In re A.G. CA2/1

CourtListener 10445459Calctapp1 mai 2025

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Filed 5/1/25 In re A.G. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.G., a Person Coming B337855
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05486)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Dismissed.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________

A.G. is Joseph M.’s (father’s) teenage daughter. The
juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over A.G. because
(1) father sexually abused another teenager in the home that
father shared with A.G.; (2) father provided marijuana to A.G.
and the other teenager; and (3) father possessed child
pornography. The court removed A.G. from father’s physical
custody, placed A.G. in foster care, ordered the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or
the agency) to provide father with family reunification services,
and permitted father to have monitored visits with A.G. This
court dismissed father’s appeal of the juvenile court’s
dispositional rulings.
At a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found
that father and paternal uncle had attempted to persuade A.G. to
provide testimony favorable to father in the criminal proceeding
arising from father’s sexual abuse of the other teenager.
Although the court ordered DCFS to continue providing
reunification services to father, the court barred father and the
paternal uncle from having contact with A.G. until father’s
criminal case was completed.1 Father appeals from this no-
contact order. He argues that visits may be suspended only if a
parent jeopardizes the minor’s physical safety and that, even if
detriment to a minor’s well-being were sufficient for a no-contact
order, the juvenile court erred because its concerns could have
been addressed by an order permitting a monitor to end a visit if
father began discussing his criminal case with A.G.

1 Paternal uncle is not a party to this appeal.

2
During the pendency of this appeal, father pleaded nolo
contendere to one count of lewd act upon a child and one count of
possession of child pornography in the underlying criminal case,
was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, and failed to appeal
from an order terminating his reunification services. This court
asked father for supplemental briefing as to why these events
do not moot his appeal. Upon considering father’s supplemental
brief, we conclude that father’s criminal case is now complete,
and that we cannot reinstate father’s reunification services to
remedy any purported prejudice he may have suffered from the
no-contact order because he failed to appeal from the order
denying reunification services. We also reject father’s argument
that we should exercise our inherent discretion to reach the
merits of this appeal. For all these reasons, we dismiss father’s
appeal as moot.

BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts relevant to our disposition
of this appeal.

1. The original dependency petition, the juvenile court’s
order declaring father A.G.’s presumed father, the
November 6, 2023 jurisdictional and dispositional
rulings, and the dismissal of father’s appeal from the
November 6, 2023 rulings
In June 2023, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code2 section 300 concerning A.G., a child who

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

3
was born in November 2007. The juvenile court later designated
father as A.G.’s presumed father.
The juvenile court held the adjudication and disposition
hearing on November 6, 2023. The court amended the operative
dependency petition by interlineation, sustained the amended
allegations against father, and assumed dependency jurisdiction
over A.G. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).3
As amended by the juvenile court, the petition alleged father
(1) sexually abused an unrelated 15-year-old child in the
residence father shared with A.G., (2) supplied the unrelated
child and A.G. with marijuana, and (3) possessed child
pornography.
Before it sustained the amended petition, the juvenile court
admitted into evidence several DCFS reports, including the
jurisdiction and disposition report. According to that report,
“A[.G.] reported that she was friends with the [unrelated 15-year-
old] . . . . A[.G.] reported that she was always present when [this
friend of hers] was in the residence. A[.G.] reported that she does
not believe her father was inappropriate with [her friend] and
reported that [the friend] was infatuated with her father . . . .
[A.G.’s] reports appear to be in direct correlation with that of the
father.” Per the report, A.G.’s caregiver told the agency that she
overheard father (1) discuss the case with A.G. and (2) tell A.G.
that “ ‘she needs to push her attorney or she is going to stay in [a]
foster home forever . . . .’ ”
As for disposition, the juvenile court declared A.G. a
dependent of the court, removed A.G. from mother’s and father’s

3 Although the juvenile court did not sustain any
jurisdictional counts against A.G.’s mother, mother submitted to
the court’s jurisdiction.

4
physical custody, placed A.G. in foster care, ordered DCFS to
provide family reunification services to mother and father,
authorized father to have monitored visits of at least one hour
per week while in custody and a minimum of four hours per week
upon his release from custody, and directed DCFS to “facilitate
phone/video visits while father is in custody.”4
Father appealed from the juvenile court’s
November 6, 2023 orders. This court later dismissed that appeal
pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.5

2. Father’s and paternal uncle’s contact with A.G.
during the six-month review period
We derive this section’s factual summary from the status
review report DCFS prepared for the section 366.21,
subdivision (e) six-month review hearing described in
Background, part 3, post.
On December 27, 2023, A.G. reported father had
telephoned her multiple times prior to that date; father often
“ ‘berate[d] [her,]’ ” “75% of the time, the calls [we]re bad”; and
“father was telling [A.G. that] people were whispering things in
her ear trying to change her thought process and make her think
different things about him.” (Boldface omitted.) “A[.G.] stated

4 Another document admitted at the November 6, 2023
hearing was the interim review report filed by DCFS on
October 6, 2023, which stated that in August 2023, father had
been arrested and charged with, inter alia, three counts of lewd
act on a child aged 14 or 15.
5 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of this court’s order
dismissing father’s appeal in case No. B333426. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

5
she felt father was getting scared and that A[.G.] seemed to be
too comfortable.” (Boldface omitted.) A.G. said that although she
did not want to live with father and “would be fine with not
having phone calls from father,” she “was still attached [to him]
and wanted to see him . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) A.G. “stated she
would like to see father in person, because she thinks that that
would be different, because he would have to be able to say things
face to face and people hide behind the phone.” (Boldface
omitted.)
A.G. stated that someone other than her caregiver was
acting as a monitor for a call A.G. had with her father on
December 26, 2023, and that during the call, father was
“dismissive of anything she said.” A.G. indicated father’s
behavior during the call caused A.G. to cry.6 The social worker
directed A.G. not to answer any calls unless her caregiver was
available to act as a monitor, and when A.G. complained that
father would “not stop calling” (boldface omitted), the social
worker replied that A.G. “could put the number on block.”
On January 9, 2024, A.G. reported to DCFS that “she had
unblocked her father’s telephone calls and he had not called her.”
On January 16, 2024, A.G.’s caregiver told the agency that
although A.G. had not received any calls from father, paternal
uncle telephoned A.G. the day before and (1) “questioned why
[A.G.] had not gone to father’s hearing [in his criminal case] and
[(2) asserted] that [the caregiver] had told [father’s] investigator
A[.G.] would not go”; the caregiver denied having any such

6 Similarly, in late November 2023, A.G.’s caregiver
informed the agency that A.G. would “often put[ ] her head down
and look[ ] at her feet and appear[ ] sad” while she was on the
telephone with father. (Boldface omitted.)

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conversation with the investigator. A.G. told the social worker
she suspected father had told paternal uncle that she “did not
want to go to court . . . .”
On January 18, 2024, paternal uncle told the agency he had
asked why A.G. did not attend a hearing in father’s criminal case
because father’s “attorney had told him that the [caregiver] had
told them that A[.G.] said she did not want to testify.”
Notwithstanding the paternal uncle’s initial claim that father’s
attorney had relayed that information to him, it appears that
paternal uncle later admitted during his interview with the social
worker that the paternal uncle was “just listening to what father
had told him.” The paternal uncle “stated until the case was
solved he would stand behind father as he was claiming his
innocence . . . .”
On January 28, 2024, a social worker took A.G. to visit
father at Men’s Central Jail. The social worker had difficulty
monitoring the visit because it appears only one individual at a
time (either A.G. or the social worker) could communicate with
father using a telephone that “does not have intercom ability.”
During the in-person visit, father told A.G. her caregiver
had “lied about A[.G.] not wanting to testify for his criminal
case.” (Boldface omitted.) The social worker then got on the
telephone, and father told the social worker that the caregiver
“had ruined his due process and he should have been allowed to
get out of jail and he could not because [the caregiver] had told
his criminal attorney A[.G.] did not want to testify.” Father also
accused the caregiver of stealing certain belongings (including
$3,500) from him. The social worker told father the caregiver
would no longer monitor his calls with A.G. “as father seemed to
be making negative comments.” (Boldface omitted.)

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A.G. got back on the telephone and “told father that he was
lying and that he was spending all the time speaking to the
[social worker] and not her.” (Boldface omitted.) When father
continued to claim the caregiver stole his money, A.G. “appeared
to be upset” and insisted the caregiver had not stolen his money.
(Boldface omitted.) After the visit, A.G. told the social worker
“the visit had been good and bad,” and A.G. “stated she was able
to say things and he had to see her face so she liked that.”
On March 18, 2024, the social worker telephoned a deputy
at the Men’s Central Jail and asked whether an in-person visit
with an inmate could be held without the use of a telephone, and
the deputy responded he did not believe it was possible for
visitors to speak directly with the inmate. The deputy also
“stated he was not sure of a way to do three-way calls as it had to
be the inmate calling directly to a phone number.” The deputy
indicated that monitored videoconferencing with an inmate may
be a viable option and transferred the social worker’s call to
another jail official who may have information; the social worker
left a voice message with that other official requesting a call
back. As of April 4, 2024, that second jail official had not
returned the social worker’s call.
DCFS stated in the status review report, “The current
caregivers acting as monitors for father’s calls is no longer an
option as father is not able nor seemingly willing to be
appropriate during his phone calls. In-person visits at the
current facility are not able to accommodate the standards of a
monitored visit.” The agency “suggest[ed that] father and
A[.G.] . . . exchange letters via the mail with [DCFS] acting as a
buffer to monitor the content.” DCFS opined, “[I]t would be
beneficial for father and A[.G.] to be able to participate in

8
conjoint counseling upon father’s release to help address the
current parent/child dynamic.”

3. The April 30, 2024 six-month review hearing and
father’s notice of appeal
The juvenile court held the section 366.21, subdivision (e)
six-month review hearing on April 30, 2024. The court stated
that it had reviewed and considered the six-month status review
report filed on April 9, 2024 and two last minute information
reports, one of which is the last minute information report that
contains a page that was missing from the status review report.
At the hearing, father’s counsel stated that although his client
acknowledged “there have been some ongoing issues with visits,
which [counsel thought were] laid out in the reports,” counsel
requested the court allow father to have visits with A.G. A.G.’s
counsel represented her client “want[ed] in-person visits with her
father.”
The juvenile court determined continued dependency
jurisdiction was necessary and found clear and convincing
evidence that returning A.G. to her parents would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child. Although the court
found father was not in compliance with his case plan, the court
also concluded that DCFS had failed to provide reasonable
reunification services to father. The court ordered DCFS to
continue providing reunification services to mother and father.
As for father’s visitation, the juvenile court ordered that
A.G. “have no contact with the father . . . until the father[’s]
criminal case is completed.” Similarly, the court barred paternal
uncle from having contact with A.G. “until the father[’s] criminal
case is completed,” and ruled that, “[o]nce the father[’s] criminal
case has completed, . . . [p]aternal [u]ncle is to have no

9
unmonitored contact until DCFS allows in writing.” In our
Discussion, post, we describe oral remarks made by the juvenile
court at the hearing concerning these visitation orders.
On May 21, 2024, father filed a notice of appeal seeking
review of the April 30, 2024 order barring A.G. from having
“contact with father until his criminal case concludes.”

4. Events occurring after the April 30, 2024 six-month
review hearing7
On August 20, 2024, the juvenile court held a 12-month
review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (f). The
court found clear and convincing evidence that returning A.G. to
her parents’ physical custody would create a substantial risk of
detriment to her. The court also determined that mother’s
progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes
necessitating placement had been substantial whereas father’s
was not, and that DCFS complied with the case plan by making
reasonable efforts to return the child to a safe home. The court
terminated father’s reunification services, ordered DCFS to
continue providing reunification services to mother, and
scheduled a section 366.22 review hearing for mother. As of
April 30, 2025, father has not appealed from the juvenile court’s

7 As explained below, with the exception of the minute
order from the section 366.22 review hearing held on
January 10, 2025, this court, sua sponte, took judicial notice of
the orders discussed in this section in our letter to father
requesting supplemental briefing. In his supplemental brief,
father did not object to our decision to take judicial notice of these
orders.

10
August 20, 2024 rulings and the 60-day deadline for doing so has
elapsed.8
In September 2024, father pleaded nolo contendere to two
criminal charges (i.e., one violation of Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (c)(1) and one violation of Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)),
the trial court dismissed the remaining charges pursuant to a
plea bargain, and father was sentenced to two years in state
prison. Father appealed the judgment on September 20, 2024
and, on October 17, 2024, the Court of Appeal limited his appeal
to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.
On December 24, 2024, father’s counsel filed the opening
brief in the instant appeal. In the opening brief, father’s counsel
does not mention the August 20, 2024 order terminating father’s
reunification services, father’s failure to appeal that order, or
father’s plea of nolo contendere in his criminal case.
The juvenile court held the section 366.22 review hearing
for mother on January 10, 2025.9 The court ruled “there is a
compelling reason for determining that termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child,” and found by “clear and
convincing evidence that [the] minor is not likely to be adopted
and has no one willing as of the date of th[at] hearing . . . to

8 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1) [“[A] notice of appeal
must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment
or the making of the order being appealed.”].) We, sua sponte,
take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s docket as of
April 30, 2025. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
9 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the minute order
from the section 366.22 review hearing held on January 10, 2025.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

11
accept legal guardianship.”10 “[I]n light of th[ose] facts,” the
court found “it is in the best interests of the child to order a
permanent plan of planned permanent living arrangement in
foster care with [the] goal of a permanent plan of return home,
adoption, legal guardianship or placement with a fit and willing
relative.” The court scheduled a hearing for June 16, 2025 to
review A.G.’s permanent plan.
On March 19, 2025, DCFS informed this court that it takes
no position on appeal and is not the proper respondent. On
March 28, 2025, the juvenile court submitted a letter stating that
it “declines to take an adversary role in this proceeding.” Neither
mother nor A.G. has filed a respondent’s brief.
On April 7, 2025, this court requested supplemental
briefing from father’s counsel regarding whether the juvenile
court’s August 20, 2024 rulings, father’s failure to appeal from
those rulings, and father’s plea of nolo contendere in his criminal
case moot this appeal. In the letter requesting supplemental
briefing, this court took judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
August 20, 2024 minute order; the abstract of judgment,
September 12, 2024 minute order, and September 18, 2024
minute order from father’s criminal case; the Court of Appeal’s
October 17, 2024 order from father’s appeal in the criminal case;
and the juvenile court’s docket as of April 7, 2025, which showed
that father had not appealed from the juvenile court’s
August 20, 2024 rulings.
On April 15, 2025, father’s counsel filed his supplemental
brief, arguing (1) this appeal is not moot and (2) even if it is moot,

10 The juvenile court noted that it had issued a protective
custody warrant for A.G. on December 2, 2024 and that, as of
January 10, 2025, A.G. “remain[ed] at large.” (Boldface omitted.)

12
we should exercise our discretion to resolve the merits of his
appeal.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING MOOTNESS IN
DEPENDENCY CASES
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes
moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
“In this context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’
[Citation.] . . . . [T]he plaintiff must . . . ha[ve] suffered from a
change in legal status. . . . that is capable of being redressed by a
favorable court decision.” (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. [Citation.]
As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review
a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence
of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’ [Citations.]”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) An appellate court may also
“exercis[e its] discretion to decide an otherwise moot case [if it

13
presents] ‘important issues that are capable of repetition yet . . .
evad[e] review[.]’ ” (See ibid.) “Ultimately, in deciding whether
to exercise its discretion, a court should be guided by the
overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide
maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the
preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and
physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]” (Id.
at p. 286.)

DISCUSSION
At the April 30, 2024 six-month review hearing, the
juvenile court stated: “A[.G.] is to have no contact with the father
and the paternal uncle . . . until the father’s criminal case is
completed. [¶] . . . Until it’s completed, there is incentive for
them to continue efforts to witness tamper, be inappropriate, et
cetera.[11] [¶] And so until that case is completed, they don’t
seem to understand the limitations of what they should and
shouldn’t be talking about and the detriment that that poses to
A[.G.]” The court further remarked, “Of course, the father’s
disposition ordered visitation and contact would kick in once that
limitation through his criminal case completion is finished.”
On appeal from the April 30, 2024 no-contact order, father
does not contest the juvenile court’s finding that father and
paternal uncle attempted to persuade A.G. to testify on father’s
behalf in the criminal case. Rather, father argues (1) the court’s
no-contact order was based on the wrong legal standard (i.e., the

11 Earlier in the hearing, the juvenile court observed DCFS
reported that the “paternal uncle [had been] inappropriate on the
phone with A[.G.] and tr[ied] to pressure her regarding testifying
in the father’s criminal case.”

14
court found that “visits were detrimental to A.G.’s well-being” but
did not determine that “visitation would place the child’s safety
in jeopardy”), and (2) “the court’s concerns that [f]ather discussed
the criminal case with A.G. could have been resolved by an order
that he not do so, perhaps with discretion for the monitor to end
any visits in which he did.” As we explain below, we conclude
that father’s conviction in the criminal case and his failure to
appeal the August 20, 2024 order terminating his reunification
services prevent us from providing father with effective relief in
this appeal, and we decline to exercise our inherent discretion to
reach the merits of father’s moot appeal.

A. Father’s Plea of Nolo Contendere and His Failure To
Appeal from the August 20, 2024 Order Terminating
His Reunification Services Moot His Appeal from the
No-Contact Order
Given that father’s criminal case has been resolved by his
plea of nolo contendere (see Background, part 4, ante), father no
longer has any motive to persuade A.G. to provide testimony
favorable to him during those proceedings. Also, to state the
obvious, there are no witnesses at the appellate proceedings to
influence. Although the juvenile court could have more clearly
identified when father would no longer be barred from having
contact with A.G., the court’s remarks at the April 30, 2024
hearing demonstrate it would have deemed the criminal case to
have been “complete” upon entry of judgment in his criminal
case.12 Therefore, even if we were to agree with father that “the

12 (See Concerned Citizens Coalition of Stockton v. City of
Stockton (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 [“ ‘The true measure of an

15
[juvenile] court’s order was vague in its timeframe,” we would not
agree with his claim that the phrase “is completed” in the court’s
ruling could fairly be interpreted to refer to his “release from
incarceration, the end of the appeal of any orders of criminal
hearings, . . . [or] upon end of probation or parole.” For that same
reason, we reject father’s assertion that “the criminal case cannot
be considered ‘complete’ procedurally until all appellate remedies
are exhausted.”
Furthermore, at the section 366.22 review hearing held on
January 10, 2025, the juvenile court found clear and convincing
evidence that A.G. was not likely to be adopted and no one was
willing to accept legal guardianship, and ordered that A.G.
remain in foster care. (See Background, part 4, ante.) Given the
court’s rulings at the section 366.22 hearing, the court is required
to “permit [father] . . . to visit the child unless it finds that
visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (See § 366.22,
subd. (a)(3).) Therefore, moving forward in the dependency
proceedings, the no-contact order does not prevent father from
informing the juvenile court of the completion of his criminal case
and requesting restoration of monitored visitation with A.G.
Indeed, father acknowledges in his supplemental brief that if we
“interpret the juvenile court’s order . . . to allow for visitation
upon [his] plea of nolo contendere[,] . . . then the issue may be
rendered moot.” He also acknowledges he may request visits

order, however, is not an isolated phrase appearing therein, but
its effect when considered as a whole. [Citations.] . . . If the
language of the order be in any degree uncertain, then reference
may be had to the circumstances surrounding, and the court’s
intention in the making of the same.’ ”].)

16
with A.G. notwithstanding the juvenile court’s order terminating
his reunification services.
Father argues his appeal of the no-contact order is not moot
because his inability to visit with A.G. could result “in the
potential degradation of a meaningful relationship for
reunification purposes.” We acknowledge that denial of visitation
may hinder a parent’s prospects of reunifying with a dependent
child. (See § 362.1, subd. (a) [indicating that the Legislature
authorized visits during the reunification period “[i]n order to
maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a
child to the custody of his or her parent”].) We further
acknowledge that the juvenile court terminated father’s
reunification services on August 20, 2024. (Background, part 4,
ante.)
Nevertheless, reversal of the April 30, 2024 order barring
father from having contact with A.G. until his criminal case was
completed would not invalidate the subsequent order terminating
his reunification services because he did not appeal the latter
ruling. (Background, part 4, ante [noting father did not
appeal the Aug. 20, 2024 rulings]; see In re Gael C. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 220, 222–225 [holding that a parent’s failure to
appeal a juvenile court order “ ‘forfeit[s] any challenge’ ” thereto];
cf. In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 666–667 [recognizing
that in a dependency case, the failure to appeal an order
awarding custody and visitation and terminating dependency
jurisdiction, which order was allegedly tainted by an earlier
dispositional order regarding custody and visitation, may moot
the parent’s appeal of that prior dispositional order].) Therefore,

17
father has not shown we can redress any prejudice the no-contact
order may have had on his ability to reunify with A.G.
Furthermore, we note father has not filed a section 388
petition seeking restoration of visitation and reunification
services, and that he could have, but did not, appeal from the
August 20, 2024 order terminating his reunification services after
he pleaded nolo contendere in September 2024 but before the
60-day deadline for filing that appeal had elapsed.
The absence of an effective appellate remedy vis-à-vis
reunification with A.G. renders unavailing father’s reliance on
In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765 (Dylan T.). There, the
issue was whether, as part of a reunification plan, the juvenile
court erred in denying a mother visitation while she was
incarcerated for a drug possession offense merely because the
minor was of a “tender age.” (Dylan T., at pp. 767–768.) The
juvenile court, however, also ruled, inter alia, that if the mother
were transferred to an inpatient drug program, mother would
have monthly visitation. (Id. at p. 768.)
The appellate court held the juvenile court erred in denying
visitation and the issue was not moot even assuming arguendo
the mother had been subsequently released to a drug treatment
facility. (See Dylan T., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 769–770
[accepting, “for the sake of argument,” that the mother had been
released from the jail and placed in a residential treatment
program].) The Dylan T. court reasoned the mother’s
“relationship with [the child] was subject to erosion during th[e]
time” in which the mother had been denied visitation; “although
[the court assumed the mother] was released to a residential
in-patient program,” she could be “reincarcerated”; and “[b]ecause
reunification efforts could be terminated after six months, the

18
lack of all opportunity for visitation during a significant portion
of this time [was] an error which could infect the outcome of
subsequent proceedings.” (See id. at pp. 769–770.)
There is no indication in Dylan T. that the juvenile court
terminated the mother’s reunification services or that she failed
to appeal from any such order. (See Dylan T., supra,
65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767–769 [discussing the factual and
procedural background of the case and certain matters occurring
after the no-visitation order was issued].) Therefore, Dylan T.
had no occasion to determine whether effective appellate relief
would be available under those circumstances. (See In re H.E.
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion
is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue
then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a
proposition not therein considered.’ ”].)
Father also argues, “Should the dependency case close, [the
no-contact] order would prejudice him in family court which could
address child custody issues. Even after A.G. reaches the age of
majority in November 2025, there may be residual family law
court issues in a divorce proceeding in which [f]ather could be
prejudiced.” Apart from these conclusory assertions, father
does not elaborate on the prejudice he believes the April 30, 2024
order would cause him to suffer in family court proceedings. Nor
is it apparent that reversal of the no-contact order at this
juncture would have any impact on his rights in those
proceedings.13 Because “speculative future harm is [not]

13 The jurisdiction and disposition report indicates that
“mother reported she was in a long term relationship and
ultimately marriage with father . . . .” Although a police report

19
sufficient to avoid mootness” (see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 278), we reject father’s argument that the juvenile court’s
alleged error “infects the outcome” of subsequent proceedings.
For these reasons, we are unable to provide father with
effective relief in his appeal from the April 30, 2024 no-contact
order.

B. We Reject Father’s Invitation To Exercise Our
Inherent Discretion To Reach the Merits of His Moot
Appeal from the No-Contact Order
Father argues we should exercise our inherent discretion to
reach the merits of his appeal even if it is moot.
First, father cites In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481
for the proposition we should reach the merits of his appeal to
“avoid any possible collateral prejudice” to him. In C.C., a
mother appealed from a dispositional order that denied her
visitation and conjoint therapy with her 12-year-old son. (See id.
at p. 1483.) There, the juvenile court found dependency
jurisdiction was proper based on the mother’s inappropriate
physical discipline and her emotional abuse of the child. (See id.
at pp. 1483–1485.) The record contained evidence that the child
refused to participate in monitored visits with the mother and
that, on one occasion, the child left the visitation room, sat on the
floor behind a couch, and banged his head against a wall while
crying. (See id. at pp. 1484–1487.) On another occasion, the
child “demanded [the mother] admit ‘all the ways [she] hurt

attached to a DCFS interim review report filed on
October 25, 2023 indicates mother and father were in the process
of securing a divorce in August 2023, father does not clarify in his
briefing whether those proceedings are pending.

20
[him]’ and the names she had called him” and thereafter “rejected
her attempts [to answer] and asked to leave the [visitation site]
after 15 minutes.” (See id. at p. 1486.) The juvenile court found
further visitation with the mother would be detrimental to the
child and suspended visitation pending a review hearing
scheduled for approximately three months later. (See id. at
p. 1487.) While the mother’s appeal from the order suspending
visits was pending, the juvenile court restored monthly
monitored visitation for the mother through an “exit order” and
terminated its jurisdiction. (See id. at pp. 1483, 1487.)14
On appeal, the reviewing court found the exit order and the
order terminating jurisdiction “effectively moot[ed]” the mother’s
appeal. (See C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483.) The C.C.
court rejected as “highly speculative” the mother’s contention
that “the finding of detriment upon which the challenged order
denying visitation was based create[d] the possibility of prejudice
in subsequent family law proceedings.” (See id. at p. 1489.)
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal elected, “in an abundance of
caution,” to reach the merits to “eliminate even the remote
possibility of prejudice to [the mother] arising from the adverse
[detriment] finding [that was] based on [an] incorrect
standard . . . .” (See id. at pp. 1483, 1489, 1492.) In particular,

14 “ ‘When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has
been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4
authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation
order (commonly referred to as an “exit order”) that will become
part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the
family law action “until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 758,
fn. 14.)

21
the C.C. court (1) construed section 362.1 as requiring that “some
visitation [be ordered during the reunification period] unless the
court specifically finds any visitation with the parent would pose
a threat to the child’s safety,” and (2) held that the juvenile court
erred in “premis[ing] its order suspending visitation on its finding
by clear and convincing evidence that further visitation with [the
mother] would be detrimental to [the child].” (See C.C., at
pp. 1490–1491.)15
As our summary of the facts of C.C. indicates, there was a
possibility (albeit a remote one) the detriment finding in that case
could have prejudiced the mother in future custody proceedings
because the finding rested on evidence that the mother’s abuse
had caused the child to harbor ongoing emotional trauma and
resentment that the child could experience in future visits with
the mother. In contrast, here, the no-contact order was based on
the juvenile court’s finding—which father does not challenge on
appeal—that father and paternal uncle sought to convince A.G. to
testify on father’s behalf in the criminal case. Now that
judgment has been entered in the criminal matter, father has no
occasion to replicate the behavior that the juvenile court found to
be detrimental to A.G., which formed the basis of the no-contact
order before us. Thus, whereas the C.C. court believed it was
prudent to reach the merits of the mother’s appeal to “avoid

15 We express no opinion on whether C.C. correctly
interpreted section 362.1. (See also In re Matthew C. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1101 [“There is currently a split of authority
as to whether section 362.1 mandates visitation absent evidence
of a threat to the minor’s physical safety [citation] or whether
courts may also deny visitation based on potential harm to the
minor’s emotional well-being.”].)

22
any possible collateral prejudice” to her (see C.C., supra,
172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483), this case does not present “even the
remote possibility” of redressable harm potentially warranting
appellate review (see id. at p. 1492).
Next, father argues this case presents “an important
[question] that is capable of repetition yet evad[es] review
because the [juvenile] court limited its order to the time period
during which [f]ather’s criminal case was co-occurring.” Father
claims, “[T]he court could make similarly erroneous orders
regarding visitation but evade review by specifying an end date
to the order which precedes the completion of appellate review.”
Father asserts that because “the no-contact order [is] vague, . . .
the criminal case may reopen at some point and the juvenile court
[may] renew the no-contact order.”
We reject father’s contention this case presents the type of
issue that will evade review unless we hear the merits of this
appeal. As we explained in Discussion, part A, ante, father could
have preserved our authority to remedy any prejudice resulting
from the no-contact order on his prospects of reunifying with A.G.
by appealing from the August 20, 2024 order terminating his
reunification services. Father’s inability to secure appellate relief
thus hinges on his failure to appeal from the order terminating
those services, and not on the provision in the April 30, 2024
order barring father from visiting A.G. until his criminal case is
completed.
Lastly, father maintains, “The appealed order is of
important public interest because it not only affected [his] ability
to retain a relationship with A.G. but also his ability to fully
assert his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial . . . .”
Specifically, father argues, “The no-contact order may have

23
influenced [f]ather to hasten his criminal case by submitting to a
plea of nolo contendere instead [of] asserting his right to a jury
trial which would take more time, so he could reinstate contact
with A.G.” (Italics added.)
We reject as speculative father’s assertion he may have
decided to plead nolo contendere to felony sex offenses to
complete his case expeditiously and resume contact with A.G.
First, father’s argument rests on a wholly unsupported factual
premise. Specifically, father relies on the premise he could have
prevailed at trial in the criminal case or, at the very least, could
have obtained a more favorable sentence had he gone to trial, but
nonetheless decided to forgo those potential advantages to
reinstate contact with A.G. at a point in time before the trial
would have been completed. Second, father’s failure to file a
section 388 petition seeking restoration of visitation after entry of
his plea undercuts his assertion he gave up a jury trial just to
reinstate contact with A.G. (See Discussion, part A, ante.)
Accordingly, we find unpersuasive father’s factually devoid
argument that the no-contact order infringed on his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.
In sum, we conclude father’s appeal from the April 30, 2024
no-contact order is moot, and we decline to exercise our discretion
to entertain it. The proper remedy for this defect is dismissal of
the appeal. (See In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59–60.)

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DISPOSITION
We dismiss as moot father’s appeal from the juvenile
court’s April 30, 2024 order barring him from having contact with
A.G. until father’s criminal case was completed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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