CourtListener 10376143•People v. Cruz CA2/7
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Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Cruz CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337306
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA090151)
v.
ANGEL DEJESUS CRUZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirming and
remanding with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H.
Thakor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Angel DeJesus Cruz appeals from the denial of his Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 The superior
court concluded Cruz failed to make a prima facie showing of
eligibility. While this appeal was pending, the California
Supreme Court issued its decision in People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton), and we invited supplemental briefing
from the parties. We affirm the superior court’s order and
remand with directions to consider an amended petition should
Cruz seek to file one.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Crime
On December 18, 2017, at approximately 11:00 a.m., James
Allen was shot while he was walking down Glenoaks Boulevard.
At the preliminary hearing, Allen testified that a “white four-door
little car” pulled up next to him, and the driver asked him where
he was from. Allen responded he did not “gang bang.” The driver
shot at him twice and hit him once in the right buttock while
Allen ran away. Allen recalled the driver wore a black baseball
cap with a yellow “P” embroidered on it. The driver said, “Fuck
Slobs” when he shot Allen. Allen identified Cruz as the shooter
at the preliminary hearing.
The prosecution presented gang expert testimony that the
crime was committed for the benefit of the Pacoima Humphrey
Boyz gang, and that the gang referred to their rivals, the West
Side Piru gang, as “slobs.” Members of the Pacoima Humphrey
Boyz gang often wore Pittsburg Pirates baseball caps with a “P”
embroidered on them to represent Pacoima. Additionally, Cruz
1 All further references are to the Penal Code.
2
had tattoos demonstrating his affiliation with the gang. The
shooting occurred within the territory claimed by the gang.
An eyewitness who was driving down the street testified he
saw a Latino man shoot a Black man, and the Black man ran
away. A neighbor’s surveillance camera captured portions of the
incident and still images created from the video showed a light
blue Honda Element and a man running down the street at the
time of the incident. Another witness testified she heard
gunshots, and a Black man ran up her driveway asking for help.
Her son called 911 but they did not allow the man into their
home.
On December 29, 2017, Cruz was pulled over while driving
a blue Honda Element. When the police questioned him, Cruz
admitted he was involved in the shooting but claimed he was the
victim. He told officers a Black man wearing a hat with a “W” for
the West Side Piru gang approached him with a handgun. Cruz
denied shooting at anyone during that encounter.
B. Cruz’s Plea
Cruz was charged with one count of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)).
It was further alleged Cruz personally and intentionally
discharged or used a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)), that he
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Allen (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)), and that the offense was committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
On January 23, 2019, Cruz pleaded no contest to one count
of attempted murder without premeditation, and admitted the
gang and great bodily injury enhancement allegations. (§§ 187,
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subd. (a), 664, 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.7, subd. (a).) Cruz
further admitted to personal use of a firearm in violation of
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), rather than the firearm
enhancements under section 12022.53 with which he was
charged. Defense counsel joined in the plea and admissions, and
stipulated to a factual basis based upon the police reports and the
preliminary hearing transcript. Counsel advised the court his
factual stipulation was made in accordance with People v. West
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.2 The trial court accepted Cruz’s plea.
The trial court sentenced Cruz to 24 years in state prison,
comprised of the middle term of seven years for the attempted
murder, 10 years for the gang enhancement, four years for the
firearm enhancement, and three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement. As part of the plea agreement, Cruz also pleaded
no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury in a separate case, which added one year to his
sentence. (See § 245, subd. (a)(4).) Cruz was sentenced to a total
of 25 years in state prison.
C. The Superior Court Denies the Petition for Resentencing
On April 21, 2023, Cruz filed a section 1172.6 petition. He
checked boxes in a Judicial Council form petition attesting an
information was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, he accepted a plea offer in
lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted
murder, and he could not presently be convicted of attempted
2 A People v. West plea is “a plea of nolo contendere, not
admitting a factual basis for the plea.” (In re Alvernaz (1992)
2 Cal.4th 924, 932.)
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murder due to amendments to the Penal Code. The superior
court appointed counsel and the parties filed briefs. The People
argued Cruz was ineligible for relief because he was the actual
shooter, having been convicted of attempted murder with a
personal gun use admission.
The superior court denied Cruz’s petition without issuing
an order to show cause based on its analysis of the charging
document and preliminary hearing transcript. The court relied
on the charging document listing Cruz as the sole defendant. The
court also stated, “when I read the preliminary hearing
transcript, it was clear to me that and confirmation that the
theory going forward with this particular crime was that the
defendant himself was the sole perpetrator. He was not aiding
and abetting anyone. That he was the actual person who
discharged the firearm.” According to the court, Cruz’s admission
to personal discharge of the firearm and personal intentional
infliction of great bodily injury buttressed the evidence adduced
at the preliminary hearing and helped to establish Cruz was the
actual shooter. The court acknowledged a split of authority
regarding the use of the preliminary hearing transcript at the
prima facie stage and asserted it did not evaluate witness
credibility or decide disputed facts to make its ruling.
Cruz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2019, changed the law of murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine (see People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842, 847-848) and significantly narrowing
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the scope of the felony-murder rule (see People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708). In 2021, the Legislature amended
section 1172.6 to authorize resentencing for “[a] person convicted
of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see People v. Lee
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174.)
Section 1172.6 provides a resentencing procedure for
certain persons who were convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter under the pre-2019 murder laws. (See
Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960 (Lewis); People v. Lezama (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590.) A section 1172.6 petition must
include “[a] declaration by the petitioner that the petitioner is
eligible for relief under this section” and indicate “[w]hether the
petitioner requests the appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(1)(A), (C).) On receiving such a petition, the court “shall
appoint counsel” if requested and assess “whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3),
(c).)
“[A]fter the appointment of counsel, a court looks beyond
the face of the petition.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.)
The court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 463-464.) “[T]he record of conviction the parties may consult
at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript
preceding a guilty plea.” (Patton, at p. 568.) “[P]etitioners
confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is
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unavailable have the burden of coming forward with
nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court
to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail. It follows . . .
that should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the
court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and
should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming
relief is not otherwise foreclosed.” (Id. at p. 567; accord, Lewis, at
p. 972 [“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’”].)
“[A] section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite having access to
counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition, offers
only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to
a record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s
conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made
a prima facie showing. Where facts from the record of conviction
are undisputed, accepting them over contrary legal allegations
that are merely conclusory is not ‘“factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”’” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565-566, fn. omitted.) Under these
circumstances, a superior court may deny a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (See ibid.)
We review de novo an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage without issuing an order
to show cause. (See People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164,
1170; People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
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B. The Superior Court Properly Denied Cruz’s Petition for
Resentencing
In his opening brief, Cruz argued the superior court erred
by summarily denying his petition because it relied on testimony
and evidence the People presented at the preliminary hearing.
On appeal, the parties acknowledged there was a split of
authority regarding the use of a preliminary hearing transcript
at the section 1172.6 prima facie stage.
The California Supreme Court resolved this split in Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 564. Patton held a superior court may
“rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a
preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox
allegations” in determining at the prima facie stage whether a
petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6. The high
court concluded the petitioner in that case failed to make a prima
facie showing because his petition contained only a checkbox
declaration with legal conclusions and he submitted no facts to
controvert the People’s showing from the preliminary hearing
transcript that he was the sole perpetrator of the attempted
murder. (Ibid.) The court affirmed the denial of the petition but
“out of an abundance of caution” ordered the Court of Appeal to
remand the matter to the superior court with directions for the
superior court to consider an amended petition should the
petitioner choose to file one. (Id. at p. 569.) We requested
supplemental briefing to address the impact of Patton on this
appeal.
The People assert the superior court’s order should be
affirmed under Patton. According to the People, the record of
conviction clearly demonstrates Cruz was the sole perpetrator
and his “conclusory checkbox allegations alone could not create a
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factual dispute about whether he played a meaningfully different
role” in the attempted murder. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 569.) The People argue Patton’s disposition—remand with
directions to consider an amended petition should Cruz seek to
file one within 30 days of remand—is not warranted because
Cruz has never offered any facts supporting the possibility of an
alternate direct perpetrator.
Cruz does not dispute he failed to make a prima facie
showing but urges us to adopt Patton’s disposition because he is
in the same position as the petitioner in Patton. We follow the
California Supreme Court’s directive “out of an abundance of
caution” and remand the matter to the superior court with
directions to consider an amended petition should Cruz seek to
file one within 30 days of the remand. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 569.)
DISPOSITION
This matter is remanded to the superior court to consider
an amended petition should Cruz, within 30 days of remand, seek
to file one. We otherwise affirm the order denying Cruz’s petition
for resentencing.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J. STONE, J.
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