In re Francisco A. CA4/1

CourtListener 10421956Calctapp30 avr. 2025

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Filed 4/30/25 In re Francisco A. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re FRANCISCO A., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
D083563
THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. JCM244080)
v.

FRANCISCO A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tilisha Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Francisco A. challenges the constitutionality of a probation condition
that requires him to submit his electronic devices to a search. Resolving this
matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.
I.
Francisco, a gang member, shot and killed Damien Estrada, a rival
gang member. After shooting Estrada, Francisco called a member of his gang
to pick him up. The fellow gang member drove Francisco to his house.
The juvenile court found Francisco, a minor, in violation of possession
of a concealable firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 1), possession of live
ammunition (§ 29650; count 2), battery on a peace officer (§ 243(b); count 3),
and murder (§ 187(a); count 4), and found true a gun enhancement
(§ 12022.53(d)). The court declared Francisco a ward of the state and
sentenced him to seven years in a youth treatment facility, with a maximum
term of confinement of one year and eight months plus 50 years to life.
As one of the probation conditions, the court imposed—without
objection—a Fourth Amendment waiver “extending” to Francisco’s “electronic
devices.” In imposing this condition, the court found a “nexus” based on
Francisco’s “call for assistance once the incident occurred where [Estrada’s]
life was lost.”
II.
Francisco claims the electronic search condition is facially,
unconstitutionally overbroad. The People counter Francisco’s claim is an
as-applied challenge he forfeited by failing to object below. We agree with the
People.
We review this constitutional challenge de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)

2
Challenges to probation conditions ordinarily must be raised in the
trial court to avoid forfeiture on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th
228, 234-235.) An as-applied challenge, which depends on the condition’s
constitutionality as applied to the probationer, is forfeited unless previously
raised. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.) But a facial challenge,
which presents a pure question of law, can be raised for the first time on
appeal. (Id. at pp. 885, 889.) In a facial challenge, “[t]he claim is that a
condition cannot have any valid application, without relying on any facts in
the sentencing record.” (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.)
Here, Francisco asserts an as-applied challenge, yet by not objecting in
the trial court, he did not preserve it for appeal. Francisco argues the
electronic search condition “is facially overbroad” and should be narrowed to
sources of electronic information reasonably likely to yield evidence of
criminal activity or probation noncompliance. The facial challenge label
Francisco applies to avoid forfeiture, however, does not stand up to scrutiny.
Electronic search conditions are not categorically invalid and may have valid
applications in some cases. (In re Ricardo P., 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1128-1129.)
Francisco admits as much in his reply when conceding the electronic search
is not “facially overbroad per se.” Rather, Francisco’s position “is that the
wording of the electronics search condition here is ‘too broad to survive
scrutiny’” because it is not limited to electronic data of gang-related activity
or weapon possession. (Italics added.) But that argument does not present a
true facial challenge because it requires us to review the record to determine
if the condition is overbroad as applied to him. (Patton, 41 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 946-947.) By not objecting below, Francisco forfeited this as-applied
challenge. (Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Accordingly, we affirm the
probation condition.

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III.
We affirm the juvenile court’s imposed electronic search condition.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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