CourtListener 10518351•People v. Vasquez CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 5/5/25 P. v. Vasquez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086742
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF154379A)
v.
TONY VASQUEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Amanda D.
Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Tony Vasquez appeals from a judgment entered following resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75.
He contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to conform to the oral
pronouncement of judgment, inasmuch as the abstract (1) does not reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement to convert all fines and fees to concurrent time, (2) improperly imposes,
in a companion probation violation case, fines and fees that were not imposed at the oral
pronouncement of judgment, and (3) fails to include updated actual time credits served in
the companion probation violation case. The People concede remand is appropriate
because the court failed to calculate actual time credits in the companion case. Defendant
does not object to this remedy.
We vacate the sentence and remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BACKGROUND2
In 2015, a jury convicted defendant of first degree premeditated murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1), attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), two
counts of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; counts 3 & 5), being
a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4), and criminal threats
(§ 422; count 9).3 The jury found true a special circumstance allegation to count 1,
firearm enhancements to counts 1 through 5, and a great bodily injury enhancement to
count 2. In bifurcated proceedings, the court found true a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts regarding the underlying offenses are not relevant to our disposition,
and we therefore dispense with a statement of facts.
3 The jury acquitted defendant on counts 6 through 8.
2.
(a)), and that defendant had suffered three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
(People v. Vasquez (Feb. 6, 2018, F071302) [nonpub. opn.] (Vasquez).)
“Defendant was sentenced to (1) life without the possibility of parole (LWOP),
plus 25 years to life for firearm discharge proximately causing death, five years for the
prior serious felony conviction, and two years for two prior prison terms,[4] on count 1;
(2) a consecutive 14 years to life, plus 25 years to life for firearm discharge proximately
causing great bodily injury, five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and two
years for two prior prison terms (see ante, fn. [4]), on count 2[5]; and (3) a consecutive six
years, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction and two years for two prior
prison terms (see ante, fn. [4]), on count 9. The court stayed execution of punishment on
counts 3 through 5 pursuant to section 654.” (Vasquez, supra, F071302.) In addition, the
court imposed a $40 court security fee6 (§ 1465.8) and $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) on each count, as well as a $300 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $300 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45).
At the time of the original sentencing, the court also imposed sentence in a
separate case involving defendant’s violation of the terms of his probation in Kern
County Superior Court case No. BF144586B. In that case, the court imposed a
concurrent upper term sentence of three years. The court also orally imposed a $40 court
security fee and $30 criminal conviction assessment, other fees and assessments under
4 “Because the prior serious felony enhancement and the third prior prison term
enhancement were based on the same offense, the court did not impose the latter. (See
People v. Perez (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 801, 805.)”
5 “Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.447, the court stayed execution of
the remaining enhancements on count 2.”
6 At the time of defendant’s conviction, section 1465.8 provided, as it does now,
for a court operations assessment, rather than a court security fee. We nonetheless refer
to this as a court security fee to reflect the language used by the court and in the abstracts
of judgment.
3.
Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5 and 11372.7, a $280 restitution fine, and a $280
parole revocation fine. Defendant was noted to have 383 days of actual credit in that
case.
The original abstract of judgment reflects an aggregate court security fee of $240,
an aggregate criminal conviction assessment of $180, a $300 restitution fine, and a $300
parole revocation fine. Additionally, the original abstract of judgment reflects 315 days
of actual credit for time served in the instant case, and 383 days actual credit for time
served in case No. BF144586B.
On appeal, this court affirmed. (Vasquez, supra, F071302.)
In 2023, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.75.7 He asked the court to dismiss the prior serious felony and prior prison term
enhancements, and to reduce the sentence on count 9 to a middle term sentence of four
years. At the resentencing hearing, he also asked the court to impose reduced firearm
enhancements pursuant to section 12022.5, in lieu of the original enhancements imposed
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
The court declined to reduce the firearm enhancements but struck the prior serious
felony and prior prison term enhancements. Defendant was resentenced to (1) a term of
7 Section 1172.75 does not provide for a petition process to seek resentencing.
Rather, the court’s jurisdiction to resentence pursuant to section 1172.75 is triggered by
certain notice procedures initiated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) The record does not reflect that the court received such notice in
this case. Nonetheless, defendant asks us to presume the court properly exercised its
jurisdiction upon notification by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and
the People do not dispute that the court had jurisdiction to resentence defendant. We
need not resolve the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction, inasmuch as our disposition
would be the same whether or not the jurisdictional requirements of section 1172.75 were
met: either we would vacate the newly imposed sentence for lack of jurisdiction under
section 1172.75, or we would vacate the newly imposed sentence due to the court’s
failure to fully resentence defendant in case No. BF144586B. Nonetheless, on remand,
the court shall assure itself that it has jurisdiction to proceed with resentencing.
4.
life without the possibility of parole on count 1, plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement to that count; (2) a consecutive term of life with the possibility parole with
a minimum term of 14 years on count 2, plus an additional term of 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement to that count; and (3) a consecutive middle term sentence of four
years on count 9. Sentence on the remaining counts and enhancements was imposed and
stayed pursuant to section 654.
Additionally, in its oral pronouncement of judgment, the court granted defendant’s
request to convert fines and fees to time in custody. For each count, the $40 court
security fee and $30 criminal conviction assessment were “converted to one day in
custody, to run concurrent.” The court also stated, “The fine pursuant to . . . section
1202.4[, subdivision ](b) is converted to three days in custody, to run concurrent.” The
sentencing minute order states, for the court security fee and criminal conviction
assessment to each count, “defendant to serve 1 days in custody in lieu of balance of
fine.” (Capitalization omitted.) The sentencing minute order states the court imposed a
$300 restitution fine but does not state that this fine was converted to concurrent time.
Meanwhile, the abstract of judgment reflects the court imposed a $280 court security fee,
a $210 criminal conviction assessment, a $300 restitution fine, and a $300 parole
revocation fine (§ 1202.45). The abstract includes the notation, “time in lieu of all fines
and fees.” The court determined defendant had accrued 3,390 days of actual custody
credits, which were duly noted on the amended abstract of judgment.
Although not addressed at the resentencing hearing or in the sentencing minute
order, the amended abstract of judgment once again included the sentence in the
probation violation case, case No. BF144586B. In the amended abstract of judgment, the
actual custody credits for case No. BF144586B remained unchanged from the prior
award of 383 days.
5.
DISCUSSION
Defendant initially argued that fines and fees relating to case No. BF144586B
should be stricken from the abstract of judgment, and the abstract of judgment corrected
to reflect updated custody credits for time served in that case. The People concede
defendant did not receive the full resentencing he was entitled to in case No. BF144586B.
As such, the People concede remand is appropriate for the court to “calculate the actual
time [defendant] has served on both cases and credit that time against his sentence.” The
People assert we need not address defendant’s remaining contentions, inasmuch as he
may raise them in the trial court on remand. Defendant now concedes this is an
appropriate remedy. We agree.
Upon resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, defendant was entitled to a full
resentencing, to include any other cases on which he originally was sentenced.
(§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c), (d)(1)–(2); People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855;
see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [under the full resentencing rule, the
resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify “every aspect of the sentence, and not just
the portion subjected to the recall”].) Here, however, the court did not address case
No. BF144586B at the resentencing hearing. The court did not orally impose sentence in
that case, address fines and fees, or recalculate defendant’s custody credits.
Accordingly, we vacate the newly imposed sentence based on the courts failure to
fully resentence defendant in case No. BF144586B. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Any resentencing that occurs on remand shall address
resentencing in case No. BF144586B. Defendant may present his arguments regarding
fines and fees and actual time credits in case No. BF144586B to the trial court on
remand. Defendant’s remaining arguments regarding errors in the amended abstract of
judgment and sentencing minute order are mooted by our vacatur of the sentence.
6.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
7.
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