People v. Dworniczak CA2/7

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Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Dworniczak CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337180

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA063390)
v.

MARK DWORNICZAK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Lenore Da Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Blake Armstrong, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2010 a jury convicted Mark Dworniczak of kidnapping,
making a criminal threat, assault with a firearm, willfully
inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a
cohabitant, and possession of a firearm by a felon and found true
several firearm allegations. In a bifurcated proceeding
Dworniczak admitted allegations he had served five prior prison
terms, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, former
subdivision (b).1 (People v. Dworniczak (Oct. 25, 2011, B224708)
[nonpub. opn.].) The trial court sentenced him on the kidnapping
conviction to the upper term of eight years, plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
The court imposed terms of eight months for making a criminal
threat, one year for assault with a firearm, and eight months for
possession of a firearm by a felon, as well as a concurrent term of
three years for willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition on a cohabitant. The court also imposed on
the kidnapping conviction five one-year terms under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b), and imposed but stayed
execution (under section 654) of five one-year enhancements
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), on each of the other
four convictions. Dworniczak’s aggregate prison term was 25
years four months.
In January 2023 Dworniczak filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.75, which provides: “Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) At the

1 Statutory references are to this code.

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initial hearing on the petition, the superior court stated to
Dworniczak: “At the very least, we know that five years are
going to be shaved off your sentence due to changes in the law.
And the issue is: How much more should your sentence be
reduced?” The court ultimately struck the one-year
enhancements under section 667.5, former subdivision (b),
conducted a full resentencing, but declined to exercise its
discretion to reduce Dworniczak’s sentence further. The court
stated: “So here’s the resentencing I have to do. Under the
changes in the law, I have to strike five years off the sentence.
That’s the way the law now reads. So each of the one-year priors
imposed under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), for his
prior prison terms, each of those is stricken. I’m not going to
modify the sentence in any other way.” The court stated “the
current aggregate sentence has been reduced to 20 years and
four months . . . .” Dworniczak timely appealed.
Dworniczak has no issue with the superior court striking
the five prior prison term enhancements imposed on his
kidnapping conviction. He argues the superior erred in failing to
strike the five prior prison term enhancements the trial court
imposed on each of his other convictions but stayed under
section 654. The transcript of the resentencing hearing indicates,
however, the superior court struck “each of” of the prior prison
term enhancements. That would include the one-year
enhancements the trial court imposed and executed and those the
court imposed and stayed execution of. True, the minute order
from the resentencing hearing states that the court “strikes five
one-year priors imposed under” section 667.5, former subdivision
(b), and that the court left the “remainder of sentence intact.”
But the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence constitutes the

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judgment and takes precedence over a subsequent minute order.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; see People v.
Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 603 [“‘the oral pronouncement
of sentence controls over a subsequently entered minute order’”];
see also People v. Henson (2022) 13 Cal.5th 574, 582, fn. 6 [“entry
of minutes is ‘a clerical function’ and ‘a discrepancy between the
judgment as orally pronounced and as entered in the minutes is
presumably the result of clerical error’”].) The trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence struck each of the enhancements
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), stayed and unstayed.
The trial court must correct the minute order to conform with the
judgment. (See People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213,
230 [Court of Appeal may direct the trial court to correct errors in
a sentencing minute order].)2

2 Because the superior court struck both the imposed and the
imposed-and-stayed enhancements under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b), we do not reach in this case the issue
whether section 1172.75 requires the superior court to strike one-
year enhancements the trial court imposed and stayed. (See, e.g.,
People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144 [petitioner is not
“ineligible for section 1172.75 relief because his now-invalid
section 667.5(b) enhancement was imposed but stayed”]; People v.
Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665 [section 1172.75 applies to
prior prison term enhancements that were imposed and stayed],
review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853; People v. Saldana (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 1270 [same], review granted Mar. 12, 2024,
S283547; People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300
[same], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189; see also People v.
Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 [section 1172.75 applies to a
prior prison term enhancement where the trial court imposed the
enhancement but struck the punishment], review granted

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The abstract of judgment after resentencing lists the
imposed-but-stayed enhancements under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). Though the directions on the abstract of
judgment state “DO NOT LIST ANY STRICKEN
ENHANCEMENT(S),” the abstract of judgment includes (with an
“S” for stayed) five one-year enhancements on each of
Dworniczak’s four non-kidnapping convictions. The superior
court, however, struck those. The superior court must correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect that the court struck each (and
every) one-year enhancement under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). (See People v. Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
713, 733 [Court of Appeal may direct the trial court to correct
errors in the abstract of judgment]; People v. Jones (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [Court of Appeal may order “appropriate
correction of the abstract of judgment”].)

Oct. 23, 2024, S286987; but see People v. Rhodius (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 38 [section 1172.75 applies only where an
enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), was
imposed and executed], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.)
Dworniczak does not challenge any other aspect of the superior
court’s ruling on his petition.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to
correct the March 11, 2024 minute order to reflect the court
struck all one-year enhancements under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that
does not include any such enhancements, and to send the
corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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