CourtListener 10375336•Lorenz v. Cohen CA2/8
Texte intégral
Filed 4/9/25 Lorenz v. Cohen CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
AUTUMN LORENZ, B331113
Cross-complainant and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV38707)
v.
JOANNA COHEN et al.,
Cross-defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Rosenberg and Rosenberg, Zachary
Rosenberg and Jeremy Rosenberg, for Cross-defendants and
Appellants.
James M. Tillipman for Cross-complainant and
Respondent.
_______________________
Joanna Cohen and Jeremy Rosenberg appeal from the trial
court’s orders taking off calendar their motion for summary
adjudication of issues in a cross-complaint and accepting the
voluntary dismissal of the operative cross-complaint. We affirm
the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After a dispute arose over their adoption of a mini pig as a
support animal, tenants Cohen and Rosenberg sued the owner of
the rental property, Autumn Lorenz. Lorenz filed a cross-
complaint against Cohen and Rosenberg, alleging 1) they
breached their lease by keeping the mini pig, and 2) they
committed other torts.
In August 2022, the trial court denied Cohen and
Rosenberg’s motion for summary judgment on the operative
cross-complaint on the ground that there existed triable issues of
material fact. The court also denied appellants’ motion for
reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling.
On March 30, 2023, Cohen and Rosenberg filed a motion for
summary adjudication “of whether a landlord-tenant relationship
gives rise to a duty of a tenant to safeguard the landlord’s
emotional well-being concerning matters of lease obligations,
property damage and/or financial interests.” The hearing on the
motion was set for June 28, 2023.
In May 2023, Lorenz’s counsel and Cohen’s counsel of
record agreed to settle the operative cross-complaint with a
settlement as to Cohen and Rosenberg. Around June 20, 2023,
Lorenz’s counsel received a draft of a settlement agreement and
after some amendments, Lorenz signed the settlement agreement
on June 22 or 23, 2023.
2
Among other provisions, the settlement and release
provided that because the parties to the cross-complaint
“desire[d] to compromise, settle and otherwise resolve all of their
disputes with one another as it relates to the Civil Cross-Action,
including but not limited to all claims Ms. Lorenz may have
against Ms. Cohen and Mr. Rosenberg for injuries, damages
and/or losses Ms. Lorenz sustained as a result of the incidents set
forth in her Third Amended Cross-Complaint,” USAA Casualty
Insurance Company would pay Lorenz $60,000. It also provided,
“Within ten (10) days after receipt of the settlement funds . . . ,
Ms. Lorenz shall file in the Civil Action, a Request for Dismissal
of the Third Amended Cross-Complaint, with prejudice, of all
claims Ms. Lorenz asserted against Ms. Cohen and Mr.
Rosenberg.” Each party was responsible for their own attorney
fees and costs related to the cross-complaint.
On June 26, 2023, Lorenz filed a request for dismissal of
the cross-complaint with prejudice, and the dismissal was
entered that day. Also on June 26, 2023, Lorenz notified the
court of the settlement of the cross-complaint and requested the
court vacate the upcoming June 28 hearing on the pending
summary adjudication motion on the cross-complaint in light of
the request for dismissal.
Cohen and Rosenberg objected to the request to vacate the
hearing on the motion for summary adjudication on the following
grounds: (1) the first line of Lorenz’s document notifying the court
of the settlement and requesting the hearing be taken off-
calendar began with the phrase “TO ALL PARTIES AND TO
THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD,” and therefore failed to
“address this honorable Court”; (2) the document inaccurately
referred to Cohen as “Joanna C. Cohen” when her middle name
3
begins with an “E”; and (3) Lorenz acted in bad faith and
breached the terms of the settlement and release by filing her
request for dismissal before she received the settlement funds in
an attempt to prevent Cohen and Rosenberg from obtaining a
decision on their motion for summary adjudication.
The trial court took the summary adjudication motion off
calendar. In its written ruling, the court acknowledged that the
right to dismiss a complaint or cause of action prior to the
commencement of trial was not unlimited, and that one such
limit was whether permitting dismissal would be fair or would
endorse dishonest litigation tactics. The court rejected the
argument that the filing of the request for dismissal breached the
release and observed that the parties did not negotiate that the
request for dismissal would not be filed until after the court ruled
on the motion for summary adjudication.
The court explained, “Cross-Defendants are correct that the
central issue here is one of fairness. The parties agreed to settle
the cross-complaint. As part of that agreement, Cross-
Complainant Lorenz agreed to dismiss the cross-complaint. That
she has done. There is no evidence that Cross-Complainant
Lorenz’s dismissal of the cross-complaint was motivated by
anything other than the belief that the dismissal was a term of
the settlement, and that the summary judgment motion was, in
essence, moot. She dismissed the cross-complaint to end, not to
continue, the litigation.” Accepting the voluntary dismissal, the
court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion for
summary adjudication because the cross-complaint had been
dismissed.
Cohen and Rosenberg appeal.
4
DISCUSSION
I. Breach of the Release
Cohen and Rosenberg argue it was a “blatant violation” of
the settlement and release for Lorenz to file her request for
dismissal, and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise.
Interpreting the provision requiring Lorenz to file a request for
dismissal of the cross-complaint within 10 days after receiving
the settlement funds as a bar precluding her from filing the
request for dismissal any sooner, they accuse the trial court of
“improperly impos[ing] specific language that it found more
appropriate rather than reading the explicit language of the
release” and applying established principles of contract
interpretation.
When interpreting a written agreement, “[t]he threshold
question for trial and appellate courts is whether the writing is
ambiguous—that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation. [Citations.] Whether a contract is ambiguous at
this initial step of analysis presents a question of law subject to
independent review on appeal.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 970, 986 (Thompson).) “ ‘ “The fundamental goal of
contract interpretation” ’ remains ‘ “to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties” ’ [citations], not to conjure up creative
interpretations for provisions. Because we enforce the
‘ “ ‘outward expression of the agreement,’ ” ’ we ‘ “are not
concerned as much with what the parties might tell us they
meant by the words they used as with how a reasonable person
would interpret those words.” ’ ” (Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, 615.)
The settlement and release does not state that Lorenz was
not permitted to file a request for dismissal before receiving
5
settlement funds or before pending motions had been heard and
decided. Rather, it sets an outer limit on the time for her to file
that request for dismissal: 10 days after the date she received the
settlement funds. As Lorenz filed the request for dismissal before
she received the settlement funds, she unquestionably complied
with her obligation to dismiss the cross-complaint before that
deadline. As for appellants’ contention that the plain language of
the settlement and release actually meant Lorenz was not
permitted to request dismissal of her cross-complaint prior to
receiving funds, a reasonable person would not interpret this
settlement and release, the entire point of which was to result in
dismissal of the cross-complaint, to instead prevent Lorenz from
dismissing the cross-complaint until some future date. As the
provision is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation
urged by appellants, there is no ambiguity here. (Thompson,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 987 [“If there is no ambiguity—that is,
the language is reasonably susceptible to only one
interpretation—our inquiry into meaning has been completed
and the one reasonable interpretation applies to the facts”].) On
our independent review, we conclude the trial court correctly
ruled that Lorenz did not breach the settlement and release by
moving promptly to dismiss the cross-complaint.
II. Invalidity of the Dismissal
Cohen and Rosenberg argue the dismissal of the cross-
complaint was invalid under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 581,
subdivision (i), because their motion for summary adjudication
was pending at the time of the dismissal. They contend the trial
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
6
court failed to consider the “implications of [s]ection 581(i),
despite the issue being explicitly highlighted in Appellants’
objections and supplemental briefing.” We have reviewed the
pages of the clerk’s transcript and augmented transcript to which
appellants refer, and we find no indication they mentioned
section 581, subdivision (i) in the trial court, much less that they
argued the dismissal was invalid for violating that provision.
“[T]o preserve an issue for appeal, a party ordinarily must raise
the objection in the trial court. [Citation.] ‘The rule that
contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal is founded on considerations of fairness to the court and
opposing party, and on the practical need for an orderly and
efficient administration of the law.’ [Citations.] Otherwise,
opposing parties and trial courts would be deprived of
opportunities to correct alleged errors, and parties and appellate
courts would be required to deplete costly resources ‘to address
purported errors which could have been rectified in the trial court
had an objection been made.’ [Citation.] In addition, it is
inappropriate to allow any party to ‘trifle with the courts by
standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a
conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and
avoid if unfavorable.’ ” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396,
406.) As noncompliance with section 581, subdivision (i) was not
raised in the trial court, appellants’ argument that the dismissal
was invalid pursuant to that provision has been forfeited.
III. Failure to Correct Prior Ruling Before Dismissal
Cohen and Rosenberg argue the trial court had an
obligation to “correct” what they describe as “egregious
substantive and procedural errors” in its August 2022 ruling on
their motion for summary judgment of the cross-complaint before
7
the court could entertain the request for dismissal of the
complaint in June 2023. They argue that because they had
“made the court aware” of alleged errors in the prior year’s
summary judgment ruling, the court had “its own duty to
correct these critical errors before validating
Respondent’s dismissal.”
Cohen and Rosenberg provide no legal authority for the
principle that a trial court must review and “correct” earlier
rulings one party argues are erroneous before permitting another
party to dismiss a cross-complaint, nor can we conceive of any
such duty. They offer some general language about core judicial
functions from Case v. Lazben Financial Co. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 172, 184, but they fail to explain how the
functions of ensuring the orderly and effective administration of
justice and declaring the law could possibly require trial courts to
perform a review of any or all prior contested rulings before
dismissing a cross-complaint that has been settled.
Moreover, Cohen and Rosenberg have not identified where
in the record they requested the trial court to review its prior
rulings prior to permitting dismissal of the cross-complaint, and
we found no such request in our review. “Failure to raise specific
challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal. ‘ “ ‘[I]t is
fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider
claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been
but were not presented to the trial court.’ Thus, ‘we ignore
arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the
trial court. Generally, issues raised for the first time on appeal
which were not litigated in the trial court are waived.’ ” ’ ”
(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins.
8
Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 (Premier
Medical).)
IV. Inevitable Summary Adjudication
Citing Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 187 (Franklin Capital), Cohen and Rosenberg
assert the court erred in dismissing the cross-complaint because a
plaintiff may not dismiss a complaint when a ruling on a
summary adjudication motion is imminent and “objective
evidence clearly indicates inherent, fatal flaws in the case’s
merits.” Appellants did not make this argument in the trial
court, and it has therefore been forfeited. (Premier Medical,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.)
Even if it had not been forfeited, the argument lacks merit.
The dismissal was not sought after a public and formal indication
by the trial court of the legal merits of the case or in light of a
legal inevitability of dismissal based on “dispositive procedural
inaction by the plaintiff (like not filing opposition to a summary
judgment motion or not bringing the case to trial in five years)”
as required by Franklin Capital, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pages
200–201. Appellants offer no support for their claims that
Lorenz’s apparent failure to file an expert witness designation,
the absence of sufficient evidence to prevail at trial, and multiple
amendments of the cross-complaint constitute the type of
“dispositive procedural inaction” contemplated by Franklin
Capital. Similarly, appellants contend that ultimately Lorenz
would not be able to prove causation, and that the court’s
“conclusive judgments” at the demurrer stage of the litigation
show that Lorenz’s claims “strain[] credulity.” Nevertheless, they
do not establish that the court made a public and formal
indication that the case lacked legal merit, or that these alleged
9
failings are “dispositive procedural inaction[s]” of the sort
required by Franklin Capital. (Ibid.)
Additionally, Cohen and Rosenberg argue the fact that
Lorenz signed the settlement and release after they filed their
reply brief on the motion for summary adjudication “suggests a
last-ditch effort to avoid legal scrutiny,” but again, they offer no
argument or authority to show that this timing meets Franklin
Capital’s requirement of a public and formal indication by the
trial court of the case’s legal merits or demonstrates a legal
inevitability of dismissal based on dispositive procedural
inaction. (Franklin Capital, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 200–
201.) Finally, Franklin Capital does not address or offer
guidance for the situation here, in which the challenged dismissal
was required by, and sought to effectuate, a settlement.
V. Alleged “Unsustainable Factual and Legal Errors” by
the Trial Court
Cohen and Rosenberg argue the trial court overlooked
Lorenz’s “ulterior motives,” misinterpreted the settlement and
release, and disregarded both the ripeness of the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment and their fairness concerns in its
ruling. First, they take issue with the trial court’s statement in
its ruling, “There is no evidence that Cross-Complainant Lorenz’s
dismissal of the cross-complaint was motivated by anything other
than the belief that the dismissal was a term of the settlement,
and that the summary judgment motion was, in essence, moot.
She dismissed the cross-complaint to end, not to continue, the
litigation.” Appellants claim the court based its order on
“unsupported assertions that ‘no evidence’ contradicted” Lorenz’s
description of her intentions in filing the dismissal, and then list
five items of what they consider “strong evidence” about Lorenz’s
10
ulterior motives that “went unaddressed by the trial court”:
“(1) the dismissal’s timing; (2) Respondent’s awareness of
Appellants’ preservation of potential future claims; (3) the court’s
new exposure to the absence of experts; (4) the violation of the
release’s plain wording; and (5) Respondent’s disregard for
Appellants’ objections that memorialized Appellants’ intent for
the [motion for summary adjudication] to be heard.”
We review factual findings by the trial court for substantial
evidence. (Cole v. Hammond (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 912, 921.)
Cohen and Rosenberg’s argument that their contrary evidence
was “unaddressed” is insufficient to demonstrate that the ruling
was not supported by substantial evidence, as is their contention
that there was evidence contradicting Lorenz’s claim she acted in
good faith. On a substantial evidence review, “ ‘ “[i]t is not our
task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the
province of the trier of fact.” ’ ” (Estate of Kampen (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 971, 992; see also Canister v. Emergency
Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 394 [“We
look at the evidence in support of the successful party,
disregarding any contrary showing, and we resolve all conflicts in
favor of the respondent, indulging in all legitimate and
reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict if possible. [Citation.]
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, we do not substitute our deductions for those of the finder
of fact. [Citation.] We must affirm if substantial evidence
supports the trier of fact’s determination, even if other
substantial evidence would have supported a different result”].)
Next, Cohen and Rosenberg assert that Lorenz could not
have “honestly believed” dismissing the cross-complaint before
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was “an
11
agreed-upon ‘settlement’ term,” because they had “explicitly
rejected that possible assumption in their objections” to Lorenz’s
request that the motion be taken off calendar, which Lorenz
submitted to the court before she filed her request for dismissal.
Appellants’ assertion is supported by a citation to approximately
20 pages in the record, with no further argument as to how this
demonstrates any error in the court’s conclusion. This is
insufficient to establish error. “To demonstrate error, the
appellant must present a cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and relevant citations to the record.” (Slone v. El Centro
Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172.)
Cohen and Rosenberg then assert the trial court made
“three egregious factual errors” in stating that the parties had
agreed to settle the cross-complaint: the court used the word
“unconditional” in describing the release, the release did not
release their rights to future claims, and they intended to
preserve their rights to potential future claims, not to settle
them. This argument is unavailing. It does not demonstrate the
court erred in ruling that Lorenz acted in good faith and/or had
not been shown to have acted in bad faith. Additionally, the
court made no such errors. It did not describe anything as
“unconditional”—it merely described a pleading as explaining
Lorenz had entered into an unconditional settlement agreement;
and it did not make findings that Cohen and Rosenberg released
their rights to future claims or did not intend to preserve those
rights.
Cohen and Rosenberg also take issue with the trial court’s
statement that the settlement “could have included a negotiation
as to when Cross-Complainant Lorenz could first file a request
for dismissal.” They claim the court made “inexplicable
12
assumptions” about the negotiations, but their assertion rests on
their interpretation of the release as expressly preventing Lorenz
from filing the request for dismissal until she received settlement
funds, an interpretation we have already rejected.
Finally, Cohen and Rosenberg assert the court’s order
“raises concerns about the lack of fair consideration given” and
lists a series of what it characterizes as things the trial court
disregarded, omitted, or failed to consider: their assessment of
what Lorenz was attempting to achieve, Lorenz’s bad faith, how
dismissing the cross-complaint pursuant to the settlement and
release denied appellants their rights, the absence of any harm to
Lorenz to justify preempting a tentative ruling on the motion for
summary adjudication, and the “ill-gotten gain” accruing to
Lorenz by her dismissal of the cross-complaint after settlement,
resulting in the absence of a ruling on their motion for summary
adjudication. Their argument boils down to a simple
disagreement with the trial court’s factual determination that
Lorenz had acted in good faith. Its rejection of Cohen and
Rosenberg’s argument that the dismissal should be vacated
because Lorenz had acted in bad faith does not demonstrate any
disregard, omission, or failure to consider their claims. Cohen
and Rosenberg have shown no error.
13
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Respondent shall recover her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
SEGAL, J.*
* Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Seven, assigned to Division Eight by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
14
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.