Diamond v. Schweitzer

CourtListener 10381996Calctapp21 avr. 2025

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Filed 3/24/25; Modified and certified for partial publication 4/21/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ZACKARY DIAMOND, as represented, etc.,
F086150
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-100707)
v.

SCOTT SCHWEITZER et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S.
Clark, Judge.
Rodriguez & Associates; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Kevin K. Nguyen and
Andrew N. Chang for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Agajanian, McFall, Weiss, Tetreault & Crist and Paul L. Tetreault for Defendants
and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff Zackary Diamond appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants Scott Schweitzer,
Schweitzer Motorsports Productions doing business as Bakersfield Speedway, and
Christian Schweitzer, an individual doing business as Starting Line Refreshments.
Plaintiff suffered injuries from a punch inflicted by a third party during an
altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway. Plaintiff alleges defendants
were negligent in failing to provide reasonable security, adequately responding to the
altercation, and undertaking reasonable rescue efforts. Defendants moved for summary
judgment, asserting plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred by the release and waiver of
liability form he signed to gain admission to the pit area. The trial court granted the
motion, concluding the release’s language was clear, unequivocal, broad in scope, and
included the negligent conduct alleged in this case. The court interpreted the release as
including risks arising out of or related to racing activities. It concluded the assault was
such a risk and, thus, was the type of event anticipated and covered by the release.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the release is unenforceable because the injury-
producing act of negligence was not reasonably related to the purpose for which he
signed the release, which he describes as observing the race up close from the restricted
pit area while it was occurring. In addition, the parties responded to this court’s request
for supplemental briefing regarding whether plaintiff pled a theory of gross negligence
and whether that theory was or was not subject to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
We conclude the requirements for an enforceable release have been met: (1) the
release contains a clear, unambiguous and explicit expression of the parties’ intent to
release all liability for plaintiff’s injury; (2) the alleged acts of negligence resulting in the
injury are reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given; and
(3) the release does not contravene public policy. (See Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing,
Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304–1305 (Sweat) [three requirements for
enforceability of a release].) We also conclude (4) defendants adequately raised a
complete defense based on the signed release of liability to all theories of negligence

2.
alleged in the complaint, and (5) plaintiff failed to rebut that defense in opposition to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
We therefore affirm.
PROCEEDINGS
In March 2020, plaintiff, through Linda Valdez, his guardian ad litem, filed a
complaint for damages against defendants, 1 alleging causes of action for (1) negligence,
(2) premises liability, (3) negligent hiring, selection, approval, retention, and supervision,
and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2
Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached their duty of care by failing to take
reasonable steps to ensure plaintiff’s safety from dangerous conditions while attending a
June 9, 2018, racing event at defendants’ raceway. Plaintiff alleged that defendants
negligently failed to provide adequate security or supervision, including by failing to hire,
train, and supervise adequate security staff where plaintiff observed the events that day,
respond to the ongoing fight that resulted in plaintiff’s injury, and undertake appropriate
rescue efforts.
Defendants answered the complaint with a general denial. Defendants’ seventh
affirmative defense alleged that plaintiff “expressly in writing waived and released all

1Plaintiff also named David Hays, David Hays doing business as A-1 Spring & Supply,
and Kyle Flippo. Hays and Flippo did not join in defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or
alternatively, summary adjudication.
2The trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment stated the
motion was moot as to plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because it “had previously been dismissed ….” Plaintiff does not acknowledge, much
less challenge, the finding that he dismissed the fourth cause of action or the related mootness
determination. The finding is supported by a May 14, 2020, entry in the register of actions
describing the filing of a request for dismissal (partial) without prejudice as to the fourth cause of
action against defendants. The contention in plaintiff’s appellate briefing that summary
adjudication is not proper as to his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is a non
sequitur because that claim was not summarily adjudicated. Based on the appellate record, we
conclude the trial court correctly determined summary adjudication of the cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress was moot and address it no further.

3.
liability” against them based on their alleged negligence, agreed to indemnify and hold
them harmless, and assumed all risks and dangers “broadly associated” with attending the
event. So, plaintiff “relieved … defendant[s] of a duty of care, and the claims of the
plaintiff are barred as a matter of law.”
In January 2022, defendants filed and served a motion for summary judgment, or,
alternatively, summary adjudication. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in December 2022. On February 24,
2023, the trial court entered judgment in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff filed a timely notice
of appeal.
BACKGROUND
The Fight
To provide context for the incident resulting in plaintiff’s injuries, we recite the
generally undisputed evidence about the incident. 3
Plaintiff attended the June 9, 2018, races at the raceway with his mother, Linda
Valdez, to watch his brother, Jacob Diamond, and his stepfather, Daniel Valdez, race
Modlite cars. Plaintiff watched the races with his mother from the pit area. David Hays,
his wife, Sonja Hays, and Sonja’s son, Kyle Flippo, were present in the pit area, too.
After a race finished, David Hays, upset over Jacob Diamond’s driving,
confronted Jacob, yelling at him and using profanity. Plaintiff and his mother arrived,
and David began yelling at them, with his wife, Sonja, joining in. The altercation ended
without violence.
When plaintiff Linda Valdez later returned to the pit area, Sonja Hays started
another verbal altercation that escalated, with Sonja charging Linda Valdez and shoving

3The parties provide similar background in their appellate briefs. Though it is relevant
that the first argument (summarized below) arose due to tension over plaintiff’s brother’s
driving, the later analysis of the release’s language largely makes this fact irrelevant. Thus, this
background is described as “context.”

4.
her with both hands. David Hays lunged between the two women and shoved Linda to
the ground. Seeing this, plaintiff ran to his mother, but Kyle Flippo intercepted him and
punched his chin. Plaintiff fell to the ground, cracking his skull in three places upon
impact and causing subdural and internal bleeding.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants’ separate statement of undisputed material facts in support of their
motion for summary judgment asserted they were entitled to summary judgment, in
relevant part, because plaintiff signed an express waiver, release, and assumption of risk
prior to attending the racing event where he was injured. 4
Defendants submitted the following relevant material facts, which were
undisputed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff signed a document titled “Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of
Risk and Indemnity Agreement” on June 9, 2018, for admission to the “pits” at the
raceway. The release was included in the evidence supporting defendants’ motion and its
terms are set forth in part II.C. of this opinion. 5 As indicated by its title, the release
protected defendants in three ways. First, the persons signing the document, for
themselves, their heirs and next of kin, released and waived the liability specified.
Second, they expressly assumed the risks described. Third, they agreed to indemnify and
hold harmless the releasees for certain losses, damage and liability. Plaintiff suffered his
injuries that same day while on the premises of the Bakersfield Speedway in the pits, a
restricted area of the raceway, following a race.

4Defendants also asserted four additional grounds for summary adjudication of plaintiff’s
causes of action: (1) defendants had no duty to provide increased security to prevent fights; (2)
defendants’ service of alcohol at the event was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; (3)
consumption of alcohol furnished by defendants was not a factor contributing to the fight that
caused plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) defendants provided adequate emergency medical support for
plaintiff. We do not reach these other grounds.
5Though plaintiff objected to the admission of the release, the trial court overruled the
objection. Plaintiff does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

5.
Defendants argued the release precluded plaintiff from establishing that
defendants owed him any duty, a necessary element for his negligence causes of action.
Defendants argued that the release broadly covered any negligence, including negligent
rescue operations, and injuries that might be sustained in restricted areas like the pit, even
if the injured party might not know of that particular risk. Defendants argued that the
release did not violate public policy and was thus enforceable.
Plaintiff’s Opposition
Plaintiff’s separate statement in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment disputed defendants’ assertion that he released them from liability “for injuries
he might sustain during the running of the race event if caused by negligence and
negligent rescue operations.” Plaintiff interpreted the release to mean (1) he “released
only Scott Schweitzer and Schweitzer Motorsports Productions,” not all defendants, and
(2) those two defendants were released only from liability for “injuries arising from or
relating to the event(s).” Plaintiff’s separate statement asserted he “was not injured
during the running of a race event or while engaged in any activity associated with the
operation of a motor vehicle” but rather by “[a] violent attack” that was “not reasonably
related to racing or the running of a racing event.” Plaintiff also asserted no races were in
progress when Kyle Flippo blindsided him with a punch.
Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities contended the required act of
negligence resulting in the injury “be reasonably related to the object or purpose for
which the release was signed.” Plaintiff argued that the act of punching another person
was “not reasonably related to the purpose for which [he] signed the release—to watch
racing in the pits.” Plaintiff relied extensively on Sweat, in which this court decided that
injuries resulting from collapsing bleachers at a raceway were not reasonably related to
the purpose of the release in that case. Plaintiff contended the trial court should rule in
his favor because “the facts and issues in this matter are nearly identical to those
adjudicated in Sweat.”

6.
Defendants’ Reply
Defendants asserted plaintiff’s injuries were covered by the release because the
injuries arose out of or were related to the racing activities. Defendants argued the fight
occurred because there had been a race and those involved in the fight were with teams or
were related to the drivers and the argument arose over what happened on the track.
Thus, defendants concluded the fight would not have occurred without racing.
Defendants distinguish Sweat by asserting there was no true relationship between the
integrity of the bleachers and racing—that is, the collapse of the bleachers was not a race-
dependent incident.
The Hearing
After the trial court announced its tentative ruling to grant defendants’ motion for
summary judgment based on the scope of the release, plaintiff’s counsel argued “the
release is only enforceable against the plaintiff if the injury producing act is reasonably
related to the purpose of the agreement that was signed,” which was “the hazards of
racing.” Counsel emphasized Sweat, arguing this case was materially like Sweat, where
the plaintiff had signed a release to go into the speedway’s pit area. Counsel
characterized the language in the release as broad and encompassing anything and any
injury that happened within the race. He argued the court in Sweat evaluated whether the
injury sustained when the bleachers collapsed was reasonably related to the hazards of
racing and found it was not.
Counsel further argued “there’s clearly ambiguity in this [release] regarding the
scope of it, regarding what the hazards of racing are between the two parties, and if
there’s any ambiguity at all in any contract, the ambiguity is construed against the
drafter.”

7.
Counsel also argued a release does not protect against liability for gross
negligence and there was clear gross negligence by defendants. 6 The trial court stated,
“[T]he complaint does not allege gross negligence and your opposition did not raise the
theory of gross negligence.” Counsel responded: “Yeah, but it’s the moving party’s
burden. The moving party … has to put in admissible evidence which establishes that we
cannot meet an essential element in our claim, and the moving parties do not meet their
burden.” Plaintiff’s counsel’s argument did not address the absence of a gross negligence
allegation in the complaint or the absence of a gross negligence argument in his
opposition papers.
In response, defendants’ counsel attempted to distinguish Sweat from the present
case. Counsel also argued that plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably related to the purpose
of the release because those injuries occurred from a fight that was part of the racing
environment. Counsel also argued the gross negligence argument was inappropriately
raised for the first time at the hearing.
Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court overruled plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, sustained defendants’
evidentiary objections, and granted defendants’ motion on the ground there were no
triable issues of fact “as to the first, second and third causes of action based upon Plaintiff
having signed a pre-event waiver and release of liability agreement on June 9, 2018.”
The court determined “the language of the release is not limited to racing, or the
operation of a motor vehicle as contended by Plaintiff.” The court stated the release’s
language was “clear and unequivocal and is broad in scope, and is understood by the
Court to include actions arising under the allegations made in this instance.”

6“[N]o published California case has upheld … an agreement purporting to release
liability for future gross negligence.” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41
Cal.4th 747, 758; see id. at p. 777.) “[A]n agreement made in the context of sports or
recreational programs or services, purporting to release liability for future gross negligence,
generally is unenforceable as a matter of public policy.” (Id. at p. 751.)

8.
The trial court rejected plaintiff’s gross negligence argument because it “was not
alleged in the complaint and was not mentioned in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.” In the opening and reply briefs on appeal, plaintiff neither contests the trial
court’s finding of forfeiture nor argues that defendants’ purported conduct constituted
gross negligence.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) When
reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts “independently
review the record and apply the same rules and standards as the trial court.” (Powell v.
Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 121.) The applicable rules and standards are
incorporated into a three-step analysis. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591,
1602; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter
Group 2024), ¶ 8:166, pp. 8-152 to 8-153 [appellate courts use same three-step analysis
required of trial court].) Independent review is appropriate because whether a trial court
erred in conducting this analysis and granting a motion for summary judgment presents
questions of law. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.)
We independently review the trial court’s interpretation of a contractual
agreement, including whether contractual language is ambiguous and whether a release
negated the duty element of a negligence cause of action. (See Dameron Hospital Assn.
v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971,
982–983; Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 433.)

9.
II. Summary Judgment Was Proper
A. Framing the Issues
The first step in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is to “identify the
issues framed by the pleadings” because the motion must show “there is no factual basis
for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading.” (AARTS
Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064; see
Brantley v. Pisaro, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) premises
liability, and (3) negligent hiring, selection, approval, retention, and supervision. (The
fourth cause of action against defendants alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress
and was dismissed before the summary judgment motion was filed. (See fn. 3, ante.)
Each of these causes of action is based on the elements of negligence. (See Civ. Code,
§ 1714, subd. (a) [all persons are legally responsible “for an injury occasioned to another
by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property”].)
Defendants’ answer included a general denial and an affirmative defense alleging the
release relieved them of a duty of care. 7 For purposes of this appeal, we conclude that
gross negligence was not an issue framed by the pleadings and further conclude that
defendants’ moving and reply papers did not need to address gross negligence. (See
Hass v. RhodyCo Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 32–33 [where complaint alleges
negligence and says nothing about a release, defendant’s initial showing is met by
presenting evidence of the release and plaintiff’s execution; the burden is on plaintiff to
raise a triable issue of material fact as to gross negligence].)

7Though “often referred to as a defense, a release of future liability is more appropriately
characterized as an express assumption of the risk that negates the defendant’s duty of care, an
element of the plaintiff’s case.… ‘“The result is that the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the
plaintiff; and being under no duty, he cannot be charged with negligence.” [Citation.]’”
(Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.)

10.
Consequently, we complete the first step of the summary judgment analysis by
concluding the issue of defendants’ negligence is “framed by the pleadings” and
defendants’ motion must show “there is no factual basis for relief” on plaintiff’s causes of
action for negligence. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank, supra, 179
Cal.App.3d at p. 1064.)
B. Shifting Burdens and Triable Issues of Fact
The second step of the summary judgment analysis requires the court to determine
whether the moving party has carried its initial burden of production and made a prima
facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries the
burden of production, the court reaches the third step of the analysis and determines
whether the opposing party has met its burden of production and shown the existence of a
triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.)
When, as here, a defendant moves for summary judgment, it has the “burden of
showing [each] cause of action has no merit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A
defendant can carry this burden by showing “that one or more elements of the cause of
action … cannot be established.” (Ibid.) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
asserts the element of a legal duty cannot be established because plaintiff signed an
exculpatory release for defendants’ future negligence. Thus, defendants will have met
their initial burden by establishing the existence of a release covering plaintiff’s injuries
and plaintiff’s execution of the release. (See Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, supra, 26
Cal.App.5th at pp. 32–33 [defendant’s initial showing where plaintiff’s complaint says
nothing about the release or gross negligence].)
The parties did not dispute, below or on appeal, that plaintiff signed the release.
Consequently, if the release covers the wrongful conduct alleged and is otherwise
enforceable, it will negate an essential element of plaintiff’s claims for negligence.

11.
C. The Release Bars Plaintiff’s Negligence Claims
“[F]or a release of liability to be held enforceable against a plaintiff, [1] it ‘must be
clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties’ [citation]; [2] the
act of negligence that results in injury to the releas[or] must be reasonably related to the
object or purpose for which the release is given [citation]; and [3] the release cannot
contravene public policy [citation].” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1304–1305;
accord, Huverserian v. Catalina Scuba Luv, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)
“A release need not be perfect to be enforceable.” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1305.) As explained post, we conclude the release meets the three requirements and,
thus, is enforceable against plaintiff’s negligence claims.
1. Clarity, Ambiguity, and Explicit Intent
In Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589, the court explained the
requirement that a release be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the parties’
intent by stating “the language used ‘must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each
of its essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the
prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.’” (Id. at p.
598.)
We apply the general principles of contractual construction to interpret a release.
(Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357 (Benedek).) We first
determine if a release contains an ambiguity: “‘[a]n alternative, semantically reasonable,
candidate of meaning of a writing.’” (Ibid.; see Joseph v. City of Atwater (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 974, 982 [“threshold question when interpreting a written contract is whether
the text is ambiguous—that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation”].)
An ambiguity can be patent, on the writing’s face, or latent, based on extrinsic evidence.
(Benedek, supra, at p. 1357.) Thus, evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
release’s execution may reveal an ambiguity not apparent on its face. (Ibid.; see Civ.

12.
Code, § 1647; Code Civ. Proc., § 1860.) Any ambiguity in a release is usually construed
against its drafter. (Benedek, supra, at p. 1357; see Civ. Code, § 1654.)
Whether the provisions of a contract, including a release, are clear and
unambiguous is a question of law, not of fact. (Madison v. Superior Court, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. 598.) Consequently, we conduct an independent review to determine
whether the release is ambiguous. (See Joseph v. City of Atwater, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th
at p. 982 [“Whether contractual text is ambiguous presents a question of law subject to
our independent review”].)
a. Text of the release
The release provides in relevant part:

“IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to compete, officiate,
observe, work, or participate in any way in the EVENT(S) or being
permitted to enter for any purpose any RESTRICTED AREA (defined as
any area requiring special authorization, credentials, or permission to enter
or any area to which admission by the general public is restricted or
prohibited), EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED … :

“1. Acknowledges, agrees, and represents that he has or will
immediately upon entering any of such RESTRICTED AREAS, and will
continuously thereafter, inspect the RESTRICTED AREAS which he
enters, and he further agrees and warrants that, if at any time, he is in or
about RESTRICTED AREAS and he feels anything to be unsafe, he will
immediately advise the officials of such and if necessary will leave the
RESTRICTED AREAS and/or refuse to participate further in the
EVENT(S).

“2. HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE … ‘Releasees,’ FROM ALL LIABILITY
TO THE UNDERSIGNED … FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR
DAMAGE, AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDS THEREFOR ON
ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OR
RESULTING IN DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED ARISING OUT OF
OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.

“3. HEREBY AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE AND
HOLD HARMLESS the Releasees .…

13.
“4. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY
RISK OF BODILY INJURY … arising out of or related to the EVENT(S)
whether caused by the NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES or otherwise.

“5. HEREBY acknowledges that THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
EVENT(S) ARE VERY DANGEROUS and involve the risk of serious
injury and/or death and/or property damage. Each of THE
UNDERSIGNED, also expressly acknowledges that INJURIES
RECEIVED MAY BE COMPOUNDED OR INCREASED BY
NEGLIGENT RESCUE OPERATIONS OR PROCEDURES OF THE
RELEASEES.

“6. HEREBY agrees that this Release … extends to all acts of
negligence by the Releasees, INCLUDING NEGLIGENT RESCUE
OPERATIONS and is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted
by the laws of the State or Province in which the Event(s) is/are conducted
and that if any portion thereof is held invalid, it is agreed that the balance
shall, notwithstanding, continue in full legal force and effect.

“I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE …, UNDERSTAND ITS
TERMS, UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND HAVE SIGNED IT FREELY AND
VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENT, ASSURANCE OR
GUARANTEE BEING MADE TO ME AND INTEND MY SIGNATURE
TO BE A COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL
LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.”
b. Extrinsic evidence
We begin our examination of the question of ambiguity by addressing the role of
extrinsic evidence in that evaluation. The principles defining that role are well
established.

“The decision whether to admit parol evidence involves a two-step process.
First, the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all
credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine
‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the
interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the
court decides the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation
urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—
interpreting the contract.” (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159,
1165; see Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968)
69 Cal.2d 33, 39–40.)

14.
When the second step is reached—that is, the court interprets the contract to
resolve its ambiguities—the court determines whether the competent extrinsic evidence is
in conflict. If there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent, the
interpretation of a release is a question of law for the court. (Salehi v. Surfside III
Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159.) If the extrinsic
evidence is uncontroverted, but there are conflicting inferences that may be drawn from
that evidence, the interpretation of the release remains solely a judicial function. (Hess v.
Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 527 [extrinsic evidence was uncontroverted].) If
there are conflicts in the extrinsic evidence, the determination of the credibility of that
evidence and the interpretation of the contract are questions of fact. (City of Hope
National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.)
The parties have acknowledged the role of conflicting evidence in interpreting
ambiguous language. Plaintiff’s reply brief stated: “Where, as here, there is no
conflicting parol evidence concerning the interpretation of a release, the court of appeal
independently determines whether the release negated the duty element of plaintiff’s
cause of action.” Similarly, defendants asserted “the trial court did not interpret the
Release with the aid of conflicting parol evidence.”
The parties’ appellate briefing, however, does not acknowledge the principles that
(1) whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law, (2) an ambiguity can
be either patent or latent, and (3) extrinsic evidence is provisionally received by a court
reviewing a contract for an ambiguity. Moreover, plaintiff has not identified the specific
words or phrases in the release that he contends are ambiguous. As a result, he has not
shown how particular language in the release is reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation. Rather, he cites Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354
to support his contention that, where the releasor “identifies ‘alternative, semantically
reasonable’ construction of the waiver, the evidence creates a triable issue of fact

15.
concerning whether and to what extent the waiver applies to release[or]’s claims,” and
then makes general arguments.
An example of plaintiff’s failure to identify specific textual ambiguity is his
contention that “there are at least triable issues of fact as to whether the language of the
release contemplated the type of injuries suffered by Plaintiff. In opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff offered evidence creating a triable issue of fact
as to whether an injury from a blindsided punch due to a lack of security and other
negligent measures by Defendants was sufficiently related to the purpose of the release,
much less explicitly included in the risks inherent in or even contemplated by the activity
of auto racing and its observation.” Plaintiff also contends “the language of the release
… does not unambiguously exempt Defendants from liability for any injury suffered by
[plaintiff] while in the pits,” and “a person signing the release in the present case cannot
be deemed to have waived any risk other than those reasonably related to the dangerous
activity of auto racing to those attendees in close proximity (in the pits) to the actual
running of the race.”
Plaintiff’s approach to the ambiguity of the release does not attempt to establish a
latent ambiguity based on extrinsic evidence. Consequently, we interpret his arguments
as asserting the purported ambiguity is patent (i.e., appears on the face of the document)
and the resolution of that facial ambiguity is aided by parol (i.e., extrinsic) evidence that
is not in conflict. As a result, we will not analyze whether extrinsic evidence establishes
the existence of a latent ambiguity, but will examine text of the release to determine if it
contains a facial ambiguity. Only if we identify a facial ambiguity, will we consider the
evidentiary issues involving the extrinsic evidence that might aid our resolution of such
an ambiguity. Those evidentiary issues might limit the extrinsic evidence evaluated
because the trial court sustained all the objections made by defendants to the evidence
submitted by plaintiff and plaintiff has not challenged those evidentiary rulings on
appeal.

16.
c. The release is not facially ambiguous
The language in a contract “‘cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.’”
(Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265, italics omitted.) The
language “‘must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the
circumstances of that case.’” (Ibid.) Generally, we interpret contractual language in its
“ordinary and popular sense.” (Civ. Code, § 1644.) Courts often look to dictionary
definitions for a word’s ordinary and popular meaning. (See, e.g., Bank of the West,
supra, at p. 1265; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1263 [courts typically look to dictionaries to determine a word’s
common meaning].) Under these principles, a disagreement concerning the meaning of a
word or phrase, or the fact that a word or phrase isolated from its context is susceptible to
more than one meaning, does not make the language ambiguous. (Foster-Gardner, Inc.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 868.)
The second numbered paragraph of the release stated plaintiff “hereby releases,
waives, discharges, and covenants not to sue [a long list of persons referred to
collectively as] ‘Releasees,’ from all liability to the undersigned … for any and all loss or
damage, and any claim or demands therefor on account of injury to the person … of the
undersigned arising out of or related to the event(s), whether caused by the negligence of
the releasees or otherwise.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Plaintiff does not contend on appeal that defendants are not “releasees.” Also, it is
uncontested that plaintiff’s complaint seeks to impose liability on defendants for loss or
damage on account of an injury to the person of plaintiff and has alleged the injury was
caused by the negligence of releasees.
The release used the word all to modify liability. “All” is broad and unambiguous.
It is a word of inclusion, not exclusion, and means “‘the whole of’ or ‘the greatest
quantity’; ‘the whole number’ or ‘sum of’; and ‘every member or individual component
thereof.’” (City of Ukiah v. Board of Trustees (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 344, 347; see

17.
Church v. Jamison (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1580; Dalton v. Baldwin (1944) 64
Cal.App.2d 259, 263 [statute’s phrase “‘all the rights of’” excluded no right whatever].)
The release used any and all to modify loss or damage. The word any also is broad and
unambiguous—it means “‘of whatever kind’” or “‘without restriction.’” (Zabrucky v.
McAdams (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 618, 628.)
As a result of the breadth of the language referring to liability and loss or damage,
the parties’ dispute about the meaning of the release and waiver provision and its scope
centers on the phrase “ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S).” This
phrase also appears in the assumption of risk provision in the release’s fourth numbered
paragraph. Our analysis of ambiguity first addresses the phrase “ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATED TO” and then considers the meaning of “THE EVENT(S).”
The phrase “arising out of” generally means in relation to “circumstances” or
“matters generally,” “[t]o spring, originate, or result from” and is “used … to introduce a
circumstance … arising out of an event, statement, etc.” (Oxford English Dict. Online
(2024) sense III.17 <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3071387586> [as of Mar. 24, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/386T-XST5>; id., sense III.18.a
<https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/4173120690> [as of Mar. 24, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/DX3A-3H6D>.)
“Related” means, relevant here, “[c]onnected or having relation to something else”
or “having mutual relation” when used in its predicative sense with “to.” (Oxford
English Dict. Online, supra, sense 2.a.i, 2.a.ii.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6513618542> [as of Mar. 24 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/WX5Q-2ZES>.) Another dictionary states the verb “relate” means “to
show or establish a logical or causal connection between.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat.
Dict. (1986) p. 1916.)
The phrases “arising out of” and “related to” are used in many legal contexts. Our
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of “related” in an insurance policy stating that

18.
“‘[t]wo or more claims arising out of … a series of related acts, errors or omission shall
be treated as a single claim.’” (Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual
Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 859, italics omitted (Bay Cities).) The Court of Appeal
had assumed the term “related” was ambiguous because it was not defined in the policy.
(Id. at p. 866.) The Supreme Court disagreed. (Id. at p. 868.) The court stated the proper
inquiry was “whether the word was ambiguous in the context of this policy and the
circumstances of this case.” (Id. at p. 868.) The court determined “related” was not
ambiguous in the context presented, stating:

“We agree with the court in Gregory [v. Homes Ins. Co. (7th Cir.
1989) 876 F.2d 602], that the term ‘related’ as it is commonly understood
and used encompasses both logical and causal connections. Restricting the
word to only causal connections improperly limits the word to less than its
general meaning. ‘Related’ is a broad word, but it is not therefore a
necessarily ambiguous word. We hold that, as used in this policy and in
these circumstances, ‘related’ is not ambiguous and is not limited only to
causally related acts.

“We do not suggest, however, that, in determining the amount of
coverage, the term ‘related’ would encompass every conceivable logical
relationship. At some point, a relationship between two claims, though
perhaps ‘logical,’ might be so attenuated or unusual that an objectively
reasonable insured could not have expected they would be treated as a
single claim under the policy. In the present case, there is no attenuation or
surprise to the insured. The two errors by the attorney are ‘related’ in
multiple respects. They arose out of the same specific transaction, the
collection of a single debt. They arose as to the same client. They were
committed by the same attorney. They resulted in the same injury, loss of
the debt. No objectively reasonable insured under this policy could have
expected that he would be entitled to coverage for two claims under the
policy.” (Bay Cities, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 873.)
The parties have cited no case law, treatise, or dictionary defining “arise,”
“arising,” “relate” or “related.” Further, they have not specifically argued that a word in
or the entire phrase “arising out of or related to” is ambiguous or unambiguous.

19.
We have considered the release as a whole and the context in which it was made
and conclude the word “related” is unambiguous and, in accordance with the common
understanding of its meaning, it encompasses both logical and causal connections. The
adoption of this broad definition is supported by other provisions in the release. The
sixth numbered paragraph states the signor agrees the release “is intended to be as broad
and inclusive as is permitted by the laws of the State … in which the Event(s) is/are
conducted.” Also, the unnumbered paragraph immediately above the signatures stated:
“I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE … AND INTEND MY SIGNATURE TO BE A
COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE
GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.” Also, plaintiff’s signature is over the
watermarked words “I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE.” These explicit statements of the
parties’ intent clearly and unambiguously establish that the term “related” should be
given a broad interpretation and it is not ambiguous simply because narrower meanings
are possible in other contexts.
The first numbered paragraph of the release also supports a broad interpretation of
the term “related.” That paragraph required plaintiff to immediately advise officials and,
if necessary, leave a restricted area if “he feels anything to be unsafe.” The pit area in
which plaintiff was injured was a restricted area. The word “anything” is broad and,
therefore, the paragraph does not expressly or impliedly restrict the release’s scope.
Consequently, we conclude the use of “arising out of or related to” is broad, not
narrow, and does not create an ambiguity. It encompasses injuries having a causal
connection to the events or having a logical connection to the events.
To the extent that plaintiff’s arguments imply the phrase is ambiguous because it
could be interpreted to require a direct causal connection between an injury and the
events, we conclude that interpretation is not reasonable in the circumstances of this case.
The argument that only injuries directly arising out of or related to the events are released
was made in a case involving what appears to be the same preprinted release form.

20.
(Hardy v. St. Clair (1999) 1999 Me. 142 [739 A.2d 368], overruled on another ground by
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp. (2008) 2008 Me. 186 [960 A.2d 1188, 1194–1195].) In
Hardy, a member of a pit crew supporting a race car was injured when a section of
bleachers collapsed. The Maine high court acknowledged that the race events did not
cause the bleachers to collapse but concluded the plaintiff’s “injuries were related to the
events and indirectly resulted from them.” (Hardy, supra, 739 A.2d at p. 370.) As a
result, the court affirmed the summary judgment granted to the defendant raceway on the
plaintiff’s negligence claims. (Id. at p. 369.)
Next, we consider whether the term “THE EVENT(S)” is ambiguous. The trial
court stated the release included “risks arising out of or related to the racing activities.”
Thus, the court interpreted “THE EVENT(S)” to mean the racing activities. Plaintiff
adopts the same interpretation, asserting: “The event, as described in the Release, was
automobile racing, not physical altercations.” Defendants’ appellate brief uses the phrase
“related to the Speedway’s events on June 9, 2018” and asserts it is “clear that the injury
arose from or was related to the Speedway’s events of the day, even if restricted to
‘racing.’”
“Event” can mean, as relevant here, (1) “a social occasion or activity” or (2) “any
of the contests in a program of sports.” (Merriam-Webster’s Dict. Online (2025)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/event> [as of Mar. 24, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/QH5H-V87J>.) An example of such contests, some of which involve a
different type of racing, are “track and field” events. (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict.,
supra, p. 788.)
The release does not define the term “EVENT(S).” However, immediately below
its title, the release has a blank line for a “DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF
SCHEDULED EVENTS.” Handwritten above that line is the venue’s name:
“Bakersfield Speedway.” On the blank line for “DATE RELEASE SIGNED” is
handwritten “June 9, ’18.” Thus, the release identified the location and date, but did not

21.
specifically describe the scheduled events. (Cf. Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc. (2000)
2000 S.D. 65 [610 N.W.2d 787, 802] [same form of release completed with handwritten
“Stock Lake County Speedway,” which indicated the events were stock car races]; Hardy
v. St. Clair, supra, 739 A.2d at p. 370 [“The term ‘EVENT(S)’ refers to Wiscasset
Raceway’s ‘Regular Races & 50 Lap Heavyweight’”].)
Other cases involving racing and the same or nearly identical form of release have
addressed the meaning of the term “event(s).” In Grabill v. Adams County Fair and
Racing Assn. (Iowa 2003) 666 N.W.2d 592, the plaintiffs sued several defendants for
injuries resulting from a fireworks demonstration at the speedway. (Id. at p. 593.) The
fireworks were discharged in the pit area after a parade lap. Some of the fireworks flew
horizontally, exploded in the pit area, and injured the plaintiffs. (Ibid.) “The release
specified the description and location of the ‘event(s)’ as “Adams Co. Speedway,
Corning, Ia.’” (Id. at p. 596.) The court rejected the plaintiffs’ “contention that the
release waived only damages caused by racing” because that content was contrary to the
broad language used in the release. As a result, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to the defendants. (Ibid.; see Werdehoff v. General Star Indem. Co. (Wis.App.
1999) 229 Wis.2d 489, 502–503 [600 N.W.2d 214, 220] [event name, “Road America,”
written over space for “‘description and location of scheduled event(s)’”; the court
concluded the release “was signed in contemplation of the motorcycle races to be held
that weekend”].)
Based on the way the release was filled out, the dictionary definitions, and the case
law, we conclude the term “EVENT(S)” is not ambiguous in the context of this case. It
refers to the races held at the Bakersfield Speedway on June 9, 2018.
d. Application of the unambiguous language
Having resolved the threshold legal question by concluding the release’s language
is not ambiguous, we next apply the release’s meaning to the facts of this case. (See

22.
Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 390–391 [determining
the meaning of a writing can be treated as distinct from applying that meaning to the facts
presented].) Combining the meanings of the phrase “arising out of or related to” and the
word “events,” the question presented is whether plaintiff’s injury has a logical or causal
connection to the races held at the Bakersfield Speedway on June 9, 2018.
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, we find as a matter of law that
plaintiff’s injury is “related to” the races. In particular, the facts establish the “but for”
test for a causal connection is satisfied. (See generally Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th
1232, 1239 [the “but for” test is subsumed in California’s “substantial factor” causation
standard].) But for the races, plaintiff and Kyle Flippo would not have been in the
speedway’s pit area on that date and, as a result, the altercations in the pit area that
resulted in plaintiff being punched would not have occurred. As discussed earlier, a
direct causal link to the racing activity is not required by the release’s “related to”
language. Thus, the indirect link between the races and the incident supplies the requisite
connection.
We recognize that at some point the connection or relationship “might be so
attenuated or unusual” that an objectively reasonable person would not expect the release
to cover the injuries. (Bay Cities, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 873.) For example, if after the
events had concluded that day, defendants negligently rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle while
at a stop light a mile from the speedway, the resulting injury would have a “but for”
connection to the events because defendants and plaintiff would not have been at that
intersection at that time if no events had been scheduled that day. In this case, the link is
not attenuated because the injuries occurred in a restricted area of the speedway.
Our application of the term “related to” to the facts of this case is consistent with
the Maine high court’s determination that a pit crew member’s injuries from falling when
a section of bleachers collapsed were covered by a release like ours. Though he “did not
receive injuries directly ‘arising out of or related to the events,’ his injuries were related

23.
to the events and indirectly resulted from them. The race events did not directly cause
the bleachers to collapse under [the plaintiff]. However, had [the plaintiff] not been
participating in the race events, he would not have been on the section of bleachers that
collapsed because that section was reserved for members of the pit crews and not open to
the general public.” (Hardy v. St. Clair, supra, 739 A.2d at p. 370.)
e. Other arguments
Here we address certain points raised by plaintiff that might imply the release is
ambiguous. For instance, plaintiff refers to the express acknowledgment in the release’s
fifth numbered paragraph that states “THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EVENT(S) ARE
VERY DANGEROUS and involve the risk of serious injury and/or death.” Plaintiff
asserts this acknowledgment indicates the risk of injury assumed are those that result
from being in close proximity to the dangerous activity of automobile racing and any
further risk that might result from the activity of observing such a race close-up. To the
extent this argument can be viewed as offering a narrower definition of the phrase
“ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S)” and thus creating an
ambiguity, we conclude that narrower definition is not reasonable. Had that narrower
interpretation been intended, the release would not have made a broad reference to the
events, but to the activities of the events or the dangerous activities of the events. Also,
the release would not have stated elsewhere that it was “intended to be as broad and
inclusive as is permitted by the laws of the State … in which the Event(s) is/are
conducted.” In sum, the acknowledgment of danger is not reasonably interpreted as a
limitation on the broad language of the release.
Plaintiff also refers to the language in Sweat about the release needing to be
“‘explicit in expressing the intent of the parties’” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1304–1305) and implies the risk of a blindside punch was not explicitly included in the

24.
release. We reject this implication because the explicitness requirement does not require
that level of specificity.
In Madison, the court addressed the type of language that creates an enforceable,
explicit release, stating: “As long as the release constitutes a clear and unequivocal
waiver with specific reference to a defendant’s negligence, it will be sufficient.”
(Madison v. Superior Court, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 597, italics added.) The court
explained: “While it is true that the express terms of any release agreement must be
applicable to the particular misconduct of the defendant (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th
ed. 1984) § 68, pp. 483-484), that does not mean that every possible specific act of
negligence of the defendant must be spelled out in the agreement or even discussed by
the parties.” (Madison, supra, at p. 601.)
Also, the court in Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
62, considered a release covering “‘any claims for injuries or damages whatsoever to
person or property of the member … arising out of or connected with the use of the
fitness center.’” (Id. at p. 65.) The court concluded the release signed by the member
was clear, unambiguous and explicit even without a specific reference to negligence. (Id.
at p. 66.) Thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment granted to the fitness center.
(Id. at p. 64.)
Here, the release and waiver provision explicitly refers to any injury “CAUSED
BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.” The assumption of
risk provision uses the same language. The release used the term “negligence” a total of
four times and “NEGLIGENT RESCUE OPERATIONS” twice. Consequently, we
conclude the release’s language is sufficient to include negligence in providing security
for the events and, thus, meets the requirement of being “‘explicit in expressing the intent
of the parties.’” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1304–1305; see Madison v.
Superior Court, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 594, 603 [release signed by participant in

25.
scuba diving course relieved defendants from “LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
PROPERTY DAMAGE OR WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE”].)
Consequently, we agree with the Hardy court’s analysis of broad language
identical to language in our release: “The sixth paragraph provided that the scope of the
Agreement ‘extends to all acts of negligence by [Wiscasset Raceway] … and is intended
to be as broad and inclusive as permitted by the laws.’ Further, the last portion of the
Agreement indicates that [the plaintiff] intended his signature to be ‘A COMPLETE
AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST
EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.’ Even when strictly construed against Wiscasset
Raceway, the Agreement ‘expressly spell[s] out with the greatest particularity the
intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability.’” (Hardy v. St.
Clair, supra, 739 A.2d at p. 370; accord, Grabill v. Adams County Fair and Racing
Assn., supra, 666 N.W.2d at p. 596 [“ALL LIABILITY” indicative of broad release of
liability]; Werdehoff v. General Star Indem. Co., supra, 229 Wis.2d at pp. 495–497 [“all
liability” and “arising out of or related to the event(s)” indicative of broad release of
liability].) In sum, a reference to all acts of negligence is sufficiently explicit expression
of the parties’ intent.
2. Reasonable Relationship
We next consider the requirement that “the act of negligence that results in injury
to the releas[or] must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release
is given.” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305.) In Madison v. Superior Court,
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 589, Justice Croskey explained this requirement: “If the negligent
act is so related then, as a matter of law, it is reasonably foreseeable whether or not it was
actually in the contemplation of either party.” (Id. at p. 601, fn. 9.)
The scope of a release generally determines whether negligent conduct reasonably
relates to the “object or purpose for which the release was given.” (Benedek, supra, 104

26.
Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.) Though the release must apply to the negligence at issue, it need
not specify “every possible specific act of negligence.” (Ibid.) Nor is it relevant
“whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the
release applies, but rather the scope of the release.” (Ibid.) Because the release at issue
specifically mentions the activities for which plaintiff sought entrance to the venue—
observation of the race—the purpose and object of the release clearly relates to the
alleged negligence arising out of conduct related to the race.
Defendants’ alleged negligence in providing security at the racing events on
June 9, 2018, is reasonably related to the release’s purpose. The release is worded, as
noted above, to obtain a broad, unconditional waiver of any liability for injuries directly
and indirectly arising from or related to attendance at the event on June 9, 2018, and
caused by defendants’ negligence.
The purpose of the release was clearly to obtain entry to the venue, including the
pit area. Plaintiff undisputedly sought entry to the event, generally, and the pit area,
specifically, to participate in the event, and, per the release’s terminology, “observe” his
brother race. Plaintiff wrote in the word “pit” after his signature and under the column in
the release titled “duties.” His additional material facts assert he entered the speedway
“through the pits to assist his brother and stepfather before their race.” This assertion
clearly indicates plaintiff signed the release to not only observe but participate in the
preparation for his family members’ race that day. After the race, he was injured during
an altercation about his brother’s racing conduct. All participants in that altercation were
in the pit area for the express purpose of attending the race. We agree with the trial court
that altercations about a sporting event are reasonably related to the purpose and object of
a release that exchanges a release of liability for entry to the racing event. Applied here,
the altercation about his brother’s racing conduct was reasonably related to the purpose or
object of the release: to gain entry to the venue to observe the event.

27.
Given this, we find inapplicable plaintiff’s substantial reliance upon our decision
in Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 1301. Sweat sued the owner of the Bakersfield
Speedway for personal injuries suffered when he sat on pit-area bleachers and they
collapsed. (Id. at p. 1303.) After a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court determined his
injuries were reasonably related to the purpose of a release signed by Sweat, and it
awarded judgment in favor of the speedway owner. (Ibid.) We reversed the trial court’s
judgment and remanded for further proceedings. (Ibid.)
In Sweat, we described the following as “[t]he pertinent language of the release
prepared”:

“‘IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to enter for any purpose
a RESTRICTED AREA (herein defined as … [the] pit areas …), or being
permitted to … observe … the event, EACH … for himself … :

“‘1. HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the … track owner … from all liability to the
undersigned … for any claim …, whether caused by the negligence of the
releasees or otherwise while the undersigned is in or upon the restricted
area and/or … observing … the event. [¶] … [¶]

“‘3. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND
RISK OF BODILY INJURY … due to the negligence of releasees or
otherwise while in or upon the restricted area … and/or … observing … the
event.

“‘EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED expressly acknowledges and
agrees that the activities of the event are very dangerous and involve the
risk of serious injury and/or death and/or property damage. EACH OF
THE UNDERSIGNED further expressly agrees that the foregoing release,
waiver, and indemnity agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive
as permitted by the law….’” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1303–
1304.)
This language, though like that in defendants’ release, contains significant
differences. First, defendants’ release does not use “and/or,” which Sweat found
ambiguous. (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305.) Second, defendants’ release
covered all liability for any harm arising out of or related to the event, and the releasee’s

28.
entry to a restricted area for “‘any purpose.’” In contrast, Sweat released the track owner
only for liability for negligence “‘while [he] is in or upon the restricted area and/or …
observing … the event.’” (Id. at p. 1303.) This language relates negligence to a location,
the restricted area, or an activity, observing the event, which the Sweat court found
ambiguous. That led the Sweat court to conclude the release’s scope only pertained to
risks related to automobile racing, thus Sweat’s injury was not reasonably related to the
purpose of the release. But defendants’ release relates the harm incurred from negligent
conduct broadly: arising from or relating to the events. It critically differs from the
Sweat release. We conclude that Sweat does not compel the conclusion that the
negligence alleged here is not reasonably related to the purpose or object of defendants’
release.
3. Public Policy
Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the
public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy. (Benedek, supra, 104
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356–1357; Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
733, 739; Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1373.)
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that, under Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 (Tunkl), enforcement of the release would contravene
public policy. Plaintiff contends the business of operating a speedway open to the public
meets Tunkl’s factors used to determine if releases involving the public interest are void
under Civil Code section 1668.8 (Tunkl, at pp. 98–101.)
California courts, including our Supreme Court, have manifestly “‘concluded
categorically that private agreements made “in the recreational sports context” releasing

8Civil Code section 1668 states: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person
or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law.”

29.
liability for future ordinary negligence “do not implicate the public interest and therefore
are not void as against public policy.”’” (Whitehead v. City of Oakland (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 775, 782, quoting City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, supra, 41
Cal.4th at pp. 759–760 & fns. 12–17 (Santa Barbara); see Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p.
101 [“[O]bviously no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one
party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have
placed upon the other party”].)
Tunkl sets forth six criteria to identify an agreement in which an exculpatory
clause is against public policy. (1) “It concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation”; (2) “The party seeking exculpation is engaged in
performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public”; (3) “The party holds himself out as
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least any
member coming within certain established standards”; (4) As a result of the essential
nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of
the public who seeks his services”; (5) “In exercising a superior bargaining power the
party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and
makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional fees and obtain protection
against negligence”; and (6) “Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property
of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of
carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 98–101, fns.
omitted.)
California courts have further clarified that “[u]nder Tunkl, … determining
whether a release of liability affects the public interest, and is thus void as a matter of
public policy, requires analysis of the transaction giving rise to the contract—not the
allegedly negligent conduct by the party invoking the release.” (Gavin W. v. YMCA of

30.
Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662, 670.) “Tunkl’s public interest
analysis focuses upon the overall transaction—with special emphasis upon the
importance of the underlying service or program, and the relative bargaining relationship
of the parties—in order to determine whether an agreement releasing future liability for
ordinary negligence is unenforceable.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 762.)
Put differently, Tunkl’s analysis of whether a release affects the public interest is
focused, in important part, on the position the releasee is placed in. For example, Tunkl’s
“rough outline” of the “type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held
invalid” explains, as a characteristic of this transaction, that “[a]s a result of the essential
nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of
the public who seeks his services.” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 100.) Rather, because
the nature of the service is essential to the public, members of the public are at a distinct
bargaining disadvantage because, by needing the service, they lack a meaningful capacity
to say “no.”
Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462 (Okura)
helpfully summarizes the types of transactions subject to Tunkl’s application. There the
Second Appellate District, Division Five, upheld summary judgment for defendants
South Bay Wheelman, Inc., and United States Cycling Federation based on a standard
entry blank and release form. (Okura, at pp. 1464–1465.) The Okura plaintiff claimed
the release he signed to enter a bicycle race in which he was injured was void under
Tunkl. The Okura court disagreed:

“Measured against the public interest in hospitals and hospitalization,
escrow transactions, banking transactions and common carriers, this
transaction is not one of great public importance. There is no compelling
public interest in facilitating sponsorship and organization of the leisure
activity of bicycle racing for public participation. The number of
participants is relatively minute compared to the public use of hospitals,
banks, escrow companies and common carriers. Also, the risks involved in

31.
running such an event certainly do not have the potential substantial impact
on the public as the risks involved in banking, hospitals, escrow companies
and common carriers. The service certainly cannot be termed one that ‘is
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.’”
(Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1467; 9 accord, Buchan v. United
States Cycling Federation, Inc. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 134, 151.)
For purposes of public interest analysis, we see no meaningful distinction between
the public benefit of an automobile race and a bicycle race. Neither compare to the
practical necessity of banks, hospitals, childcare services, or common carriers: essential
services upon which nearly all individuals rely. That entertainment and leisure are
important to human flourishing does not elevate automobile racing, or entertainment
more generally, to the level of practical necessity required under Tunkl. Given there are
myriad opportunities for entertainment, broadly defined, members of the public have a
meaningful choice to participate in bicycle or automobile races, unlike other essential
industries like banking, escrow services, healthcare, and common carriers.
For this reason, we disagree with plaintiff’s argument that “watching sports and
attending large concerts and entertainment events” should be viewed as matters of great
importance to the public under Tunkl. Plaintiff provides no citation to authorities holding
otherwise.
We also disagree with plaintiff’s other argument that defendants’ business is
suitable for public regulation as meant by Tunkl. Plaintiff contends the business is
suitable for public regulation because it requires licenses to serve alcoholic beverages and
is subject to health and safety regulation under local ordinances. But we decline “to place
undue emphasis” on local alcohol, health, and safety ordinances that do not indicate a

9The cases cited by Okura include Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 (release regarding hospital-physician relationship), Vilner v. Crocker
National Bank (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 732 (release related to night deposits at banking
institutions), Akin v. Business Title Corp. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 153 (escrow companies).
Okura also observed that exculpatory agreements are void as to common carriers. (Rest.2d
Contracts, § 195, com. (a), p. 66.) (Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1467.)

32.
regulatory scheme. (See YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 22, 29 [fact that one aspect of YMCA Senior Program was to provide food
subject to Health & Saf. Code sanitation requirements did “not mean the Senior Program
was subject to government regulation” as described in Tunkl]; accord, Westlye v. Look
Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1735 [“ski industry … is not subject to
comprehensive public regulation”]; Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center (1985) 168
Cal.App.3d 333, 342 [“parachute jumping is not subject to the same level of public
regulation as is the delivery of medical and hospital services”]; cf. Gardner v. Downtown
Porsche Audi (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 714, 718 [automobile repair service suitable for
public regulation because licensed by the state and regulated by state agency].)
Though plaintiff cites local ordinances that regulate aspects of the speedway’s
business, nothing indicates the speedway itself is subject to a comprehensive regulatory
scheme like the banking, healthcare, childcare, or other essential industries. We doubt
the government’s general interests in regulating alcohol service, health, and safety—
interests applicable to numerous businesses and not only automobile racetracks—is
sufficient to indicate the speedway is itself thought suitable for public regulation. We
conclude defendants’ business is not thought suitable for public regulation as meant by
Tunkl.
Plaintiff does not analyze the remaining four Tunkl factors. We decline to accept
plaintiff’s conclusory argument that “[t]he present situation exhibits all of the four
remaining Tunkl factors,” and that “[p]laintiff’s argument under Tunkl satisfies all of the
six factors ….” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”]; Benach v. County of Los
Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [assertion of a point absent “reasoned
argument and citations to authority” results in waiver].)

33.
We conclude the release does not involve a transaction that affects the public
interest. The release’s enforcement does not contravene public policy. 10
III. Gross Negligence and Wanton or Reckless Conduct
Although not specifically raised on appeal, out of an abundance of caution, we
requested supplemental briefing regarding whether plaintiff pled a theory of gross
negligence and whether that theory was or was not subject to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Upon further consideration, we find that (1) defendants adequately
raised a complete defense based on the signed release of liability to all theories of
negligence alleged in the complaint, and (2) plaintiff failed to rebut that defense in
opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
A. Background
The request for supplemental briefing explained the relevant background of the
issue as follows:

“Paragraph 36 appears under the heading, ‘GENERAL
ALLEGATIONS,’ and alleges (1) defendants allowed, condoned, or
encouraged physical altercations among drivers, racing teams, and patrons
at the speedway, including the pit area, to make it part of the entertainment
and thrill of the show and (2) ‘such conduct was in reckless disregard to
the safety of the public, including without limitation, those at the
BAKERSFIELD SPEEDWAY PROPERTY[.] (Boldface added.)

“Paragraph 75 appears under the heading, ‘SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION [¶] Premises Liability,’ and alleges defendants ‘proximately
caused damages to Plaintiff by negligently, wantonly, and recklessly’
operating the property; instructing others regarding patrolling, security and
operation of the property; failing to protect patrons, guests and spectators;
and conducting themselves so as to cause the property to be in a dangerous
and unsafe condition. (Boldface added.)

10Plaintiff raises other arguments on appeal addressing the alternative grounds for
summary judgment raised by defendants’ motion. Because the release covers plaintiff’s
negligence claims and is enforceable, we need not address the merits of plaintiff’s other
arguments.

34.
“Despite the allegations that defendants’ conduct was reckless and
wanton conduct, defendants’ moving papers did not address either theory of
relief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1) [what a separate
statement must identify].) Similarly, plaintiff’s opposition papers did not
argue summary judgment was inappropriate because the moving papers did
not address all theories for relief contemplated by his complaint. At the
motion hearing, plaintiff’s counsel argued for the first time that the motion
did not reach gross negligence. Defense counsel asserted that was the first
time in the case the words ‘gross negligence’ had been mentioned together.
The trial court agreed, rejecting plaintiff’s gross negligence argument
because it ‘was not alleged in the complaint and was not mentioned in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment.’ At the hearing, the trial
court said it was not timely to bring up gross negligence at that point.
Plaintiff’s appellate briefing did not raise the issues of gross negligence,
reckless conduct, or wanton conduct.

“When answering the questions, consider whether gross negligence,
recklessness, and wantonness identify different levels of culpability under
California tort law. (See e.g., [Santa Barbara, supra,] 41 Cal.4th 747, 754,
fn. 4 and accompanying text; Brown v. El Dorado Union High School Dist.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1028 [gross negligence falls short of reckless
disregard of consequences].)”
B. Analysis
Resolving the issues raised in the parties’ supplemental briefing requires
determining whether (1) plaintiff had the burden to rebut defendants’ assertion of the
release as a complete defense to plaintiff’s negligence claims, or (2) defendants had the
initial burden in moving for summary judgment to address plaintiff’s allegations of gross
negligence and wanton or reckless conduct in the complaint. We conclude plaintiff had
the burden to rebut defendants’ complete defense based on the release but failed to carry
that burden.
Generally, a release, like the one here, is insufficient as a matter of public policy to
preclude liability for gross negligence or other degrees of negligence beyond ordinary
negligence, i.e., wanton conduct or conduct committed with reckless disregard of the
consequences. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 751 [“an agreement made in the

35.
context of sports or recreational programs or services, purporting to release liability for
future gross negligence, generally is unenforceable as a matter of public policy”].)
Gross negligence means “either a ‘“‘want of even scant care’”’ or ‘“‘an extreme
departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’”’” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 754.) It “‘falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences and differs from
ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.’” (Gore v. Board of Medical Quality
Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184, 197.) Thus, there is no separate cause of action
for gross negligence; it is a degree of ordinary negligence. (Hass v. RhodyCo
Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 32 (Hass) [noting that, in Santa Barbara, “the
Supreme Court did not definitively resolve [whether gross negligence is a separate cause
of action], commenting only that it did not view its holding invalidating releases for
future gross negligence ‘as recognizing a cause of action for gross negligence’”].)
1. Shifting Burdens
Importantly, in Santa Barbara, the Supreme Court stated, “Our holding simply
imposes a limitation on the defense that is provided by a release. A plaintiff is not
required to anticipate such a defense [citation]; instead, the defendant bears the burden of
raising the defense and establishing the validity of a release as applied to the case at
hand.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 780, fn. 58.) Thus, a plaintiff is not
required to allege gross negligence in a complaint.
However, a plaintiff can allege gross negligence in a complaint. Consider Westlye
v. Look Sports, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1715 (Westlye). Westlye concerned the
unconscionability of a release. A plaintiff sued a ski rental company for negligence in
adjusting ski bindings that caused the plaintiff’s injury. The company moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred by
an express written release of liability plaintiff signed. In explaining the plaintiff’s burden
to raise the issue of a release’s unenforceability, the appellate court stated that “[h]ad

36.
plaintiff anticipated the defense of the release agreement in his complaint and alleged
facts suggesting [its invalidity], the matter would have been a material issue which
defendants would have had to refute in order to obtain summary adjudication.” (Id. at pp.
1739–1740; see id. at p. 1740 [“‘If … the plaintiff pleads several theories or anticipates
affirmative defenses by a show of excusing events or conditions, the challenge to the
opponent is made by the complaint, requiring the moving defendant to affirmatively react
to each theory and excusing or justifying event, or condition which supports a theory, if
the motion is to be successful’”].) In that case, the court concluded that “[s]ince
plaintiff’s complaint said nothing about the agreement, the matter of [its validity] was not
a material issue for purposes of defendants’ initial showing on its motion for summary
adjudication. [The defendant] met its initial burden by adducing evidence of the …
agreement and plaintiff’s execution. The burden thereafter shifted to plaintiff to raise a
triable issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 1740.)
Hass drew similar conclusions about a plaintiff’s burden. Hass involved the tragic
cardiac arrest, collapse, and death of a runner after finishing a half marathon race. (Hass,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 17.) The deceased’s family, the plaintiffs, alleged various
negligent organization and management of the race and provision of emergency medical
services. (Ibid.) The trial court initially granted the defendant summary judgment under
theories of primary assumption of risk and express waiver based on the defendant’s
showing of a release executed by the decedent. (Ibid.) But the court reversed itself after
the plaintiffs brought a motion for new trial. The court ruled the plaintiffs should be
allowed to amend their complaint to plead gross negligence: conduct falling outside the
scope of the written waiver and release. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed. Relevant
here, the court determined that the court erred in granting leave to amend to plead gross
negligence because gross negligence need not be pled in the complaint. (Id. at p. 18.)
Relying on Westlye, Hass explained that although the plaintiffs “set forth certain
facts in the Complaint which could be viewed as supporting a claim of gross negligence,

37.
it cannot be said that the Complaint— which does not even mention the Release—
anticipated the Release defense or raised gross negligence as a material issue which [the
defendant] was required to refute in order to succeed on summary judgment. Instead,
[the defendant] met its initial burden by producing evidence of the existence of the
Release and its execution by [the decedent]. The burden then shifted to [the plaintiffs] to
raise a triable issue of material fact as to gross negligence.” (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th
at p. 33.)
In Hass, the court observed that the plaintiffs did not need to plead gross
negligence to properly raise it as a defense to the release’s waiver of liability. Rather,
because the plaintiffs raised the theory of gross negligence in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, the only question was whether the plaintiffs showed a triable issue of
material fact on that theory of liability. (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)
Given these authorities, two distinct pleading situations arise that shift the burden
on summary judgment: (1) a plaintiff pleads gross negligence in the complaint in
anticipation of a release defense, in which case the defendant must address that theory in
moving for summary judgment, or (2) a plaintiff does not plead gross negligence in the
complaint in anticipation of a defense of waiver via a release, in which case the plaintiff
must raise the theory of gross negligence in opposition to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
Here, we find plaintiff did not adequately plead gross negligence in anticipation of
the release. In analyzing whether plaintiff pled gross negligence in anticipation of a
release, both courts in Hass and Westlye observed that, even though a complaint may
allege facts supporting a claim of gross negligence, the failure to mention the release in
the complaint indicates that gross negligence was not a material issue raised by the
pleadings. (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; Westlye, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p.
1740 [“Since plaintiff’s complaint said nothing about the agreement, the matter of
adhesiveness/unconscionability was not a material issue for purposes of defendants’

38.
initial showing on its motion for summary adjudication. [Defendant] met its initial
burden by adducing evidence of the rental agreement and plaintiff’s execution”].)
Though plaintiff used words like “wanton” and “reckless” in the complaint
indicating an alleged greater degree of negligence than ordinary negligence (see Santa
Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 754, fn. 4 [“‘wanton’ or ‘reckless’ misconduct …
describes conduct by a person who may have no intent to cause harm, but who
intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he or she knows or
should know it is highly probable that harm will result”]), whether plaintiff’s bare
reference to these legal terms implicated theories of wanton or reckless conduct or gross
negligence, any use of these terms failed to create a separate cause of action. Nor can we
conclude that they were pled in anticipation of the release at issue where the complaint
does not mention or anticipate the release.
This fact is important. “‘A defendant moving for summary judgment has the
burden of showing that a cause of action lacks merit because one or more elements of the
cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of
action.’” (Kim v. County of Monterey (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 312, 323, italics added.)
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that “[t]he contractual express
assumption of the risk and waiver and release signed by plaintiff … is a complete defense
to his negligence-based claims ….” 11 (Italics added.) Because there is no separate cause
of action for gross negligence (or wanton or reckless conduct), plaintiff’s use of words
like “reckless disregard” and “wanton” do not alter the fact that his cause of action was

11Though we noted previously that a release is not technically a defense but rather an
“express assumption of the risk that negates the defendant’s duty of care, an element of the
plaintiff’s case” (see Eriksson v. Nunnink, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 719), defendants
introduced the release to completely negate that they owed plaintiff any duty under any theory of
negligence raised in the complaint. Put differently, because a release cannot alleviate
defendants’ duty to refrain from gross negligence or reckless or wanton conduct, by raising the
release to negate the duty element of plaintiff’s claims, defendants were challenging any
assertion by plaintiff that defendants acted with gross negligence or wanton or reckless disregard.

39.
for negligence. By moving based on a complete defense to plaintiff’s “negligence-based
claims,” which would definitionally include gross negligence and wanton and reckless
conduct as degrees of negligence, defendants asserted waiver as a complete defense to all
these theories.
Put differently, defendants’ challenge to plaintiff’s “negligence-based claims”
included, by definition, any alleged gross negligence and wanton and reckless conduct.
By asserting the release as a “complete defense,” defendants challenged plaintiff to
demonstrate the release was not a complete defense, i.e., that it was unenforceable as to
defendants’ allegedly grossly negligent or wanton and reckless conduct. Given
defendants’ evidentiary production of the release as a complete defense to plaintiff’s
“negligence-based claims,” the burden shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of
material fact that defendants committed gross negligence, i.e., conduct not covered by the
release as a matter of public policy.
2. Failure to Rebut Defendants’ Complete Defense of Waiver
Plaintiff did not properly raise this argument below or on appeal. Plaintiff’s
opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment contains no argument that the
release is unenforceable as a matter of public policy, much less that defendants’ conduct
constituted gross negligence rendering the release inapplicable.
Plaintiff’s opposing statement of additional material facts did not raise gross
negligence or the unenforceability of the release for violation of public policy as issues. 12
Plaintiff first mentioned “gross negligence” to the trial court at oral argument, which was

12Plaintiff raised the following issues: (1) whether the conduct resulting in plaintiff’s
injury was “reasonably related to the purpose of the Release that [plaintiff] signed,” (2) whether
defendants had “a duty to provide adequate security” in the raceway pits, (3) whether defendants
demonstrated there was “no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Moving
Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff’s] injuries,” (4) whether
defendants met “their burden to show that the serving of alcohol was not a proximate cause of
[plaintiff’s] injuries,” and (5) whether defendants were “negligent in the hiring, retention,
supervision, and training of their security personnel.”

40.
untimely and procedurally unfair to defendants. 13 (New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098 [“[n]ew issues cannot
generally be raised for the first time in oral argument”]; accord, People v. Grimes (2015)
60 Cal.4th 729, 757; see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295,
fn. 11 [“[o]bvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised
initially in the reply brief of an appellant”].)
Given we conclude plaintiff failed to adequately raise the issue of gross negligence
or wanton or reckless conduct in the complaint in anticipation of the release, plaintiff
could not successfully resist summary judgment on a theory neither pled nor argued in his
opposition papers but instead raised for the first time at the summary judgment motion
hearing. (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1208, 1225 [“‘[t]he complaint serves to delimit the scope of the issues before
the court on a motion for summary judgment [citation], and a party cannot successfully
resist summary judgment on a theory not pleaded’”]; see also Olson v. La Jolla
Neurological Associates (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 723, 739 [theory not raised in appellant’s
opposition to summary judgment forfeited].)
Though we requested supplemental briefing to address, in part, whether there
might be an error we must address, we conclude there was no error: plaintiff bore the
burden to rebut defendants’ complete defense based on waiver, including by arguing, and
showing a triable issue of fact regarding, defendants’ conduct as constituting gross

13On this point, the supplemental briefing request asked if the trial court erred “by
concluding California’s rules of pleading required gross negligence to be explicitly alleged.”
This was not exactly the court’s conclusion. The court denied the gross negligence theory “on
the basis that no such cause of action was pled and on the basis that Plaintiff[] did not raise this
issue in the opposition to the motion.” Though the court erred in stating that gross negligence is
a “cause of action,” the court, in essence, captured the pleading dynamic: either plaintiff needed
to plead gross negligence or oppose the release, as a complete defense to plaintiff’s claims, in his
opposition. Therefore, the court did not err. The reference to gross negligence as a “cause of
action” is a harmless error.

41.
negligence or wanton or reckless conduct. Plaintiff’s failure to raise those theories below
means he failed to meet his burden to oppose the release on these grounds. The trial
court did not err when it rejected plaintiff’s belated attempt to raise the theory of gross
negligence in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

42.
Filed 4/21/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ZACKARY DIAMOND, as represented, etc., F086150

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-100707)

v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION,
CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
SCOTT SCHWEITZER et al., PARTIAL PUBLICATION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendants and Respondents.

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 24, 2025, be modified as
follows:
1. On page 26, in the first full paragraph, the last sentence beginning “In sum” is
deleted and the following sentence is inserted in its place:

In sum, a reference to all acts of negligence is a sufficiently explicit
expression of the parties’ intent.
2. On page 27, the first sentence of the first full paragraph is modified to read as
follows:

Defendants’ alleged negligence in providing security at the racing
events on June 9, 2018, is reasonably related to the release’s purpose,
which was to avoid liability for negligence and thereby decrease the cost of
operating the business.
3. At the end of the last paragraph on page 27, add the following sentences:
Similarly, as applied here to defendants, the injury also related to the
additional purpose or object of the release: to avoid liability for any
negligence on its part during the race on its premises. This mutual intent is
clearly expressed in the words of the release. As such, each side was aware
of the other’s reasons for the release, which created a mutuality of intent.
4. In the last paragraph on page 28, the third sentence beginning “Second,
defendants’ release” and continuing to the top of page 29 is modified to read as follows:

Second, defendants’ release covered all liability for any harm arising out of
or related to the event, and the releasor’s—i.e., plaintiff’s—entry to a
restricted area for “‘any purpose.’”
In the partial paragraph at the top of page 29, the fourth full sentence beginning
“But defendants’ release” is deleted and the following sentence inserted in its place:

Here, on the other hand, defendants’ release relates the harm incurred from
negligent conduct broadly: arising from or relating to the events.
5. On page 31, in the first sentence of the first full paragraph, the word “releasee”
is changed to “releasor” so the sentence reads:

Put differently, Tunkl’s analysis of whether a release affects the
public interest is focused, in important part, on the position the releasor is
placed in.
There is no change in the judgment.
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 24, 2025, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the
opinion should be published in the Official Reports with the exception of part III of
Discussion and it is so ordered.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

2.

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