A.S. v. D.S. CA2/7

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Filed 4/11/25 A.S. v. D.S. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

A.S., B328086

Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 17PSFL01164)
v.

D.S.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Don Christian, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Galperin & Hensley and Yury Galperin for Appellant.
Castellanos Law Group and Patricia Saucedo for
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Mother A.S. appeals from the family court’s orders granting
father D.S.’s request for a move away order and for primary
custody of their child, Mason S. The family court erred by
granting the initial move away order on an ex parte basis based
on reasons that did not meet the statutory standard under
Family Code section 3064. Under the circumstances presented,
however, we affirm because at the subsequent contested hearing
the court applied the correct standard and did not take into
account its prior ex parte ruling. Further, A.S. has not met her
burden to demonstrate prejudicial error arising from the ex parte
order, or that the family court abused its decision by granting the
move away order after the contested hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background
A.S. and D.S. married in 2015, and Mason was born in
2016. The parents separated in 2017 and their stipulated
judgment of dissolution was filed in July 2019. The judgment
specified A.S. and D.S. had joint legal and physical custody of
Mason. Both resided in Southern California at the time of the
dissolution.
On January 31, 2020, D.S. filed a request for an order to
give D.S. primary physical custody of Mason and for permission
to move to Texas with Mason. D.S. believed they would enjoy a
lower cost of living there, and he anticipated a job offer from the
Dallas Police Department. The parties stipulated to the
appointment of an expert pursuant to Evidence Code section 730
who would make recommendations about the move away request.

2
The family court had previously appointed counsel to represent
Mason, and minor’s counsel participated in the move away
proceedings.
On January 27, 2021, the family court conducted a
contested hearing on D.S.’s request. The expert testified the
ideal arrangement for Mason would be both parents living in
close proximity to one another because it would be difficult for a
four-year-old child to travel that distance and be away from
either parent for extended periods of time. If, however, D.S. were
to move, the expert recommended A.S. be granted primary
physical custody of Mason with D.S. receiving his custodial time
with Mason during school holidays and in the summer. The
expert explained both parents were “good parents” but she
believed Mason was “a little bit more attached to mom.”
The court adopted the expert’s recommendation and denied
D.S.’s move away request. The court ordered custody to remain
the same if D.S. chose to stay in Southern California but it also
set out a detailed custody schedule if D.S. chose to move away.
D.S. relocated to Texas soon after the hearing.

B. The Ex Parte Request
On August 26, 2022, D.S. moved for an ex parte order
“resetting” the move away request and for further review by the
court-appointed expert. In his declaration in support of the ex
parte motion, D.S. stated he learned A.S. intended to move in
with her boyfriend and enroll Mason in a different school in a
different school district. According to D.S., Mason told D.S. a
“few” times that he was scared of A.S.’s boyfriend. D.S. asserted
Mason had a few instances of wetting himself at school and at
home, causing A.S. to take him to the doctor. D.S. also relayed

3
that A.S. violated court orders by changing Mason’s doctor
without D.S.’s consent, referring to D.S. by his name rather than
as “daddy” when speaking with Mason, failing to ensure D.S.
spoke to Mason by video every day, and seeking to encroach on
D.S.’s custody time with Mason.
A.S. opposed the ex parte motion, arguing Mason “is not in
harm’s way, started school August 8th, Mason is loving his
school, [and] also started Pop Warner football this month.”
The family court granted D.S.’s ex parte request on
August 26, 2022, the day D.S. filed his request, and set a
contested hearing for the following month, which was later
continued to November. The court appointed the same expert to
review the new move away request. D.S. relocated Mason to
Texas and enrolled him in school there. The record does not
reflect A.S. sought a stay of the family court’s order granting the
ex parte motion or appellate review.

C. The Contested Hearing
On November 28 and 29, 2022, the court conducted the
contested hearing. The previously-appointed expert
recommended Mason be placed with D.S. in Texas, with D.S. as
his primary custodian but with both parents retaining joint legal
custody. The expert testified she did not take into account that
Mason was already with D.S. in Texas as the sole basis in
making her recommendation. She further testified that she
primarily focused on the 16-month period between the first move
away request in January 2021 and the second request in August
2022, but she “also did focus a bit on past incidents.” She again
testified the parents were both good parents but had difficulty
working together as a team and communicating effectively. She

4
explained it was a “very close call” but she examined the factors
identified in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072
(LaMusga), and in rendering her opinion she selected the parent
who seemed most likely to facilitate the other parent’s custodial
time.
In her written opposition, A.S. disputed D.S.’s assertions,
arguing they lacked evidentiary support. She stated her
boyfriend moved to be nearer to his own daughter and she does
not live with him. A.S. stated she lived with her mother and
brother while staying at her boyfriend’s home on the weekends.
She affirmed she changed Mason’s school so he would be closer to
her new workplace. The change was approved by Mason’s
counsel after D.S. failed to reply to A.S.’s attempt to contact him.
She also disputed that Mason was afraid of her boyfriend, stating
he and Mason had a bonded relationship, and that D.S. had not
previously raised this issue with her. She further stated she did
not refer to D.S. by his name when speaking to Mason, and she
supported Mason’s relationship with his father.
At the hearing, A.S. testified regarding her daily routine
with Mason when she was his primary caregiver. A.S. further
testified Mason was attached to her, and he tells her he misses
her every day since he moved to Texas. A.S. explained she did
not intend to infringe on D.S.’s custody time but she wanted to
take Mason on a family trip to Mexico, and D.S. would not work
with her to change the custody schedule.
A.S.’s counsel argued Mason’s “paramount” need for
stability and continuity was fulfilled by remaining in California,
where Mason had lived since birth. She further argued the harm
that could result from the disruption to Mason’s patterns of care
and emotional bonds weighed heavily in favor of maintaining the

5
current custody arrangement where A.S. was the primary
custodian and to whom Mason was very attached.
D.S. submitted on his papers and the expert’s evaluation.
Mason did not testify at the hearing. Mason’s attorney in closing
arguments stated she had spoken to Mason, who indicated he
was equally happy living with his father or mother. She further
stated A.S. and D.S. would benefit from conjoint therapy to help
them advance their communication skills. She agreed with the
expert that primary custody should be granted to D.S.
The family court granted D.S.’s move away request,
adopting the expert’s recommendation and finding the request to
be in Mason’s best interest. The court set out a detailed custody
schedule in which A.S. had visits with Mason during the summer,
school holidays, and one weekend per month during the school
year. The court also ordered A.S. and D.S. to participate in at
least six sessions of conjoint counseling. Mason’s attorney was
ordered to continue her representation of him, with monthly
phone calls to monitor his wellbeing for one year. A.S. timely
appealed.1

1 The family court stated its ruling was “not a final order
under the case of Montenegro vs. Diaz.” In light of the court’s
statement, on appeal “this court is obligated to review the
question of appealability.” (Doran v. Magan (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292.) We conclude the superior court’s
order is an appealable order after final judgment because Mason
was removed from A.S.’s physical custody and the court granted
D.S.’s move away request after a contested hearing with no
further issues to be determined. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1,
subd. (a)(2); Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 253-254
[exercising jurisdiction over an appeal taken from an order
entered after a contested hearing on custody]; see also Critzer v.

6
DISCUSSION

A.S. raises two principal arguments on appeal. First, she
contends the family court erred by granting D.S.’s ex parte
motion without sufficient evidence of “immediate harm” as
required under Family Code section 3064.2 Second, A.S. argues
the family court compounded its initial error by granting D.S.’s
move away request, purportedly based on the ex parte order. We
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it granted
primary custody to D.S. after a contested hearing and allowed
Mason to relocate permanently to Texas based on the
recommendations of the court-appointed expert and minor’s
counsel.

A. Standard of Review
“The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation
orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test.” (In re Marriage
of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32 (Burgess); accord,
Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 (Montenegro).)
“[W]e must uphold the [family] court ‘ruling if it is correct on any
basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.’”
(Montenegro, at p. 255.) A court may abuse its discretion by
applying improper criteria or making incorrect legal
assumptions. (See Mark T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App4th

Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251-1252 [“where no issue is
left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or
noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is
final”].)
2 All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise specified.

7
1115, 1124-1125.) We apply the substantial evidence standard to
the court’s factual findings. (See Burgess, at p. 32; In re Marriage
of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.)

B. The Ex Parte Move Away Request Failed To Establish
Immediate Harm
Section 3064 provides in pertinent part: “The court shall
refrain from making an order granting or modifying a custody
order on an ex parte basis unless there has been a showing of
immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the child will
be removed from the State of California.” Section 3064,
subdivision (b)(1), defines “‘Immediate harm to the child’” as
including, but not limited to, acts of domestic violence and sexual
abuse of the child. The statute further directs the court to
consider a parent’s illegal access to firearms and ammunition as
a basis for determining whether there is a showing of immediate
harm to the child. (§ 3064, subd. (b)(2)(A).)
A.S. argues the family court erred when it granted D.S.’s
ex parte request because there was no showing of immediate
harm or an immediate risk that Mason would be removed from
the state of California. On appeal, D.S. does not address the
propriety of the ex parte order. He asserts the court’s subsequent
permanent custody order should be affirmed “[e]ven assuming,
arguendo, that the Trial Court erroneously granted Respondent’s
Ex parte Application on August 26, 2022.”
Here, the allegations in D.S.’s ex parte request fail to
disclose acts of domestic violence, sexual abuse, or anything
similar. Nor did the family court explain the immediate harm
that Mason would suffer if it did not grant the ex parte request.
Nevertheless, we conclude that “even if Mother were correct that

8
the court should not have granted custody to Father ex parte, she
suffered no ultimate prejudice as the same result was supported
by the record at the full evidentiary hearing.” (In re Marriage of
Slayton & Biggums-Slayton (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 653, 658.)
A.S. received a full evidentiary hearing, where she was
represented by counsel and testified. Additionally, the court-
appointed expert presented updated recommendations, and her
attorney was able to cross-examine the expert. As we discuss in
the next section, the family court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the move away request after the contested hearing.
Under these circumstances, there was no prejudicial error
requiring reversal.

C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting the
Move Away Request After the Contested Hearing
1. The Law Governing Move Away Requests
“Under California’s statutory scheme governing child
custody and visitation determinations, the overarching concern is
the best interest of the child.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 255; §§ 3011, 3040.) In determining the best interest of the
child, section 3011 directs the court to consider “all relevant
factors, including the child’s health, safety, and welfare, any
history of abuse by one parent against any child or the other
parent, and the nature and amount of the child’s contact with the
parents.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th
947, 955-956.)
“‘[O]nce it has been established that a particular custodial
arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court need
not reexamine that question. Instead, it should preserve the
established mode of custody unless some significant change in

9
circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in
the child’s best interest. The rule thus fosters the dual goals of
judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements.’”
(Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256, quoting Burchard v.
Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 38.) The noncustodial parent has a substantial burden to show
changed circumstances. (Burgess, at p. 38.)
The California Supreme Court in LaMusga, supra,
32 Cal.4th at page 1101 stated that, “we must permit our
superior court judges . . . to exercise their discretion to fashion
orders that best serve the interests of the children in the cases
before them. Among the factors that the court ordinarily should
consider when deciding whether to modify a custody order in
light of the custodial parent’s proposal to change the residence of
the child are the following: [1] the children’s interest in stability
and continuity in the custodial arrangement; [2] the distance of
the move; [3] the age of the children; [4] the children’s
relationship with both parents; [5] the relationship between the
parents including, but not limited to, their ability to communicate
and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the
interests of the children above their individual interests; [6] the
wishes of the children if they are mature enough for such an
inquiry to be appropriate; [7] the reasons for the proposed move;
and [8] the extent to which the parents currently are sharing
custody.” LaMusga held, “The likely consequences of a proposed
change in the residence of a child, when considered in the light of
all the relevant factors, may constitute a change of circumstances
that warrants a change in custody, and the detriment to the
child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent that will be
caused by the proposed move, when considered in light of all the

10
relevant factors may warrant denying a request to change the
child’s residence or changing custody.” (Id. at p. 1097.)
Courts have applied LaMusga to cases involving a
noncustodial parent like D.S.3 who seeks both primary custody
and a move away order, “what amounts to a double-barreled
change.” (Jane J. v Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894,
905 (Jane J.); accord, In re Marriage of C.T. & R.B. (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 87.) In those cases, the noncustodial parent bears
a burden of proof different from that of a custodial parent seeking
a move away order. Jane J. explained, “Because Father is not
the custodial parent, he does not have a presumptive right to
relocate the children to another region of the country simply
because he acts in good faith and for a legitimate reason.
Instead, as the noncustodial parent who seeks a change in
custody involving an out-of-state move away, Father bears

3 Generally, in cases involving joint custody, the party
seeking a move away order need not demonstrate changed
circumstances because the family court makes its custody
determination de novo based on what is in the best interest of the
child. (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 40, fn. 12; Niko v.
Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364.) Here, neither party
contends the joint custody order in the 2019 judgment of
dissolution is the operative order from which D.S. sought a
change in custody. D.S. concedes the 2021 order denying his
initial move away request “fundamentally changed the status quo
[because] [A.S.] was granted primary custody of the minor child
in California” when he moved to Texas. Under these
circumstances, we conclude LaMusga’s changed circumstances
analysis applies. (See Jane J., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 894.)
Both parties agree D.S. had the burden to prove changed
circumstances at the November 2022 move away hearing.

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additional burdens of persuasion as part of the changed
circumstances standard.” (Jane J., at p. 904.)
Here, this requires “a balancing of the children’s current
situation in California and their proposed new situation in
[Texas], with the substantial burden of showing a change of
circumstance imposed upon Father, as the noncustodial parent,
to establish that the children would not sustain detriment by the
proposed move, and that the out-of-state move away will serve
their best interests.” (Jane J., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 905.)
The noncustodial parent must demonstrate these changed
circumstances based on the LaMusga factors. (See ibid.)

2. Analysis
A.S. contends the family court abused its discretion by
“confirm[ing] its ex parte order without properly considering the
relevant case law.” In A.S.’s view, the court simply adopted the
expert’s recommendation without considering the LaMusga
factors. A.S. contends the LaMusga factors “heavily” favored the
denial of the move away and she disputes D.S.’s reasons for the
change in custody were supported by evidence.
The record does not support A.S.’s assertion the family
court failed to consider LaMusga. To the contrary, the court
stated, “This [case] is about the requirements of LaMusga, a
move-away case in reality, and the parents not going to live in
the same location.” The court-appointed expert also testified she
considered the LaMusga factors in her evaluation. The expert
submitted a 17-page updated report addressing all the LaMusga

12
factors.4 Additionally, there is no indication the court granted
D.S.’s move away request based on its ex parte order. The court
conducted a full contested hearing within a few months of its ex
parte order. It made no mention of the ex parte order or of
Mason’s relocation to Texas in its ruling. It adopted the
recommendation of the expert, who testified she did not place any
particular emphasis on the ex parte order in her evaluation.
Under these circumstances, A.S. has not demonstrated the court
abused its discretion by applying improper criteria or by making
incorrect legal assumptions. (See Mark T. v. Jamie Z., supra,
194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1124-1125.)
On the merits, A.S. has not met her burden on appeal to
demonstrate the court committed reversible error by granting
D.S.’s move away request. (See Aguayo v. Amaro (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109 [“‘We presume the trial court’s
factual findings are supported by the evidence, and it is the
appellant’s burden to show that they are not.’”]; In re Marriage of
Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484 [“It is a
fundamental rule of appellate review that a judgment is
presumed correct and the appealing party must affirmatively
show error.”].) Here, we are guided by well-established rules of
appellate review. We presume the family court’s ruling granting
the move away order after the contested hearing is correct. (See
LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1093; In re Marriage of

4 We asked the parties to lodge with the court the exhibits
from the contested hearing, including the expert’s supplemental
report. We take judicial notice of the expert’s supplemental
report on our own motion. (See Evid. Code, § 452; see also In re
Marriage of Wilson & Bodine (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 768, 770,
fn. 1.)

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Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) “Where, as here, no
statement of decision was requested, all intendments will favor
the [family] court’s ruling and it will be presumed on appeal that
the [family] court found all facts necessary to support the
judgment.” (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643,
649; accord, Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100,
104.) Then, we consider whether the implied findings are
supported by substantial evidence. (See Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1148, fn. 11.)
Although the family court based its ruling on the expert’s
report (which was admitted into evidence) and her testimony at
the contested hearing, A.S. did not designate the expert report as
part of the record on appeal. The court issued an order after
hearing that set out custody and visitation details, but the order
did not explain the reasons for its ruling. A.S. did not ask the
family court to issue a statement of decision. Yet her opening
brief characterizes the court’s ruling as “issued in the form of an
extensive soliloquy covering the job of counsel in litigation, the
COVID 19 Pandemic and the Court’s own family,” without the
requisite findings under LaMusga. Without a statement of
decision, we must presume the family court made all findings
necessary to support the judgment. We further conclude
substantial evidence supports these implied findings.
At the contested hearing, the court-appointed expert
testified that this case involved “a very close call.” She opined
that the fifth LaMusga factor—the parents’ “ability to
communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to
put the interests of the children above their individual interests”
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101)—was dispositive and
that she concluded that factor weighed in favor of D.S. She

14
stated that the parents’ main challenge in coparenting was their
inability to communicate and cooperate effectively. As a result,
she recommended D.S. become the primary caregiver because it
was her opinion that D.S. would be more likely to facilitate
Mason’s relationship with A.S.
As to the remaining LaMusga factors, the expert testified
that Mason loved both of his parents and had close ties to his
extended family in Texas and in California. He also did well in
school in Texas and California; he would have changed schools
whether he stayed with A.S. in California or moved to Texas with
D.S. She further stated that no party asserted Mason would
suffer detriment by moving to Texas, and the expert concluded
Mason would not suffer detriment from the move. The expert
agreed her recommendation reversed who the custodial parent is
“during the school year” and “during the summer.” Mason’s
attorney agreed with the expert’s recommendation. We conclude
the expert’s testimony is substantial evidence to support an
implied finding by the family court that a “change in
circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in
the child’s best interest.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 256.) Further, as stated, the expert submitted an updated
report addressing all the LaMusga factors.
A.S. does not address the expert’s recommendation in her
appellate briefing. Nor does she challenge the expert’s testimony
regarding the fifth LaMusga factor. As to the remaining factors,
she acknowledges the second (distance), sixth (child’s wishes),
and eighth (current custody plan) factors are neutral. And she
does not contend the seventh factor (reasons for the move) favor
her over D.S. Further, even if we were to assume, as A.S. argues,
the other LaMusga factors—first (stability), third (age), and

15
fourth (relationship with parents)—weigh in her favor, A.S. fails
to explain why or how these favorable factors would override the
five additional factors and the substantial evidence provided by
the expert testimony. We conclude based on the record before us
that they would not. Under these “heart-wrenching
circumstances,” the California Supreme Court requires that “we
must permit our superior court judges—guided by statute and
the principles we announced in Burgess and affirm in the present
case—to exercise their discretion to fashion orders that best serve
the interests of the children in the cases before them.”
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.)
Additionally, A.S.’s attempt to challenge D.S.’s stated
reasons for the move away request—the suspected move to A.S.’s
boyfriend’s home, the change in schools, Mason’s bedwetting
incidents, and A.S.’s interference with D.S.’s custody time and
video calls—does not override the substantial evidence
supporting the implied finding that changed circumstances
indicated it was in Mason’s best interest to award primary
custody to D.S. and grant his move away request. A.S. has failed
to meet her burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
The cases A.S. cites are distinguishable and do not
persuade us reversal is warranted.
In Jane J., a noncustodial father sought to obtain custody
of his children and to move them from California to his new home
in Alabama. The trial court granted his request, stating, “‘It’s
time [Father] had an opportunity to parent these children. I’m
going to change custody. He needs to be given the opportunity to
be the parent that he’s striving to be in the limited time that he
has.’” The court also based its ruling on the mother’s interference
with the children’s relationship with the father. (See Jane J.,

16
supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900, 906.) The appellate court
concluded the trial court erred and granted the mother’s petition
for a writ of mandate. (See id. at p. 910.)
Jane J. held the father as the noncustodial parent bore
additional burdens of persuasion as part of the changed
circumstances standard, including the burden “to establish that
the children would not sustain detriment by the proposed move,
and that the out-of-state move away will serve their best
interests.” (Jane J., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 905.) It held
the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
LaMusga factors, particularly the children’s interest in the
stability of the current custody arrangement. Jane J. also
faulted the trial court for “miss[ing] an opportunity to obtain
expert guidance when it rejected the parents’ stipulation to share
in the costs to retain and use an Evidence Code section 730
evaluator to analyze the matter and to make recommendations
for custody and visitation.” (Id. at p. 906.)
Here, by contrast, the family court appointed an Evidence
Code section 730 evaluator to make recommendations, and the
record reflects it considered the LaMusga factors in making its
ruling in adopting the expert’s conclusion and testimony.
Additionally, the record before us supports an implied finding
that Mason would not suffer detriment from a move to Texas. As
discussed above, in comparing Mason’s living situation in
California and Texas, the expert testified both locations were
essentially equal because Mason enjoyed his time in both places,
had significant ties to both places, and did well in school in both
places.
In In re Marriage of C.T. & R.B., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
page 102, the noncustodial father sought to relocate his child out

17
of state and become the primary custodian. As here, the father
and mother both lived in California at the time of the final
custody order, which awarded the parents joint legal and physical
custody. When the father moved to Arkansas, neither parent
sought a change in the custody order and the mother in effect
became the primary physical custodian of the child. Six years
after his move, the father sought to relocate the child to
Arkansas, which the trial court granted. (See ibid.) The
appellate court reversed because the father failed to demonstrate
that changing physical custody would not detrimentally affect his
son’s interest in continuity and stability and that relocation was
in the son’s best interest. (See id. at p. 97.) It concluded the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing a change of custody and
relocation of the child based solely on a finding that the mother
was the “least likely” to share the child with the other parent,
especially because the other LaMusga factors “heavily” weighed
in favor of keeping the mother as the primary custodian. (Id. at
p. 107.) The evidence in that case demonstrated: the child had a
strained relationship with the father and previously refused to
have any contact with the father; the child had strong ties to his
community in California and “minimal” ties to Arkansas; and the
father, who was unemployed and financially dependent on his
80-year-old parents, had failed to demonstrate how he would
provide for his son without their help. (Id. at pp. 108-112.)
Unlike the child in In re Marriage of C.T. & R.B, it is
undisputed Mason has a happy and bonded relationship with
both parents; he has extensive community ties in California and
Texas; and both parents are “good” parents who provide for
Mason. Additionally, here the LaMusga factors do not weigh
heavily in favor of A.S., and the family court did not abuse its

18
discretion when it determined one factor was dispositive in light
of the relative balance of the other factors.

DISPOSITION

The November 29, 2022 order is affirmed. D.S. may recover
his costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

STONE, J. PULOS, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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