People v. Marez CA4/2

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Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Marez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E082832

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV037241)

VICTOR MAREZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bridgid M.

McCann, Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey and

Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Defendant and appellant Victor Marez appeals from the trial court’s summary

denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 As the high

court has just recently explained, contrary to defendant’s contentions, a trial court may

“rely on,” as the lower court did here, “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a

preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations” in a

resentencing petition. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 605 (Patton).) On that

basis, moreover, the trial court may deny the defendant’s petition for failure to make the

requisite prima facie showing for resentencing. (Ibid.) We therefore reject defendant’s

appellate challenge and affirm the trial court’s order. Following Patton’s example,

however, “out of an abundance of caution [we] order a remand to the superior court with

directions . . . to consider an amended petition should [defendant], within 30 days of . . .

remand, seek to file one.” (Id. at p. 609.) In other words, we affirm the trial court’s order

but remand with directions permitting defendant to file an amended petition—or not, at

his election.

BACKGROUND

In March 2006, defendant was charged with two counts of premeditated murder

(§ 187, subd. (a)) for shooting Narciso Perez and Henry Armando Valle to death. The

allegations included multiple firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and

a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) on each count. Neither the felony complaint

nor a subsequent information named another defendant nor indicated any co-perpetrator

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
or accomplice. In May 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to two

counts of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted personal use of a

firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in committing the slayings. Defendant stipulated that the

preliminary hearing transcript contained the factual basis for his plea. He was sentenced

under the plea agreement to a determinate term of 29 years four months in prison.

According to testimony at defendant’s preliminary hearing on the murder charges,

a deputy sheriff responded around 7:00 a.m. on January 20, 2005, to an investigation in

progress in Chino Hills, where the victims’ bodies were discovered in the front seat of a

white van. Both victims had been shot in the head; rigor mortis had begun. A bag of

partially eaten food was found in the van, along with a receipt indicating the food had

been purchased at a fast-food restaurant that morning at 12:45 a.m.

On March 10, 2005, officers made a traffic stop and arrested defendant on an

outstanding warrant when he departed a location under surveillance. Defendant had a

loaded .38-caliber handgun in his waistband, and the officers also seized defendant’s cell

phone.

Further investigation showed defendant made the last call to one of his victims’

cell phones, received at 1:00 a.m. on the day of the shooting. The investigation also

indicated that defendant’s cell phone pinged off of cellular phone towers near the location

where the victims were found, around the estimated time of their deaths. Subsequent

ballistics testing revealed that bullets and bullet fragments recovered from the victims’

bodies matched defendant’s handgun.

3
More than a decade after his guilty plea, defendant in January 2022 filed a petition

seeking resentencing under section 1172.6. Defendant’s preprinted petition included

checkmarked boxes next to statements he alleged as the basis for his petition, including

that he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to Penal

Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”

The trial court appointed counsel for defendant at his request. Appointed counsel

filed a brief supplementing defendant’s petition, “anticipat[ing]” in the brief that the

prosecution would “seek to incorporate the Preliminary Hearing into the record herein as

a basis for denying the petition,” and objecting thereto. The supplemental brief added no

specific factual allegations regarding the circumstances of the offense to support

defendant’s petition; instead, it relied on the petition’s generic allegations.

The prosecutor filed a brief opposing defendant’s petition, relying on the

information charging only defendant with the murders, as well as other court records

including the preliminary hearing transcript and the plea bargain defendant signed. The

prosecutor argued that the records showed defendant “was an active shooter in this case”

and, therefore, was “directly liable” on the “[m]urder charges originally filed” against

him. The prosecution asserted defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his

petition because he raised no factual issue to suggest he was only an accomplice or

otherwise not the person who shot the victims. Defendant did not file a reply, instead

resting on his supplemental brief anticipating, and objecting to, the prosecutor’s reliance

on the preliminary hearing transcript.

4
At the hearing on the petition, the trial court stated it reviewed the preliminary

hearing transcript as “part of the court record.”

The court subsequently denied defendant’s petition in a written order. The court

noted it considered the preliminary hearing transcript in reaching its conclusion,

exclusive of hearsay. The court found nothing in the record to indicate “imputed intent”

lurked in defendant’s conviction, nor “that either manslaughter was based upon a targeted

offense that was not charged.” The court concluded, “There has been no showing by

petitioner that he was convicted of manslaughter of either victim under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine,” or under any theory proscribed by current law.

Accordingly, the court declined to issue an order to show cause and conduct an

evidentiary hearing on whether to grant defendant resentencing relief. Instead, the court

found as a matter of law that defendant “has not made a prima facie case for relief.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding he did not make the requisite

prima facie showing to proceed to an evidentiary hearing on his petition for resentencing

relief under section 1172.6. The court did not err.

“[S]ection 1172.6 applies to those who pled guilty to manslaughter after being

charged with murder and who would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a

felony murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other

theory of imputed malice. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) To be eligible for relief, the petitioner

must make a prima facie showing that he could not presently be convicted of murder

under changes to these theories of murder liability made effective January 1, 2019 by

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Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . . (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) If the

petitioner makes a prima showing, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on

the petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).)” (People v. Gaillard (2024)

99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.)

Defendant’s petition alleged as a predicate for resentencing relief that he could not

now be convicted of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The parties do

not dispute, however, that where the record of a conviction shows the defendant was the

person who actually killed the victim, he or she remains liable under current law to be

validly convicted of murder, and therefore is per se ineligible for resentencing under

section 1172.6. (See, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48, 52; see

also People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1119-1120 [a finding that the defendant

personally used a firearm supports a determination the defendant was the actual killer].)

Similarly, where the record of conviction reflects that the defendant was not convicted

under any theory of imputed malice, no evidentiary hearing is required. (See, e.g.,

People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233, citing § 1172.6, subd. (a) [where the

petitioner was the “only participant in the killing,” he was not convicted under an invalid

theory and could not have made a prima facie showing for resentencing relief].)

Against this backdrop, the parties contested in their briefing only whether the trial

court could properly rely on the preliminary hearing transcript in evaluating defendant’s

resentencing petition. The Supreme Court has now resolved this question in Patton. The

court held that “the record of conviction the parties [and the trial court] may consult at the

prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.”

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(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 608.) The record of conviction the parties may consult at

the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea

In Patton, the high court observed that “statements within Patton’s preliminary

hearing transcript contributed specific factual assertions about his conviction—namely,

that it was premised on him being the sole shooter.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 609.)

The court held that “Patton’s conclusory checkbox allegations alone could not create a

factual dispute about whether he played a meaningfully different role in the attempted

murder.” (Ibid.)

Summarizing, the Supreme Court noted that “Patton’s petition contains only a

checkbox declaration with legal conclusions, he submitted no reply, and he made no

argument when invited to do so at the prima facie hearing.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at

p. 609.) In doing so, “Patton offered only conclusory allegations of entitlement to

resentencing relief under section 1172.6 in response to a record of conviction that the

lower courts viewed as foreclosing it because that record foreclosed the conclusion that

Patton’s conviction was under a now-invalid homicide theory.” (Ibid.) Patton reaffirmed

that, “before ordering an evidentiary hearing, a trial court may properly, at the prima facie

stage, reference the record of conviction to “ ‘ “refut[e]” ’ ” [citation] conclusory

allegations in furtherance of its statutorily required screening function at that juncture of

a section 1172.6 proceeding.” (Ibid.) “[T]his is not,” the high court emphasized,

“impermissible factfinding” and, thus, the Court of Appeal there “correctly concluded

Patton had not, on the record before it, made a prima facie showing.” (Ibid.)

7
Patton likened the defendant’s requisite prima facie showing to that in habeas

cases or, in the civil context, to overcome a demurrer. In the former, “conclusory

allegations do not meet a habeas petitioner’s prima facie burden”; rather, “a habeas

petitioner [must] ‘detail[] the facts upon which a conclusionary allegation is based.’”

(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 606.) Patton explained that this “particularity

requirement helps courts identify ‘material issues of disputed fact’ ” and, as such,

“ ‘simply demands of [the petitioner] a measure of frankness in disclosing [the relevant]

factual situation’ supporting relief.” (Ibid..)

By way of an example likening a section 1172.6 petitioner’s prima facie showing

to that necessary in the demurrer context, Patton noted: “A dispute regarding the basis of

a conviction might arise if, for instance, a petitioner points to specific facts that identify

someone else as the direct perpetrator.” (Patton, 17 Cal.5th at p. 607.) The court

elaborated: “At the least, as the People note . . . , this may come from the record itself.

But absent specific facts, no such dispute arises, as Patton asserts, from mere latent,

speculative possibilities; that is, a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be

conjured from thin air or a legal conclusion. (See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western

Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 327 . . . [‘unsupported speculation and

argumentative allegations’ do not suffice for a pleading to survive a demurrer];

Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 398 . . . [same].)” (Patton, supra, 17

Cal.5th at pp. 607-608.)

So it is here. Defendant’s conclusory allegation in his petition that he could not

now be convicted of murder under current law was insufficient to make his prima facie

8
showing for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing relief. This bare assertion was

unbolstered by any specific facts to rebut the prosecution’s contrary showing. The

prosecution’s contrary showing was properly founded in the preliminary hearing

transcript to indicate that defendant was the victims’ actual killer and indeed sole shooter.

As such, defendant, contrary to his assertion, could properly be subject to prosecution and

conviction for murder under current law. In view of defendant’s failure to present

anything in his petition or his attorney’s supplemental brief in rebuttal, and indeed

lacking any rebuttal whatsoever of the prosecution’s showing, the trial court did not err in

concluding defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden. As the Supreme Court

explained, while this burden “is a ‘ “bar” ’ that is set ‘ “very low,” ’ ” it is not nonexistent.

(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 607.) By statute, “a ‘petitioner’ must nonetheless ‘make[]

a prima facie showing’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) to frame a disputed issue that entitles that

petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid.)

In Patton, the defendant at oral argument in the Supreme Court requested “to be

permitted to plead additional facts on remand,” in the event the court—as it did—

affirmed denial of his section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17

Cal.5th at p. 609.) Despite upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court ordered

remand based on the defendant’s request. (Ibid.) Remand no doubt was also informed

by: (1) the uncertainty of the law reflected in divergent Court of Appeal decisions up to

that point on the relevant issues (see id. at p. 603), and (2) the Supreme Court’s new

reminder and endorsement that “[c]ourts should . . . implement section 1172.6 so that

petitioners have ‘meaningful’ opportunities to present their petitions” (id. at p. 608),

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including by way of pleading additional facts with specificity as in the habeas and

demurrer contexts. (Id. at p. 609.) Thus, the Patton court held there that: “out of an

abundance of caution—[we] will order a remand to the superior court with directions for

that court to consider an amended petition should Patton, within 30 days of that remand,

seek to file one.” (Ibid.)

Here, we see no need to hold oral argument simply for defendant to make a

request for remand, if he so desires. Instead, the Supreme Court’s example informs our

disposition ordering remand, but leaving it for defendant to decide, as in Patton, whether

to seek to file an amended petition.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to consider an

amended petition if defendant, within 30 days of our remittitur, seeks to file one. We

otherwise affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s resentencing petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.

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