People v. Patel CA2/5

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Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Patel CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B335952

Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. MA084506)

v.

MAYA PATEL,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Emily J. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Sophia A.
Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Maya Patel appeals from her convictions for
child abuse, driving while intoxicated, and resisting a peace
officer, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to
instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity. We
affirm.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution’s Case

On the night of January 1, 2023, Shana Ruder was
awakened by her dogs barking at “a lot of commotion” outside her
Lumber Street residence in Lancaster, including people yelling
and a car horn honking. She heard a combination of male and
female voices and “excessive” honking, like someone “laying on
the horn” at least 10 times.
Ruder went outside and saw a Prius driving in and out of
her next-door neighbors’ driveway “aggressively.” Although her
neighbors—defendant and her domestic partner Emmanuel
Erby—had argued before, Ruder described this scene as “way
different” and “out of the ordinary.”1 She called 911 and reported
that her “‘neighbor [was] trying to run over [Erby] with a car out
in the middle of the street.’”
Ruder observed Erby walking in the middle of his driveway
as defendant drove a car toward him, “going fast”, causing him to

1 Prior to the incident, Ruder heard defendant and Erby
argue a lot and she saw him be physically violent with her at
least twice before.

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jump out of the way.2 The car came “pretty close” to Erby, and
Ruder believed that it would have hit him if he had not jumped
out of the way. The car then went up on the front lawn, where
Erby picked up a brick and threw it at the windshield.
Defendant backed up, but continued to go in and out of the
driveway, and it appeared to Ruder that defendant was “actively
attempting to hit [Erby]” with the car.
On January l, 2023, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Megan Holcomb,
along with four other deputies, responded to a report of domestic
violence at defendant’s residence on Lumber Street. When
Deputy Holcomb arrived at the scene, she observed defendant
standing in the driveway outside a vehicle in which defendant’s
two young children were sitting and yelling.3 They were not
restrained by a seatbelt or car seat and the only child safety car
seat in the vehicle was not buckled in. The deputies gave
defendant commands to walk down the driveway toward them,
but she refused and instead entered the car’s rear passenger
compartment with her children and then sat on top of them.
Deputies approached the vehicle and asked defendant to
step out and speak with them. But she “kept screaming that she
did not want [the deputies] to . . . take her kids and that she was
not getting out of the vehicle.” Deputy Holcomb estimated that

2 During Ruder’s testimony, the prosecution played a
residential surveillance camera video of the incident, and she
confirmed that it accurately depicted portions of the incident she
observed that night.

3 During her investigation, Deputy Holcomb determined that
the children were defendant’s two daughters, ages seven and two
years old.

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she asked defendant to exit the vehicle at least 20 times, but she
refused to comply. Defendant’s children were screaming and
crying as deputies tried to convince her to exit the vehicle. The
deputy could smell the odor of alcohol coming from defendant
who was “very obviously drunk.”4
Based on defendant’s movements inside the vehicle,
including an attempt to reach for the ignition, the deputies
decided to remove her. As they pulled defendant from the
vehicle, she dragged the child safety car seat out with her.
Outside the vehicle, Deputy Holcomb struggled with defendant,
who refused to put her hands behind her back while the deputy
attempted to handcuff her.
During her investigation, Deputy Holcomb obtained
security camera video of the incident from a residence directly
across the street. The beginning of the video showed defendant’s
car leaving the scene for approximately 30 seconds, but
returning. The car then moved up the driveway directly toward
Erby, reversed, and repeated the maneuver toward Erby two
more times. The third time the car moved up the driveway
toward Erby, he retreated backwards.
After the car reversed and then moved up the driveway
toward Erby a fourth time, he ran from the driveway to the lawn.
When the car followed him, he appeared to pick up something
and throw it at the vehicle, damaging the windshield.
In total, defendant drove up the driveway toward Erby at
least seven times before reversing for a final time and leaving the
view of the surveillance camera. But, a short time later,

4 Defendant stipulated that on the night of the incident, she
drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a
blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or greater.

4
defendant returned to the driveway as deputies responded to the
scene.

B. Defendant’s Testimony

Defendant began dating Erby in 2009 and had her two
daughters with him. By 2010, the relationship became abusive
and included Erby pushing, grabbing, and striking her.5 In
addition, he once knocked defendant’s tooth out, placed a pillow
over her face on another occasion, threw things at her, and
routinely destroyed her clothes and belongings.
On January 1, 2023, after returning from their two-year-old
daughter’s birthday celebration at a party venue, defendant and
Erby, who began drinking earlier in the day, engaged in an
argument after he searched through her phone and discovered
she had been talking to another man. Erby became aggressive,
called defendant names, and punched a hole in the wall. He then
started to push and grab defendant, leaving bruise marks and
causing her to fear for her life.
Defendant ran outside with her children, entered the
vehicle with them, locked the doors, and waited. After “[a] few
minutes”, Erby came out and threw a remote control, a Patron
bottle, and a “dollhouse” at the vehicle, breaking the windshield.
Defendant, who was scared of dying, began to honk the horn at
Erby attempting “to scare him[ and t]o make him stop.”
When the honking failed to deter Erby, defendant began
accelerating forward, and then reversing the vehicle, in an effort
to make him stop; she had no intention of hitting him. But Erby

5 According to defendant, Erby was six-feet, five-inches tall
and weighed 280 pounds and she was four-feet, nine-inches tall.

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continued to throw heavier objects at the windshield, including
heavy decorative rocks, and finally succeeded in shattering the
windshield.
Defendant did not intend to drive that night because she
had been drinking. She was unsure whether she placed her two-
year old in a properly restrained child safety car seat or whether
she fastened her seven-year old’s seat belt.
Defendant admitted driving away from the house and going
to the end of the road near the intersection of 21st Street West
and Lumber Street where she “just [hid] there on that street.”
She claimed that she did not call anyone at that point because
she did not have a phone.
When defendant saw police lights, however, she drove
home assuming that they were coming to the residence to help
her, not arrest her. Once home, she exited the vehicle without
her children, went into the house, and “grab[bed personal] items”,
including her identification and phone. When she turned around,
she saw police pointing their guns at her and heard them yelling
at her. But she ignored their commands to walk toward them
and instead returned to the vehicle because she was scared and
wanted to protect her children. While in the vehicle, defendant
refused to tell the deputies what happened to her windshield
because she was protecting Erby and afraid that, if she told them,
Erby would hurt her. And, she refused to exit the vehicle when
requested by the deputies because she did not want to be
separated from her children or have them taken away from her.

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In an amended information, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney charged defendant, in counts 1 and 2, with child
abuse under circumstances likely to cause great bodily injury or
death in violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a)6; in
count 3, with assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section
245, subdivision (a)(1); in count 6, with driving under the
influence in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision
(a); in count 7, with driving with a blood alcohol content of .08
percent or greater in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152,
subdivision (b); and in counts 8 and 9, with resisting, delaying, or
obstructing an officer in violation of section 148, subdivision
(a)(1).
The jury found defendant guilty on counts 1, 2, and 6
through 9, but deadlocked on count 3, resulting in a mistrial on
that count.
At the sentencing hearing, after the prosecution amended
the information to add count 10—assault by means of force likely
to cause great bodily injury in violation of section 245,
subdivision (a)(4)—defendant pleaded no contest to that offense
and the trial court accepted the plea, convicted defendant on
count 10, and dismissed count 3. The court then suspended
imposition of sentence on the counts upon which defendant had
been found guilty and placed her on probation for four years with
180 days in county jail.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

6 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
unless otherwise indicated.

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IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing
her request to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity, thus
violating her federal due process rights.

A. Duty to Instruct Upon Request

“In general, a trial court must give a requested jury
instruction if there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting such an instruction. (See People v. Cunningham
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008 . . . .) ‘In determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court
does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but
only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury,
was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .”’ (People v. Salas
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) ‘On appeal, we likewise ask only
whether the requested instruction was supported by substantial
evidence—evidence that, if believed by a rational jury, would
have raised a reasonable doubt as to’ an element of the crime in
question. (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288.)” (People
v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 583.)
“Whether or not a given set of facts provides the necessary
support for drawing a particular inference is a question of law.
Before instructing a jury that it may draw the inference, the trial
court must determine that there is evidence on the record which,
if believed, will support it. (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d
588, 597–598.)” (People v. Romo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 519.)

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B. Background

During the prosecution’s case, the trial court and counsel
discussed jury instructions, including one based on the necessity
defense. The court acknowledged that defense counsel had
requested the instruction and that it had tentatively included an
instruction on that defense in the package of instructions it
intended to give.7 The court noted, however, that the evidence up
to that point did not warrant the instruction and advised that it
would wait until it heard defendant’s evidence before making a
final decision on whether to give it.
After the close of evidence, the trial court returned to the
necessity defense instruction and decided it was not warranted,
reasoning as follows: “I have to decide whether or not there’s
been substantial evidence for this instruction, and I do not find
that there is substantial evidence for this instruction; so I did
take it out of the final instructions. I put it in so that we could
have this discussion, and I wanted to wait until the defendant

7 The CALCRIM instruction on the defense of necessity,
No. 3403, reads: “The defendant is not guilty of ____ <insert
crime[s]> if (he/she) acted because of legal necessity. [¶] In order
to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: [¶]
1. (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a significant bodily
harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else); [¶]
2. (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative; [¶] 3. The
defendant’s acts did not create a greater danger than the one
avoided; [¶] 4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually
believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened
harm or evil; [¶] 5. A reasonable person would also have
believed that the act was necessary under the circumstances; [¶]
AND [¶] 6. The defendant did not substantially contribute to the
emergency.” (CALCRIM No. 3403.)

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testified to see if there was substantial evidence entered in, and I
have found that there is not. I just want [defense counsel] to
have the opportunity to object.” At that point, defense counsel
objected.

C. Analysis

Defendant argues that her evidence supported a reasonable
inference that (1) faced with the imminent threat of physical
injury by Erby that night, she had no legal alternative but to
place her two-year-old and seven-year-old daughters in her car
and then to drive with them—unrestrained—while intoxicated, in
violation of section 273a, subdivision (a) (child abuse under
circumstances likely to cause great bodily injury or death) and
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b) (driving
under the influence and driving with a blood alcohol content of
.08 or greater); and (2) based on the same threat of physical
harm, she had no alternative upon returning home from driving,
and seeing at least five deputies at her home, but to refuse to
obey their commands or answer their questions, in violation of
section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (resisting, delaying, or obstruction
a peace officer).
The necessity defense on which defendant sought an
instruction “‘is very limited and depends on the lack of a legal
alternative to committing the crime. It excuses criminal conduct
if it is justified by a need to avoid an imminent peril and there is
no time to resort to the legal authorities or such resort would be
futile.’ [Citation.] ‘By definition, the necessity defense is founded
upon public policy and provides a justification distinct from the
elements required to prove the crime.’ [Citation.] ‘Necessity does

10
not negate any element of the crime, but represents a public
policy decision not to punish such an individual despite proof of
the crime.’ [Citation.]
“‘To justify an instruction on the defense of necessity, a
defendant must present evidence sufficient to establish that [she]
violated the law (1) to prevent a significant and imminent evil,
(2) with no reasonable legal alternative, (3) without creating a
greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief
that the criminal act was necessary to prevent the greater harm,
(5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under
circumstances in which [she] did not substantially contribute to
the emergency.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1146, 1164–1165, fn. omitted (Verlinde); see also
CALCRIM No. 3403.)
We will assume, for the sake of argument, that defendant’s
evidence supported a reasonable inference that Erby’s conduct
that night, which included physical abuse of defendant before the
driving incident and acts of violence against defendant and her
children during it, constituted an imminent threat of physical
harm and that defendant acted to prevent such harm. We
nevertheless conclude that there was insufficient evidence to
support one or more of the other elements of her necessity
defense. (See Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [refusal
to give necessity instruction upheld when defendant failed to
establish fourth and fifth elements of the defense].)
As to the child abuse and driving under the influence
convictions, defendant’s evidence did not support the fifth
element of her defense—that a reasonable person would also
have believed that her actions in driving at 8:30 p.m. with her
children unrestrained and while she was intoxicated were

11
necessary under the circumstances. Defendant admitted that
when she left the house with her children, she sat in the car for
“a few minutes” before Erby came out of the house and began
throwing objects at the car. That was enough time to have
sought refuge at a neighbor’s home or to have borrowed a
neighbor’s phone and called law enforcement. Defendant also
admitted that after finding a place to hide, at the end of her road,
she drove back to the home, again with the children
unrestrained, when she saw police lights. A reasonable person
under those circumstances would not have operated a vehicle
with her children inside, knowing she was too intoxicated to
properly restrain or drive with them.
As to the delaying, resisting, or obstructing the deputies’
offenses, defendant admitted once she arrived back home with
the children in the car, she (1) believed the deputies were on their
way to the home to assist her; (2) did not see Erby in front of the
home; (3) she voluntarily entered the home to retrieve personal
belongings; and (4) she saw deputies arrive at the home with
their guns drawn. That evidence did not support elements four
or five of her proffered defense—that she actually believed her
conduct in ignoring the deputies’ repeated demands to walk
toward them and to exit the vehicle were necessary to prevent
further physical harm by Erby or that a reasonable person would
have held such a belief. By the time she committed the acts
underlying her resisting convictions, defendant knew or should
have known that Erby no longer posed any threat to her or her
children. Thus, no rational juror could have found that she
actually believed her conduct in resisting and obstructing
deputies was necessary to prevent harm from Erby or that a
reasonable person could have held that belief.

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Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury on the necessity defense.8

V. DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

BAKER, J.

8 For similar reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
violate defendant’s due process right to present a complete
defense as the necessity instruction was not supported by
substantial evidence. (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th
263, 294.)

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