In re A.W. CA3

CourtListener 10385290Calctapp25 avr. 2025

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Filed 4/25/25 In re A.W. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Glenn)
----

In re A.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile C102406
Court Law.

GLENN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN (Super. Ct. Nos. 22JP01052,
SERVICES AGENCY, 22JP01053)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Mother S.N. (mother) of minors A.D. (born 2019) and Z.D. (born 2021) (the
minors) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying mother’s petition for
modification and terminating parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395; statutory section references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion

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in denying her petition for modification and erred by failing to find that the beneficial
relationship exception to adoption applied. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

A. Detention/Jurisdiction/Disposition

In December 2022, the Glenn County Health and Human Services Agency (the
Agency) filed section 300 petitions alleging mother and presumed father G.D. failed to
protect the minors (§ 300, subd. (b)) and the minors were suffering or at risk of suffering
serious emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)) after the minors witnessed multiple incidents
of physical and emotional abuse between their parents. The juvenile court ordered the
minors detained and entered a general visitation order providing mother with a minimum
of two supervised visits, totaling four hours, each week. The court also ordered
reunification services. Mother’s services included drug and alcohol testing, substance
abuse treatment, parenting education, and mental health counseling.
At the uncontested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition,
declared the minors dependent children of the court, and continued supervised visits as
previously ordered. At the contested disposition hearing the juvenile court ordered the
minors removed from parental custody. The court found mother made no progress
toward alleviating or mitigating the causes that required placement of the minors in foster
care and set the six-month review hearing.

B. Six- and Twelve-Month Review

In August 2023, the Agency reported mother was expecting her seventh child. She
was looking for living arrangements that the Agency would approve. At the time, mother
had attended 14 weeks of the recommended 52-week child abuse/child endangerment
program and was making progress toward “her treatment goals” in individual counseling.
The Agency noted that mother was not in compliance with the required weekly
counseling sessions in four of the five previous months.

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Mother completed the required parenting program on May 24, 2023, and did well
in the program. Mother also attended several Al Anon meetings. Nevertheless, the
reporting social worker observed that mother had not made “any progress remaining calm
when given difficult information,” and she continued refusing to take responsibility for
her actions or let go of things that are not within her control. Overall, mother was
“resistant to any change in her parenting style.”
The assigned social worker acknowledged mother complied with “several of the
services outlined in her case plan” but she remained concerned about mother’s
unwillingness to recognize her role in the minors’ detention. Mother insisted the Agency
was corrupt and “making every effort to make her fail.” Mother could present as calm
and regulated but was “paranoid, hostile[,] and unstable when presented with
conversations or information that challenge[d] her narrative.” And, as reported by the
Agency, mother was dishonest with the social worker regarding her living situation and
her relationship with the presumed father.
Based on both parents’ “lack of behavioral change, lack of engagement in court-
ordered services, hostile communication and apparent paranoid thoughts,” the Agency
concluded it was unlikely the minors would be returned by the 12-month permanency
hearing. If the juvenile court were inclined to continue reunification services, the Agency
asked the court to order a psychiatric evaluation for both parents.
Mother was late to the six-month review hearing on December 11, 2023. She
appeared, wearing a hospital wrist band, after several witnesses testified. The court
continued the hearing to January 22, 2024, for a combined six- and twelve-month
hearing.
Mother did not appear at the January 22, 2024, hearing. After hearing from
counsel, the juvenile court terminated services for both parents, set a section 366.26
hearing for May 13, 2024, and a post permanency review hearing for July 22, 2024.

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C. April 2024-August 2024

On April 18, 2024, acting without appointed counsel, mother filed a section 388
petition for each minor asking the juvenile court to return the minors to her or,
alternatively, to give her another chance at reunification. She argued that she was
“falsely misrepresented” by her social worker and “not represented” by her appointed
counsel. She asserted the change in order would be better for the minors because she
feared for the minors’ safety in their foster home. The court set the petitions for hearing
on May 13, 2024, alongside the section 366.26 hearing.
The Agency’s May 3, 2024, selection and implementation report recommended
parental rights be terminated and adoption the permanent plan. The minors’ foster
parents were found “suitable and committed to” adopting the minors. During the
reporting period, mother’s visitation was gradually decreased to once monthly, supervised
by the Agency. Mother consistently attended her scheduled visitation but the Agency
reported the visits were not “beneficial” for the minors: “During her limited time with
the [minors], she prioritizes examining their bodies, taking pictures and videos, talking on
her phone, interrogating the [minors], and making complaints to staff and law
enforcement.”
Additionally, the Agency noted that during their visits, mother demonstrated “an
inability to consistently meet the [minors’] psychological and emotional needs, fails to
consistently and appropriately respond to their non[-]verbal [c]ues, and does not
intervene when the children are engaging in unsafe play, even when directed to by the
[Agency].” Mother’s interaction with the minors was not “conducive to creating or
maintaining a healthy and stable parent-child relationship, bond[,] or attachment.”
The parties appeared before the juvenile court on May 13, 2024, and the court
continued the section 366.26 hearing to August 12, 2024. Mother asked for increased

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visitation in the interim, and the court acceded to her request, over the objection of
minor’s counsel.
The Agency filed an addendum to their report on August 7, 2024. Mother’s adult
child T.N. contacted the assigned social worker saying she was concerned mother was
lying to the Agency. T.N. told the assigned social worker that mother and the presumed
father continued to engage in “mutual domestic violence,” often in the presence of their
infant daughter. The Agency continued to recommend terminating parental rights and
freeing the minors for adoption.
On August 12, 2024, before appearing in court, mother filed a section 388 petition
for each minor, without the assistance of appointed counsel. She asked the court to
reinstate reunification services for six months. In support of her petition, mother said she
continued with her counseling, and she completed her parenting class. In addition,
mother was attending codependency classes, anger management classes, and a domestic
violence class. She had housing through the Salvation Army, and she was working as a
nanny. She argued that no one cared more about the minors than she did, and she
continued to assert the minors were being abused in their foster home. She also said the
assigned social worker was biased against her and “cruel.”
When the parties appeared before the court, mother’s counsel asked to be relieved
— there had been a complete breakdown in communication. The court granted counsel’s
request and appointed new counsel. The court continued the hearing to September 9,
2024.

D. September 2024

On September 9, 2024, mother moved the juvenile court to appoint her new
counsel. The court denied her motion. The court then heard testimony from mother, the
presumed father, and the assigned social worker. The social worker testified that mother
was disruptive during the minors’ vaccination appointment on August 5. Mother did not

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want the minors to be vaccinated so, rather than hold either of the minors, she became
angry with the social worker and medical professionals. Her face red, mother clenched
her fist and rocked back and forth, raising her voice. Mother was asked to leave the
room.
The social worker also testified about several videos she reviewed. In one video
the presumed father appeared intoxicated, and mother was “comforting” him. In another,
the presumed father appeared to be “stumbling and agitated”; mother was pulling on him
or pushing him as he was “trying to get away from her.” Several videos captured mother
and the presumed father fighting over his consumption of pornography, often they were
yelling at each other. The social worker also reviewed a video depicting mother’s infant
daughter in a car, unattended for approximately 30 minutes.
The social worker had “several concerns” about returning the minors to mother
and the presumed father. The family had been engaged with the Agency for more than 18
months and there was substantial evidence the domestic violence between them
continued. She also was concerned that mother was either in denial about what was
going on or was lying. And she was concerned that mother was in denial about the harm
done to the minors who witnessed the violence.
Mother was going to her classes but there was no evidence mother was benefitting
from them. Mother continued to blame the Agency and the presumed father for the
minors being removed. According to mother, “she has been nothing short of a wonderful
mother and has never put her children in a potentially harmful or a harmful situation.”
Mother continued in the cycle of abuse and there were no changes to her behavior. The
social worker also found it “very concerning . . . that there has been no stability in their
housing, in their relationship status, [or] in their communication with the [Agency] for
the duration of this case.”
After considering the testimony and written evidence submitted, the court denied
mother’s section 388 petitions. The court found “this is a circumstance where there are

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changing circumstances, not changed circumstances.” At 21 months in, mother had not
shown significant progress toward reunification. The court told mother “taking classes is
not the point of taking classes. The point is to learn from those classes . . . .” Mother had
not learned and had not changed her behavior.
The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to October 28, 2024, where the
court would also hear the de facto parent request filed by the minors’ foster parents.

E. October 2024

On October 25, 2024, mother and the presumed father, without their appointed
counsel, filed a joint section 388 petition. Again, they asked the juvenile court to
reinstate services. They argued that mother stayed in her classes, graduated from “New
Beginnings,” and participated in services on her own through the Salvation Army. They
also argued the presumed father was now sober and responsible. They again claimed the
assigned social worker was biased against them and corrupt.
Mother’s adult daughter S.L. filed a similar section 388 petition, asking the minors
be returned “home so we can be together.” In support of her petition, S.L. said, “mom &
dad take very good care of me.”
On October 28, 2024, the juvenile court found the minors’ foster parents to be the
de facto parents over mother’s objection. The court took notice of the evidence submitted
at the September 9, 2024, hearing. The court then heard testimony from mother and the
family’s visitation monitor Xochitl J. Xochitl testified mother visited the minors
regularly; she brought them healthy snacks to eat and appeared to care for them.
Recently, the visits were in the park, which the minors loved; they had fun and enjoyed
their visits outside.
Xochitl also observed that, during the visits, mother spent “too much time trying
to make the kids say they miss mom” and looking for anything “wrong” that she could
blame on the Agency or the foster parents. In Xochitl’s opinion, mother was “very

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restrictive on the kids,” what they were doing and how they were talking. Mother also
questioned the minors about what was happening in their foster home. She would
examine their bodies and take pictures at nearly every visit. At the end of their visits, the
minors did not cry; they would just say good-bye. And the minors never, on their own,
said they missed mother or told her they love her, only when she asked them.
After considering the evidence presented, the juvenile court found the minors were
adoptable and terminated parental rights. The court also denied the section 388 petitions
filed on October 25, 2024. The court found the parties were filing the section 388
petitions “on their own without their attorneys’ knowledge. They are represented[;]
therefore, the attorneys are responsible for making requests to change orders.” In any
event, the court ruled, the changes requested in the petitions did not promote the best
interest of the minors.
The same day the juvenile court terminated parental rights, mother filed her notice
of appeal. In her notice of appeal, mother indicates she is appealing from orders issued
on October 28, 2024, and September 23, 2024.

DISCUSSION

I

Forfeiture/Appealability

Respondent contends mother has forfeited her right to challenge the juvenile
court’s order terminating her parental rights.
Respondent correctly states the law: “In order to obtain review on appeal from the
final order in the section 366.26 hearing of issues subsumed within an order setting a
section 366.26 hearing, a party must first timely file a writ petition seeking review of the
order setting the section 366.26 hearing; the petition must substantively address the
specific issues to be challenged; the petition must be supported by an adequate record;

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and finally, the petition must have been ‘summarily denied or otherwise not decided on
the merits.’ ” (Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1507.)
Respondent, however, is not correct that the law precludes mother from pursuing
this appeal. The appeal here is not from an order setting the section 366.26 hearing or an
order “subsumed within the order setting a section 366.26 hearing,” it is from orders
terminating parental rights and denying section 388 petitions at the section 366.26
hearing. Failure to file a writ petition from the order setting a section 366.26 hearing
does not preclude appeal of the findings and orders made at the section 366.26 hearing
itself. (Joyce G. v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 & fn. 3.)
Mother timely filed her notice of appeal. In her notice of appeal, mother clearly
identified the orders from which she appealed as the orders denying her section 388
petitions and terminating her parental rights. Her appeal from these orders is properly
before this court and her claims are preserved for our review.

II

Section 388 Petition

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section
388 petition. We disagree.

A. Orders Appealed From

As an initial matter, mother acknowledges she filed several section 388 petitions in
the juvenile court, all of which were denied. Her argument on appeal, however, appears
to refer only to a singular petition, which she does not identify by date but only by
citation to the record. That citation is to the section 388 petition mother filed on
August 12, 2024. The juvenile court denied that petition on September 9, 2024,
following an evidentiary hearing.
Mother’s notice of appeal does not include the September 9, 2024, order; it
includes the October 28, 2024, orders and a September 23, 2024, order that is not part of

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the record. Construing the notice of appeal liberally, as we must, we assume the
September 23rd date is a typographical error and we interpret the notice to apply to the
September 9, 2024, order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).)

B. Legal Principles

Section 388, subdivision (a) provides that a parent of a dependent child may
petition the juvenile court “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence . . .
for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made.”
Section 388 permits modification of a dependency order if a change of circumstance or
new evidence is shown and if the proposed modification is in the best interests of the
minor. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.)
“After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point
‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The juvenile court looks not to the parent’s
interests in reunification but to the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Ibid.;
In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) In assessing the petition, the court may
consider the entire history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181,
189.) “ ‘A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean
delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent . . . might be able
to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best
interests.’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206.) The child’s “best interests
are not to further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding [the parent] for
[his or] her hard work and efforts to reunify.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503,
527.)
The party petitioning for modification has the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence of both changed circumstances or new evidence and that the requested

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order would serve the minor’s best interests. (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th
1698, 1703.) A modification “petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile
court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in denying mother’s petition.

C. Analysis

Mother has failed to demonstrate her August 12, 2024, section 388 petition, which
sought reinstatement of reunification services, is supported by changed circumstances.
In support of her petition, and to demonstrate changed circumstances, mother
offered evidence that after reunification services were terminated, she continued to
participate in services voluntarily. She remained in counseling and began taking several
new classes, including classes on codependency, anger management, and domestic
violence. She also completed a parenting class. Mother has, however, been engaged in
these and similar services since the minors’ detention in 2022. And, despite engaging in
these services, mother continued to participate in a relationship with the presumed father
that was marred by domestic violence.
Mother fails to cite any authority supporting her position that, following
termination of reunification services, her ongoing and voluntary participation in services
constitutes changed circumstances sufficient to support a section 388 petition. (Accord In
re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [mother’s “recent sobriety reflects
‘changing,’ not changed, circumstances” in light of her “history of drug relapses”].)
On the other hand, “ ‘[a] petition which alleges merely changing circumstances
and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent
. . . might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child
or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] “ ‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to
become adequate.’ ” ’ ” (In re Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.)

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Here, the weight of the evidence demonstrates that, despite her ongoing
participation in these services, mother remained adamant it was not her fault the minors
were removed. She continued to blame the presumed father, the Agency, and others; by
mother’s own estimation, she was a wonderful parent. It was the system that failed the
minors, not her. As the social worker said, mother continued to demonstrate a complete
unwillingness to change her parenting style or her relationship with the presumed father.
These are not changed circumstances. They are, at most, changing circumstances. The
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s August 12, 2024, section
388 petition.
To the extent mother challenges the juvenile court’s October 28, 2024, order
summarily denying the section 388 petitions she filed on October 25, 2024, we also find
no error. Mother filed these petitions pro se, despite being represented by appointed
counsel. The Supreme Court has long recognized that motions “and briefs of parties
represented by counsel must be filed by such counsel” unless the filings relate to the
adequacy of counsel’s representation. (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173,
abrogated on another ground as stated in People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 704-
705.) “Where the party is not permitted personally to participate in conducting the case,
pro se filings by that party may be returned unfiled [citation] or, if filed, may be
stricken.” (People v. Harrison (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 780, 788.) Accordingly, the court
acted well-within its discretion to summarily deny those petitions.

III

Section 366.26 Hearing

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption.
At the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, a juvenile court must
choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . .

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The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If
the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court
to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would
be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is the
beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629.)
The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of
any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) For the beneficial parental relationship
exception to apply, “[t]he parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent must show
that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent — the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. And
the parent must show that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child
even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.”
(Caden C., at p. 636.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption “must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child
bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (In
re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576.) The factual predicates of the
exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its
discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (In re Caden C., supra,

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11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court as to what is in the child’s best interests. (Id. at pp. 640-641.)
Here, it is not in dispute that mother maintained consistent visitation with the
minors. However, mother did not present sufficient evidence that her relationship with
the minors was so significant that severance of those relationships would outweigh the
benefits of adoption. (Cf. In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637.) Both the
assigned social worker and the visitation monitor reported that during their visits,
mother’s interaction with the minors was neither positive nor beneficial. She spent a
great deal of the visits coaching the minors to say they loved her and missed her. She
inspected their bodies for any sign of injury or abuse, took pictures of their bodies with
her phone, and interrogated them about their foster parents.
During visits, mother’s focus was often on her phone. She failed to intervene
when either of the minors would become emotionally dysregulated, she even failed to
intervene when their playing put them at risk of injury. When the minors were getting
their vaccines, mother refused to hold them. Mother was, instead, focused on her anger
toward the social worker and medical personnel. Mother made no effort to bond with the
minors during these visits. She did not engage the minors in positive interactions but
focused on finding evidence that the Agency or the minors’ foster parents were doing
something wrong. Such evidence supports a finding that neither minor would benefit
from a continuing relationship with mother. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632
[one consideration is positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child].)
The minors were removed from mother’s custody when they were three years old
and 16 months old, respectively. At the time of the October 2024 selection and
implementation hearing, the minors were nearly five and three years old respectively and
they had not been in mother’s care for nearly two years. The juvenile court could
reasonably find against mother on this element based on the short time they spent in
mother’s custody and the fact that neither minor was crying or sad when taken back from

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mother at the end of their visits. (See In re Kathrine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318
[“beneficial relationship exception demands something more than the incidental benefit a
child gains from any amount of positive contact with her natural parent”].)
The juvenile court could reasonably find that foregoing stability and permanence
in favor of a tenuous placement to provide an opportunity for continued contact with
mother would not be in the minors’ best interests. In light of the minors’ young age, the
limited portion of their lives spent in mother’s care, the negative effects mother’s visits
had on the minors, and the minors’ need for stability as well as the stability the minors
were enjoying in their foster home, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that
terminating parental rights would cause the minors to suffer detriment from the loss of a
significant bond that would outweigh the benefits of permanency. There was no error in
finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

HULL, J.

We concur:

EARL, P. J.

KRAUSE, J.

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