People v. Chivrell CA3

CourtListener 10581742Calctapp9 mai 2025

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Filed 5/9/25 P. v. Chivrell CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101250

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24CF01586)

v.

KRIS VALL CHIVRELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Kris Vall Chivrell pled no contest to felony vandalism and was ordered
to pay over $40,000 in direct victim restitution for extensive damage he caused to the
victim’s truck. On appeal, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
object to the recommended restitution amount or request a hearing on the matter. He
contends the restitution order must be reversed and that the matter be remanded for a
restitution hearing. Finding no merit to his contentions, we shall affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After dating for nearly a decade, in February 2024, A.R. told Chivrell that she
wanted to end their relationship.1 During a subsequent argument, Chivrell struck A.R.
with his fist on the side of her head. A.R.’s friend, E.D., witnessed the incident.
Two months later, in April 2024, Chivrell significantly damaged E.D.’s Ford F-150
truck after he got mad that A.R. went to a casino with E.D. Chivrell was supposed to
remove the engine and replace it. Instead, he removed the engine and sold it for scrap
(without E.D.’s permission) and then failed to install the new engine, which E.D. believed
he had also sold for scrap. Chivrell broke the rear window, the driver’s side window, the
windshield, and the right mirror, and he slashed the truck’s tires. E.D. submitted a repair
estimate to law enforcement from an automotive repair shop for $43,819.97, which
represented the cost to fix the damage Chivrell caused to her truck.
Based on the two incidents, Chivrell pled no contest in April 2024 to misdemeanor
domestic violence battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1))2 and felony vandalism causing
over $400 worth of property damage (§ 594, subd. (a)) in exchange for a stipulated
“NISP” agreement (no immediate state prison agreement); the matter of probation and
sentencing was to be determined solely by the judge. The plea agreement acknowledged
that, as a consequence of his plea, Chivrell would have to pay victim restitution and other
additional fines. In May 2024, the trial court placed Chivrell on three years of formal
probation with various terms and conditions.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court discussed restitution and fines with
Chivrell. The probation report had recommended direct victim restitution in the amount

1 This factual summary is based on the police reports as described in the probation
report. Chivrell stipulated to the probation report and the police reports as well as the
probable cause declaration and the face of the complaint as the factual basis for his plea.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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of $43,819.97, based on the repair estimate from the automotive repair shop. The court
explained that Chivrell had to pay victim restitution, although “if [he] disagree[d] with
the amount, [he could] talk to [his] lawyer and have a hearing.” After the court clerk
inquired whether the court was “setting [the] interest rate to accrue for the victim
restitution,” the court replied, “Do you do that? Is he agreeing already or is he going to
ask for a hearing?” Chivrell then stated, “I’d like to subpoena the receipt for the vehicle
because I know how much she paid for it.” The court responded, “Okay. Don’t tell me.
Tell [your attorney].” Defense counsel informed the court, “Your Honor, at this point I
previously discussed with my client, I believe he was okay with stipulating to the amount.
But I would reserve the right to set a hearing to ask for modification, if so appropriate.”
The court replied, “Okay,” and set interest to accrue at 10 percent from the date of
sentencing. In doing so, the court commented, “I [have] rarely seen this big [of an]
amount in a criminal case on restitution.” A subsequent order for restitution and abstract
of judgment checked a box indicating that Chivrell had stipulated to the amount of the
direct victim restitution at the May 2024 sentencing hearing.
Chivrell timely appealed the victim restitution order in May 2024. The trial court
denied his request for a certificate of probable cause. Chivrell’s opening brief was filed
in October 2024, and this case became fully briefed on February 21, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Chivrell contends his trial counsel’s failure to object to the amount of direct victim
restitution, or to otherwise request a hearing, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his view, counsel should have requested a restitution hearing or challenged the amount
because: (1) he told the trial court that he would like to subpoena the repair estimate
receipt because he supposedly knew how much E.D. had paid for her truck, and (2) the
trial court said it had rarely seen such a large restitution amount in other criminal matters.

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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) that he suffered prejudice,
meaning that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, it is reasonably probable that the
result would have been different. (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)
“Ineffective assistance of counsel is particularly difficult to demonstrate on direct appeal,
where we are limited to the record from the trial court.” (People v. Acosta (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 701, 706.) Unless the defendant establishes the contrary, we presume
counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions or inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. (Ibid.)
If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, we must reject an ineffective assistance claim unless counsel was asked for
an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation. (Ibid.)
B. Direct Victim Restitution
Under section 1202.4, a crime victim is entitled to restitution for economic losses
suffered from criminal conduct. (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court must order a
defendant convicted of the crime to pay restitution “in an amount established by court
order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the
court.” (Id., subd. (f).) The restitution order must “fully reimburse the victim . . . for
every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal
conduct, including, but not limited to . . . [f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen
or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement
cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.”
(Id., subd. (f)(3)(A).)

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Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(A) gives the trial court discretion to choose
between the cost of replacement or the cost of repair when ordering direct victim
restitution, and nothing in the statute requires the court to select the lesser of the two
amounts. (People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 737.) Courts have recognized that
valuation may be based on a loss report filed with the police or on a victim’s own
statement of value. (See People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946-947 (Foster),
superseded by statute on other grounds.) The standard of proof for victim restitution is
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and no particular
kind of proof is required. (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542-1543.)
A trial court, moreover, “is entitled to consider the probation report when
determining the amount of restitution,” and “[a] property owner’s statements in the
probation report about the value of [his or] her property should be accepted as prima facie
evidence of value for purposes of restitution.” (Foster, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 946;
In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 547, fn. 2 [“None of the cases hold that the victim
must supply a sworn proof of loss or detailed documentation of costs and expenses”].)
“When the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a
recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with
contrary information to challenge that amount.” (Foster, at p. 947.)
C. Analysis
Chivrell has not met the heavy burden of establishing that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. At the outset, we note that a reasonable explanation exists for
defense counsel’s lack of objection below. As defense counsel explained to the court, he
had previously discussed the recommended restitution amount with Chivrell, and Chivrell
had agreed to stipulate to the amount. Based on these conversations, counsel had no
reason to challenge the restitution amount recommended in the probation report. Indeed,
when defense counsel informed the court that Chivrell was willing to stipulate to the

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amount, Chivrell did not interject that counsel was mistaken or voice a contrary position
to the court.
Although it is true, as Chivrell points out, the written plea agreement does not
specify an exact amount of victim restitution, it does acknowledge that he would be
required to pay victim restitution. And based on defense counsel’s statements during the
sentencing hearing, he and Chivrell had discussed the amount of restitution recommended
in the probation report, and Chivrell had agreed to stipulate to that amount.
In any event, even if Chivrell’s statement—that he wanted to subpoena the repair
estimate receipt because he knew how much the victim had supposedly paid for her
truck—could be interpreted as a withdrawal of his consent to stipulate to the amount,
Chivrell cannot show that counsel’s failure to object or request a hearing resulted in
prejudice.
The probation report recommended the $43,819.97 restitution amount based on an
automotive repair estimate from Collision Masters and Framework, which the victim had
obtained and provided to law enforcement. The trial court was entitled to rely on the
information in the probation report and this repair estimate in setting the amount of direct
victim restitution even if the prosecution did not produce the actual estimate during the
sentencing hearing. (See Foster, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 946 [trial court may rely on
information in probation report in determining appropriate amount of restitution owed].)
“ ‘Due process does not require a judge to draw sentencing information through the
narrow net of courtroom evidence rules . . . sentencing judges are given virtually
unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and the source from
whence it comes.’ ” (People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 81 [rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the trial court could not consider the probation report in
determining the amount of restitution because the report was based on hearsay and
included conclusions by the probation officer drawn from extrajudicial statements].)
Given the trial court’s broad discretion to award victim restitution, defense counsel may

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reasonably have decided to forgo making an objection regarding the repair costs
described in the probation report, believing such an objection to be futile. (See People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing
to make futile motions or requests].)
And, to the extent the estimated repair cost exceeded the amount the victim had
originally paid for the truck (as Chivrell’s comment during the sentencing hearing
seemingly implies) or purportedly exceeded a Kelly Bluebook estimate for replacing the
truck with a like vehicle (as Chivrell argues for the first time on appeal), these facts alone
do not mean that the result would have been different had defense counsel objected or
requested a hearing. In Stanley, for example, our Supreme Court found that the trial court
did not err in ordering over $2,000 in restitution based on an automotive repair shop’s
written estimate of the repair cost for damages the defendant had caused to the victim’s
truck, which she had purchased for $950. (People v. Stanley, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 736.)
The Stanley court specifically found that section 1202.4 did not require the trial court to
limit restitution to the purchase price of the truck, even though it was lower than the
repair cost. (Stanley, at pp. 738-739.) Thus, it would have been futile for defense
counsel here to object to the restitution award because the purchase price of the truck (or
the alleged replacement cost for obtaining a comparable vehicle) was less than the
estimated repair cost. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 437 [defense counsel
cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make groundless objection].)
Finally, we reject Chivrell’s argument that defense counsel should have objected to
the restitution amount or requested a hearing simply based on the trial court’s observation
that it had rarely seen a restitution amount this high in other criminal matters. That the
property damage in other criminal cases was less than the damage Chivrell caused here
does not negate the victim’s entitlement to be fully reimbursed for the estimated cost of
repairing her truck, which Chivrell admitted to having significantly vandalized.
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A) [a restitution order must “fully reimburse the victim” for all

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economic losses incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct].) The court’s
comment had no bearing on the proper amount of victim restitution in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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