CourtListener 10374569•In re E.M. CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 4/8/25 In re E.M. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re E.M. et al., Persons Coming B338020
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00598A–E)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELMER M.,
Defendant and Appellant;
MARIA R.O.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela Deavours, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
No appearance for Plaintiff.
________________________
After sustaining juvenile dependency petitions, the juvenile
court declared Elmer M.’s (Father) children1 dependents and
placed them in the custody of Maria R.O. (Mother) under the
court’s supervision. At Mother’s request, the court issued a
restraining order protecting her and the children from Father.
The restraining order contains an exception permitting Father to
have weekly, monitored visits with the children. On appeal,
Father challenges the issuance of the restraining order, arguing
there was insufficient evidence to support it. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2024, the juvenile court sustained petitions,
with amendments, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
1 The court found Father was the “presumed” father of three
of the children and the “biological” father of the other two. The
legal distinction between these parentage statuses is not relevant
to this appeal.
2
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).2 The petitions were based
upon Mother’s failure to provide appropriate parental care and
supervision, which resulted in sexual abuse of one child by
members of their household and put the other children at risk.
Father was non-offending in the petitions as sustained. The
juvenile court placed the children with Mother and ordered
services for both parents.
Immediately following the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court addressed Mother’s request for a
permanent restraining order protecting her and the children from
Father. Each of the children’s counsel joined in Mother’s request.
The juvenile court granted the request and issued a permanent
restraining order,3 with a carveout for Father to have monitored
visitation with the children for a minimum of four hours per
week.
Father timely appealed.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
3 The juvenile court originally issued the restraining order
for five years. Section 213.5, subdivision (d)(1), permits the court
to issue a restraining order for “no more than three years” absent
further proceedings. Father challenged this defect in a
supplemental opening brief. The juvenile court later modified the
restraining order to expire three years from the original date of
issuance, and this court took judicial notice of the modified order.
In his reply brief, Father withdrew his argument as moot.
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DISCUSSION
The juvenile court has authority to restrain any person
from contacting a dependent child and any parent of that child.
(§ 213.5, subd. (a) & (d)(1).) Restraining orders may be based on
“reasonable proof of harassment,” defined as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 527, 527.6, subds. (b)(3), (b)(7) &
(d); § 213.5, subd. (a).) Restraining orders based on domestic
violence may be supported by “reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a); § 213.5, subd. (a).)
While evidence of past physical harm may be sufficient to justify
the issuance of a juvenile court restraining order, the issuance of
the order “does not require such evidence[;] [n]or does it require
evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse.”
(In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997 (Bruno M.),
citations and italics omitted.) Evidence that a person “‘disturbed
the peace’” of the child or the other parent can suffice. (Ibid.)
The ultimate question is whether failure to issue the restraining
order may jeopardize the safety of the person for whom protection
is sought. (In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.)
“‘[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard
to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual
findings in support of a [juvenile court] restraining order and the
abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the court
properly issued the order.’” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
654, 670–671.) “‘[W]e view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable
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inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there
is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance
of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’” (Bruno M.,
supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996–997.) “It is not our function to
second-guess [the juvenile court’s] credibility determinations or
weighing of the evidence.” (In re S.G., at p. 672; see In re Eli B.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1072 [“[i]n reviewing the juvenile
court’s ruling we cannot reweigh the evidence or evaluate witness
credibility”; “[w]e must uphold the juvenile court’s factual
determination as long as it is supported by substantial evidence
“‘even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and
the trial court might have reached a different result had it
believed other evidence’””].)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s issuance
of a restraining order protecting Mother and the children from
Father. Mother reported that Father had raped her “many
times” from 2008 to 2018, and again in 2019. He would also
“throw . . . hot food on [her] face, hurting [her].” Father also
made threats against Mother and the children. In January 2024,
he told Mother he was going to “take [her] very far away, where
nobody knows” and that “one day one of [the] kids is going to
disappear.” In March 2024, Father called Mother and threatened
to take the children away from her. In April 2024, Father called
Mother four times in one day, and Mother told him to stop
contacting her. Mother stated she was afraid of Father and took
his comments about the children as threats to their safety as
well. Father originally admitted to social workers that there had
been domestic violence between him and Mother, but later
reported “[t]here was no domestic violence” and he “didn’t abuse
her . . . at all.” The juvenile court reasonably credited Mother’s
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statements, along with Father’s earlier admissions, in
determining that failure to issue the restraining order might
jeopardize Mother’s and the children’s safety.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
PULOS, J.*
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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