CourtListener 10375435•People v. Smith CA2/3
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Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Smith CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B335637
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA158043)
v.
DAVID SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted David Smith of one count of second degree
murder. Defense counsel conceded that Smith shot the victim
but argued he did so in self-defense. On appeal, Smith contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction of
second degree murder because the People failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did not act in imperfect self-defense. He
also asserts that the trial court erred when it did not instruct the
jury, sua sponte, on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of
passion theory. We reject these contentions. Finally, Smith
argues that testimony from a crime analyst was improperly
admitted at trial. He concedes, however, that he failed to object
to the admission of the testimony. We conclude his argument is
forfeited and, even if it were not, he has not established
prejudice. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of March 7, 2022, at approximately
7:00 p.m., Smith and his girlfriend, Desiree Rivera, arrived at a
laundromat at 2700 East Gage Avenue in Huntington Park.
After starting their laundry, they walked to the nearby Gage
Bargain store, arguing along the way.
Around the same time, Jose Leandro, Jr., left a nearby
family gathering to purchase some items at the same store. The
store was within walking distance of the gathering. As he
entered Gage Bargain, Smith and Rivera were inside, still
engaged in their argument. Rivera testified that Leandro
“butted” into the dispute, appearing angry and aggressive.
Leandro seemed to be defending Rivera. Smith told Leandro to
stay out of it, emphasizing that it was not his business.
2
Smith and Rivera left the store, but Leandro followed.
Surveillance video showed Leandro removing his jewelry before
stepping outside. He continued speaking aggressively to Smith
while in front of the store, but Rivera could not hear their
conversation. Rivera testified that Smith seemed “mad.”
Smith lingered by an alley before catching up with Rivera,
who had headed back to the laundromat. Rivera handed him her
car keys so that he could sit and “cool down.” In the meantime,
she went into the laundromat. Her car was parked in front.
After checking on Smith later, Rivera described him as “just
upset a little bit.”
Meanwhile, Leandro called his fiancée, Evelyn Hernandez,
and told her he needed to speak with his brother, Ulises.1
Hernandez, Ulises, and other family members were at the family
gathering. Leandro claimed that someone who had a gun had
tried to rob him. He urged Ulises to come quickly. Ulises, along
with Hernandez, Leandro’s brother-in-law Jesus “Alex” Rios, and
Leandro’s sister Anel, rushed down an alley to Gage Bargain.
At the corner of the alley near the store, they encountered
Smith. Anel asked Smith if there had been an “altercation” and
if he had seen anything. Smith said yes, but that it happened
“sometime back” and was over. Anel testified that Smith said he
did not know anything and had not seen anyone. Anel left the
others and returned home.
Ulises went inside Gage Bargain and found Leandro.
Leandro again claimed that someone had tried to rob him, saying
the person had attempted to steal his “chain and everything” and
had a gun.
1 We refer to members of Leandro’s family who share his last
name by their first names for clarity.
3
Leandro, Hernandez, Ulises, and Rios walked toward the
laundromat together. Ulises testified that they were heading
home. Leandro gave Hernandez his purchases and jewelry.
Leandro appeared visibly upset to both Rios and Hernandez.
As they walked, Leandro told Ulises that someone had been
“talking shit to him.” Leandro then noticed Smith sitting in
Rivera’s car and said, “That’s him.” Inside the car, Smith tilted
his head up, in a nodding gesture, towards Leandro.
Leandro turned around and headed to the driver’s side of
the vehicle, where Smith sat. Ulises and Rios followed. Leandro
knocked on the window and ordered Smith to “ ‘Get out,’ ”
challenging, “Let’s see one on one.” Smith lowered his window
slightly. Ulises and Rios were standing at the front of the car.
Ulises saw Smith moving his hand to retrieve something in the
car. Smith pulled out a gun. Leandro reached into the car,
attempting to grab the weapon. Smith fired multiple shots,
hitting Leandro three times. He then immediately reversed and
drove away.
Shortly before, Rivera had checked on Smith in the car and
was walking back into the laundromat when she saw a group of
people and heard one say, “ ‘He’s right there.’ ” A few minutes
later, she saw gunfire coming from her car. She saw Smith drive
away.
Leandro died from the gunshot wounds.
During their investigation, law enforcement recovered
surveillance footage from four nearby businesses. A video
showed Smith, Rivera, and Leandro enter and exit the Gage
Bargain store. Other footage captured Smith getting into the car,
and Leandro, Ulises, and Rios approaching it. On cross-
examination, the officer describing the footage agreed with
4
defense counsel that a few seconds before Leandro approached
the car, it appeared on the video that Leandro “may have
something in his hand.” However, no percipient witness in the
case indicated Leandro had any type of weapon. No firearms,
knives, or other weapons were located at the scene.
In October 2022, the People charged Smith by information
with the murder of Leandro (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The
information alleged that Smith personally used a weapon, a semi-
automatic handgun, in the commission of the murder, within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). He pled no contest to
the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Smith did not testify at trial or offer any witness testimony
in his defense. During his opening statement and closing
argument, defense counsel conceded that Smith shot Leandro but
argued that he did so in self-defense. The court instructed the
jury on justifiable homicide based on reasonable self-defense and
voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect, or unreasonable,
self-defense.
The jury found Smith guilty of second degree murder and
found the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm allegation
true. The trial court sentenced Smith to 15 years to life in prison,
plus four years for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed
and stayed a two-year midterm sentence on the felon in
possession of a firearm count.
Smith timely appealed.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
5
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding
that Smith Did Not Act in Imperfect Self-Defense
A. Standard of review
To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
criminal conviction, “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9
Cal.5th 793, 820 (Vargas).) In our review, we must presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably deduce from the evidence, and we accept logical
inferences the jury might have drawn from circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1103.)
Reversal is not warranted unless it appears “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Penunuri
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
B. Substantial evidence supported the conviction
Smith argues there is insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s conviction of second degree murder because the People
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in
imperfect self-defense. We disagree.
“Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation
required for first degree murder.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th
593, 600.) “ ‘ “ ‘Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when
the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person
because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he
6
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the
defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can
be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1192, 1226.)
Imperfect, also known as “unreasonable” self-defense, thus
“involves a misperception of objective circumstances.” (People v.
Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 134.) It requires “ ‘an honest but
unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent
peril to life or great bodily injury . . . .’ . . . [I]t is most accurately
characterized as an actual but unreasonable belief.” (Id. at
p. 134, fn. omitted.) Thus, “[i]mperfect self-defense differs from
complete self-defense, which requires not only an honest but also
a reasonable belief of the need to defend oneself.” (People v.
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 (Simon).) A defendant is not
required to testify to his or her actual belief. (People v.
Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262.) It is “for the jury
sitting as the trier of fact to decide whether appellant actually
feared serious injury or death . . . .” (People v. Vasquez (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179.)
“When imperfect self-defense is at issue, the malice
element of murder requires the People to show the absence of
that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243, citing People v. Rios (2000)
23 Cal.4th 450, 463.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the
jury’s rejection of Smith’s claim of imperfect self-defense. The
record lacks any evidence of Smith’s actual fear of imminent
death or bodily harm. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 133–134.)
7
He “did not testify, and there is no evidence he ever told anyone
that he had acted out of fear.” (Id. at p. 134.)
Smith argues that the evidence showed he felt the need to
defend himself. Smith points to the evidence that Leandro
initiated the argument in the store, called for backup, removed
his jewelry in preparation for a fight, approached Smith’s car,
challenged him to a fight, and tried to grab his gun.
Yet, there was also evidence permitting the jury to
reasonably conclude Smith acted out of anger—first at Leandro
for his behavior in the store, then at being followed and
challenged to a fight. Rivera testified that Smith was mad and
sitting in the car to cool down. Evidence also suggested that
Smith waited for Leandro in the alley before encountering
Leandro’s family, thus not shying away from further altercations
with Leandro. When Anel asked Smith if he had seen anyone
fitting Leandro’s description, Smith laughed and said no. He also
told her any altercation was over. Later, when Leandro
approached Rivera’s car, Smith engaged him by tilting his head.
At that point, Smith had a firearm within his reach and Leandro
did not. When Leandro knocked on the window, seeking further
confrontation, Smith rolled the window down rather than taking
available measures to protect himself, such as keeping the
window closed. After the shooting, he immediately drove away.
This evidence tended to show that Smith did not shoot Leandro
because he actually feared serious injury or death.
Ultimately, to the extent the evidence, and the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn from that evidence, were in
conflict, it was for the jury to weigh the evidence and make
credibility determinations. “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
8
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cruz-
Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 206.) The jury was permitted
to reject Smith’s theory of imperfect self-defense given the
evidence of Smith’s anger and the lack of any evidence that
Smith believed he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily injury. (See People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978,
989 [“the jury was free to disbelieve Morales’s claim that he was
afraid and acting in self-defense, especially in light of the
evidence to the contrary”].)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude a reasonable jury could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith did not act in imperfect
self-defense.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Instruct,
Sua Sponte, on Voluntary Manslaughter Based on
Heat of Passion
Smith also contends the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter under a
heat of passion theory. He asserts there was substantial
evidence to support a finding that he killed Leandro in the heat of
passion due to sufficient provocation that caused him to fear for
his life. We find no error.
A. Applicable legal principles
The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on any lesser
included offenses that are supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 718; People v. Souza
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 116 [even on request, court has no duty to
9
instruct on a lesser offense unless it is supported by substantial
evidence].)
The “ ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by
“ ‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’ ” but rather by evidence
from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but
not the greater, was committed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538 (Nelson).) “Speculative, minimal, or
insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on
a lesser included offense.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132.)
But any uncertainty about whether the evidence is sufficient to
warrant the instruction must be resolved in favor of the
defendant. (People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 792
(Vasquez).)
We independently review whether the trial court
erroneously failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 538.) “ ‘In deciding whether
evidence is “substantial” in this context, a court determines only
its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.’ [Citation.]” (Vasquez,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 792.) We therefore do not evaluate
the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Martinez (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 892, 901 (Martinez).)
“ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.’ (§ 187, subd. (a).) ‘Manslaughter is the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice.’ (§ 192,
subd. (a).) Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder,
and a defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing
but who lacks malice is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Heat
of passion is one of the mental states that precludes the
formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder
to manslaughter.” (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 538.)
10
“Heat of passion arises if, ‘ “at the time of the killing, the
reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of
average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) This
theory has both an objective and a subjective component. To
satisfy the objective component, “ ‘ “the accused’s heat of passion
must be due to ‘sufficient provocation.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Moye).) To satisfy the
subjective component, “the accused must be shown to have killed
while under ‘the actual influence of a strong passion’ induced by
such provocation.” (Id. at p. 550.)
B. Discussion
Here, there was no substantial evidence to support a heat
of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction. The subjective
component of the heat of passion theory required that at the time
of the killing, Smith was actually under the influence of a strong
passion.3 (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 539; Martinez, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 905.) His mental state must have been
such that his “reason ‘ “ ‘was obscured or disturbed by passion’ ” ’
to so great a degree that an ordinary person would ‘ “ ‘act rashly
and without deliberation and reflection’ ” ’ . . . .” (Vargas, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 828.)
Smith contends there was substantial evidence he acted out
of great fear for his life. We disagree. Rivera’s testimony offered
the only direct evidence of Smith’s mental state, and that
testimony did not suggest Smith was in a state of fear so great
3 Because we conclude that the subjective component is not
met, we need not and do not address the objective component.
11
that it obscured his reason. Rivera testified that Smith was
initially angry after the interaction at the store, but when she
checked on him as he sat in her car, he was “just upset a little
bit.”
Other evidence similarly failed to create a reasonable
inference that Smith was overcome with fear. When faced with a
group of individuals obviously associated with Leandro, Smith
spoke to them, and even laughed as he denied seeing anyone
matching Leandro’s description. He had gone to the car,
according to Rivera, to “cool down.” When Leandro knocked on
the car window, he rolled it down in response. There was no
nonspeculative evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude Smith was experiencing an emotion so intense that he
simply reacted. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 116.)
In Moye, the California Supreme Court reasoned that
simply being on the defensive during an attack, with evidence the
defendant killed in self-defense, is insufficient to require a heat of
passion instruction. Rather, there must be evidence that the
defendant acted without due deliberation and reflection. (Moye,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 553.) Therefore, in cases involving
fighting between the defendant and the victim, courts have
determined a heat of passion instruction was required where
there was at least some evidence of the defendant’s state of mind
at the time of the killing. (See, e.g., People v. Dominguez (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180 [defendant testified he “ ‘reacted’ ” while
“ ‘super panicked’ ” and “ ‘super scared,’ ” his mind “ ‘went
blank,’ ” he closed his eyes, and just started shooting]; In re
Hampton (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 463, 480 [“Scared that he would
be shot, Hampton grabbed the gun, swung his arm out towards
[the victim], and fired. He did so without conscious thought and
12
was stunned when the gun discharged.”]; People v. Millbrook
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1139 [“Millbrook testified that
when he shot [the victim] he was ‘scared’ and ‘panicking’ . . . .”];
People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 640 [defendant
testified “ ‘I was afraid. I was nervous. I just wasn’t thinking
clearly’ ”].)
Here, because there was insufficient evidence that Smith
“ ‘actually, subjectively, kill[ed] under the heat of passion,’ ” the
trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter under that theory. (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 554.)
III. Smith Forfeited His Objections to the Admission of
Expert Testimony and, Even if Not Forfeited, He
Failed to Establish Prejudice
A. Background
Lizet Rosales is a crime analyst for the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department Homicide Division. One of her duties is to
obtain cell phone records and input their data into a software
program that maps the locations of the phones during a crime.
The records link a phone to a specific cell phone tower at a given
time.
Rosales obtained Smith’s cell phone records from the night
of Leandro’s murder. She used the records and mapping software
to identify the phone’s locations between “approximately 5:00
p.m. to approximately 12:00 p.m. [sic].” She compiled her
analysis into a report that was shown to the jury.
Rosales testified that Smith’s cell phone was connected to a
tower in the “Florence area” at 6:57 p.m. By 7:00 p.m., Smith’s
phone connected to cell towers in the vicinity of the shopping
13
center on Gage Avenue where Leandro was killed. It re-
connected with a cell tower in the “Florence area” at 7:39 p.m.
Rosales further testified that a license plate reader
captured Smith’s car at 942 West 54th Street at an unspecified
time between 7:35 p.m. and 11:59 p.m.
B. Discussion
Smith contends Rosales was unqualified to provide expert
opinions on the mapping software’s analysis and the accuracy of
the cell phone data. He contends her testimony about the cell
phone data and the license plate reader data lacked foundation
and exceeded her qualifications, in violation of Evidence Code
sections 801, 803, and 804. He also argues her testimony
included inadmissible hearsay since she recited information from
the cell phone provider’s reports that she did not prepare. He
similarly asserts Rosales’s testimony about license plate reader
data was inadmissible hearsay.
However, as Smith acknowledges, he forfeited these
arguments by not objecting to Rosales’s testimony at trial.
“Ordinarily, ‘the failure to object to the admission of expert
testimony or hearsay at trial forfeits an appellate claim that such
evidence was improperly admitted.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Perez
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Perez); see also People v. Dowl (2013) 57
Cal.4th 1079, 1087 [“defendant who fails at trial to object that a
witness lacks the qualifications to render an expert opinion may
not on appeal contest the opinion’s admissibility”]; People v.
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 654 [failure to object to
admission of hearsay at trial forfeited argument on appeal];
People v. Garlinger (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193 [failure to
object to the admissibility of police detective’s testimony
14
regarding cell phone locations under Evidence Code at trial
forfeited testimony].)
We decline to address the merits of Smith’s evidentiary
objections for the first time on appeal. “ ‘ “The reason for the
[objection] requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded
objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It
allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or
limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows
the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify
the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the
prospect of reversal.” ’ [Citation.]” (Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 7.)
Moreover, even if we were inclined to consider the merits of
Smith’s arguments for the first time on appeal, we would reject
them as a basis for reversal of the judgment. The record
demonstrates that even if Rosales’s testimony was inadmissible,
the admission of the evidence was harmless under any standard.
It was undisputed at trial that Smith was at the scene of
the shooting, that he shot Leandro, and that he immediately
drove away. This was established by the testimony of the
witnesses who were present, including Rivera, Smith’s girlfriend.
Rosales’s testimony was entirely duplicative of this other
evidence that was admitted without objection and is not
challenged on appeal. The cell phone location and license plate
scanner evidence was irrelevant to the only contested issue,
which was whether Smith had the mental state necessary to be
convicted of murder or manslaughter. The location data evidence
could not have affected the outcome of the trial in any way.
On appeal, Smith contends that Rosales’s testimony
allowed the People to argue that Smith immediately fled the
15
scene after shooting Leandro, suggesting consciousness of guilt.
But Rivera, Hernandez, and Ulises testified to Smith’s immediate
departure. There is no basis for Smith’s contention that since he
“did not dispute his encounters with [Leandro] at Gage Bargain
or that his gun issued the fatal shots, the jury was left with the
impression that the geolocation data supported the prosecution’s
claim of murder with scientific certainty.” There was no
connection between the location data evidence and Smith’s claim
of self-defense and the prosecution did not attempt to draw one.
The location data evidence was offered only to establish Smith’s
presence at the scene and his departure, facts that were
undisputed and established by several other unchallenged pieces
of evidence. It is not reasonably probable Smith would have
obtained a more favorable result in the absence of Rosales’s
testimony. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)
The lack of any prejudice is also fatal to Smith’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if Smith could establish
his counsel’s failure to object to Rosales’s testimony constituted
deficient performance, he cannot establish he was prejudiced.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217–218.)
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
17
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