CourtListener 10407784•In re Jan.B. CA2/4
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Filed 4/29/25 In re Jan.B. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re Jan.B. et al., Persons B335262
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 23LJJP00369
SERVICES,
Plaintiff,
v.
J.B.,
Defendant and Appellant,
Jan.B. et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.B.
Janette Freeman Cochran for Jan. B., et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile dependency case, J.B. (father) challenges
the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders relating to 14-
year-old Jan.B., 12-year-old Jal.B., and 10-year-old T.B., his three
children with non-party S.B. (mother). Contrary to father’s
arguments, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and removal
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nor did the
juvenile court exceed the bounds of its broad discretion by
declining to proceed with informal supervision pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 360, subdivision (b).
Accordingly, we affirm.
DISCUSSION2
I. Jurisdiction
A. Governing Principles
Under section 300, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may
exercise jurisdiction over a child upon finding “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by
the child’s parent . . . .” Jurisdiction may lie under section 300,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) The parties are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of the case, so we do not fully restate those
details here. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851
[unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of juvenile
court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal
statement” (fn. omitted)].)
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subdivision (b)(1)(A) where the juvenile court finds that “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A)
The failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.”
“‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused
or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to
protect the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Instead, “‘[t]he basic question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the [adjudication] hearing subject
the minor to the defined risk of harm.’” (In re J.N. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) In evaluating whether a child faces a
risk of harm under section 300, the court may consider past
events, as “[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) To
establish a risk of harm at the time of the hearing, however,
“[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe
the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
We review jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence.
(In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) Under this
standard, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s determinations, drawing all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court’s
findings and orders.” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
B. Analysis
The juvenile court found T.B. fell within the purview of
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) based on allegations that
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father physically abused T.B.3 In so doing, the court credited the
children’s reports of physical abuse. The juvenile court also noted
that father had previously participated in an anger management
course, but that this anger management course had apparently
failed to prevent the abuse.
Father asserts the finding that he physically abused T.B.
should be reversed as unsupported by substantial evidence. In so
doing, he contends the record lacks sufficient evidence
demonstrating that he actually subjected T.B. to any physical
abuse. Father also argues that even if the record indicated he
has been physically aggressive with T.B. in the past, it did not
demonstrate such incidents were likely to recur. We disagree.
Father highlights evidence supporting his position while
minimizing and criticizing contrary evidence. In so doing, father
misapprehends substantial evidence review. Father essentially
invites us to reweigh the evidence, second-guess the juvenile
court’s credibility determinations, and resolve conflicts in the
evidence in his favor. But that is not our role as an appellate
court. (See DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 371, 382 (DeNike).) Rather, we must “view the
record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
determinations” (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992)
and “uphold a [finding] that is supported by substantial evidence
even if substantial evidence to the contrary also exists.” (DeNike,
at p. 382.) Applying these principles, we conclude the record
3 The juvenile court also found it appropriate to exercise
jurisdiction over the children based on allegations of neglect
pertaining to the mother. Those allegations are not pertinent to
this appeal, and we do not comment on them.
4
adequately demonstrates that father physically abused T.B and
may do so again in the future.
All three children reported that father physically abused
T.B. T.B. reported that the day after arriving at father’s home,
father grew angry when he saw T.B. sitting incorrectly on his
electronic recliner couch. According to T.B., father yelled at him,
“grabbed [him] by the shirt collar, shook him, and placed him
onto the appropriate seat. Father then took his hand and pushed
his head back and brushed his elbow to his eye.” T.B. related
that father’s elbow left a mark near his eye. Later that day, T.B.
reported, father yelled at him for being too loud while playing a
game. T.B. stated father “‘socked [him] three times in [his] body
because [he] wasn’t [being] quiet.’” While reporting this incident,
T.B. “pointed to his mid-section of his body.” T.B. explained that
he “d[id] not want to return to . . . father’s home because he does
not like to be socked.”
Similarly, Jan.B. reported that, after seeing T.B. sitting on
the edge of the couch, father “‘grabbed [T.B.] by his shirt, started
swinging him around, shaking him, and the[n] . . . punched [T.B.]
in his stomach and back[ ]’” with a closed hand. (Italics omitted.)
Jan.B. also suggested that father hit T.B. in the eye, as T.B. had
a bruise in the area. Jan.B. reported feeling afraid of father.
Jal.B. observed a different incident. She “witnessed . . .
father sock [T.B.]” on “‘his chest and his sides’” because T.B. “was
not packing his bag fast enough so they could leave for [an]
overnight [visit] to their grandmother’s home.”
Despite the children’s reports of physical abuse—which, as
noted above, the juvenile court credited—father repeatedly
denied hitting T.B. or engaging in any abusive behavior while the
children were in his care. Instead, he accused mother of coaching
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the children into making false reports of physical abuse to
prevent their placement with him. And in his most recent
interview with the Department, father stated he did not want to
participate in services because, in his view, mother alone was
responsible for the family’s referral to the Department.4
Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
finding, and with deference to its credibility determinations, the
evidence discussed above demonstrates that despite completing
an anger management program, father quickly lost his temper
with nine-year-old T.B. and responded to the child’s relatively
minor misbehavior with inappropriate physical aggression (e.g.,
punching him multiple times on the torso) on more than one
occasion. By the time of the disposition hearing, father had yet to
take responsibility for his actions. He was also unwilling to
participate in services.
On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
that T.B. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm
because father physically abused T.B. The juvenile court could
also reasonably conclude that the abuse was likely to recur. (See
In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot
correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].) Thus, substantial
4 For these reasons, the present case is distinguishable from
In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1010), discussed in father’s
opening brief. In that case, the family was involved in a car
accident after the father, with the mother’s acquiescence, tried to
drive the family home from a restaurant while under the
influence of alcohol. (Id. at pp. 1017-1018.) Soon thereafter, both
parents accepted responsibility for their behaviors, expressed
remorse for their actions, and recognized how they had placed the
children in danger. (Id. at p. 1018.) Father has not done the same
here.
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evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding based
on father’s physical abuse.
II. Disposition
A. Informal Supervision
1. Governing Principles
“Once the juvenile court finds jurisdiction under section
300, it must adjudicate the child a dependent unless the severity
of the case warrants nothing more than [the Department’s]
supervision of family maintenance services. Under section 360,
subdivision (b), if appropriate, the court may, without
adjudicating the child a dependent, order that services be
provided to keep the family together under the informal
supervision of the child welfare agency. [Citations.]
“Whether to exercise this option under section 360,
subdivision (b), is a discretionary call for the juvenile court to
make; it may opt to do so, but it need not. ‘The court has broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with
its discretion.’ [Citation.] As an appellate court, we cannot
reverse the court’s dispositional order absent a clear abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] A court exceeds the limits of legal
discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the
bounds of reason.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 171.)
2. Analysis
Father argues that, rather than declaring the children
dependents of the court, the juvenile court should have followed
the Department’s recommendation and ordered informal
supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). In support of his
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position, he notes that “[f]ather had his own residence, was
employed outside of the home, lived with a female companion,
and had been proactive with enrollment and participation in
services.”
Again, father fixates on the evidence weighing in his favor
while ignoring the evidence undermining the merits of his
position. But our inquiry in reviewing for abuse of discretion is
similar to that which governs substantial evidence review. “In
determining whether there has been . . . an abuse [of discretion],
we cannot reweigh evidence or pass upon witness credibility. The
trial court is the sole arbiter of such conflicts. Our role is to
interpret the facts and to make all reasonable inferences in
support of the order issued.” (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins.
Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.)
Applying these principles, and as discussed above (see
Discussion Part I.B., ante), the record demonstrates father
physically abused T.B. more than once, notwithstanding his
completion of an anger management program before receiving the
children into his care. And contrary to his contentions, the
evidence does not show he had been proactively participating in
services at the time of disposition. Instead, in his most recent
interview with the Department, father stated that he did not
want to participate in services, and that he was not enrolled in
any services or programs at the time. Thus, based on father’s
refusal to acknowledge his inappropriate physical discipline of
T.B., and his unwillingness to engage in further services, we
conclude that the juvenile court did not “exceed[ ] the bounds of
reason” by declining to order informal supervision under section
360, subdivision (b). (In re N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p.
171.)
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B. Removal
1. Governing Principles
Pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile
court may remove a child from the custody of a parent if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” “A
juvenile court’s removal order at a disposition hearing will be
affirmed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (In
re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)
In Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 (O.B.), our
Supreme Court clarified the nature of substantial evidence
review applicable to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a finding made under the clear and convincing
evidence standard. It held: “[A]n appellate court must account
for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing a
claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under
this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
9
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011-
1012.)
2. Analysis
Father contends the removal order must be reversed
because the record lacks substantial evidence to support the
juvenile court’s findings under either prong of the two-part test
set forth in section 361, subdivision (c)(1). He argues that: (1) the
record fails to demonstrate father abused T.B. and, therefore,
does not indicate that T.B. would be at substantial risk of danger
if returned to father; and (2) several reasonable alternatives to
removal were available to safeguard T.B. from harm if he were to
remain in father’s care.
Again, the applicable standard of review mandates that we
reject father’s contentions. As set forth in detail above (see
Discussion, Part I.B., ante), the children reported that, on more
than one occasion, father responded to nine-year-old T.B.’s minor
misbehaviors by punching him on the torso multiple times. At
the time of these incidents, father had already completed an
anger management program. And throughout the case, father
has repeatedly denied hitting T.B., shown no insight into how his
actions placed T.B. in danger, and recently expressed
unwillingness to participate in services.
Viewing this evidence “in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below” (i.e., the Department), and giving “due
deference” to the juvenile court’s resolution of conflicts in the
evidence, as well as its credibility determinations, we conclude
the juvenile court could have found it “highly probable” that
father physically abused T.B. multiple times and was likely to do
so again in the future, such that T.B. would face “substantial
danger to [his] physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
10
emotional well-being if [he] . . . were returned” to father. (O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996; § 361, subd. (c)(1); see also In re Cole
C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 918.) Thus, substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding under the first prong of section 361,
subdivision (c)(1)’s two-part test.
As to the second prong, there is also substantial evidence
that father’s proffered alternatives to removal would not have
been sufficient to protect T.B.5 The record indicates that the
reported incidents of abuse happened quickly, stemming from
father’s spontaneous and emotional reactions to T.B.’s relatively
minor misbehavior. It therefore shows that father’s prior
participation in services (i.e., an anger management program)
had not curbed his aggressive behavior. Nor, construed in the
light most favor to the juvenile court’s order, did the record show
that father had gleaned insight into his reactive and anger-driven
actions. Considering these circumstances, as well as father’s
unwillingness to participate in further services, and construing
the evidence as we must on substantial evidence review, we
conclude the juvenile court could reasonably have found it “highly
probable” that T.B. would remain at risk if returned to father’s
care, even with father’s proffered safeguards in place.6 (O.B.,
5 Father suggested, as alternatives to removal, conditioning
T.B.’s placement in father’s care upon paternal grandmother
residing in father’s residence, mandating frequent updates to the
juvenile court regarding T.B.’s well-being, and requiring father to
participate in counseling.
6 The juvenile court stated as much when, contrary to
father’s assertion, it set forth the facts on which it relied in
rendering its removal order as required under section 361,
subdivision (e). Specifically, at the adjudication hearing, the
court explained that it had “bas[ed] [its] decision [to remove T.B.
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supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996; see also In re Cole C., supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) Thus, substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that “there are no reasonable means by which
[T.B.’s] physical health can be protected without removing [him]
from [father’s] . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are
affirmed as to father.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.*
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P.J.
MORI, J.
from father] on the sustained petition, the evidence that father’s
prior anger management classes were unsuccessful, and the fact
that he punched . . . one minor[ ] [on] two different occasions.”
The court found father’s actions to be inappropriate “given
[T.B.’s] age and what [T.B.] allegedly did to offend . . . father.”
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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