CourtListener 10385284•People v. Ramirez CA2/4
Texte intégral
Filed 4/25/25 P. v. Ramirez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336525
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. TA148786)
v.
JOSE FRANCISCO RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Sean D. Coen, Judge. Remanded in part and Affirmed in part.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2021, defendant and appellant Jose Francisco Ramirez pled no
contest to attempted murder and admitted to personally using a firearm in
the commission of the crime. In 2022, Ramirez filed a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court ultimately
denied the petition for failing to establish a prima facie showing. On appeal,
Ramirez challenges the trial court’s order and requests a correction in the
abstract of judgment to properly reflect his plea. The Attorney General
agrees with the correction but disputes Ramirez made a prima facie showing
under section 1172.6. We affirm the trial court’s order but remand the
matter to the trial court to permit Ramirez to amend his petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I. Plea
On August 25, 2020, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
filed an information charging Ramirez and his two codefendants (Isaiah
Horton and Rosalynn Rollins) with kidnapping during the commission of
carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a), count 1), kidnapping to commit another crime
(§ 209, subd. (b)(1), count 2), and carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a), count 3). As to
counts 1 through 3, it was further alleged a principal was armed with a
firearm in the commission of those offenses (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In the
same information, Ramirez was also charged with attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2 We granted Ramirez’s motion to augment the record to include the
preliminary hearing transcript.
2
5) and aggravated mayhem (§ 205, count 6).3 As to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, it
was further alleged Ramirez personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm which caused great bodily injury to the victim (§ 12022.53, subds. (b),
(c), (d)).
In July 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ramirez pled no contest to
attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 5) and admitted to personally
using a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The
parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the police reports
and the preliminary hearing transcript. In exchange, Ramirez was sentenced
to 19 years in state prison and the trial court dismissed the remaining counts
and allegations. Both codefendants pled no contest to carjacking.
II. Petition for Resentencing
In June 2022, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing (§ 1172.6). On a
preprinted form, Ramirez checked the boxes that (1) the information filed
against him allowed the prosecution to proceed with attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2) he was convicted of
attempted murder, and (3) he could not be presently convicted of attempted
murder because of the changes in the law. He further alleged that he
presented a facially sufficient petition and requested appointment of counsel.
The trial court appointed him counsel.
The People filed a response, arguing that Ramirez was not entitled to
relief because he was the actual shooter and was not convicted under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People further argued
Ramirez was the direct perpetrator because he was the only defendant who
3 The information did not include a count 4.
3
was charged with, and entered a plea to, attempted murder with the personal
use of a firearm. Ramirez’s codefendants were not charged with attempted
murder and both had entered pleas to carjacking. In contesting his prima
facie showing, the People relied on the minute orders reflecting Ramirez’s
and his codefendants’ pleas. In reply, Ramirez asserted he had met the
prima facie burden and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Ramirez did
not offer any factual counterweight. The trial court found Ramirez made a
prima facie showing and set an evidentiary hearing.
In October 2023, the People filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
Ramirez is ineligible for relief as a matter of law because at the time of his
plea, the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an invalid theory of
liability for attempted murder. The People noted that Senate Bill No. 1437,
effective on January 1, 2019, amended the Penal Code and eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. The
People further noted that despite Senate Bill No. 775 adding attempted
murder to the list of crimes eligible for potential resentencing, effective
January 1, 2022, the bill did not amend the murder statutes. In support, the
People again attached the minute order of Ramirez’s plea. No opposition was
filed by Ramirez.
In January 2024, the trial court denied the petition for resentencing,
finding Ramirez did not establish a prima facie showing “based upon these
facts that I’m able to look at without making an independent factual
determination.”
Ramirez timely appealed.
4
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ramirez contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition for resentencing because his record of conviction, specifically the date
of his plea, did not establish he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
We agree.
Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine in cases of murder by amending the Penal Code. (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595.) The bill also enacted the procedure by
which eligible defendants may petition for relief under the amended law.
After Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect on January 1, 2019, however,
disagreement emerged among appellate courts as to whether the bill’s
amendments to the Penal Code applied to offenses other than murder, such
as attempted murder. (See People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434
[noting split in authority].) The Legislature resolved the dispute by enacting
Senate Bill No. 775, which took effect on January 1, 2022, “to make clear the
natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice
liability to attempted murder.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191,
193.)
When Ramirez entered his plea in July 2021, the law remained
unsettled as to the impact of Senate Bill No. 1437 on attempted murder, and
Ramirez still could have been convicted of that offense pursuant to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [when “appellate decisions are in
conflict” a “court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice
between the conflicting decisions”].) Therefore, we conclude the trial court
erred by denying Remirez’s petition based solely on the date of his plea.
5
Ramirez then argues to the extent the trial court denied his petition
based on the preliminary hearing transcript, it was improper judicial
factfinding at the prima facie stage. We recognize that the trial court did not
explicitly indicate in its order that it found Ramirez ineligible for relief on
this basis. We also note the People did not attach the preliminary hearing
transcript in support of its response to Ramirez’s petition for resentencing or
to its motion for reconsideration.4
While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court decided People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 600 (Patton), which held “that a petitioner who
offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief under section
1172.6, in response to a record of conviction that demonstrates the
petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made
a prima facie showing.” Although the “‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), it is not on the
floor. A petitioner “confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief
is unavailable ha[s] the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory
allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an
evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Patton, supra, at p. 607.) A petitioner
may satisfy this burden by, for instance, pointing to “specific facts that
identify someone else as the direct perpetrator.” (Ibid.) “But absent specific
facts, no such dispute arises, . . . from mere latent, speculative possibilities;
that is, a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from
thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Id. at p. 608.)
4 On appeal, the Attorney General does not assert that Ramirez’s plea
along with his codefendants’ pleas (alone) are sufficient to deem him
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
6
The court in Patton made clear “there is no dispute that the record of
conviction the parties may consult at the prima facie stage includes a
preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 608.) In Patton, as in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to
make a prima facie showing because he “offered only conclusory allegations of
entitlement to resentencing relief under section 1172.6 in response to a
record of conviction.” (Id. at p. 609.) In light of the preliminary hearing
transcript, the court held that the petitioner’s “conclusory checkbox
allegations alone could not create a factual dispute.” (Ibid.) However, in
response to the petitioner’s belated request at oral argument, the court in
Patton remanded the matter back to the superior court to permit the
petitioner to plead additional facts.
After briefing was complete in this case, on March 6, 2025, Ramirez
filed a new authority letter citing Patton. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.254.)
While the letter may not include any “argument or other discussion of the
authority,” we deem counsel’s citation to Patton as a request to remand for
the opportunity to plead additional facts. (See id., rule 8.254(b).) Consistent
with the disposition in Patton (and in an abundance of caution), we remand
the matter to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an
amended petition should Ramirez, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file
one. We express no opinion on the viability of any additional facts Ramirez
might allege in his amended petition.
Lastly, Ramirez contends, and the Attorney General agrees, there is an
error in the abstract of judgment. The abstract erroneously reflects a
conviction on count 5 for premeditated attempted murder rather than for
simple attempted murder. We order this error corrected. (See People v.
7
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [it is proper and important to correct
errors and omissions in abstracts of judgment].)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court to consider an amended
petition should Ramirez, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one. The
trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing is otherwise affirmed.
The abstract of judgment is to be amended to correctly reflect a conviction for
attempted murder, not premeditated attempted murder, on count 5. The
clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare and forward to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation an amended abstract of
judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
COLLINS, J.
DAUM, J.*
*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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