: “The trial
court could reasonably infer that appellant knew [the victim] was
repeatedly being hit in the head with a shovel and bat and that
he intended to aid those acts by participating in the assault. The
blows to [the victim’s] head were loud enough to be heard by
several neighbors, some of whom heard someone yell, ‘Stop it’ and
‘[y]ou’re killing him.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, evidence was presented that the attackers were
predominantly gang members who despised Black people. The
mob that attacked Le Blanc was filled with people who belonged
to Tinto Killers and 12th Street, groups that were notorious for
their hatred of Black people. The tagging crew’s name translated
to Black Killers. One of 12th Street’s primary activities was
murder. A witness testified that he repeatedly heard people in
the crowd yelling “Get that [derogatory racial epithet]” and “Kill
that [derogatory racial epithet].” Like the defendant in Schell,
Martinez attacked Le Blanc as one of a very large number of
gang members and taggers working together. Le Blanc was even
3 Evidence was presented that the victim was stabbed, but
the trial court expressly stated that its ruling “ ‘[did] not depend
on the knife.’ ” (Schell, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 441.)
20
more severely outnumbered than the victim in Schell—a mob of
10 or more people began the attack on Le Blanc; they were closely
followed by another large group of people attempting to join
them. Deborah M. testified that Le Blanc was down on his knees
on the stairs surrounded by a group of males who were punching
him so hard that she could hear “thud sounds” upon impact. As
Martinez himself put it, the attackers “stomped [Le Blanc] out”
on the stairway. By that time, Le Blanc was unarmed and was
trying to cover his head with his hands. Deborah M. testified
three times that the attackers were “beating the life out of”
[Le Blanc]. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned
her description of the beating, asking: “I take it that you are
saying that because of what took place later that night; right?”
Deborah M. responded, “No. Just by seeing what I had seen in
front of my eyes at that very moment.”
If Deborah M. had not managed to open the gate, there is a
high probability that Le Blanc would have been beaten to death
in the back yard. There was no indication that the mob intended
to cease beating Le Blanc, who was visibly unarmed by the time
he reached the stairs. Like the people in Schell who witnessed
the beating, Deborah M. yelled for the mob to stop, but they
persisted. They physically attacked and injured Deborah M.
They also injured Deborah M.’s aunt, whose only involvement
was attempting to facilitate Le Blanc’s escape. Contrary to
Martinez’s assertions, Le Blanc’s flight did not usher in a new
“phase” of the attack in which he was a mere observer. There
was no pause in the mob’s pursuit of Le Blanc. Numerous
members of the crowd immediately chased Le Blanc, knocked
him to the ground, and resumed beating him relentlessly even
after he appeared to be unconscious.
21
Although the beating may not have been the cause of
death, it was unquestionably a life-threatening act. Absent
intervention, there was a very high probability that the beating
would lead to Le Blanc’s death, in one manner or another. The
evidence demonstrates that the attack was vicious and
unrelenting from inception. The goal, as several of the
participants loudly proclaimed, was to kill Le Blanc.
Once the mass beating is properly identified as a life-
endangering act, Martinez’s other arguments fall to the wayside.
He cannot and does not contend that his actions did not
contribute to the mass beating, that he did not know the
perpetrators intended to beat Le Blanc so severely that his life
would be endangered; that he did not intend to aid and abet the
mass beating; or that he did not act with conscious disregard for
Le Blanc’s life. There is substantial evidence that Martinez aided
and abetted the murder with implied malice.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Martinez’s
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting, P. J. KIM (D.), J.
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