CourtListener 10425739•Tilden v. OCR-GP CA4/1
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Filed 4/30/25 Tilden v. OCR-GP CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BRADLEY W. TILDEN, as Successor in D085386, D085387
Interest to B. Gedney Tilden, et al.
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and
Respondents, (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2105005)
v.
OCR-GP, LLC, et al.
Defendants, Cross-complainants
and Appellants.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, Carol A. Greene, Judge. Dismissed.
Thompson & Colegate, Susan Knock Beck, John A. Boyd and Craig M.
Marshall, for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants Bradley W. Tilden
et al.
Kessler & Seecof, Daniel J. Kessler and Benjamin R. Seecof, for
Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants OCR-GP, LLC, et al.
INTRODUCTION
Two brothers, B. Gedney Tilden (Gedney) and M. William Tilden (Bill),
disagreed over how their family cattle ranch should be managed. Following
years of disagreement, Gedney filed a complaint to dissolve and wind up the
limited partnership that owned and operated the ranch and for an
accounting. Bill responded with a cross-complaint for declaratory relief.
After a four-day bench trial, the trial court ordered the dissolution of
the partnership. In a statement of decision attached to the minute order, the
court gave Bill 60 days to buy out Gedney’s interests at fair market value and
stated, it “will set a return hearing date to order further relief” pursuant to
California Corporations Code1 section 15908.02 once the 60 days has passed.
Ninety days later, the court entered a formal judgment decreeing the
partnership dissolved and denying Bill’s request for declaratory relief. It
later granted in part and denied in part Bill’s motion to tax costs. The court
has not ruled on Gedney’s second cause of action for a full accounting of the
partnership’s activities or issued a wind-up decree.
Bill filed three notices of appeal—from the minute order and statement
of decision, formal judgment, and the order taxing costs, which we
consolidated for review. We now dismiss the consolidated appeals because
judgment is not final and there is no appealable interlocutory order before us.
BACKGROUND
In 1985, Burton W. Tilden purchased an 8,400-acre cattle ranch in
O’Neals, California. In 1999, he formed Oak Crest Ranch, LP (partnership)
under a limited partnership agreement (partnership agreement) to own and
operate the ranch. Following Burton’s death in 2007, his sons Gedney and
Bill were admitted as general partners pursuant to the partnership
agreement.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the California
Corporations Code.
2
In 2017, Gedney and Bill executed an amendment to the partnership
agreement to specify the current ownership structure of the partnership.
Relevant here, Gedney owned BC Tilden Holdings, LLC and Bill owned
OCR-GP, LLC. The ownership structure was specified as follows: As limited
partners, 33 percent owned by Gedney’s BC Tilden Holdings, LLC, 33 percent
owned by Bill’s OCR-GP, LLC, and 33 percent owned by Bill, as trustee of the
Burt and Mary Tilden Trust. As general partners, 0.33 percent owned by
Gedney’s BC Tilden Holdings, LLC, and 0.667 percent by Bill’s OCR-GP,
LLC. Later in 2017, Gedney and Bill filed an amended certificate of limited
partnership with the Secretary of State, confirming each and their respective
LLCs as new general partners, and removing Gedney and Bill as trustees of
the Burt and Mary Tilden Trust as general partners.
In November 2021, Gedney and BC Tilden Holdings, LLC (together,
plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Bill, OCR-GP, LLC, the partnership, and
Bill as trustee for the Burt and Mary Tilden Trust (together, defendants)
asserting a first cause of action for involuntary dissolution and winding up of
the partnership and a second cause of action for a full accounting of the
partnership’s activities. Generally, plaintiffs alleged defendants exercised
unilateral control of the partnership by hiring employees, making purchases,
and contracting on behalf of the partnership and denied plaintiffs access to
the partnership’s reports, books and records, and tax returns.
In January 2022, defendants filed a cross-complaint for declaratory
relief that they were the sole serving general partner, that plaintiffs were not
entitled to certain reports and financial information or to manage the
partnership, and that no cause exists for dissolution or for an accounting.
The trial court conducted a four-day bench trial in June 2023. After
taking its decision under submission, the court issued a minute order and
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statement of decision on August 4, 2023. In the minute order, the court
ruled: “After weighing the evidence presented at trial, this Court finds that it
is not reasonably practicable for the [partnership] to carry on its activities in
conformity with the [p]artnership [a]greement. Plaintiffs have established,
by a preponderance of evidence, that [d]efendants wrongfully excluded
[p]laintiffs from managing the [p]artnership. For years, [d]efendants have
deprived [p]laintiffs of their rights under the [p]artnership [a]greement,
including access to financial records. As such, this Court orders the
dissolution of the [p]artnership pursuant to . . . section 15908.02. Judgment
on Complaint for Partnership and Governance (Over 25,000) of [plaintiffs]
against [defendants].”
In a detailed 14-page statement of decision attached to the minute
order, the trial court elaborated on its factual findings in favor of plaintiffs
and the evidence on which it relied. It restated its conclusion that
“irreconcilable differences” had arisen among the general partners such that
“it is not reasonably practicable for the [p]artnership to carry on its activities
in conformity with the [p]artnership [a]greement.” In a paragraph entitled
“Remedies,” the court ruled: Bill, “as manager of OCR-GP, LLC and general
partner of Oak Crest Ranch, LP, will have sixty (60) days from today’s ruling
to purchase the General Partnership and Limited Partnership interests of
[Gedney’s] BC Tilden Holdings, LLC at fair market value. Once the sixty (60)
days has passed, the court will set a return hearing date to order further
relief per . . . section 15908.02(b).”
On November 2, 2023, the trial court entered a “Judgment on Plaintiff’s
Complaint.” The judgment stated it was not reasonably practicable for the
partnership to carry on its activities in conformity with the partnership
agreement due to defendants’ wrongful exclusion of plaintiffs from managing
4
the partnership; defendants’ request for declaratory relief is denied as not
supported by the trial evidence; and judgment shall be entered in plaintiffs’
favor “as to the verified Complaint for Partnership and Corporate
Governance (Over 25,000)”2; and the partnership shall be dissolved pursuant
to section 15908.02. The same day, the court entered a minute order to
clarify that judgment on defendants’ cross complaint for declaratory relief “is
granted as stated in the Judgment filed 11/02/2023.”
On February 1, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting in part
and denying in part defendants’ motion to strike and/or tax costs, awarding
plaintiffs a total of $7,730.50.
Defendants filed three notices of appeal in Division Two of this
court—from the August 4, 2023 minute order and statement of decision, from
the November 2, 2023 judgment, and from the February 1, 2024 order taxing
costs. In April 2024, Division Two consolidated the appeals.
On August 20, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated appeals which defendants opposed.3 Division Two deferred the
motion to dismiss to the merit’s panel and, after briefing concluded in
November 2024, the matter was transferred to Division One on December 30.
2 As defendants noted in their answer to the complaint, and our review of
the record confirms, there is no verified complaint. As neither party has
asserted otherwise, we construe this reference in the judgment to mean the
operative complaint.
3 Plaintiffs ask us to take judicial notice of the trial court’s register of
actions. We deny the request as it is duplicative of documents already
contained in the appellate record. (See Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho
Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 406, fn. 12.)
5
DISCUSSION
Relying on Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 964
(Kinoshita), plaintiffs argue a judgment directing the dissolution of a
partnership is not final and the August 4, 2023 order/statement of decision
and November 2, 2023 judgment are not final for the additional reason that
they “do not reflect the winding up and accounting [plaintiffs] prayed for.”
Because there is no final judgment, they further assert the order on their
motion to tax costs is not appealable. We agree on all their contentions.
I.
The November 12, 2023 Judgment is Interlocutory and Not Appealable
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there
is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) “The right to appeal is
wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior
Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Code of Civil Procedure section
904.1 set forth appealable judgments and orders. “Chief among them is a
‘judgment’ that is not interlocutory, [that is,] a final judgment.” (Dana Point,
at p. 5.) “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties
(Code Civ. Proc., § 577) when it terminates the litigation between the parties
on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.” (Ibid.) “It is not the form of the decree
but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative. As a
general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the
individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future
consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of
the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature
6
of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination
of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].)
As our high court has explained, “the purpose of the final judgment rule
is to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals which tend to be
oppressive and costly. Interlocutory appeals burden the courts and impede
the judicial process in a number of ways: (1) They tend to clog the appellate
courts with a multiplicity of appeals[.] (2) Early resort to the appellate courts
tends to produce uncertainty and delay in the trial court[.] (3) Until a final
judgment is rendered the trial court may completely obviate an appeal by
altering the rulings from which an appeal would otherwise have been taken.
(4) Later actions by the trial court may provide a more complete record which
dispels the appearance of error or establishes that it was harmless.
(5) Having the benefit of a complete adjudication . . . will assist the reviewing
court to remedy error (if any) by giving specific directions rather than
remanding for another round of open-ended proceedings.” (Dana Point,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5 [cleaned up].)
Applying these general test and principles enunciated by our high
court, the court in Kinoshita dismissed an appeal from a judgment directing
the dissolution of a partnership and sale of its assets by a receiver,
concluding “such a judgment is interlocutory” and not appealable.
(Kinoshita, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 961, 968.) In doing so, the court
observed partnership dissolutions, by their nature, are “serial aspect actions
involving provisional remedies” before final judgment. (Id. at p. 963.) For
that reason, “[a]pplication of the final judgment rule has proven especially
difficult in partnership dissolutions and similar proceedings because they
tend to require a series of adjudications by the trial court. Typically, the
court must first determine the weighty threshold questions on which the
7
parties’ rights and obligations depend, such as whether a partnership was
formed and what assets were acquired. The court may then be called upon to
order one or more provisional or special remedies which necessarily occur in a
progression of steps culminating in a final decree which settles the actions
taken under the earlier rulings.” (Ibid.)
The judgment from which the appeal was taken in Kinoshita decreed
“(1) plaintiff owns a 31.43 percent interest in the [limited] partnership [that
owned and operated an apartment building]; the partnership is ‘ordered
dissolved’; (3) the receiver, subject to the court’s approval, will sell the
property, pay the partnership’s debts, distribute the remaining assets, and
dissolve the partnership; (4) defendants are entitled to certain credits but not
others; (5) defendants will bear 85 percent of the receiver’s expenses and fees;
(6) at the time of distribution, plaintiff will recover his court costs from
defendants' share of assets; (7) certain leases entered into by defendants are
null and void.” (Kinoshita, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 962.) Importantly,
the judgment also decreed “(8) the court will retain jurisdiction ‘for all
purposes necessary to insure compliance with this Judgment and dissolution
and distribution of the partnership assets.’ ” (Ibid.)
Looking to the substance and effect of the adjudication, the court
concluded the Kinoshita judgment was not a final determination of the rights
of the parties because it “does not provide a complete formula for distribution
of the proceeds of sale, but at most identifies some of the factors and
principles which will go into that distribution. Nor does it determine the
interests of the individual defendants. Even if these deficiencies might be
cured by reference to the partnership agreement or the applicable statutes
(see Corp. Code, §§ 15040, 15523, 15684), the judgment does not determine
the manner in which the expenses assessed to defendants will be allocated
8
among them.” (Kinoshita, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 965.) Additionally,
“the trial court expressly reserved power over the conduct of the sale” and
reserved jurisdiction “for all purposes necessary” to ensure compliance with
the dissolution and distribution of the partnership assets. (Ibid.)
Like the Kinoshita judgment, the trial court’s judgment here does not
terminate the proceedings below by “ ‘completely disposing of the matter in
controversy.’ ” (Kinoshita, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 963.) Plaintiffs’
complaint requested “a decree of winding up and dissolving the [p]artnership
and distributing assets as provided by law.” But the judgment decrees only
that the partnership is dissolved. It is silent as to how the court will
accomplish that dissolution, including for example its determinations on
settling debts and distribution of assets. The unresolved issues here are
more numerous than the deficiencies in the Kinoshita judgment, which at
least identified some of the factors and principles that would go into how the
dissolution would be accomplished but still failed to provide a complete
formula for assets distribution. (Id. at p. 965.) Surely, if the Kinoshita
judgment failed to satisfy the one final judgment rule, so too must the
judgment here. Moreover, the judgment here does not include a wind-up
decree or resolve plaintiffs’ second cause of action for a full accounting of the
partnership’s activities and thus it cannot be said to have terminated the
litigation between the parties on the merits of the case. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 577; Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5.) For these reasons, the
November 2, 2023 judgment dissolving the partnership is interlocutory and
not appealable. (Kinoshita, at p. 968.)
We are not persuaded to the contrary by defendants’ arguments.
Defendants contend the November 2, 2023 judgment dissolving the
partnership pursuant to section 15908.02, subdivision (a), is final and “no
9
essential judicial act remains to be done.” They argue this is because section
15908.03 “provides that the subsequent winding up of the limited partnership
is self-executing, and intended to occur without further court intervention,
judicial act, or modification of the judgment” and “any court supervision of a
winding up is a discretionary remedy made upon a separate and subsequent
application to a court.” Defendants point us to no authority that requires a
“separate and subsequent application” to the court for a wind up, ignoring
that plaintiffs’ complaint did request a decree for a winding up.
Finally, to avoid Kinoshita, defendants argue the case is inapposite and
“pre-date . . . section 15908.02[, subdivision] (a) and its related statutory
scheme by decades.” Defendants do not, however, explain what effect if any
section 15908.02, subdivision (a), has on the Kinoshita holding. An
undeveloped argument is a forfeited one. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc.
v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 701, fn. 15 [failure to develop an
argument forfeits that point].) Even if not forfeited, we see nothing in the
enactment of section 15908.02 that changes Kinoshita’s holding that a
judgment ordering dissolution is not a final appealable judgment.
II.
The August 4, 2023 Order is Not Directly Appealable
The August 4, 2023 minute order is not final and appealable because it
directed the future preparation and filing of a judgment. (Estate of Sapp
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 [“A minute order that directs the preparation
of a formal written order is not itself appealable.”].) Defendants, however,
claim “the trial court ordered a buy-out pursuant to . . . section 15908.02,
subdivision (b)” and the order is therefore directly appealable under section
15908.02, subdivision (d). We disagree.
10
Where, as here, a court orders dissolution of a partnership, section
15908.02, subdivision (b), provides “the other partners may avoid the
dissolution of the limited partnership by purchasing for cash the partnership
interests owned by the partners so initiating the [dissolution] proceeding (the
‘moving parties’) at their fair market value.”
Subdivision (c) of section 15908.02 then provides, “If the purchasing
parties (1) elect to purchase the partnership interests owned by the moving
parties, (2) are unable to agree with the moving parties upon the fair market
value of the partnership interests, and (3) give bond with sufficient security
to pay the estimated reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, of the
moving parties if the expenses are recoverable under subdivision (d), the
court, upon application of the purchasing parties, either in the pending action
or in a proceeding initiated in the superior court of the proper county by the
purchasing parties, shall stay the winding up and dissolution proceeding and
shall proceed to ascertain and fix the fair market value of the partnership
interests owned by the moving parties.” (Italics added.)
If such an application is made by the purchasing parties, pursuant to
subdivision (d) of section 15908.02: “The court shall appoint three
disinterested appraisers to appraise the fair market value of the partnership
interests owned by the moving parties, and shall make an order referring the
matter to the appraisers so appointed for the purpose of ascertaining that
value. The order shall prescribe the time and manner of producing evidence,
if evidence is required. The award of the appraisers or a majority of them,
when confirmed by the court, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties.
The court shall enter a decree that shall provide in the alternative for
winding up and dissolution of the limited partnership unless payment is
made for the partnership interests within the time specified by the decree. If
11
the purchasing parties do not make payment for the partnership interests
within the time specified, judgment shall be entered against them and the
surety or sureties on the bond for the amount of the expenses, including
attorneys’ fees, of the moving parties. Any member aggrieved by the action of
the court may appeal therefrom.” (Italics added.)
It is clear from the plain language of section 15908.02 that the
statutory right of appeal under subdivision (d) is available to a party
aggrieved by a court’s action on a buyout petition filed to avoid dissolution.
(See Panakosta, Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Management LLC (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 612, 625 (Panakosta).) Here, the trial court’s August 4, 2023
order is not an action on a buyout petition, because defendants have not filed
one.
In Panakosta, a case cited by defendants, majority owners in a limited
partnership filed an action for dissolution. Minority owners, seeking to avoid
the dissolution, petitioned for a buyout of the majority owners’ interest in the
business pursuant to section 15908.02. (Panakosta, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 620–621.) The minority owners filed a concurrent motion for
appointment of appraisers to value the partnership and for a stay of the
related dissolution proceeding. (Id. at p. 621.) The trial court denied the
buyout petition and minority owners appealed. (Ibid.) The appellate court
held “subdivision (d) [of section 15908.02] . . . expressly confers a statutory
right to appeal from an action of the court on a request for buyout of interests
by partners who seek judicial dissolution of a partnership.” (Id. at p. 625,
italics added.) Because minority owners were “aggrieved by the trial court’s
denial of the motion to buy out the majority partners’ interests under section
15908.02,” the appeal from the denial order was authorized by subdivision
(d). (Id. at p. 625.)
12
Defendants have not filed a petition or request for buyout of plaintiffs’
interests in the partnership. To fit their appeal under the statutory right of
subdivision (d), they characterize the trial court’s order as one “requiring”
defendants to buyout plaintiffs’ interest pursuant to section 15908.02,
subdivision (b). We disagree with this characterization. The court’s order
provided defendants “will have sixty (60) days from today’s ruling to
purchase . . . [plaintiffs’] interests . . . at fair market value.” Fairly read, the
court provided defendants with an opportunity to avoid dissolution by the
filing of a buyout petition. And had defendants filed a buyout petition and
were subsequently aggrieved by the court’s action on that buyout petition,
they would have a statutory right to appeal the court’s action. But, again,
they have not. Consequently, the court’s August 4, 2023 order for dissolution
does not trigger the statutory right of appeal under section 15908.02,
subdivision (d).
III.
The February 1, 2024 Order Awarding Costs is Not Appealable
Because the November 2, 2023 judgment is not a final judgment, we
also lack jurisdiction to review the subsequent February 1, 2024 order
granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion to tax costs. (See
Lacey v. Bertone (1949) 33 Cal.2d 649, 654 [An order on a motion to tax costs
is appealable only when it is made after final judgment.]; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1(a)(2).)
IV.
We Decline to Exercise Our Discretion to Treat the Appeal As a Writ Petition
Should we determine that we lack jurisdiction to decide any portion of
their consolidated appeals, defendants ask that we treat their opposition to
the motion to dismiss as a petition for extraordinary writ relief. When an
13
appellant does not seek writ relief in the first instance, the question is not
whether we may, but whether we should treat the appeal as a writ petition.
As our Supreme Court has explained, although we do have the power to treat
an appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, “we
should not exercise that power except under unusual circumstances.” (Olson
v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401; accord San Joaquin County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Winn (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.)
We are sympathetic that plaintiffs have incurred the expense of
responding to the merits of the appeal while their motion to dismiss was
pending. However, as plaintiffs also recognize, resolving this appeal on the
merits now is not likely to avoid piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals
that the one final judgment rule is intended to prevent. (See Dana Point,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5 [cleaned up].) Thus, because we discern no unusual
or extraordinary circumstance, we decline to treat the appeals as petitions for
writ of mandate. (Cf. Olson v. Corey, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 400–401
[exercising discretion to treat appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ to
avoid unnecessary trial proceedings because the briefs and record on appeal
were adequate, the appealability of the order was not clear, and all parties
urged the court to reach the merits]; Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 746 [sufficiently unusual circumstances may be present
where the trial court made a substantive error and judicial economy would
not be served by deferring resolution until final judgment].)
14
DISPOSITION
The consolidated appeals are dismissed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.
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