People v. Saenz CA4/2

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Filed 4/17/25 P. v. Saenz CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083122

v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1600281)

JUAN MANUEL SAENZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J.

Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Juan Manuel Saenz appeals from the trial court’s order

finding him ineligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing under Penal Code

1
section 1172.75.1 The trial court entered its order after determining one-year enhanced

terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for defendant’s two prior prison commitments

remained stayed, neither having been executed since defendant was originally sentenced

four years earlier. We affirm the court’s ruling.

BACKGROUND

In May 2019, under the terms of his plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to

making a criminal threat (§ 422), assault likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245), and

possession of heroin in county jail (§ 4573.6). Defendant also admitted two prior prison

commitments. (§ 667, subd. (b).) Consistent with defendant’s plea terms, the trial court

sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of four years eight months. As relevant

here, the court imposed but stayed execution of one-year enhanced terms for each of

defendant’s prison priors.

In December 2023 the trial court considered defendant’s eligibility for recall of his

sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found he was ineligible.

Defendant’s case was one of dozens considered together that day by stipulation of

the parties, pursuant to which the court operated under the assumption that each

defendant’s “one-year prior state prison enhancement(s) had been ‘stayed.’ ”

In reaching the conclusion defendant was ineligible for relief, the court noted

expressly that it had considered several recently decided cases: People v. Saldana (2023)

97 Cal.App.5th 1270 (Saldana), review granted March 12, 2024, S283547; People v.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189

(Christianson); People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 (Rhodius), review granted

February 21, 2024, S283169; and People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276.

Defendant’s petition was not heard or reported separately, but the parties stipulated

to incorporate into defendant’s court file the reporter’s transcript and other relevant

documents from the lead case heard that day. In that case, the defendant’s original

sentencing court had stayed execution of his penalty enhancement or enhancements

imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b). In denying the defendant resentencing

relief under section 1172.75, as it likewise did for defendant here, the trial court

concluded the Legislature intended resentencing relief for enhanced terms imposed for

prison priors to extend only to “anyone . . . serving time on them.” The court reiterated

later in the hearing that “what the Legislature was after” in enacting section 1172.75 was

to provide a recall and resentencing mechanism for inmates “serving additional time

based on the[ir] prison priors.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends he is entitled to recall of his sentence and resentencing under

section 1172.75 despite the stay on enhanced penalty terms for his prison priors. The stay

has never been lifted. We conclude the trial court did not err in finding defendant

ineligible for resentencing under the statute.

At the time of defendant’s conviction and sentencing, “section 667.5,

subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each

true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a separate prior prison term and

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had not remained free of custody for at least five years.” (People v. Jennings (2019) 42

Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) Subsequently, section 1172.75 now provides, with an exception

that is not applicable here: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to

January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5 . . . is legally invalid.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (a), italics added.2) Disagreement over what constitutes “imposed”

within the meaning of the statute still divides appellate panels, as we note briefly post.

Section 1172.75 further provides, as pertinent here, for recall and resentencing on

conditional terms, namely: “If” the superior court in which the defendant was sentenced

“determines that the [defendant’s] current judgment includes an enhancement described

in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added; see id., subd. (b) [specifying

sentencing court as recall and resentencing venue].) Additionally, the statute specifies

that for defendants eligible for recall and resentencing, their resentencing “shall result

in,” “as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,” “a lesser sentence than

the one originally imposed . . . , unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence

that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1),

italics added.3)

2 The exception specifies that only prior prison enhancements “for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense” remain valid. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

3 This subdivision, without our italics, quotation marks, and ellipses inserted for
clarity, provides in full: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall
not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).)

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We conclude defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75

because his prison prior enhancement terms have remained stayed since his original

sentencing. Simply put, we agree with Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38 that the critical

term “imposed” in subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 “must be interpreted as shorthand

for ‘impos[ed] and execut[ed].’ ” (Rhodius, at p. 43; see People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43

Cal.4th 1118, 1125 [recognizing “the word ‘impose[d]’ ” refers “often” to “enhancements

that are ‘imposed and then executed’ ”].) Rhodius reached this conclusion to make sense

of codified language the Legislature chose in enacting the statute but, similarly,

uncodified provisions equally chosen in the statute’s preamble require the same

conclusion.

Of particular note in the statute’s codified provisions, Rhodius examined the

requirement in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that resentencing must result in “a

lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the

repealed enhancement.” (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 43, some italics omitted.)

Reasoning that “[t]he only way for the repealed enhancement to have increased the length

of a sentence is for the enhancement to have been imposed and executed,” Rhodius

concluded that applying section 1172.75 to a stayed prior prison term would require a

resentencing court to “arbitrarily lower” the defendant’s sentence in a way unrelated to

the enhancement in order to comply with the statute’s “lesser sentence” requirement.

(Rhodius, at p. 44.) Because the Legislature presumably must not have intended arbitrary

sentence reductions to meet this requirement, Rhodius held section 1172.75 must be

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interpreted to apply only to prior prison enhancement terms that were imposed and

executed. (Rhodius, at p. 44.)

Similarly, in the uncodified preamble to the statute, the Legislature stated its intent

expressly in a way incompatible with relief for stayed prison priors: “it is the intent of

the Legislature to retroactively apply [new limitations on prior prison term

enhancements] to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison

for these repealed sentence enhancements.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.) A

defendant who had his or her punishment on a prior prison enhancement stayed at

sentencing is not serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for that enhancement, so

the Legislature manifestly did not intend to provide retroactive relief to those defendants.

Other appellate panels—one before Rhodius and the others relying on

Christianson after Rhodius was decided—have held that section 1172.75 applies to prior

prison term enhancements that were imposed but stayed. (See People v. Renteria, supra,

96 Cal.App.5th 1276; see also Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300; Saldana, supra,

97 Cal.App.5th 1270; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665 (Mayberry),

review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853.) All of these decisions since and including

Rhodius remain under review, as the high court considers the issue.

In brief, Christianson, Saldana, and Mayberry disagreed with Rhodius because

they viewed striking a stayed enhancement upon resentencing as resulting in a “lesser”

sentence in compliance with section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). As Christianson

explained, this view is grounded in a stayed enhancement’s “potential for an increased

sentence” because “the trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term

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under certain circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.”

(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) Under this interpretation, striking a

stayed enhancement reduces the defendant’s sentence because it eliminates the risk that

the enhancement will be executed in the future. (Ibid.; see also Saldana, at p. 1278;

Mayberry, at pp. 674-675 [“Imposed-but-stayed prior prison term enhancements carry the

possibility of execution,” and striking them “eliminates their impact”].)

We do not agree with this rationale. It does not account for the uncodified

preamble to section 1172.75 stating the Legislature’s contrary intent. Likewise, the

statute’s codified language requiring a lesser sentence is better reconciled with an actual

reduction in “time served” as the enactment’s goal, as reflected throughout

section 1172.75’s legislative history. (See Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 46-48

[identifying numerous such instances].) Rhodius summarized that history as follows:

“The findings, costs, and ramifications of Senate Bill 136 and Senate Bill 483 cited

during the legislative sessions presuppose inmates who are serving additional time as a

result of the sentencing enhancement under section 667.5(b). The references to financial

and familial burdens do not logically follow if a defendant is not actually serving

additional time as the result of an imposed and executed sentence associated with a

section 667.5(b) prior. As such, to interpret the statute to include enhancements that were

imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of

the statute.” (Rhodius, at pp. 48-49; see also id. at p. 47 [the foregoing history reflects “a

clear presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed sentence”].)

7
Defendant cites, without discussion, the decision by a divided panel in People v.

Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.

The majority in Espino saw no reason to distinguish between prison prior enhancements

that were imposed but stayed and those that were imposed but the punishment struck.

(Id. at p. 193 [“section 1172.75 should be interpreted to apply whenever a prison prior

was imposed, whether punishment was executed, stayed, or struck”].)

The dissent in Espino, however, found the “additive character of the term of

imprisonment . . . integral to imposition of a sentence enhancement,” such that “when the

law otherwise prescribes an additional term of imprisonment, a trial court that elects to

strike that additional term of imprisonment has not imposed it—not even conditionally, as

would be the case when a court elects to stay the additional term.” (Espino, supra,

104 Cal.App.5th at p. 203 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) The dissent also echoes Rhodius’s

concern that the Legislature presumably did not intend to force resentencing courts to

arbitrarily lower sentences, noting that “eliminating an enhancement for which the court

had already stricken the punishment” does not, by itself, result in a lesser sentence.

(Espino, at p. 203, fn. 2 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) The majority opinion does not address

these issues, which contravene both Rhodius’s and Christianson’s analyses of

section 1172.75. On balance, we find the Espino dissent more persuasive than the

majority opinion.

For all of these reasons, the trial court did not err in finding defendant ineligible

for recall of his sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75.

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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.

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