In re J.S. CA2/7

CourtListener 10518357Calctapp5 mai 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 5/5/25 In re J.S. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.S., a Person Coming Under B338427
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP00583)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

U.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Syna N. Dennis, Juvenile Court Referee.
Dismissed as moot.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother U.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s modification
order removing her son J.S. (born 2009) from her physical
custody and placing him with his foster parents. U.S.’s sole
contention on appeal is that the court and the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice
provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Cal-ICWA)
(see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 224.2, 224.3, subd. (a)1)).1
While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered
the Department to conduct an additional ICWA inquiry. On this
basis, the Department moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. We
grant the motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Proceedings
In April 2019, the juvenile court sustained a petition by the
Department alleging U.S. physically abused J.S. and his siblings.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

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The court declared J.S. a dependent child of the juvenile court
and removed him from U.S.’s custody, with family reunification
services for U.S.
U.S. identified Cody H. as J.S.’s biological father and the
court found him to be an alleged father. Cody stated he had not
seen J.S. since infancy and declined to participate in the
proceedings. The court ordered no family reunification services
for Cody.
U.S. failed to reunify with J.S., and in 2022, the juvenile
court terminated her reunification services and set a permanency
planning hearing under section 366.26. The court identified
adoption by the foster parents as the appropriate permanent plan
for J.S. In July 2023, before the section 366.26 hearing was held,
the Department reported the foster parents no longer wanted to
adopt J.S. and asked the court to return J.S. to U.S.’s custody. In
January 2024, the court ordered J.S. be placed in U.S.’s care with
family maintenance services.
In February 2024, J.S.’s attorney filed a request for
modification under section 388, seeking to have J.S. returned to
his foster parents. The Department and U.S. opposed the request
and asked that J.S. remain with U.S. and his siblings with family
maintenance services.
In April 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing, granted
the modification request, and removed J.S. from U.S.’s physical
custody with reunification services. U.S. timely appealed.

B. The Department and Juvenile Court’s ICWA-related Actions
At the time the Department filed the petition on behalf of
J.S. in 2019, it attached the required ICWA-010(A) form
indicating inquiry had been made and J.S. had no known Indian

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ancestry. U.S. filed an ICWA-020 form stating she had no known
Indian ancestry.
At the initial hearing, U.S. advised the juvenile court she
had no reason to know any of the children’s fathers had Indian
ancestry. The court found it did not have reason to know J.S.
was an Indian child at that time. It ordered the Department to
continue interviewing all appropriate relatives regarding Indian
ancestry. There is no record that any other ICWA inquiry was
ever made. At a hearing in 2020, the juvenile court stated that
its “prior no ICWA finding remains in full force and effect.”
The Department does not dispute that it did not conduct an
adequate ICWA inquiry. The Department interviewed Cody
twice, in 2019 and 2022, but there is no indication of any ICWA
inquiry during these interviews. Although Cody also identified a
paternal grandmother who lived in another state, there is no
indication the Department made any inquiry of her, or of any
other paternal or maternal extended family members as to
whether J.S. had any Indian ancestry. The record also reflects a
maternal aunt would visit J.S., the Department had contact with
the maternal grandmother in 2009, and that the children resided
with the grandmother from 2010 to 2012; but it does not appear
either was questioned about J.S.’s ancestry.

C. The Postjudgment ICWA Order
While this appeal was pending, on January 2, 2025, the
juvenile court ordered the Department to conduct further ICWA
inquiry. Consistent with In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1087, we take judicial notice of the existence and content of the
juvenile court’s postjudgment order. (See id. at p. 1106 [“a court
‘“‘may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a

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court file’”’” as well as “‘“‘judicial notice of the truth of facts
asserted in documents such as orders’”’”]; Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459;
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
Specifically, the court ordered:
“1. Mother and father shall provide DCFS with contact
information of extended family members.
“2. Mother and father shall provide DCFS with any genetic
tests or other documents relating to the child’s paternity.
“3. DCFS shall interview/attempt to interview all known
and available maternal extended family members about whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child as required by WIC
section 224.2, subd. (b), including the maternal grandmother and
maternal aunt.
“4. In the abundance of caution, even though the father is
alleged only, DCFS shall interview/attempt to interview all
known and available paternal extended family members about
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child as required by
WIC section 224.2, subd. (b), including the father and paternal
grandmother.
“5. DCFS is not required to re-interview persons already
interviewed about Native American ancestry, unless further
ordered by the court.
“6. DCFS shall document all its efforts and submit a
written report on the results of the interviews/attempts to
interview all extended family members prior to February 27,
2025, the previously scheduled 366.26 hearing.
“7. After reviewing the report and determining whether
DCFS has interviewed all available extended family members,
the juvenile court shall make a finding regarding the ICWA’s
applicability.”

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DISCUSSION

A. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.” (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,1129; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1921;
In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 218.) “[W]hen ICWA
applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at
any point’ in a proceeding involving the removal of an Indian
child from their family.” (In re Dezi C., at p. 1129; see also
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).) “To ensure tribes have the opportunity to
exercise their rights in dependency proceedings, an investigation
of a family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry
must be undertaken and notice provided, where appropriate, to
the relevant tribes.” (In re T.R., at p. 218; see § 224.2, subd. (a).)
An inadequate ICWA inquiry in a dependency case does not
involve “a conventional scenario in which the harm from error
directly and solely affects the appealing party.” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1138.) Rather, “an appealing parent ‘is in
effect acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising compliance
issues.’” (Ibid.) “ICWA and Cal-ICWA ‘“‘recognize[] that the
tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a
parity with the interest of the parents’”’ and other relatives.”
(Ibid.) “That interest is compromised and cannot be protected if
the social service agency and the juvenile court fail to perform
their inquiry duties.” (Ibid.)

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The duty to inquire “‘begins with initial contact (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
child may be an Indian child.’” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) The juvenile
court is required to “ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The Department’s duty of
“[i]nquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.)
ICWA and Cal-ICWA define “‘extended family member,’” if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child's
tribe, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who
is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1,
subd. (c).)
The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court
or the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) That further inquiry requires
interviewing, “as soon as practicable,” extended family members,
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and contacting “the tribe
or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected

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to have information regarding the child's membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(2)(C); see
In re T.R., at p. 219.)
If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052; accord, In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; see
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a).) “‘The duty to develop
information concerning whether a child is an Indian child rests
with the court and the Department, not the parents or members
of the parents’ families.’” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317; accord, In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1132.)
“[E]rror resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA
inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child
welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section
224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5),
and when necessary, comply with the notice provision of
section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is
impossible to ascertain whether the agency’s error is prejudicial.
[Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial inquiry
and makes that information known, it is impossible to know what
the inquiry might reveal.’” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1136; accord, In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 220; see
In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1094 [“a judgment must
be conditionally reversed when error results in an inadequate
ICWA inquiry”].)

B. The Appeal Is Moot
As stated, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to conduct a further ICWA inquiry. The

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Department moved to dismiss the appeal as moot or “not yet ripe
for review.” We review questions of mootness and ripeness de
novo. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [mootness];
Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582 [ripeness].)
An appeal “becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(Ibid.) “In this context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’”
(Id. at p. 277.)
Here, U.S. “satisfied the first requirement: she complains
of the Department’s and the court’s failure to fulfill their duty of
inquiry under ICWA.” (In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 214.) As the Department concedes, its ICWA inquiry was
insufficient. The Department had a duty pursuant to
section 224.2, subdivision (b), to ask the parents and extended
family members whether J.S. had possible Indian ancestry. It
failed to ask Cody about J.S.’s possible Indian ancestry at any
interview. Maternal and paternal family members were also
identified. The Department was required to, but did not, report
that an ICWA inquiry was made of these relatives. Additionally,
the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department had complied
with its statutory obligations before finding ICWA did not apply.
In short, the Department and the court did not fully comply with
ICWA. (See In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

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Ordinarily we would conclude that U.S. met the second
requirement “because we can grant her relief by remanding to
the juvenile court for ICWA compliance.” (In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 217 [conditionally affirming jurisdiction
findings and disposition order].) The appropriate relief would be
a conditional remand with directions for full compliance with the
inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (See ibid.;
In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125; In re Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1094.) However, in this instance, U.S.
already has the relief she seeks on appeal: The juvenile court has
already ordered the Department to interview father and all
known and available maternal and paternal extended family
members, including the maternal grandmother, maternal aunt,
and paternal grandmother, and to report the results. We cannot
provide any effective relief by ordering the juvenile court to take
the action it has already taken. At oral argument, U.S.’s attorney
conceded there was no practical difference between an order from
this Court directing the Department to comply with ICWA and
the juvenile court’s order. Accordingly, U.S.’s appeal is moot.
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [“As a rule, courts will generally
exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court's
determination.’”; see id. at pp. 285-286 [identifying additional
relevant factors for dependency cases that reviewing courts may
consider].) U.S. does not argue or identify any reason why we
should exercise our discretion to consider her moot appeal.

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Our conclusion that this appeal is moot is not affected by In
re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th 1087 or In re Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th 1112. These were not mootness cases and instead
addressed “whether a child welfare agency’s failure to make the
statutorily required initial inquiry under California’s heightened
ICWA requirements constitutes reversible error.” (In re Dezi C.,
at p. 1125; see In re Kenneth D., at p. 1094.) In In re Kenneth D.,
the Court also held that “[w]here the juvenile court finds that
ICWA does not apply based on an inadequate inquiry into a
child’s Native heritage, an appellate court, absent exceptional
circumstances, may not consider evidence uncovered during a
postjudgment inquiry to conclude the failure to conduct a proper
inquiry was harmless.” (In re Kenneth D., at p. 1107 [reversing
appellate court’s finding of harmless error on the basis of a
postjudgment department report submitted to the appellate
court].) By contrast, our conclusion U.S.’s appeal is moot is not
based on postjudgment evidence resulting from an additional
ICWA inquiry, but rather from the existence of the juvenile
court’s postjudgment order giving her the same relief she seeks in
this appeal.2

2 We decline to rely on In re Baby Girl M. (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 635, 697, which predates In re Kenneth D. and
examined a postjudgment “report filed in the juvenile court” by
the Department regarding the sufficiency of its ICWA inquiry.
We do not reach the Department’s argument the appeal is not
ripe because we dismiss the appeal as moot.

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DISPOSITION

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal dismissed
as moot.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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