People v. Halfhide CA3

CourtListener 10583335Calctapp13 mai 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 5/13/25 P. v. Halfhide CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100957

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR20233617)

v.

DAMIAAN ANTHONY HALFHIDE,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Damiaan Anthony Halfhide guilty of assault, false
imprisonment, contempt of court, and endangering the health of a child. The court
granted probation and imposed an electronic search condition as part of its grant of
probation. Defendant claims this probation condition is unreasonable and
unconstitutionally overbroad. We agree the electronic search condition is unreasonable
and remand with directions to strike or tailor the condition at issue.

1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2023, defendant was at home with two of his children while his wife,
daughter, and stepdaughter were shopping. Defendant was drinking alcohol during the
day and became upset when his wife returned home later than expected.
When defendant’s wife, daughter, and stepdaughter returned home defendant was
asleep on the couch. When he woke up he appeared inebriated and complained that the
house was dirty. Defendant went into the kitchen, threw his wife’s and stepdaughter’s
phones into one of the younger children’s play area, and then walked through a hallway
to his room. Defendant’s wife later found a half-empty bottle of vodka and emptied the
contents into the bathtub.
Defendant returned to the hallway and started to film his family members with his
cell phone. His stepdaughter walked past him, ignoring him, and into the living room to
get ready for a party. Defendant followed and continued to film her from an armlength’s
distance. Defendant’s stepdaughter testified she did not know why he was filming her.
After asking defendant to stop filming her, she reached for his phone. In response,
defendant grabbed and twisted her arm. Defendant’s wife came into the room to separate
them but moments later defendant and his stepdaughter were grabbing each other’s
throats and yelling at each other. Defendant admitted to putting his stepdaughter in a
headlock during the altercation. Defendant’s wife again pulled them apart and
defendant’s stepdaughter threw his phone out the front door of the house. Defendant’s
stepdaughter immediately called 911; police officers arrived and arrested defendant.
A first amended information charged defendant with assault by means of force
likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1); false
imprisonment with force and violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 2); contempt of

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
court by contacting persons protected by a court order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count 3);
battery against a spouse (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 4); abusing or endangering the health
of a child, (§ 273a, subd. (b); count 5); and battery, (§ 242; count 6). The information
also alleged several circumstances in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a) &
(b)).
At trial, the prosecution introduced prior instances of defendant committing
domestic violence including: Defendant slapping his daughter in February 2022 and an
incident in April 2022 where defendant and his wife got into a physical altercation after
defendant was drinking alcohol. During the April 2022 incident, defendant’s wife fell to
the ground during an argument and suffered a cut on her face. After she fell, defendant
sat on her, the children intervened physically, and police officers eventually arrived at the
home and arrested defendant.
A jury found defendant guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 and not guilty on counts 4
and 6. The court stayed imposition of the sentence and placed defendant on formal
probation for four years. The court included the following condition as a term of
defendant’s probation: “The defendant shall consent to a search of any digital devices
(including communication devices) in [his] possession or control and any social media
accounts; [he] shall disclose passwords for any such devices/accounts to a probation
officer or any peace officer on demand, without warrant or suspicion; . . . to ensure
compliance with CPO.”
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the electronic search condition,
claiming it was overbroad. Defense counsel asserted there was no nexus between the
charged offenses or the risk of future criminality, citing to In re David C. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 657. He further argued, “[Defendant] didn’t commit this offense by use of a
cell phone. The offenses for which he’s before the Court were physical confrontations. It
wasn’t a cell phone that caused the offense to occur. These were physical confrontations.
. . . [¶] . . . There’s nothing to show that he utilized a cell phone to commit the offenses,

3
and there’s no reason to believe that this restriction will serve a rehabilitative purpose.
There’s nothing more than an abstract or hypothetical relationship in determining future
criminality. [¶] It also challenges his privacy in an extreme way because it’s asking for
consent to search all digital devices. It’s not narrowly limited.”
The prosecution argued defendant took In re David C. out of context. It asserted
that the probation term was valid because it related to preventing his past harassing
conduct in violation of other restraining orders; to ensure compliance with criminal
protective orders; and that defendant’s means of harassing his family members, using his
phone to film his family members, involved technology that should be subject to search.
The trial court imposed the electronic search term over defendant’s objection, finding that
the probation term “pass[ed] muster” under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent)
for the reasons stated by the prosecution.
Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims the electronic search condition in his probation terms is
unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad. The People assert the term is valid and
that under Lent the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing it. The People
further assert the condition is closely tailored to its legitimate objective, which is to
prevent defendant from harassing his family. Defendant replies that the electronic search
condition is not reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interest to rehabilitate him or
to protect the public.
When granting probation a court may impose “reasonable conditions, as it may
determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be
made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting
from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of
the probationer.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)

4
“[C]ourts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to
protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (People v. Carbajal (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) However, the court’s discretion is not without limits--a condition
of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute. (Id. at p. 1121.) Under the test
in Lent, a probation condition will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to
the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself
criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Further, a probation condition that
regulates conduct that is not itself criminal, such as an electronic search condition, must
be “reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future
criminality.” (Ibid.) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness
of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on
the defendant’s constitutional rights.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)
We review a challenge to a probation condition for abuse of discretion. (See In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
The electronic search condition at issue permits the general “search of any digital
[and communication] devices” and “any social media accounts” to ensure compliance
with the criminal protective order. The court found the electronic search condition
related to preventing defendant’s past harassing conduct in violation of other restraining
orders, to ensure compliance with criminal protective orders, and that defendant had
harassed his family members by filming them with his phone.
Because the electronic search term is related to conduct that is not itself criminal,
the term must be reasonably related to the underlying crime and preventing future
criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Here, defendant’s criminal conduct was
assaultive in nature. Although defendant used his phone to film his family members
during the commission of the crimes, his use of the phone was incidental. Defendant’s
phone was not used to plan, facilitate, or commit the criminal conduct which the

5
probation condition seeks to prevent. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1119,
1122-1123 [a probation condition providing full access to the defendant’s phone was not
proportional because defendant’s cell phone use was not connected to his commission of
burglary].) Because nothing in the record suggests defendant used his phone in
connection with his criminal conduct, the burden imposed by the condition and the
legitimate interests served by the condition were not proportional. (In re Erica R. (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 907, 909-910 [electronic search condition was unreasonable because
there was no history of the defendant using a phone in connection with criminal activity];
In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 752 [electronic search condition for theft offense
was unreasonable because the phone was not used to facilitate the offense].)
The probation condition also does not reasonably prevent future criminality.
Because use of cell phones is a ubiquitous part of daily life, mere use and possession of a
cell phone alone does not indicate future criminal activity and a probation condition must
balance defendant’s privacy interest with the state’s legitimate interest to prevent future
harassment. (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385, 394-395; In re Ricardo P.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122 [“ ‘[C]onditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the
offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime’ [citation] so long as
they are ‘reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality’ ”].) The
People argue defendant “used his phone to record the victims in this case as a means of
harassment and intimidation,” to justify the probation condition. But the record
demonstrates that defendant’s assaultive conduct of throwing his stepdaughter’s cell
phone, hitting and choking his stepdaughter, and knocking his wife to the ground did not
involve cell phone use. Defendant used his phone to film portions of the incident, not to
commit any of the underlying criminal activity. Nor did he use his cell phone during any
prior incidents where he harassed or assaulted his family members. As written, the
expansive electronic search condition would allow law enforcement officers to access
defendant’s e-mail, text and voicemail messages, photos, and online accounts, including

6
social media, at any time. (In re Ricardo P., at p. 1127 [holding an expansive electronic
search term related to a burglary conviction was invalid under Lent].) The condition also
lacks any temporal limitations, which would allow access to digital information predating
defendant’s probation. (Ibid.) We conclude the electronic search condition is overbroad
and not narrowly tailored to prevent future harassment of defendant’s family and is
therefore invalid under Lent.
Because we conclude the probation condition was not reasonable, we need not
address defendant’s second contention that the electronic search condition was
unconstitutionally broad.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the electronic search probation condition. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court so it may
consider whether it can adopt a tailored electronic search condition consistent with this
opinion.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

7

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.