People v. Jones CA4/2

CourtListener 10407773Calctapp29 avr. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Jones CA4/2
See Concurring Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083498

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF083076)

KEVIN ANTHONY JONES, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John. D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and

Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Kevin Anthony Jones appeals the trial court’s judgment

following its resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. He argues that the court

erred in failing to dismiss a sentencing enhancement under section 1385, subdivision

(c)(2)(C). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 23, 1998, defendant committed a bank robbery. On February 17,

1999, following a court trial, he was found guilty of robbery. (§ 211.) The court also

found true the allegations that defendant had 20 prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds.

(c) & (e) and 1170.12, subd. (e)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)),

and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On April 23, 1999, the court sentenced

him to 25 years to life in state prison on count 1, plus a determinate term of 11 years for

the two prior serious felony enhancements and the prior prison enhancement.

On June 26, 2023, after defendant’s name was presumably provided to the trial

court as someone potentially eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, the court

held a full recall/resentencing hearing. The minute order indicates the court struck the

prison prior as invalid, pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and that sentenced

1 All further statutory references will be made to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
2
was defendant to 25 years to life, plus a determinate term of 10 years. It then set a

hearing pursuant to Romero.2

Defendant filed a brief seeking to have the court resentence him by striking one or

both of his prior serious felony enhancements and/or 19 of his 20 prior strike convictions,

pursuant to sections 1172.75, subdivision (b), and 1385, subdivisions (a) and (c).3 The

People filed a brief arguing that section 1172.75 did not entitle defendant to litigate a

Romero motion, and that, in any event, the court should not dismiss any of his prior strike

convictions. The People further argued that the court should not exercise its discretion

under section 1385 to dismiss any of the enhancements.

The court held a hearing on March 5, 2024, and noted that it had read both sides’

moving papers. The court found that defendant was entitled to a full resentencing and

was entitled to “run an additional Romero motion.” However, it declined to exercise its

discretion to dismiss any of defendant’s prior strikes, in light of his extensive criminal

history. Defense counsel then asked the court to strike both of defendant’s prior serious

felony enhancements under section 1385. The People requested that the court only strike

one of them. The court exercised its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c),

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. We note the record
on appeal does not appear to contain the reporter’s transcript from the resentencing
hearing, so it is unclear exactly what the court said or did, or why it sentenced defendant
and then set another apparent sentencing hearing.

3 The record on appeal does not appear to contain a sentencing brief by defendant.
However, the record does indicate that he filed one.

3
stating, “I will strike one of the nickel priors, but not both of them. So the total aggregate

term will now be 25 years to life plus five years.”

DISCUSSION

Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C) is Inapplicable

Defendant contends his sentence was unauthorized because the court was required

to dismiss his remaining prior serious felony enhancement. Specifically, he asserts that

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) required dismissal of the enhancement because his

sentence exceeded 20 years. The People argue that defendant forfeited his claim since he

failed to raise a specific objection at the resentencing hearing, and in any event, his claim

lacks merit. We agree with the People.

A. Defendant Forfeited His Claim

At the outset, we note that defendant forfeited his claim of sentencing error under

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) by failing to object below. (People v. Scott (1994)

9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [“only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are

reviewable on appeal”].) Defendant concedes that he did not object to the sentence based

on section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), but contends an objection was not required

because his sentence was unauthorized under the statute. We disagree. (See post, § D.)

B. Standard of Review

Defendant’s claim involves a question of statutory interpretation, which this court

reviews de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “As in any case

involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the

4
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by

examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.”

(People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) “‘If the statutory language is

unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.’” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100,

1106.)

C. Relevant Law

“[S]ubsequent to the original sentencing, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.

Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to allow for the imposition of one-year

prior prison term enhancements only for specified sexually violent offenses.” (People v.

Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 334 (Cota).) Defendant’s sentence was recalled

pursuant to section 1172.75, which “provides a process for recall of sentences involving a

now-invalid prior prison term enhancement and resentencing of affected defendants.”

(Ibid.; § 1172.75, subd. (c).)

In resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, “‘[t]he court shall apply

the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that

reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of

sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’” (Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

p. 334; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)

“Enacted in 2021, Senate Bill 81 amended Penal Code section 1385 to guide

sentencing courts in deciding whether to dismiss an enhancement. [Citation.] Under new

section 1385(c), a court ‘shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice

5
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’

[Citation.] In deciding whether to strike the enhancement, ‘the court shall consider and

afford great weight to evidence . . . that any of [nine enumerated] mitigating

circumstances . . . are present.’” (People v. McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147,

1152; § 1385(c)(2).)

The mitigating circumstance at issue here provides: “The application of an

enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the

enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)

D. Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C), is Inapplicable Here

Defendant claims that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), “prohibits imposition of

an enhancement if the sentence exceeds 20 years.” He argues his sentence is thereby

unauthorized “because it included an enhancement and the sentence was more than 20

years in prison.” Thus, defendant contends the five-year term on his prior serious felony

enhancement must be vacated.

Defendant’s claim fails under the plain language of section 1385, subdivision

(c)(2)(C), which states the mitigating circumstance as “[t]he application of an

enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” The court here sentenced

defendant to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a determinate term

of five years on the prior serious felony enhancement. Thus, it cannot be said that the

application of the enhancement “could result in a sentence of over 20 years” since

defendant’s sentence already exceeded 20 years, due to the indeterminate term of 25

6
years to life on count 1. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance enumerated in section

1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), does not apply here.

Defendant claims the issue is whether the word “shall” in section 1385,

subdivision (c)(2)(C) makes the dismissal of his prior felony enhancement mandatory.

(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C) [where the application of an enhancement could result in a

sentence of over 20 years, “the enhancement shall be dismissed.”].) We disagree.

Although we find this section 1385 subdivision (c)(2)(C) not applicable here, even

if it did apply, our Supreme Court has held that dismissal of an enhancement is not

mandatory, but rather discretionary. In exercising its discretion, the court, giving great

weight to mitigating factors, must determine whether dismissal of the enhancement is in

the furtherance of justice. (People v Walker (2024) 16 Cal. 5th 1024, 1036). “Stated

simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then

mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the

court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice.” (Ibid.) Here, the

court exercised its discretion and declined to strike the second enhancement given

defendant’s extensive record which included 20 prior strike convictions. We see no error

or abuse of discretion.

7
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

I concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

8
[People v. Jones, E083498]

RAPHAEL, J., concurring.

I agree with the disposition, but I write to disagree with the restrictive

interpretation of the word “result” in the majority opinion. If applied in other cases, this

interpretation would erroneously affect the application of sentencing enhancements in

many cases where a defendant receives a sentence exceeding 20 years.

Generally, a court may dismiss a sentencing enhancement in furtherance of justice.

(Pen. Code § 1385, subds. (a), (b).)1 Effective in 2022, section 1385, subdivision (c)

provides nine “mitigating circumstances” that “weigh greatly in favor of dismissing the

enhancement.” In these situations, the statute is not silent about a judge’s dismissal

discretion but encourages dismissal by giving the circumstance great weight.

One of these circumstances is: “The application of an enhancement could result in

a sentence of over 20 years.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) That circumstance applies the

special dismissal standard to any enhancements in a case where the total imprisonment

results in a sentence exceeding 20 years (putting aside the few enhancements that the law

never allows to be dismissed). Here, for example, the total sentence is 30 years to life.

That means that the five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony would be subject to

the special standard. Its application resulted in a sentence over 20 years; that is, 30 years

to life.

The majority opinion, in contrast, holds that an enhancement “results” in a

sentence over 20 years only when it puts the sentence over the 20-year threshold. (Maj.

1
opn., ante, at pp. 6-7.) So the majority finds that the five-year enhancement is not subject

to the special standard because the sentence was 25 years to life without it.

The majority’s interpretation is disconsonant in the context of this statute. Here,

the Legislature obviously intended to heighten scrutiny of enhancements that make

sentences particularly long. It does not make sense that the Legislature would encourage

dismissal of enhancements that happen to increase sentences above 20 years but not

enhancements that make longer sentences even longer.

Twenty years is not a magic number, but the Legislature’s way of identifying a

long sentence. As is common with laws that draw a line at an age or length of time, the

Legislature picked a point above which a rule applies, though that 20-year level itself

does not have independent significance. The Legislature wanted to identify

enhancements to long sentences for scrutiny, so it drew a simple, clear line.

The majority’s standard is arbitrary beyond just line-drawing. Consider the

majority test’s effect on a trial court’s consideration of the five-year enhancement for a

prior serious felony. The special standard in section 1385, subdivision (c) would apply

when the sentence was sixteen to twenty years long without the enhancement. Then, the

five-year enhancement alone would push the total sentence over the 20-year threshold.

But the heightened standard would not apply when the sentence was 21 years or more

without the enhancement. Then, the five-year enhancement would result in an even

longer sentence but not be the threshold-crosser. There is no reasonable basis for this

rule.

2
The legislative history of the bill that created the nine mitigating circumstances

supports my reading of the statute, that the Legislature meant to apply the special

standard to long sentences, not enhancements that chance to cross the 20-year threshold.

The legislative report from the introduction of Senate Bill No. 81 cited a study that found

“[t]he incremental deterrent effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at

best.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)

Mar. 16, 2021, p. 4. (Senate Report).). The report also cited the state’s Little Hoover

Commission criticism of the state “putting away offenders for increasingly longer periods

of time, with no evidence that lengthy incarceration, for many, brings any additional

public safety benefit.” (Ibid.)

Senate Bill No. 81 was meant to “codify” a recommendation from the Committee

on Reform of the Penal Code. (Senate Report, at pp. 4-5). That committee’s report

proposed the circumstance at issue here with language that shows it meant to apply to any

enhancement where the overall sentence exceeded 20 years. It recommended the higher

standard where “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case or the total sentence

is over 20 years.” (Com. On Revision of Penal Code, Annual Report and

Recommendations (Feb. 9, 2021) at p. 37 <https://perma.cc/TG5N-XNGL>.) It did not

signify that an enhancement that itself crossed the 20-year mark was significant. It

simply identified cases where the total sentence exceeded 20 years. Also, in accord with

what the Legislature would later state, the Committee described “broad consensus”

among academic studies that “long sentences have little or no public safety value.” (Id.

3
at p. 42.) The proposal was to have trial courts scrutinize enhancements to long

sentences, not only enhancements that happen to cause a sentence to surpass 20 years.

While I disagree with the majority’s restrictive interpretation of the word “results,”

I agree that there was no error here. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) Defendant originally was

sentenced with two five-year serious felony enhancements. In the 2024 resentencing, the

trial court expressly referred to section 1385, subdivision (c), which it stated applied to

those enhancements. It stated that it was “mindful of the change in the law with respect

to 1385” and would strike one of the defendant’s two enhancements. It referred to

section 1385, subdivision (c) when it struck the enhancement. It stated that it would not

strike both enhancements. The record thereby indicates that the trial court properly

applied the law. The defendant’s argument here is not that the trial court failed to apply

the mitigating circumstance, but that, when that circumstance applies, dismissal is

mandatory under section 1385, subdivision (c). Defendant is wrong about that, as the

trial court instead must “‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the

enumerated mitigating factors.’” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036.) The

mitigating circumstance applied here, but nevertheless the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in striking one enhancement, but not both.

RAPHAEL
J.

4

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.