In re Lopez CA4/2

CourtListener 10584079Calctapp14 mai 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 5/14/25 In re Lopez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re MATTHEW CHARLES LOPEZ

on Habeas Corpus. E084939

(Super.Ct.No. CVRI2402796)

OPINION

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Timothy J.

Hollenhorst, Judge. Petition granted.

Law Office of Janice M. Bellucci and Janice M. Bellucci for Petitioner.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda J. Murray and John P.

Walters, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Matthew Charles Lopez challenges the

constitutionality of a special condition of parole prohibiting him from having any contact

with his minor daughter. We conclude that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad

and therefore grant the petition.

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BACKGROUND

In 2010, Lopez was convicted by plea of one count of committing lewd and

lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The

victim was Lopez’s four-year-old stepdaughter, who reported that Lopez placed his penis

on her vagina and made her orally copulate him when he babysat her while her mother

was working. Lopez was sentenced to eight years in state prison. He was released in

August 2017 and ordered to serve a maximum term of 10 years on parole. Lopez’s

original parole terms included a condition that prohibited him from having any contact

with any minor female (special condition no. 8).

Lopez was released on parole in August 2017. He married Inez Lopez, and she

gave birth to their daughter Sofia L. nearly one year after he was released.1 Lopez

disclosed Inez’s pregnancy to his parole officer, and after Sofia was born his parole

conditions were modified at his request to allow him to live with Sofia. The conditions

were modified to include now-former special condition no. 67, which provided: “You

shall not have unsupervised contact with your biological daughter, Sofia L. You shall

make sure an adult family member is available [to] supervise contact at all times. Family

1 In his verified habeas petition, Lopez states that he met and married Inez after he
was released from custody. But a 2020 report from the Division of Adult Parole
Operations (the parole division) of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the
Department) states that Lopez married before he was released from custody.

2
members authorized to supervise contact are: Ynez Lopez (spouse/Sofia’s mother),

Steven Lopez (father), Rosemary Lopez (mother), and Steven Lopez Jr. (brother).”2

The parole division conducted its first discharge review of Lopez in August 2020,

with annual reviews conducted thereafter.3 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3720, subd.

(a)(2), 3722, subd. (b); unlabeled references to administrative regulations are to Title 15

of the California Code of Regulations.) In connection with each review, the parole

division authored a discharge review report memorializing the review and containing

recommendations from the parole officer who authored the report, a unit supervisor, and

a parole administrator.

In August 2020, Lopez and his family—his wife, brother, mother, and father—all

signed a general affidavit acknowledging that they would ensure that Lopez was not left

alone with Sofia. In that month’s discharge review report, the parole officer, a unit

supervisor, and a parole administrator agreed that Lopez should be retained on parole.

The parole officer reported that Lopez was employed full time as a butcher, was also a

part-time student, and was living with his wife and two-year-old daughter at his parents’

2 The earliest copy of Lopez’s conditions of parole contained in the exhibits
supporting the habeas petition is from 2020. It contains now-former special condition no.
67. Lopez verified that the contents of the habeas petition are correct, and in the petition
he states that now-former special condition no. 67 was imposed after Sofia was born in
2018.

3 “Discharge Review means a review of a supervised person’s criminal history, and
their adjustment and/or performance while under parole supervision for the purpose of
rendering a decision as to whether or not a supervised person should be retained on
parole supervision for another year or be discharged from parole supervision altogether.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3720, subd. (a)(2).)

3
house. Lopez had no parole violations, was attending sex offender treatment, and was in

“good standing” with the sex offender treatment provider. The parole officer noted that it

was “[o]f concern” that Lopez had a two-year-old biological daughter with whom he was

living, and the officer recommended that the family would “greatly benefit” from

Lopez’s continued participation in sex offender treatment and retention on parole. The

unit supervisor, while acknowledging that Lopez had made “positive strides in adjusting

in the community,” recommended that continued supervision on parole was warranted for

the protection of the community and in order for Lopez to continue in sex offender

treatment to address factors that led him to molest his stepdaughter. The parole

administrator likewise acknowledged Lopez’s positive progress but recommended

retention on parole to monitor his family dynamics and to ensure his continued

participation in sex offender treatment, given that he had “a young daughter who is

approaching the age of the victim,” which the administrator found to be “of great

concern.”

In the discharge review reports in 2021 and 2022, the parole officer reported that

Lopez’s living situation remained the same, he was employed full time as a financial

advisor and consultant, he did not violate any parole conditions, he “[a]ttended,

participated, and/or completed sex offender treatment,” and he was in compliance with

the sex offender treatment provider. In July 2021, the parole officer and a parole

administrator again noted that Lopez’s continued participation in sex offender treatment

and retention on parole would benefit Lopez and his family because Lopez’s daughter

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was “the same age” that his stepdaughter was when he sexually abused her, which the

parole officer found to be “[o]f concern.”

In the August 2022 discharge review report, the parole officer reported that Lopez

worked full time as a financial consultant for a company of which he was a minority

owner. He worked “various hours remotely.” When Lopez was not working, he spent

his time at home “taking care of his daughter, assisting his parents and wife with house

chores and cooking.” Lopez also passed a polygraph test in April 2022. The parole

officer noted that Lopez’s overall performance on parole had been “excellent,” but the

officer nevertheless was concerned that Lopez’s daughter was “the same age as his 4-

year-old step-daughter victim.” Taking all circumstances into consideration, the parole

officer recommended that Lopez remain on parole with continued sex offender treatment.

The unit supervisor disagreed and instead recommended that Lopez be discharged from

parole. The unit supervisor acknowledged the parole officer’s concern about Lopez

living with his daughter but remarked that “it has not been a large enough concern to

recommend a special condition of parole to restrict contact with her.” The parole

administrator disagreed with the unit supervisor and recommended that Lopez be retained

on parole based on guidelines pertaining to sex offenders, which required a parolee to

complete 78 months of parole out of a 10-year period before discharge should be

recommended. The August 2022 discharge review report was signed by the parole

officer, the unit supervisor, and the parole administrator within one week after Sofia

turned four years old.

5
In the August 2023 discharge review report, the parole officer reported that

Lopez’s living and employment situations remained the same. Lopez was in compliance

with his sex offender treatment and had “titrated into maintenance phase.” He passed

another polygraph test in February 2023. The parole officer observed that Lopez had no

parole violations during the period and had satisfactory attendance with the sex offender

treatment provider, and his performance on parole had “been positive.” The parole

officer did not note any concerns with Lopez’s living situation but recommended that

Lopez remain on parole because he was ineligible for early discharge consideration. The

unit supervisor similarly recommended that Lopez remain on parole because he was not

eligible for early discharge and also because Lopez continued to rely on his parents for

support, and his commitment offense was very serious in that “he took advantage of the

innocence of a young minor member of society, victimizing that innocence.” The parole

administrator also noted that Lopez was not eligible for early discharge and therefore

should remain on parole. The parole administrator commented: “Additionally, [Lopez’s]

conditions are being amended to reflect no contact with biological children, as his offense

was committed against his step daughter while he was a father figure. Additional

supervision is in the best interest of the community.”

In August 2023, special condition no. 9 was added to Lopez’s parole terms. It

provides: “You shall not have contact with your biological or adopted children. ‘No

contact’ means no contact in any form, whether direct or indirect, personally, by

telephone, in writing through electronic media, email, computer, or through another

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person, etc.” A notice stating Lopez’s updated conditions of parole includes an

explanation for the special conditions. It describes the commitment offense, the sentence

that Lopez received, and his criminal history, but it provides no other explanation of

special condition no. 9.

Lopez learned of the new condition from his parole officer in late July 2023. The

following month, Lopez submitted a grievance (Grievance No. 438374) to the

Department, challenging the decision to revoke the previous parole condition that

allowed him to have supervised contact with Sofia and replacing it with a condition that

prohibited all contact with her. Lopez argued that not allowing him to have any contact

with his daughter was overbroad, not narrowly tailored, and an infringement on his

constitutional right to familial association as set forth in United States v. Wolf Child (9th

Cir. 2012) 699 F.3d 1082 (Wolf Child), which concluded that a supervised release

condition prohibiting a convicted sex offender from “‘dat[ing] or socializ[ing] with

anybody who has children under the age of 18’” without prior approval (id. at p. 1089)

was an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement on the defendant’s constitutional right

to free association and, specifically, familial association (id. at pp. 1087-1088, 1100).

Lopez asked to have former special condition no. 67 restored so that he could again live

with Sofia with supervised contact.4

4 A new, unrelated 67th condition was added to Lopez’s parole conditions in 2023,
so we refer to the condition that allowed Lopez to live with Sofia with supervised contact
as former special condition no. 67.

7
In October 2023, the Department’s Office of Grievances issued its decision on

Grievance No. 438374 (the first grievance decision). It denied Lopez’s challenge to

special condition no. 9 and concluded that the condition would “remain imposed.” The

Office of Grievances reasoned: “You are currently on parole for PC 288 (a) L&L Child

Under 14 Years. The circumstances of the offense were you sexually molested your 4-

year-old step-daughter on multiple occasions. [¶] United States v. Wolfchild has clearly

defined familial relationship as it applies to contact with biological children. Based upon

the circumstances of your commitment offense, you have shown that no familial barriers

exists and you took advantage of your position of trust as a parental figure. Based on the

aforementioned, a nexus exists to impose [special condition no. 9].”

Lopez appealed that decision. In late December 2023, the Department’s Office of

Appeals issued its decision. The Office of Appeals granted Lopez’s claim. The Office of

Appeals did not have access to and had not been provided the 2023 discharge review

report, but it noted that the 2022 discharge review report revealed that Lopez had

continued to improve on parole and that he had maintained a stable living arrangement.

The Office of Appeals reasoned that there was no evidence indicating that Lopez’s

“situation, including family structure, changed significantly from 2022, necessitating the

additional parole condition.” Citing Wolf Child, the Office of Appeals explained that

“special conditions impacting a fundamental right must take into account an

individualized assessment of [the parolee’s] situation, including family structure, and

must not be overly broad.” The Office of Appeals concluded: The “Office of

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Grievances’ response does not provide sufficient information to establish staff followed

provisions of case law and all applicable rules and regulations. Based on the

preponderance of evidence available at time of review, Office of Grievances’ decision is

not proper.”

As a remedy, the Office of Appeals ordered: The “Office of Grievances shall

open a new offender grievance tracking log number, determine if the Department has

jurisdiction and if so, consider all relevant documents, gather and preserve all relevant

evidence, conduct necessary interviews, and answer this claim on the merits.

Specifically, address whether Special Condition of Parole No. 09, ‘You shall not have

contact with your biological or adopted children. ‘No contact’ means contact in any

form, whether direct or indirect, personally, by telephone, in writing through electronic

media, email, computer, or through another person, etc,’ imposed on August 8, 2023,

infringes on [Lopez’s] constitutional right to familial association and is overly broad

pursuant to United States v. Wolf Child (9th Cir. 2012) and People v. Smith (2007).” In

granting Lopez’s claim, the Office of Appeals indicated that the “decision exhausts the

administrative remedies available to the claimant within the CDCR.”

In mid-February 2024, Lopez filed a form request to implement remedies for the

first grievance decision with the Office of Appeals. The form specifies that it is to be

used “to ask for a remedy that was granted but is overdue.” (Italics omitted.) Lopez

stated that he had “received no decision from the Office of Grievances, nor has any

relevant person been contacted for the interview.”

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In April 2024, the Office of Grievances issued a new decision with a new tracking

number—Grievance No. 545764—in which the Office of Grievances again denied the

challenge and ordered special condition no. 9 to remain imposed (the second grievance

decision). The Office of Grievances explained the reason for the denial as follows:

“United States v. Wolf Child has clearly defined familial relationship as it applies to

contact with biological children. Based upon the circumstances of your commitment

offense, you have shown that no familial barriers exist and you took advantage of your

position of trust as a parental figure. Given the nature of your commitment offense that

involved sexual abuse of your stepdaughter with whom you were a father figure,

prohibiting contact with your daughter regulates conduct that is not in itself criminal, but

reasonably likely to increase the chance the offender will commit a new crime.”

Lopez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court. In August

2024, the superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing,

finding that Lopez had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal

the second grievance decision.

The following month, the Office of Appeals responded to Lopez’s February 2024

request to implement remedies in the first grievance decision. It stated: “The Office of

Appeals received your Request to Implement Remedies (Form 602-3) regarding the

above-referenced matter. Subsequent to your filing, this Office has confirmed that the

remedy has been fully implemented. The matter is therefore fully resolved.”

10
Lopez subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court. We

issued an order to show cause.

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion of administrative remedies

The Department argues that the habeas petition should be denied because Lopez

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not appealing the second grievance

decision. We are not persuaded.

Before seeking judicial relief, habeas corpus petitioners must exhaust all available

administrative remedies, even if “constitutional issues are at the core of the dispute.” (In

re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667, 678, abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in

Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 130.) Exhaustion of

administrative remedies “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.”

(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293.)

The Department has a multi-level administrative process for review of challenges

to conditions of parole. (In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) When Lopez filed

his grievance and administrative appeal, the Department’s regulations required Lopez to

submit a written grievance to the Office of Grievances within 60 days of discovering the

challenged parole condition.5 (Former §§ 3481, subd. (a), 3482, subds. (a)(2), (b)(1).)

The parolee could then file a written appeal within 60 days of the Office of Grievances’

5 The pertinent Department regulations were amended effective January 1, 2025.
(Cal. Reg. Notice Register 2025, No. 82.) We cite and quote the version of the
regulations that was in effect in 2023, when Lopez filed his grievance and his appeal
from the denial of his grievance was decided.

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decision. (Former §§ 3481, subd. (a), 3484, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The Office of Appeals

was required to issue a written decision within a specified period, and the regulations

listed 10 permissible resolutions of each claim in the appeal, one of which was that the

appeal was “‘[g]ranted.’” (Former § 3485, subd. (g)(2)(A).) The regulations further

provided that “[c]ompletion of the review process by the Office of Appeals resulting in a

decision of . . . ‘granted,’ . . . constitutes exhaustion of all administrative remedies

available to a claimant within the department.” (Former § 3485, subd. (l)(1).)

Under the then-existing regulations, Lopez exhausted his administrative remedies

with respect to the first grievance decision denying his challenge to the imposition of

special condition no. 9 and the revocation of former special condition no. 67. It is

undisputed that Lopez filed a timely administrative appeal of the first grievance decision

and that the Office of Appeals “granted” that appeal. That appeal was decided in 2023,

when the regulations provided that the granting of an appeal exhausts a claimant’s

administrative remedies. (Former § 3485, subd. (l)(1).) Accordingly, the Office of

Appeals correctly stated in its decision that Lopez exhausted his administrative remedies

within the Department.

Contrary to the Department’s argument, Lopez was not required to appeal from

the second grievance decision in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Lopez did

not file a second grievance that independently required exhaustion. Rather, the Office of

Appeals required the Office of Grievances to “open a new offender grievance tracking

log number” to reconsider Lopez’s challenge to the constitutionality of special condition

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no. 9, which the Office of Grievances did. The second grievance decision therefore was

merely a continuation of the only grievance that Lopez filed, which was exhausted when

the Office of Appeals granted the appeal. (Former § 3485, subd. (l)(1).) The applicable

regulations did not require Lopez to take any further action, so Lopez exhausted his

administrative remedies when the Office of Appeals granted the appeal. (Ibid.)

For these reasons, we conclude that under then-applicable regulations Lopez

exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the grievance that he filed

challenging the constitutionality of special condition no. 9.

II. Constitutionality of the parole condition

Lopez argues that special condition no. 9 is unconstitutional because it was

arbitrarily imposed and infringes on his right to familial autonomy because it is not

narrowly tailored. We agree that special condition no. 9 is unconstitutionally overbroad.

“‘Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner who has already served part of his

or her state prison sentence. Once released from confinement, a prisoner on parole is not

free from legal restraint, but is constructively a prisoner in the legal custody of state

prison authorities until officially discharged from parole.’” (In re Taylor (2015) 60

Cal.4th 1019, 1037.) Parolees “have fewer constitutional rights than do ordinary

persons.” (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233 (Stevens); Taylor, at

pp. 1036-1037.) But there are still “constitutional limits upon the parole authority’s

imposition of restrictions.” (People v. Perrot (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 795, 806.)

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In general, the state may impose any parole condition that it deems proper (Pen.

Code, § 3053, subd. (a)), but the conditions “must be reasonable since parolees retain

‘constitutional protection against arbitrary [and] oppressive official action’” (Stevens,

supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234). “Conditions of parole must be reasonably related to

the compelling state interest of fostering a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee. [Citation.]

Thus, a condition that bars lawful activity will be upheld only if the prohibited conduct

either 1) has a relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, or 2) is

reasonably related to deter future criminality.” (Ibid.)

In addition, parole conditions may not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

(People v. Austin (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 778, 787.) A parole condition restricting a

parolee’s exercise of a constitutional right must not be overbroad and will be upheld

“only if narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and

rehabilitation, and if [it is] ‘specifically tailored to the individual [parolee].’” (People v.

Smith (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1250 (Smith) [addressing a probation condition]; In

re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [same]; see also Stevens, supra, 119

Cal.App.4th at p. 1233 [“The criteria for assessing the constitutionality of conditions of

probation also applies to conditions of parole”].) “The essential question in an

overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the

restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in

mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity

will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)

14
Lopez has a constitutional right to free association that includes the right of

familial association and “‘a fundamental liberty interest in companionship with his . . .

child.’” (Wolf Child, supra, 699 F.3d at p. 1091.) It is undisputed that special condition

no. 9 infringes that right. (Id. at pp. 1089, 1092 [similar restriction].) But the right “‘is

not absolute.’” (Id. at p. 1092.) An infringement of the right is not impermissibly

overbroad if it is narrowly tailored to the government’s interests in public safety and

rehabilitation and specifically tailored to Lopez’s circumstances. (Smith, supra, 152

Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.) Special condition no. 9 does not satisfy those requirements.

Special condition no. 9 broadly prohibits Lopez from having any direct or indirect

contact or communication with his daughter. The stated basis for the newly imposed

restriction was a description of the commitment offense. Given that Lopez was convicted

of committing a lewd and lascivious act against his four-year-old stepdaughter when he

lived with her, restricting Lopez’s contact with his five-year-old biological daughter has a

direct relationship to the crime of which Lopez was convicted and forbids conduct that is

reasonably related to preventing future criminality. (People v. Mills (1978) 81

Cal.App.3d 171, 182.) Special condition no. 9 thus serves the compelling government

interests of keeping a young child safe and preventing recidivism. (Jonathan L. v.

Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1104 [“There can be no dispute that the

child’s safety is a compelling governmental interest”]; Mills, at p. 181 [preventing

recidivism by sex offenders is a legitimate state interest].)

15
“‘But “[i]t is not enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the

means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.”’” (Stevens, supra, 119

Cal.App.4th at p. 1237.) Special condition no. 9 does not satisfy that requirement.

(Smith, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)

Nothing in the record supports the Department’s imposition of a complete ban on

Lopez’s contact with Sofia in 2023. The commitment offense has not changed since

Lopez was released on parole in 2017. But Lopez was allowed to live with his daughter

for the five years before special condition no. 9 was imposed—that is, Sofia’s entire

life—with the limitation that he could not have any unsupervised contact with her. There

was no indication in the annual discharge review reports filed in 2020 through 2023 that

Lopez was violating that condition or was engaging in any inappropriate conduct toward

Sofia. In the reviews conducted in the years preceding the modification, the parole

division staff expressed concern that Sofia was approaching or had reached the age at

which Lopez’s stepdaughter was sexually abused, but no one recommended modification

of the parole condition allowing Lopez to live with Sofia. The Department instead

continued to allow Lopez to live with his daughter on the condition that they have no

unsupervised contact. Moreover, in 2022, shortly after Sofia turned four years old and

thus was the same age at which Lopez’s stepdaughter was abused, the unit supervisor

even recommended discharging Lopez from parole, noting that Lopez had performed

excellently on parole and that the concern about Lopez’s living with his daughter had not

led anyone to recommend that such contact be prohibited. No one expressed any concern

16
about Lopez living with his daughter in the 2023 report, when the conditions were

modified. The parole division thus did not have any new information tending to show

that Lopez presented any greater danger to Sofia by living with her than he had

previously.

Special condition no. 9 is not narrowly tailored to these circumstances “to interfere

as little as possible” with Lopez’s constitutionally protected right to familial association.

(People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 944.) It is extremely broad and prohibits

Lopez from have any contact with Sofia—not only in-person contact but also video calls,

voice calls, and even written communication—despite the absence of any evidence of

problematic behavior during their years of supervised in-person contact. Given the

circumstances, there are far less restrictive means by which the Department could have

achieved its goals. (People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 623.) For example,

assuming for the sake of argument that some change in Lopez’s parole conditions was

warranted by Sofia’s age, there is still no evidence that allowing supervised visits with

Sofia in a public setting or supervised voice or video calls would fail to achieve the goals

of protecting Sofia and preventing recidivism by Lopez. Because special condition no.

9’s blanket prohibition of all contact between Lopez and Sofia is not narrowly tailored to

his circumstances, special condition no. 9 is an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement

of Lopez’s right of familial association.

We accordingly grant the petition and order the Department to strike special

condition no. 9. Because we conclude that special condition no. 9 is unconstitutionally

17
overbroad, we need not decide whether it was imposed in an unconstitutionally arbitrary

manner.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The Department is ordered to

strike special condition no. 9 and to reinstate former special condition no. 67, which

allowed Lopez to live with his daughter so long as his contact with her is supervised at all

times by specified persons.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

MILLER
J.

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