CourtListener 10377041•Mondragon v. Let's Do Lunch CA2/5
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Filed 4/11/25 Mondragon v. Let’s Do Lunch CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RAFAEL MONDRAGON, B329898
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV13838)
LET’S DO LUNCH, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maren E. Nelson, Judge. Reversed.
Mahoney Law Group, Kevin Mahoney, Katherine
Odenbreit, Raleigh Dixon; Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and John
A. Hribar for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Michele J. Beilke, Julia Y. Trankiem and
Blake E. Guerrero for Defendant and Respondent.
******
A former employee filed two separate cases against his
former employer—one alleging wage and hour violations, and
another alleging wrongful termination in violation of public
policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in the wage
and hour case based solely on the former employee’s response to a
contention interrogatory in the wrongful termination case. This
was error, so we reverse the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Let’s Do Lunch, Inc. (defendant) provides “perishable
prepared food for schools’ distributors, private-label, and retail
customers in California and throughout the United States.”
Raphael Mondragon (Mondragon) was hired as a forklift operator
at defendant’s Los Angeles-based warehouse in November 2018.
He was terminated less than six months later, in April 2019, for
being verbally aggressive toward a co-worker.
While employed by defendant, Mondragon was required to
“come earlier” for his shift than the designated “start time,” but
not permitted to clock in until “half an hour or one hour late.”
Mondragon’s supervisors also directed him to “punch out” for the
day, but to “come back” to finish the day’s work. There were also
times that he could not take rest or meal breaks due to the
volume of work, but was ordered to clock out to document breaks
he never took. As a result, Mondragon’s paystubs did not include
the extra hours he worked or premiums for missed breaks. He
was also assigned to work “14 or 15 days” “nonstop” without
2
receiving extra pay. Mondragon spent his own money to
purchase thermal shirts, pants, protective gloves, and boots and
incurred expenses to launder his work uniform separately
because it was “too dirty” to wash with his personal clothes.
II. Procedural Background1
A. Wage and hour action
1. Complaint
In April 2020, Mondragon filed a wage and hour action
against defendant.2 He asserted causes of action for (1) failure to
1 Defendant filed a request for judicial notice of nine exhibits
consisting of pleadings and filings from the various trial court
matters Mondragon filed; Mondragon opposed the request as to
three of those exhibits on the ground that they are “irrelevant”
and presented simply to “make Mondragon look bad.” The court
hereby:
(1) denies defendant’s request for judicial notice of
Exhibits 1 through 6 because they contain pleadings and filings
already in the record on appeal in the parties’ appendices;
(2) denies defendant’s request for judicial notice of
Exhibit 8 (the trial court’s order striking a peremptory challenge
filed by Mondragon) because it is irrelevant to the issues on
appeal (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
556, 569 (Aquila) [only relevant material may be judicially
noticed]); and
(3) grants defendant’s request for judicial notice of
Exhibit 7 (the trial court’s order finding certain of Mondragon’s
actions related) and Exhibit 9 (the trial court’s order dismissing
one of Mondragon’s actions) because they are relevant to the
litigation history here (Aquila, at p. 569; Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)).
2 Mondragon initially filed the wage and hour action as a
putative class action, but later dismissed the class allegations.
3
pay all wages (in violation of Labor Code sections 204, 206, 510,
1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197), (2) failure to accord meal
periods (in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512), (3)
failure to accord rest periods (in violation of Labor Code section
226.7), (4) failure to pay all wages at termination (in violation of
Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203), (5) failure to issue
accurate itemized wage statements (in violation of Labor Code
sections 226 and 1174), (6) failure to indemnify for work-related
expenditures (in violation of Labor Code sections 2800 and 2802),
and (7) a derivative violation of California’s Unfair Competition
Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) based on the underlying
Labor Code claims.3
2. Discovery
Defendant propounded form contention interrogatories
that, among other things, asked Mondragon:
“Do YOU OR ANYONE ACTING ON
YOUR BEHALF contend that any
PERSON involved in the INCIDENT
violated any statute, ordinance, or
regulation and that the violation was a
legal (proximate) cause of the
INCIDENT? If so, identify the name,
ADDRESS, and telephone number of
each PERSON and the statute, ordinance
or regulation that was violated.”
3 In July 2020, Mondragon also filed a separate action
asserting all the same Labor Code violations but under the
Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et
seq.). That PAGA action was stayed pending the outcome of the
wage and hour action.
4
Mondragon served a verified response to the interrogatory in
October 2020 that listed the various Labor Code provisions from
his complaint as well as the UCL and sections of the California
Code of Regulations.
B. Wrongful termination action
1. Complaint
In September 2020, Mondragon (represented by a different
law firm) filed a wrongful termination action against defendant.
Mondragon alleged that he made three categories of complaints
to his supervisors: (1) in March 2019, Mondragon “raised safety
issues” about his coworkers “improperly stack[ing] pallets” in his
loading area and “entering into the path of his forklift”; (2) in
April 2019, Mondragon complained about his hours being reduced
and not receiving reporting-time pay for his short shifts; and (3)
in April 2019, Mondragon demanded pay for time spent at an HR
office reporting the issues with his reduced hours. Mondragon
alleged that he was terminated, shortly thereafter and in a
“retaliatory fashion,” for complaining about defendant’s “safety
practices” and about his “missing compensation.”
Based on these allegations, Mondragon asserted causes of
action for (1) violation of the UCL, and (2) wrongful termination
in violation of public policy.4
2. Discovery
Defendant propounded the same form contention
interrogatory it had propounded in the wage and hour action,
4 Mondragon’s counsel in the wage and hour action also filed
a retaliation action in February 2022, based on the same
allegation that Mondragon was terminated for complaining about
“unsafe forklift operating practices.” Mondragon dismissed that
retaliation action a few months later.
5
asking Mondragon if he “contend[s] that any PERSON involved
in the INCIDENT violated any statute, ordinance, or regulation
and that the violation was a legal (proximate) cause of the
INCIDENT?” Defendant inserted its own definition of “incident”
that was keyed to the allegations in the wrongful termination
action—specifically, “incident” was defined by defendant to mean:
“The allegations in the operative complaint, including but not
limited to, unfair business practices, wrongful termination, and
[Mondragon’s] complaints about missing compensation and
[d]efendant’s safety practices.”
Mondragon served a verified answer to the contention
interrogatory in October 2021 that made several objections and
then answered, “No.”
3. Summary judgment and sanctions
Defendant moved for summary judgment of Mondragon’s
wrongful termination action on the ground that Mondragon’s
response to the contention interrogatory that defendant did not
violate any laws (as well as other interrogatory responses)
foreclosed his wrongful termination claims. Mondragon did not
oppose the motion, and the trial court granted it.5
5 The court then awarded defendant $123,299 in attorney
fees as sanctions against Mondragon for his “bad faith”
maintenance of the wrongful termination action “without
evidentiary support or factual basis.” Mondragon and his counsel
in the wrongful termination action appealed that sanctions order,
and today we have issued a separate opinion in that matter.
However, because our review of a summary judgment ruling is
restricted to the evidence submitted in connection with the
summary judgment motion (Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 149, 163), the record in that separate sanctions
appeal has no bearing on our resolution of this appeal.
6
C. Summary judgment in wage and hour action
Defendant then moved for summary judgment of the wage
and hour action on the ground that Mondragon’s interrogatory
response in the wrongful termination action admitting “there has
been no statutory violation by [d]efendant” was also “fatal” to his
wage and hour claims and established that those claims “lack[]
merit.” Mondragon opposed the motion. In his opposition,
Mondragon (1) objected to the admissibility of his interrogatory
response from the wrongful termination action; and (2) argued
that, even if admissible, that response was not dispositive
because (a) his response to the nearly identical form
interrogatory in the wage and hour action identified a plethora of
underlying statutory violations, and (b) his deposition testimony
and corresponding time sheets and wage statements provided
factual substantiation of his wage and hour claims. Following
further briefing and a hearing, the trial court issued a 15-page
ruling granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The court reasoned that (1) Mondragon’s response to the
contention interrogatory in his wrongful termination action
constitutes an “evidentiary admission of a party” and therefore is
admissible in the wage and hour action’s summary judgment
proceeding; (2) Mondragon is “bound” by that “unequivocal[]”
evidentiary admission that defendant did not commit any
statutory violations; and (3) Mondragon did not carry his burden
to show a triable issue as to any violations because his “contrary
evidence is simply not credible” under D’Amico v. Board of
Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 (D’Amico).
D. Appeal
Following the entry of judgment for defendant, Mondragon
timely filed this appeal.
7
DISCUSSION
Mondragon argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for defendant in the wage and hour action
based on his response to the contention interrogatory from the
wrongful termination case.
We independently review a summary judgment ruling.
(Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 499-500
(Patterson).) While there is a split of authority over whether we
review a trial court’s subsidiary evidentiary rulings, including
subsidiary rulings under D’Amico, supra, 11 Cal.3d 1, de novo or
for abuse of discretion, we will sidestep that split by utilizing the
standard of review most favorable to Mondragon—that is, de
novo review. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535
[declining to decide governing standard for review of evidentiary
objections in summary judgment proceedings]; Harris v. Thomas
Dee Engineering Co., Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 594, 604
[reviewing D’Amico ruling de novo]; Mackey v. Trustees of
California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657, 659
(Mackey) [reviewing D’Amico ruling for abuse of discretion].)
I. Pertinent Law Governing Motions for Summary
Judgment
A. Burdens of proof
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “all the
papers submitted” show that “‘no triable issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
In adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, the
moving party (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of
showing that the plaintiff “has not established, and reasonably
8
cannot be expected to establish, one or more elements of the
cause of action in question.” (Patterson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p.
500; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a), (c), (o)(1), (p)(2).) If the
defendant does not carry that initial burden, the motion must be
denied. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064.) If carried, however, the
“burden [then] shifts” to the plaintiff to come forward with
“substantial responsive evidence” “‘“showing that a triable issue
of material fact exists as to that cause of action.”’” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 830, 862; Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television
Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 274; Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.)
On appeal, we identify the issues framed by the plaintiff’s
operative pleading, determine whether the defendant carried its
initial burden as to those issues, and if so, assess whether the
plaintiff produced substantial evidence of any triable issues of
material fact. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1238, 1252-1253; Heritage Marketing & Ins. Services, Inc. v.
Chrustawka (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [“[t]he pleadings
frame the issues on a motion for summary adjudication”].)
B. Using discovery responses
A summary judgment motion may be supported by
“answers to interrogatories” as well as other modes of discovery
like “admissions” and “depositions.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (b)(1); cf. Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
582, 587 [summary judgment can also be supported “through
factually devoid discovery responses”].)
Not all types of discovery have the same preclusive effect.
9
If a response to a request for admission is unambiguous,
the matter admitted in that response is deemed to be “a
conclusive concession of the truth of [the] matter,” effectively
functioning as a judicial admission that cannot be contradicted
with other evidence. (Troche v. Daley (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 403,
409; Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410, subd. (a); Inzunza v. Naranjo
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 736, 742; Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 455-456 (Minish); Monroy v. City of
Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 260; Fredericks v. Kontos
Industries, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 272, 276-277.)
A response to an interrogatory or deposition testimony
constitutes an evidentiary admission in any action. (Evid. Code,
§ 1220; Murillo v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730,
736.) Unlike a judicial admission, an evidentiary admission is
not preclusive because it “may be rebutted with explanatory
evidence from the party against whom the [evidence] is offered.”
(Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1425,
fn. 21 (Mt. Hawley); see also Phillips v. Cooper Laboratories
(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1648, 1661 [“a party may present evidence
[at trial] at variance to prior answers to interrogatories”].) In
other words, “[f]or summary judgment purposes,” interrogatory
responses and deposition testimony are “simply evidence” that
“are considered and weighed in conjunction with other evidence”
rather than treated as “incontrovertible judicial admissions.”
(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1522
(Scalf); Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 457-458.)
C. The D’Amico Rule
In D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 11
Cal.3d 1, our Supreme Court held that a party who makes a
“clear and unequivocal” discovery response cannot meet his
10
burden of showing a triable issue of material fact (and thereby
defeat summary judgment) by crafting a “self-serving”
declaration that contradicts that prior response. (Id. at pp. 21-22;
Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 482 (Price),
overruled on other grounds in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v.
Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169;
Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 459-460; see also Shin v.
Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12 [“a party cannot create an
issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior discovery
responses”].) D’Amico rests on the notion that an earlier
discovery response that was prepared “in the context of an
established pretrial procedure whose purpose is to elicit facts” is
of such “a very high credibility value” that a party’s subsequent
declaration contesting the earlier response fails to constitute
substantial evidence necessary to defeat summary judgment.
(D’Amico, at p. 22; Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d
1485, 1503; Preach v. Monter Rainbow (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th
1441, 1451.)
The D’Amico rule has three implicit limitations or
exceptions. First, the D’Amico rule does not apply in the first
place if the party’s discovery response is “equivocal” or
“ambiguous.” (Price, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 482; Minish,
supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) Second, the D’Amico rule will
not treat a prior discovery response as controlling if the party
“credibly explains” the discrepancy between his prior discovery
response and his declaration. (Ahn v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 133, 144-145 (Ahn); Scalf, supra, 128
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1524-1525; Mason v. Marriage & Family
Center (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 537, 545-546.) Third, the D’Amico
rule does not deem a prior discovery response as controlling if
11
there is other “credible evidence” in the record “demonstrat[ing]”
that there are “genuine issues of factual dispute.” (Scalf, at pp.
1524-1525; Ahn, at p. 147.) These exceptions strike a balance
between penalizing gameplaying by a party who conveniently
contradicts himself to avoid summary judgment (Scalf, at pp.
1522) and keeping the door to trial open for cases where there are
genuine factual disputes (id. at p. 1525; Price, at p. 482).
II. Analysis
The trial court here erred in granting defendant’s summary
judgment motion because (1) defendant failed to satisfy its initial
burden by relying on Mondragon’s interrogatory response from
the wrongful termination case, and (2) even if the burden shifted
to Mondragon, the D’Amico rule does not apply to bar
consideration of other evidence establishing material disputes of
fact on Mondragon’s wage and hour claims.
A. Defendant’s initial burden
As a threshold matter, and contrary to what Mondragon
argues, Mondragon’s contention interrogatory response from the
wrongful termination action was admissible in the wage and hour
action. It constitutes an adverse party admission (Evid. Code, §
1220), and because that admission narrowed the scope of
Mondragon’s pleadings in the wage and hour action, Mondragon’s
admission falls comfortably within the general rule that
pleadings in one case are admissible as evidentiary admissions in
other cases. (Magnolia Square Homeowners Assn. v. Safeco Ins.
Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1061; Mt. Hawley, supra, 215
Cal.App.4th at p. 1425, fn. 21; Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at
p. 457; Meyer v. State Board of Equalization (1954) 42 Cal.2d 376,
385.) Mondragon resists this conclusion, pointing to the language
in Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.410 that the party
12
propounding an interrogatory “may use” the response at “the trial
or any other hearing in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410,
italics added.) But that statute’s affirmation that an
interrogatory response may be used in the case in which it is
elicited does not on its face preclude its use in other cases. Our
Legislature has explicitly precluded use of responses to requests
for admissions in other cases (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.410, subd.
(b) [response to request for admission “is made for the purpose of
the pending action only” and “shall not be used in any manner
against that party in any other proceeding”]); we must give effect
to our Legislature’s failure to impose a similar restriction with
respect to interrogatory responses. (See People v. Trevino (2001)
26 Cal.4th 237, 242 [our Legislature’s use of “materially different
language” in provisions “addressing the same subject or related
subjects” is indicative of a different meaning].)
Despite the general rule that an interrogatory response is
admissible, Mondragon’s specific response to the contention
interrogatory in the wrongful termination action did not satisfy
defendant’s initial burden on summary judgment because that
response is irrelevant to the claims at issue in the wage and hour
action. As noted above, Mondragon’s response that “no” statute,
ordinance, or regulation was violated during “the incident” was
necessarily limited to “the incident,” which the contention
interrogatory defined as “[t]he allegations in the operative
complaint” in the wrongful termination action. However, and as
noted above, the conduct underlying the wrongful termination
and UCL claims in that operative complaint deal chiefly with
Mondragon’s termination after reporting safety issues, the
reduction of his work hours, and failure to pay for his time spent
at the HR office. Although one sentence in the operative
13
complaint alleges that “[d]efendant[] continued with [its] pattern
and practice of cutting costs, at the expense of [Mondragon], and
its employees by failing to provide [Mondragon] and other
employees meal and rest periods in compliance with the law,”
that sentence is part of a paragraph that more broadly alleges
that defendant committed an unfair business practice by
adopting an amalgam of cost-cutting measures, including (1)
purported failures to hire “sufficient employees to fill in for a
permanent employee who is out on medical leave, or to assist an
employee with medical work restrictions,” and (2) the above noted
cost-cutting measure of not providing meal and rest periods. This
stray allegation is nowhere tied to the factual allegations in that
operative complaint. (See John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford
Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1008 [a
complaint should be read “‘as a whole and all its parts in their
context’”].) Critically, the operative complaint in the wrongful
termination action nowhere alleges the failure to provide meal
and rest periods as independent Labor Code violations, nowhere
alleges a failure to pay all wages, a failure to pay all wages at
termination, a failure to issue accurate itemized wage
statements, or a failure to indemnify for work-related
expenditures. As a result, Mondragon’s response to the
contention interrogatory is not relevant to establish that he
admitted no pertinent violation of law as to the Labor Code
violations at issue in the wage and hour action.
Defendant responds that Mondragon acknowledged an
overlap between the wrongful termination action and the wage
and hour action when he filed a notice of related cases. We
disagree. While Mondragon checked a box on the notice stating
the cases “involve[] the same parties and [are] based on the same
14
or similar claims,” the language of the operative complaints
shows that the similarity of those claims stops with the fact that
they arose out of Mondragon’s employment; the language of the
operative complaints refutes that they arose from the same facts
or entail the same alleged violations of the law. What is more,
there is nothing in the record indicating the trial court ever
deemed those actions related (as it did with two of Mondragon’s
other actions). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300.)
B. Mondragon’s responsive burden
Even if we assume that Mondragon’s response to the
contention interrogatory in the wrongful termination action was
sufficiently relevant to sustain defendant’s initial burden,
Mondragon met his responsive burden of raising a triable issue of
material fact by pointing, at a minimum, to his contention
interrogatory response in the wage and hour action enumerating
the pertinent violations of law.
The trial court discounted this contrary evidence solely on
the basis of the D’Amico rule. This was incorrect for two reasons.
First, the contrary evidence the trial court disregarded in
this case was not created to generate a triable issue by
contradicting an earlier discovery response. Here, Mondragon
responded to a contention interrogatory in this case by listing
various Labor Code violations in October 2020 and provided his
deposition testimony substantiating those violations in November
2022. Mondragon’s response to the contention interrogatory in
the wrongful termination action occurred in between these two
discovery events, in October 2021. This sequence of events bears
little to no resemblance to the events giving rise to the D’Amico
rule, which, as noted above, involve a party submitting a
declaration in opposition to summary judgment that contradicts
15
an otherwise fatal discovery response. Given these
dissimilarities, it is unclear that the D’Amico rule applies at all.
(Accord, Scalf, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1522 [“In a nutshell,
the rule bars a party opposing summary judgment from filing a
declaration that purports to impeach his or her own prior sworn
testimony”].)
Second, the D’Amico rule applies only when the party’s
earlier discovery response is “clear and unequivocal.” To be sure,
and as defendant argues and as Mondragon’s set of attorneys
admitted in the wrongful termination action, Mondragon’s “No”
response to the contention interrogatory in the wrongful
termination action was “clear and unequivocal” as to whether any
legal violations underlie the claims in that action. But, as
discussed above, that response is far from clear as to whether it
constitutes an admission to the absence of the Labor Code
violations underlying the claims in this action.
Defendant resists this conclusion by asserting that
Mondragon never tried to explain to the trial court the
discrepancy between his interrogatory response in the wrongful
termination action and the evidence he adduced in support of his
claim in this case. Defendant further asserts that Mondragon
cannot explain that discrepancy now because he forfeited any
explanation in the trial court. While Mondragon did not provide
an explanation of a discrepancy, Mondragon effectively explained
that there was no discrepancy to explain away when, in
opposition to summary judgment, he asserted that the
interrogatory response from the wrongful termination action has
“no bearing or evidentiary value” in the wage and hour action,
which is “a different case with different causes of action.”
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Mondragon is entitled to his
costs on appeal, and we deny defendant’s request for attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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