CourtListener 10375437•People v. Johnson CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B325412
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA097716)
v.
ANTHONY MARCELL
JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Anthony Marcell Johnson
(defendant) appeals the judgment entered after he was convicted
of murder. He contends his matter should be remanded to
juvenile court for a retroactive transfer hearing; that the trial
court erred in denying his request for appointment of an expert;
that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and if this
case is not sent to juvenile court for a retroactive transfer
hearing, it should be remanded for resentencing based on
changes in law after sentence was imposed. Finding no merit to
defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, defendant and codefendant Harry Keo were
charged with the murder of Prince Mollett (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a), count 1). The information alleged that defendant
personally used a firearm, personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, and personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or
death in the commission of the murder within the meaning of
Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c) & (d).1
1 The information included a gang enhancement allegation
under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and
another under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) that a
principal personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm.
As Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) applies when
there is a gang finding and the prosecutor below declined to
proceed on that gang allegation, the firearm allegation under
that section was dismissed.
Codefendant Keo was charged with three additional
offenses, unlawful possession of a firearm and a drug offense. He
and defendant were tried separately.
2
At defendant’s 2022 trial, the evidence showed defendant
and codefendant Keo were gang members. Keo’s girlfriend
Lanaya B. testified she overheard defendant telling Keo that
Mollett, a member of a different gang, had “banged” on defendant
at a bus stop. Defendant, Keo and Lanaya then left for a store,
with Lanaya driving. En route defendant saw Mollett at a bus
stop and identified him as the person who had “banged” on him.
He told Lanaya to make a U-turn and pull over. Defendant got
out of the car, Keo got out next, and Lanaya saw defendant shoot
Mollett with Keo’s black-colored Beretta. A bus passenger saw a
person at the location holding a black-colored gun when he heard
gunshots. Lanaya saw defendant and Keo run back to the car,
with Keo limping due to an earlier injury. Later that evening,
defendant, Keo, Lanaya and a few friends were at Keo’s
apartment when Lanaya heard defendant bragging about
shooting someone. Defendant said something like, “I got him,” “I
domed him,” and “fuck the bugs,” an insult to Mollett’s gang.
Defendant was 16 (almost 17) years old at the time of the
2013 murder. Proposition 57, which amended Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707,2 took effect on November 9, 2016,
and in December 2016 defendant filed a motion seeking remand
to the juvenile court under its provisions. A hearing was held on
October 26, 2017, and the juvenile court ruled defendant was not
a fit subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law. The
matter was returned to criminal court.
Defendant’s jury trial was held in criminal court in June
2022. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with true
2 All further unattributed code sections are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code section unless otherwise stated.
3
findings of premeditation and personal firearm use under Penal
Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), causing great bodily
injury and death to the victim. At his sentencing hearing on
September 22, 2022, defendant submitted a “Youth Offender
Mitigation Brief” and brought a motion for transfer to juvenile
court under section 707, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361), although the
amendment would not take effect until January 1, 2023. (See
Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) The trial court denied the motion and
allowed defendant to incorporate the mitigation brief into his
request to strike the firearm enhancement pursuant to the
amendments to Penal Code section 1385 enacted by Senate Bill
No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81). The motion was
denied, and defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life
in prison for the murder and a concurrent term of 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Juvenile transfer
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for a retroactive transfer hearing. The denial was based
on law that had yet to be in effect, and was thus premature.
Defendant contends remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing
is now required due to Assembly Bill 2361’s amendments to
section 707 that became effective January 1, 2023, just over three
months after his sentencing. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.)
At the time of defendant’s 2017 juvenile court fitness
hearing, Proposition 57 had amended section 707 to eliminate the
direct filing of charges against certain classes of minors in
4
criminal court by prosecutors, although they “‘can still be tried in
criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a
transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s
maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent
history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)’” (People v. Superior Court (Lara)
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305–306.) It was the prosecution’s burden
at the fitness hearing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the minor should be transferred back to criminal court. The
juvenile court was allowed to give enumerated factors the weight
it considered appropriate. (See D.W. v. Superior Court (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 109, 116–117.)
Assembly Bill 2361 amended section 707, former
subdivision (a)(3) to change the prosecutor’s burden from a
preponderance of the evidence to require the juvenile court to
“find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) In addition, Assembly
Bill 2361 added a requirement the juvenile court’s recitation of
the basis for its decision in the minutes “shall include the reasons
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Ibid.)
Since the passage of Assembly Bill 2361, section 707 has
again been amended by Senate Bill No. 545 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 545). (See Stats. 2023, ch. 716, § 1.) Effective
January 1, 2024, Senate Bill 545 amended section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) to require the court to give
weight to the enumerated factors that previously were
discretionary, and it added factors that must be given weight
5
when evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited
by a minor. In addition to the inclusive factors enumerated in
subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) at the time of defendant’s 2017
fitness hearing, Senate Bill 545 now requires weight to be given
to “the effect of the minor’s family and community environment;
the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the
child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as
a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on
the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Senate Bill 545 also added subdivision (a)(3)(E)(iii): “When
evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i) [success of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor], the
court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the
person against whom the minor is accused of committing an
offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the
minor.”
Although the briefs in this case were filed after the
January 1, 2024 Senate Bill 545 effective date, the parties did not
discuss these changes. After we invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefing regarding the effect, if any, of Senate Bill
545 on the issues in this appeal, both parties filed supplemental
letter briefs and motions to augment the record, which we
granted.
The People agree with defendant the amendments to
section 707 are retroactive in cases that were not yet final, and
defendant’s case is not final. (See In re J.M. (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 745, 7533 [applying Sen. Bill 545 and Assem. Bill
3 The Supreme Court granted review in In re J.M., supra,
103 Cal.App.5th 745, deferring further action pending
consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Lopez
6
2361 retroactively]; In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152,
169–170 (Miguel R.), citing People v. Superior Court (Lara),
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 304.)
Defendant contends he must be given a new fitness hearing
to allow the juvenile court to consider the now required relevant
factors under Senate Bill 545 and to apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard. Defendant disagrees with the
People’s argument that we should instead review the 2017
juvenile court proceedings and apply the test of harmlessness of
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), under which
defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different
outcome.
Defendant quotes In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 715–
716 (F.M.), to respond there is no basis for a harmless error
analysis under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 because “‘[a]pplying
Watson to assess the likelihood of a more favorable result does
not address the risk of courts misapprehending the extent of their
lawful authority in this particular context.’” In F.M. our
Supreme Court addressed the juvenile court’s failure to classify a
wobbler offense as a misdemeanor or a felony, as required under
section 702, and clarified the standard to be applied when a trial
court failed to exercise its discretionary sentencing authority.
(F.M., at pp. 704–705.) Defendant also quotes F.M. at page 716:
“[W]here the concern is that no discretionary decision was made,
attempting to discern the likelihood of a ‘more favorable’ decision
is a more speculative inquiry. Instead of hypothesizing what
decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 but unrelated to the issue presented in the
case before us. (See In re J.M., Sept. 25, 2024, S286259.)
7
the extent of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have
consistently held that remand is appropriate in these
circumstances.”
The juvenile court’s ruling was a discretionary decision.
(See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Miguel R.,
cited by the People in support of their harmless error argument,
was decided after Assembly Bill 2361 amended section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), by adding the clear and convincing standard,
and held: “We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer
motion for abuse of discretion” (Miguel R., at p. 165; accord, In re
J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211). “‘The abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for
varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under
review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
arbitrary and capricious.’” (Miguel R., supra, at p. 165.) Thus,
harmlessness is not the only issue; showing the juvenile court’s
ultimate ruling was an abuse of discretion also requires a review
of the record, and if the court’s findings were made by clear and
convincing evidence, the high probability standard would apply
on review. (Cf. Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1006–1007 [substantial evidence review].) It follows that, if the
clear and convincing evidence standard should have been applied
by the juvenile court, we determine whether “‘a reasonable trier
of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded
by’ the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R.,
supra, at p. 165, italics added.)
Defendant argues the juvenile court did not apply the clear
and convincing standard in 2017 because it was not then
8
required. Defendant also contends that in 2017 the juvenile court
did not consider the factors it was required to give weight to, as
they were then discretionary and are now mandatory. Defendant
adds the record does not show that in 2017 the juvenile court
considered evidence of abuse when assessing criminal
sophistication, a factor added by Senate Bill 545. (See § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) Defendant appended to his motion to augment
the record a copy of his mitigation brief submitted at the time of
sentencing. That report catalogued childhood trauma, childhood
and adolescent abuse, drug addiction suffered by defendant and
more.4 Noting the things defendant claims are not contained in
the juvenile court record, defendant suggests the juvenile court
did not understand the extent of its lawful authority. Citing
F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 716, defendant claims because
reviewing courts have consistently held that “remand is
appropriate in these circumstances,” it is appropriate here.
As first noted in the People’s original brief, defendant did
not ask to include the juvenile court record in the record on
appeal. The People’s motion to augment, filed with their
supplemental brief includes the “Defense Transfer Hearing Brief”
filed with the juvenile court prior to the 2017 hearing. The brief
discusses the criteria to consider in determining fitness, which
were enumerated in section 707, former subdivision (a)(2)(A)
through (E), and the evidence supporting the factors for
evaluating the criteria.5 The same factors currently appear in
4 Defendant also appended “Social History Report” and
argues because this was compiled in 2022, it was not considered
at the 2016 transfer hearing.
5 The trial court’s minutes of November 16, 2017, note the
court is in receipt of the juvenile court minute order of
9
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E), although it is now
mandatory to give weight to the factors. The transfer brief
included the probation report, which was also before the juvenile
court. The probation report provided an exhaustive account of
defendant’s childhood trauma, abuse, drug addiction and more.
The only factor added since 2017 is “evidence offered that
indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of
committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually
battered the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(iii).) In the transfer
brief, there was some evidence alleging that as a minor defendant
was having a sexual relationship with an adult woman. The
People also attached to their motion to augment the juvenile
court minute order of the hearing, which notes the court heard
testimony from defense expert Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd, as well as
argument from both sides before continuing the matter to review
the preliminary hearing transcript, probation reports, and
Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s report.
Defendant’s assignment of error in this appeal is the trial
court erred in denying defendant’s request for a retroactive
transfer hearing. The People claim defendant failed to establish
prejudice due to the denial because defendant has failed to show
the result might have been different, either by a reasonable
probability or a “‘high probability demanded by’ the clear and
convincing evidence standard.’” (Miguel R., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Defendant essentially responds that
October 26, 2017, which states: “[T]he court finds minor is not a
fit subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law.” In their
motion to augment, the People have included the juvenile court
minute order showing it considered the criteria in section 707,
former subdivision (a)(2)(A) through (E).
10
remand should be automatic because the juvenile court record
failed to contain the information now required by section 707. As
the juvenile court record, other than defense counsel’s brief and
exhibits and a few other pages from the clerk’s transcript, has not
been made a part of the record of this appeal, we reject
defendant’s speculation regarding what the juvenile court did or
did not consider or what weight it gave to that it did consider.
“‘[I]t is elementary that the function of an appellate court, in
reviewing a trial court judgment on direct appeal, is limited to a
consideration of matters contained in the record of trial
proceedings, and . . . “[matters] not presented by the record
cannot be considered on the suggestion of counsel in the briefs.”’”
(In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437, fn. 6.)
“It is axiomatic that it is the burden of the appellant to
provide an adequate record to permit review of a claimed error,
and failure to do so may be deemed a waiver of the issue on
appeal.” (People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385.)
“While the defendant is entitled to a record adequate to afford a
meaningful appeal, he bears the burden to show the deficiencies
in the record are prejudicial.” (People v. Coley (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 964, 970.) If parts of the record are missing,
defendant must attempt, if possible, to reconstruct them or
obtain a settled statement. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13
Cal.4th 622, 661–663; Coley, supra, at pp. 969–972.) As
defendant has failed to do so we deem the issue of the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s request for transfer to be waived, and as
defendant has thus not demonstrated error or prejudice, the
order is presumed correct. (See People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th
866, 881.)
11
II. Request for continuance and appointment of expert
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for appointment of an expert to testify regarding juvenile
brain development. Defendant misconstrues the issue. The trial
court denied defendant’s oral request for a continuance to find an
expert to testify regarding juvenile brain development. If this
court found the motion timely, the trial court alternately relied
on Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the evidence described in
defendant’s offer of proof.
Thus, defendant must first address the timeliness of the
motion for continuance. “Continuances shall be granted only
upon a showing of good cause. Neither the convenience of the
parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good
cause.” (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (e).) “A showing of good cause
requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have
prepared for trial with due diligence.” (People v. Jenkins (2000)
22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.) “It is a settled rule of practice that an
application for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court . . . .” (People v. Collins (1925) 195 Cal. 325, 332;
accord, People v. Froehlig (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 260, 265.) “The
granting or denial of a motion for continuance rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] That discretion, of
course, must be exercised in conformity with the applicable law.
A continuance may be granted only on the moving party’s
showing of good cause. [Citations.] Such a showing requires,
inter alia, a demonstration that both the party and counsel have
used due diligence in their preparations. [Citation.] [¶] It follows
that on appeal, a ruling on a motion for continuance is subject to
review under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” (People v. Mickey
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 660.) “‘“[D]iscretion is abused whenever the
12
court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being
considered.”’” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412,
1450.) Where the “defendant has failed to demonstrate the
court’s ruling . . . exceeded the bounds of reason . . . , no abuse of
discretion has been shown.” (Ibid.)
Defendant failed to show diligence in preparing for trial
and the need of expert testimony for trial, or making the request
for continuance. In 2019, approximately a year and a half before
trial began, he obtained an expert’s report regarding juvenile
brain development and its application to defendant.
On June 9, 2022, after voir dire had already begun and
approximately one week before defendant made his request for
continuance, the prosecutor moved to exclude mention of
defendant’s age, 16 years old, at the time of the murder.
Defendant opposed the motion, stating his age would be relevant
to the issue of his state of mind as a youthful offender and on the
issue of specific intent. The prosecutor countered by noting he
had received no discovery in that regard. The trial court denied
the motion to exclude evidence of defendant’s age but cautioned
any argument regarding defendant’s age or lack of cognitive
ability would have to be based upon expert testimony. Defendant
offers no explanation of his reasons for not requesting
appointment of an expert witness before trial.
On June 15, 2022, defendant made a motion to continue
after the prosecution had rested. Defense counsel indicated he
would make a request for the appointment of an expert with
regard to juvenile brain development. Counsel stated his offer of
proof was that the expert’s testimony would be relevant to
specific intent in a homicide case in light of all the new expert
information with regard to juveniles. The requested continuance
13
was oral, and counsel explained to the court he had tried
unsuccessfully for the past week to contact potential experts. He
never, however, explained his attempts. The prosecutor objected
as such late discovery would probably lead the prosecution to
request a continuance after receiving the information.
The trial court denied the request for continuance as
untimely, noting the case had been pending in superior court for
seven years—five years with another bench officer and two years
with the current bench officer. The court also observed in the
event the appellate court found the request timely, the trial court
found nothing in the record to support giving expert testimony
specific to defendant’s capability to form specific intent. The
court noted no witness had testified or was questioned regarding
any deficiency in defendant’s ability to understand. Applying
Evidence Code section 352, the trial court concluded such
evidence would be more prejudicial than probative and unduly
consumptive of court time.
Defendant has made no effort here to meet his burden of
demonstrating an abuse of discretion. No mention of the court’s
ruling on his motion for continuance was raised until his reply
brief in response to the People’s argument he must show the
denial of the continuance was a prejudicial abuse of discretion,
and the trial court’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
Instead defendant claims the issue is whether the denial of a
continuance to present “critical defense evidence violated [his]
due process rights.” Defendant cites no authority to support this
assertion but instead refers to his opening brief at pages 26–28,
14
where defendant discussed the standard of review for the denial
of due process not the denial of a continuance.6
“‘The burden is on the party complaining to establish an
abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and
unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court
will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of
its discretionary power.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 566.) As defendant has failed to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion or error in denying his request for
continuance, we affirm the ruling that defendant’s request was
untimely, and need not discuss the court’s alternative ruling.
III. Effective assistance of counsel
Defendant contends counsel’s failure to seek appointment
of an expert on juvenile brain development at an earlier juncture
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686–687
(Strickland); see Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) It is the defendant’s
burden to establish that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
inadequate and resulted in prejudice. (Strickland, at p. 687;
People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1126.) “Reviewing
courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in
examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation],
and there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
6 Defendant cited People v. Jackson (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1,
27, which involved a new trial motion in a case where many
pretrial continuances had been allowed, mostly at the request of
the prosecution, and the appellate court did not address the
defendant’s motion for a continuance.
15
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’
[Citation.] Defendant’s burden is difficult to carry on direct
appeal, as we have observed: ‘“Reviewing courts will reverse
convictions [on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate
counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] act or
omission.”’” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436–437
(Lucas).) To establish prejudice, defendant must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
(Strickland, supra, at p. 694.)
Quoting Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 437, defendant
argues the record on appeal “‘“affirmatively discloses that counsel
had no rational tactical purpose”’” in failing to make an earlier
request for an expert. Defendant reasons that prior to trial
counsel was aware defendant’s youth was relevant to the jury’s
consideration of the evidence of intent and premeditation.
Defendant refers to the 2019 expert report and the in limine
hearing of June 9, 2022, in which counsel objected to the
prosecution’s unsuccessful motion to exclude defendant’s age at
the time of the murder, both of which are discussed in part II
above.7 Defendant notes that due to the 2019 report, counsel
knew of defendant’s troubled background and the expert’s
conclusion, which defendant describes, as making “it likely that
7 Defendant contends witnesses testified he acted
impulsively, the shooting was not planned, and he regretted it.
However the testimony cited came from witnesses who related
what defendant told them.
16
he lacked intent to kill and did not willfully deliberate the
killing.”8
While we agree defense counsel knew long before trial that
defendant’s youth may have been relevant to the issue of
impulsivity at the time of the shooting, we disagree this shows
that counsel had no rational tactical reason not to have earlier
requested the appointment of an expert to testify regarding
juvenile brain development. On the contrary, counsel’s
awareness shows he had a great deal of time to and did carefully
consider the subject. As our “scrutiny of counsel’s performance
must be highly deferential” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 689), we decline to assume counsel did not contemplate the
issue of whether to raise it at trial, rather than make a tactical
decision not to do so until a continuance would be necessary. (Cf.
People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 772 [counsel may or may
not have tactical reason for delay].) Counsel may have been
contemplating calling defendant at trial and was concerned about
incriminating statements in the expert’s report. As the record
does not affirmatively show otherwise, defendant has not
demonstrated his claim should be reversed on direct appeal. (See
Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 437.)
8 The expert noted defendant claimed Mollett had been
aggressive, disrespectful, and had threatened the brother of
defendant’s friend, “creat[ing] terror in [his] friend,” and thus he
may have acted in defense of another. Defendant claimed “that
he acted impulsively when he saw Prince Mollett on the street,
with ‘no ponderance,’” and the expert concluded defendant’s
“history of impulsivity [made] it likely that he did not reflect on
the consequences of such an act.” (Italics added.) We observe
that deciding to kill someone and considering the consequences
for doing so are different concepts.
17
Defendant must show counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive him of a fair trial, and he must show he suffered
prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different
outcome but for counsel’s alleged inadequacies. (Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688.) Defendant has done neither. In
discussing the lack of prejudice the People note Penal Code
sections 28 and 29. Section 28, subdivision (a) excludes
“[e]vidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental
disorder . . . to show or negate the capacity to form any mental
state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge,
premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which
the accused committed the act. [Such] [e]vidence . . . is admissible
solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed
a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.”
Section 29 provides: “In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any
expert testifying about a defendant’s mental illness, mental
disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the
defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which
include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or
malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to
whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental
states shall be decided by the trier of fact.” “Put differently,
sections 28 and 29 do not prevent the defendant from presenting
expert testimony about any psychiatric or psychological diagnosis
or mental condition he may have, or how that diagnosis or
condition affected him at the time of the offense, as long as the
expert does not cross the line and state an opinion that the
defendant did or did not have the intent, or malice aforethought,
or any other legal mental state required for conviction of the
18
specific intent crime with which he is charged.” (People v. Cortes
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 908.)
Defendant is vague as to how an expert would testify. He
suggests the testimony would explain “the scientific
underpinnings to the impulsivity of juveniles that diminishes
their ability to make executive decisions.” Defendant then takes
a selective quote from People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261,
288, and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471, to support
testimony regarding the science of juvenile impulsivity. These
cases concern sentencing. Defendant does not explain how such
testimony can provide a defense. As the People point out, “‘[a]
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’” (Roper v.
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569. This is common knowledge
“as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies . . . tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.’ . . . ‘Even the normal 16-year-
old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult’ . . . . It has been
noted that ‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior.’” (Ibid., citations
omitted.)
Defendant thus fails to explain what an expert would add
that would not be subject to exclusion for being used to invoke
juror sympathy or that defendant did not harbor an intent to kill.
In his opening brief, defendant’s entire prejudice argument is
19
that “an expert witness would have shown the jury how
[defendant]’s age could have impacted his ability to form the
mental state required for first-degree murder, and jury notes
evinced a concern with whether the prosecution proved its case,
most notably, premeditation, but for counsel’s dereliction there is
a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”
Defendant neglects to say how an expert would do this
without giving an opinion “that the defendant did or did not have
the intent, or malice aforethought, or any other legal mental
state required for conviction of the specific intent crime with
which he is charged.” (People v. Cortes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at
p. 908.)
IV. Requested remand for resentencing
Defendant requests remand for resentencing due to legal
developments regarding Senate Bill 81 since the imposition of
sentencing. At his sentencing hearing defendant moved to strike
his firearm enhancement of 25 years to life under Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d). Senate Bill 81 was enacted in
2021 and amended Penal Code section 1385 effective January 1,
2022, which provides trial courts with guidance in exercising
their discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements. (See People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723–724 (Coleman).)
Amended Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) enumerates
mitigating circumstances the trial court “shall consider and
afford great weight to” when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
Defendant contends because the trial court did not mention
Senate Bill 81 at the sentencing hearing, the record affirmatively
shows the court was unaware of its sentencing discretion under
20
amended Penal Code section 1385, and the court failed to
exercise its discretion. Defendant cites People v. Diaz (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1172, 1187 (Diaz), where that defendant was
sentenced about two months after Senate Bill 81 had become
effective, and the publication of People v. Tirado (2022) 12
Cal.5th 688 (Tirado), which “held that the gun enhancement
statute that added 25 years to life to [the defendant’s] term gave
trial courts the discretion to impose lesser uncharged
enhancements of either 10 or 20 years” (Diaz, supra, at p. 1187,
citing Tirado, at pp. 694–702). The Diaz court concluded: “The
obvious reading of the record is that the busy actors in this case
had not yet learned of the new developments.” (Diaz, at p. 1188.)
Diaz is distinguishable, indeed inapplicable to defendant’s
case. The developments here were not new. Defendant was
sentenced September 22, 2022, nearly nine months after Senate
Bill 81 amended Penal Code section 1385 and the California
Supreme Court published Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, and
more than five months before trial commenced, allowing
sufficient time to “assume the trial court was aware of and
followed applicable law.” (Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 724.) Defendant acknowledges he asked the court at
sentencing to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill
81. Defendant acknowledges the trial court had before it his brief
entitled “Defense Counsel’s Views Concerning Sentencing,” as
well as defendant’s “Youthful Offender Mitigation Brief” both
documents putting forth defendant’s youth and history of
childhood abuse. The trial court allowed defendant to incorporate
the mitigation brief into his motion to strike the firearm
enhancement pursuant to the amendments to Penal Code
section1385 enacted by Senate Bill 81. Defense counsel argued at
21
the hearing for the applicability of the amendments. Defendant
was thus aware of Senate Bill 81 and certainly made the trial
court aware of Senate Bill 81. It is thus defendant’s burden is to
“affirmatively demonstrate[]” the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion. (Coleman, supra, at p. 724.)
Defendant contends the trial court erred because its “sole
reason for refusing to strike the enhancement was that the
murder was a ‘brutal senseless act of violence.’” It was error,
defendant argues, “especially in light of the fact that, even before
[defendant] was arrested, he expressed remorse for his conduct,
and the evidence showed the shooting was unplanned; it ‘just
happened’ when Keo handed [defendant] the gun.” Defendant
takes great liberty with what the evidence “showed,” citing only
defendant’s own statements made to others.
To the extent defendant contends the trial court erred by
expressing only one reason for denying his motion to strike the
enhancement, we note Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a)
requires reasons to be stated on the record only if the court
dismisses or strikes the enhancement. Under “the presumption
of Evidence Code section 664, ‘that official duty has been
regularly performed[,]’ . . . where a statement of reasons is not
required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume
the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or
order.” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; see
Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 724–725.) “Defendant's
citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.” (Coleman, at p. 725.)
We conclude defendant had sufficient time and awareness
to move alternatively for a lesser enhancement and request
additional reasons from the court for its denial. We also find
22
weight was given to relevant mitigating circumstances as set
forth in Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) and raised by
defendant. As defendant has failed to show he is entitled to
resentencing, we deny his request for remand.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
23
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.