CourtListener 10583337•People v. Avila CA4/3
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Filed 5/12/25 P. v. Avila CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063613
v. (Super. Ct. No. 14NF2846)
PAUL AVILA III, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Paul Avila III appeals a postjudgment order denying
his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Under that
section, resentencing is generally required when the defendant is serving a
sentence for a judgment that includes a prior prison term enhancement
under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)). Although
Avila’s judgment includes two such enhancements, the trial court determined
he was ineligible for resentencing because their punishment was stricken at
the time of sentencing. Avila contends that ruling was erroneous, and we
agree. Following the Sixth District’s recent opinion in People v. Espino (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino), and
pending review of that issue by the California Supreme Court, we reverse the
court’s order and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In 2015, Avila was convicted of two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon. The trial court also found true that he had served two prior
prison terms for purposes of former section 667.5(b). The court sentenced
Avila to an aggregate term of 18 years in prison. It imposed enhancements
for the two prior prison terms but struck them “for purposes of punishment
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
only.”2 A panel of this court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Avila
(Sept. 12, 2016, G051707) [nonpub. opn.].)3
Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature limited the
applicability of section 667.5(b) to prior prison terms that were served for
sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It later afforded
retroactive relief to those serving a sentence that includes a now-invalid
prison prior enhancement. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Avila petitioned the
trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him pursuant to section
1172.75. The trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that Avila
appeared “on a list furnished by [the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation] to the Court of persons potentially eligible for relief
pursuant to . . . sections 1172.75 or 1172.7.”4 But because Avila’s punishment
on his prison prior enhancements was stricken, the trial court determined he
was ineligible for relief and denied his petition. Avila timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Avila contends the trial court erred in denying his resentencing
petition. We agree.
Before 2020, section 667.5(b) “required trial courts to impose a
one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the
2 Although Avila’s abstract of judgment does not include two
prison prior enhancements under section 667.5(b), the reporter’s transcript
from the sentencing hearing indicates, and the parties agree, that the court
struck them “for purposes of punishment only.”
3 This court previously granted Avila’s request to take judicial
notice of the prior opinion in this case, remittitur, and the California
Supreme Court order denying petition for review.
4 This list is not in the record on appeal.
3
defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free
of custody for at least five years.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379–380.) Effective January 1, 2020, section 667.5 was amended “by
limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually
violent offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms
served for other offenses became legally invalid.” (People v. Burgess, at
p. 380.)
Those changes were made retroactive through the passage of
subsequent legislation, including section 1172.75. (People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 399.) The statute declares that any prior prison term
enhancement that was imposed before 2020 for a crime other than a sexually
violent offense is legally invalid. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) It also provides an
ameliorative remedy when the defendant’s judgment includes such an
enhancement. Indeed, the statute requires the trial court to recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant in that situation. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c).) Resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).)
The question we must decide is whether section 1172.75 requires
resentencing when a defendant has sustained a prior prison term
enhancement under former section 667.5(b) but the trial court struck its
punishment at the time of sentencing. Pending direction from the California
4
Supreme Court, we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion in Espino,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted, and conclude that it does.5
Reviewing the meaning of section 1172.75 de novo, Espino, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted, determined the statute “should be
interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘impose’ and
therefore [should apply] whenever a prison prior is included in a judgment,
whether the prior is executed, stayed, or punishment is struck.” (Espino, at
p. 194.) While recognizing that a defendant suffers no immediate adverse
consequences when the punishment for his prison priors has been stricken,
Espino found it significant that the enhancement remains on the judgment in
that situation and “may adversely impact the defendant in other ways such
as restricting the ability to accrue conduct credits or subjecting the defendant
to additional punishment for future convictions.” (Id. at p. 201.) Espino held
that this potential for future adverse consequences is sufficient to trigger the
protections afforded in section 1172.75. (Ibid.)
This case presents the same circumstance referenced by the
Espino court. Because Avila’s prior prison term enhancements were imposed
and only their punishment was stricken, the enhancements are still included
5 In addition to granting review in Espino, which involved a
request for resentencing where the punishment for a now-invalid prison prior
enhancement had been stricken, the California Supreme Court has granted
review to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeal regarding whether
section 1172.75 applies where a now-invalid prison prior was imposed but
stayed. (See, e.g., People v. Rhodius, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.)
5
in the judgment. For the reasons explained in Espino, we conclude Avila is
therefore entitled to resentencing.6
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Avila’s petition is reversed and
the matter is remanded for the trial court to recall his sentence and
resentence him pursuant to the terms of section 1172.75. Upon conclusion of
the new sentencing hearing, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
SCOTT, J.
I CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
6 Although we agree with the Espino majority’s rationale, we
acknowledge the well-reasoned analysis of the dissent in that case and await
the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue.
6
DELANEY, ACTING P.J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the sole issue in this case concerns
the interpretation of Penal Code section 1172.75, and I agree the trial court
erred in denying defendant Paul Avila III’s resentencing petition.1 I write
separately because I believe the statutory analysis which compels this
conclusion is different than that articulated in People v. Espino (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino), on
which the majority relies.
“Our task when interpreting statutory language is to discern the
Legislature’s intent ‘so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.]
‘The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with
the statute’s words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and
construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning
governs.’” (People v. Hupp (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 946, 950.)
Section 1172.75 requires resentencing when a defendant’s
judgment includes a now-invalid prison prior sentencing enhancement
“imposed” pursuant to a former version of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
(§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).) The Attorney General argues the word imposed
should be interpreted to mean imposed and executed.
On its face, section 1172.75 does not require a defendant to have
been subjected to a term of imprisonment to qualify for resentencing. Rather,
the statute is broadly worded to apply whenever a prior prison term
enhancement was “imposed,” without further qualification. (§ 1172.75, subds.
(a), (c).) Had the Legislature intended to limit section 1172.75’s reach to cases
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
where the enhancement was imposed and executed, it could have expressly
done so. But it did not.
When the plain language of a statute is clear, courts are not at
liberty to rewrite it to conform to a presumed legislative intent which does
not appear in its text. (See Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th
792, 807; Figueroa v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 708, 712). Thus, if
one views “imposed” as unambiguous, the express language of section
1172.75 does not support the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute
as requiring both imposition and execution of a prior prison term
enhancement as a prerequisite to obtaining resentencing relief. (Espino,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 197, rev. granted; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 665, 676.)
Applying that understanding of the “imposed” language to a
situation in which the punishment for a prison prior enhancement was
stricken, a court does not impose a sentence enhancement finding. Rather, it
imposes punishment for a sentence enhancement. (See People v. Gonzalez
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125; Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 (dis.
opn. of Lie, J.), rev. granted.) Punishment cannot be stricken, unless it is first
imposed. (See Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impose, par. 1.a> [as of Feb. 18, 2025] archived at:
<https://perma.cc/9DW6-JUF6> [defining “impose” as “to establish or apply
by authority”]; Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/strike, par. 4> [as of Feb. 18, 2025] archived at:
<https://perma.cc/MR92-TPD5> [defining “strike” as “to delete something”].)
Here, the original sentencing court struck only the punishment for the
enhancement and did not strike the enhancement itself. So, even though
Avila was not subjected to prison time or the threat of prison time as a result
2
of the prior prison term enhancement finding, the sentence enhancement was
imposed for purposes of section 1172.75 resentencing eligibility.
While the foregoing analysis is premised on the statute’s plain
language being unambiguous and on a certain ordinary meaning of the word
imposed, I would be remiss not to recognize People v. Rhodius (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted February 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius),
and the Espino dissent. Both provide equally persuasive, supported, and well-
reasoned argument for ascribing a different meaning to the word imposed,
including cogent rationale that goes beyond the statutory language. (See
Rhodius, at pp. 43–48, rev. granted; Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp.
202–204 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.), rev. granted.)
Among other matters, the Espino dissent highlights the divergent
positions held by the judiciary regarding whether an enhancement for which
punishment was stricken may have potential future adverse consequences,
such as restricting a defendant’s custody credits, and whether the Legislature
intended section 1172.75 to neutralize any such potential collateral
consequences. (Compare Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 201, with id. at
pp. 204–205 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.), rev. granted.) Relevant to those points, and
the related statement by the majority in this case, any defendant who
previously served a term in prison will always have that prior prison term in
their history. Thus, even if the finding and punishment for an enhancement
based thereon is eliminated from a particular judgment, the prior prison term
has the potential for negatively impacting them in the future. (See, e.g., §
1170, subd. (b)(2) [court may impose sentence exceeding middle term of
sentencing triad when “circumstances in aggravation” justify doing so];
Chavez Zapeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 78
[“‘circumstances in aggravation’” in § 1170, subd. (b)(2), includes factors listed
3
in Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 [prior
prison term served by defendant is an aggravating circumstance].)
Similarly, Rhodius brings to light the current fundamental
disagreement among appellate courts regarding whether unexecuted
punishment for a prison prior enhancement adds to a defendant’s sentence,
such that elimination of all aspects of the enhancement will “result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1); see, e.g.,
Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 197, rev. granted; People v. Christianson
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 312, review granted February 21, 2024, S283189;
Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43–44, rev. granted.) In this regard, I
respectfully disagree that an enhancement for which punishment was
originally stricken can result in an additional term of imprisonment during a
future resentencing.
Roughly two years before the Legislature enacted section
1172.75, it amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to narrow the availability
of the one-year prison prior enhancement. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The
enhancement is now only available for prior prison terms for sexually violent
offenses, which is the precise type of prison prior enhancement excluded from
section 1172.75 resentencing eligibility. (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 1172.75, subd.
(a).) Accordingly, a court conducting a resentencing today could only “revive”
a one-year prison prior enhancement for which punishment was previously
stricken if the qualifying prior prison term was for a sexually violent offense.
A court could not, now or in the future, impose punishment for a prison prior
enhancement that the Legislature makes unavailable at the time of a
resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 160–163
[new laws that mitigate punishment for offense generally are presumed to
apply to cases not yet final, including when prior sentence is vacated for
4
resentencing]; People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206 & fn. 4
[except where barred by prohibition against ex post facto laws, trial court
must apply law in effect at time of resentencing].)
Where, as here, the use of statutory construction tools leads to
two reasonable interpretations of the statute which completely
counterbalance one another, the inescapable conclusion is the statute is
ambiguous in such a manner, and to such an extent, that its meaning cannot
be conclusively resolved by applying rules of statutory construction. Under
these unique circumstances, the rule of lenity applies, and we must adopt the
interpretation most favorable to Avila—that an imposed prison prior
sentence enhancement triggers application of section 1172.75’s resentencing
process, even if the original sentencing court ultimately struck the
punishment. (See People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 611 [rule of lenity
applies “‘“‘only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative
body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to
justify invoking the rule’”’”]; Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 201, rev.
granted [rule of lenity would apply if section 1172.75 interpretations were
equally strong on both sides].)
Because Avila’s judgment includes a prison prior sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, within the meaning
of section 1172.75, I agree Avila is entitled to resentencing.
DELANEY, ACTING P.J.
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