CourtListener 10381301•People v. Baker CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Baker CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100823
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
2011-0005672, SF117345A)
v.
RICKEY RENARD BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Rickey Renard Baker filed a motion for evidence preservation under
Penal Code1 section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); he
also requested appointment of counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s motion
without explanation. The parties agree this was error because defendant’s motion was
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
1
sufficiently pled to initiate a hearing under section 1203.01. We reverse the trial court’s
order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2012, defendant pled guilty to two counts of kidnapping, one count of rape
in concert with the use of a firearm, one count of forced oral copulation, and two counts
of second degree robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a determinate term of 25 years.2 In February 2024, defendant, while
incarcerated, filed a motion titled “[m]otion for evidence preservation proceeding under
. . . [section] 1203.01 in addition, for appointment of counsel” under the original trial
court caption and case number.
The motion provided that defendant sought “evidence preservation proceedings
under . . . [section] 1203.01” to “make [a] record of mitigating youth-related evidence
existing at the time of his commitment offences, and to correct the record transmit[ted] to
[the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation with] respect to [defendant].”
Defendant further requested appointment of counsel “to represent him for his Franklin
hearing.” (Italics added.)
In the motion, defendant alleged he was 23 years old at the time of his offenses,
eligible for early release parole consideration under sections 3051 and 4801, and due to
appear before the Board of Parole Hearings no later than April 2025. Defendant further
alleged he could not have “foreseen the future changes in law that made him eligible for
review” under sections 3051 and 4801 and pointed to his “diminished culpability” as a
youth at the time of his offenses. Therefore, defendant argued, “[H]e was not offered the
opportunity to establish and preserve for the record his diminished culpability related to
2 The sentencing hearing was held on May 1, 2012. A court reporter was present
for the sentencing proceeding but did not transcribe it.
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his youthfulness or the hallmark features of youth present [during] his [comm]itment
offences.”
In March 2024, the trial court denied his motion in a written order and dropped the
matter from its calendar without explanation.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues he is “entitled to a youth offender parole hearing” and “may
obtain proceedings in the trial court to preserve and collect mitigating evidence . . . in
anticipation of the parole hearing.” Defendant contends his February 2024 motion
“included . . . substantially all of the elements delineated in Cook[3]” and therefore, was
“sufficient to initiate proceedings under section 1203.01.” (Some italics omitted.) The
People concede defendant’s “motion was sufficient to initiate a hearing” and agree “the
matter should be remanded for further proceedings.” We agree with the parties.
In 2013, the California Legislature enacted a parole eligibility mechanism for
juvenile offenders. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277; People v. Perez (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618.) Section 3051 “provides all juvenile offenders with a parole
hearing during or before their 25th year of incarceration.” (Franklin, at p. 278.) Section
3051 applies to any person incarcerated for a “controlling offense” committed when they
were 25 years of age or younger. (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1).) The hearing must be
held no later than a person’s 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarnation depending on the
controlling offense. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) Section 4801, subdivision (c) provides that the
Board of Parole Hearings “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth
as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” This allows an
3 In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook).
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offender to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to
cross-examination) that may be relevant at [a defendant’s] eventual youth offender parole
hearing.” (Franklin, at p. 284.)
After Franklin, our Supreme Court in Cook extended the remedy of evidence
preservation under section 1203.01 to final judgments. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 446-447.) “[T]he proper avenue is to file a motion in [the trial] court under the
original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s
decision[, i.e., Cook]. The motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth
offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if
one or more hearings have already occurred.” (Cook, at p. 458.) “Rigorous pleading and
proof requirements” are not required. (Id. at p. 457.)
In People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 889, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, Division Three, reversed the trial court’s denial of a postjudgment Franklin
proceeding. It held the defendant’s improper request for resentencing and appointment of
counsel, as well as his failure to specify the dates of his previous or upcoming parole
hearings, was not fatal. (Id. at pp. 894-896.) Rather, it held that our Supreme Court
“reasonably envisioned a simple pleading mechanism to get the process started.” (Id. at
p. 896.)
In the instant case, we hold that defendant’s motion substantially satisfies the
requirements outlined in Cook. Defendant filed his motion under the original caption and
case number. Defendant stated he was 23 years old at the time of his offenses, expected
to appear before the Board of Parole Hearings no later than April 2025, and could not
have foreseen the changes to the early parole provisions contained in sections 3051 and
4801. Defendant mentioned Franklin and cited to the appropriate code sections, along
with a discussion of the relevant law, making it clear he was seeking a postjudgment
Franklin proceeding. Defendant did not list the specific evidence he hoped to present but
did reference categories of information that would be relevant to early parole
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consideration, such as evidence of growth, maturity, and the diminished culpability of
juveniles. Defendant did not cite to Cook, but it is inconsequential because “section
1203.01 does not impose . . . rigorous pleading and proof requirements” (Cook, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 457) and defendant indicated his case was final and he was availing
himself of a postjudgment application of Franklin, as was the case in Cook. This was
enough to inform the trial court of the purpose of defendant’s motion and to get the
process started. (See People v. Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.)
There is nothing in the record to suggest the trial court based its decision on
whether “fruitful evidence” would result or that it considered factors of exercising its
discretion as delineated in Cook. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 [the trial court may
exercise its discretion to deny the motion if the information sought is irrelevant,
cumulative, or otherwise not in accordance with the governing rules, statutes, and
regulations].) Nor could the court have found a lack of fruitful evidence because
defendant’s original sentencing transcript is not available. Because defendant
substantially met the requirements in Cook, defendant should have the opportunity to
introduce evidence regarding youth-related factors that was not available to him at the
time of his sentencing. We reverse and remand the matter to allow defendant an
opportunity to proffer evidence he seeks to present at a Franklin proceeding.
On remand, the court may “require . . . proof regarding the evidence [defendant]
seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-
related factors and meaningfully adds to the . . . record.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 459.) The court may “determine whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ [citation], or if
other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (Ibid.) Indeed, the trial court should
exercise its discretion to ensure the evidence “ ‘introduced is relevant, noncumulative,
and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.’ ” (Ibid.) We
further note the trial court will need to decide the scope of defendant’s right to counsel in
the first instance on remand.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court to allow defendant an opportunity to proffer evidence he seeks to introduce at a
Franklin proceeding.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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