Nobility SD v. Rocher CA4/1

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Filed 4/8/25 Nobility SD v. Rocher CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NOBILITY SD, LLC et al., D083268

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-00002369-
CU-DF-CTL)
PERFECTE ROCHER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Keri G. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
The Vora Law Firm, Anujan Jeevaprakash and Nilay U. Vora, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dunn DeSantis Walt & Kendrick, James A. McFaul and Adam J.
Yarbrough and Genevieve Sauter, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
This case arises out of a struggling venture to open a new restaurant in
La Jolla. In the spring of 2022, partners Paul Basile and Jules Wilson
invited chef Perfecte Rocher to join them in developing the restaurant by
designing the menu, sourcing vendors, and the like. Believing that he would
become an equal member of the company that would own the restaurant,
Nobility, SD LLC (the LLC), Rocher agreed. By the fall, however, Basile and
Wilson became disillusioned with Rocher. When they eventually terminated
their working relationship with him, Rocher retained an attorney.
In a series of letters, phone calls, and e-mails over the next few months,
Rocher (through counsel) asserted that he remained entitled to his interest in
the LLC and other compensation. Basile and Wilson disagreed. After
negotiations proved unsuccessful, Basile, Wilson, and the LLC (collectively
Nobility) filed a complaint against Rocher asserting causes of action for
declaratory relief and slander of title. Rocher responded with a special
motion to strike the complaint in its entirety pursuant to the anti-SLAPP

statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)1 He theorizes that both of Nobility’s
claims were based on his attorney’s prelitigation communications, which he
maintains are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
The trial court denied the special motion to strike and Rocher appeals.
For reasons we explain, we independently conclude that Rocher has failed to
carry his burden of showing that Nobility’s claims arise from protected
prelitigation activity and therefore affirm the order denying the motion.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. “SLAPP” stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation.
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 882, fn. 2 (Wilson).)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Basile, Wilson, and their longtime friend Anthony Viveros created the
LLC in December 2021 for the purpose of opening a restaurant in La Jolla.
Rocher is an accomplished chef with experience at renowned restaurants
around the world. Beginning in March 2022, Basile and Wilson began
discussing the possibility of Rocher joining them in their venture. With the
understanding that he would receive an equal interest in the LLC, Rocher
agreed.
In April 2022, Rocher accepted an Executive Chef position with the
LLC. The employment offer letter described “Pre-Opening Expectations” for
Rocher, which included such tasks as creating the menu, sourcing vendors,
and designing the kitchen. The letter also outlined Rocher’s overall
compensation, which included a salary, benefits, a “3 [percent] from Gross”
management fee, and a “[percentage] of equity” in the LLC “to be equal as
other founders.” Rocher expected his membership interest in the LLC to be
formalized in an updated operating agreement sometime soon.
Rocher began working on the restaurant right away. In his view,
things started off smoothly. After a few months, however, tensions arose
between the four collaborators. Basile and Wilson became particularly
concerned about the “toxic” working relationship between Rocher and
Viveros. Although Rocher assured Basile and Wilson that he wanted to
continue working with Viveros, Viveros did not feel the same way, so Basile
and Wilson purchased Viveros’s share of the company in July 2022. Since
Viveros was primarily responsible for providing capital and finding investors
for the restaurant, the venture experienced financial setbacks.
Meanwhile, Rocher had been asking Basile and Wilson whether the
operating agreement had been updated to reflect his membership interest in

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the LLC. Basile repeatedly assured Rocher that a revised agreement was
forthcoming. Finally, in September 2022, Basile sent Rocher a draft of a
revised agreement granting Rocher a restricted membership interest that
would not vest until certain financial conditions were satisfied.
Before the operating agreement was finalized or executed, Basile and
Wilson’s relationship with Rocher broke down. According to Basile, Rocher
was unproductive, and the few ideas he came up with were unworkable and
too expensive. They had drastically different visions for the restaurant.
Basile and Wilson became “overwhelmed” with the lack of progress and the
“significant lack of capital.” They stopped paying Rocher on time and then
terminated him in late October 2022.
At this point, Rocher retained attorney Chet H. Olsen to pursue claims
for wrongful termination and breach of contract. On October 27, 2022, Olsen
sent Basile and Wilson a letter that stated in critical part:
“We have reviewed agreements and documentation
pertaining to the relationship among [Rocher], the LLC and
its other owners. This documentation includes
emails . . . stat[ing] that Perfecte Rocher has no ‘rights
relative to Nobility SD, LLC’ and that ‘any pending offers’
relating to the LLC are terminated. Such unilateral
proclamations do not, however, end the relationship, the
LLC’s obligations or our client’s right to ownership and
compensation.

“Perfecte Rocher made substantial contributions to the
LLC. . . . As consideration for [his] contributions to the
LLC and its business, Perfecte was given a management
fee based on sales, an annual distribution and ‘equity to be
equal as other founders.’ This consideration was not a
‘pending offer’ as you reference in your emails, but rather it
was the consideration included in the [offer letter] binding
the LLC. [¶] . . . [¶]”

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“While an operating agreement was never finalized or
signed by any of the LLC members, this is not a
requirement for our client’s membership interest in the
LLC to legally exist. His membership interest was based
not only on the actions of you and the other members of the
LLC, but the inclusion of Perfecte as a founder of the LLC
and its business. [He] relied on promises made by you and
the LLC in emails, agreements, documents, and verbal
communications. . . .

“Mr. Basile, other members of the LLC and the LLC itself
have no legal standing or authority to exclude an owner of
the LLC and founder of its business. Taking another
owner’s contributions to the LLC and its business and then
excluding that owner from the proceeds of such effort is not
only contrary to normal business practices but also a
breach of contract and violation of the California
Corporations Code. Perfecte Rocher maintains his one-
third ownership in the LLC and continues to be entitled to
three percent of the gross sales of the restaurant.

“We fully expect you and the other LLC members to comply
with its legal obligations as outlined above. We look
forward to your assurances that this will be the case. I
suggest you or your legal counsel contact me immediately
to discuss properly addressing Mr. Rocher’s membership
interest in the LLC and his compensation pursuant to his
contract with the LLC. . . . [¶] . . . This letter is not
intended to be a complete statement of our client’s rights
and shall not be construed as a waiver of any legal or
equitable rights or remedies, all of which are expressly
reserved.”

In early November 2023, Olsen connected with counsel for Basile and
Wilson, James A. McFaul. In an initial phone call between counsel, McFaul
explained his clients’ position and asked that Rocher retract his claim to
having an interest in the LLC. According to McFaul, “[t]he prospect of
litigation was not discussed during this call.” In another call two weeks later,

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Olsen informed McFaul that Rocher would not retract his claim and made a
“settlement demand” for $250,000.
Later that same month, McFaul wrote a letter to Olsen formally
responding to the October letter and rejecting the $250,000 settlement
demand. As McFaul explained in the letter, Basile and Wilson took the
position that Rocher would only become entitled to the management fee and
the interest in the LLC upon completing his Pre-Opening Expectations,
which he failed to do. They asserted that Rocher was unproductive and had a
“combative attitude” that “drove away talent” such as Viveros. This put the
restaurant project months behind schedule and lacking in investors. After
five months of working with Rocher, Basile and Wilson felt they had no choice
but to remove him from the project and start over from the beginning.
The letter made clear that Rocher’s assertion that he holds an interest
in the LLC “cannot – and will not – be allowed to sit idle while [the company]
continues to pursue the opening of a restaurant.” Basile and Wilson gave
Rocher two choices: (1) in exchange for Rocher affirming he holds no interest
in the LLC and a mutual release of claims, they would assign him the rights
to his ideas for the restaurant (e.g., a name and an associated website
domain); or (2) Rocher could purchase their interests in the LLC. If Rocher
was not amenable to either of those choices, Basile and Wilson would “pursue
an immediate action for, at the very least, a declaration” that Rocher had no
interest in the company.
Counsel continued to discuss their clients’ settlement positions via e-
mail and phone over the next several weeks. On January 4, 2023, Olsen sent
an e-mail to McFaul that stated in part:

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“During our call, I indicated that [Rocher was] not
interested in what your client[s] . . . proposed and I urged
you to get back a dollar figure response to the $250,000
offer. Based on what you told me, I was expecting to hear
back from you with a number. Without such a counteroffer
. . . , you are asking my client[ ] to negotiate against
[himself] by lowering [his] own offer. [He is] unwilling to
do this. It remains [Rocher’s] position that contributions
were made to the business that were used by the LLC and
its other owners. The position that ownership rights exist
also remains. [¶] I hope you can now follow up with your
client[s] and a counteroffer is presented. Otherwise, we
will need to discuss other ways to address this situation.”

In an e-mailed response, McFaul maintained that Basile and Wilson
would not make any monetary offer. He reiterated that Rocher’s “continued
assertion” that he holds an interest in the LLC was “baseless,” inhibited the
company from acquiring new investors—“because who wants to invest in a
company where the ownership is being disputed?”—and in turn delayed the
project. McFaul again urged Rocher to “expressly withdraw his assertion of
any ownership interest in the company” or else “the damages associated with
[his] slander of title will only continue.” The record does not reflect any reply
from Olsen.
Basile, Wilson, and the LLC (collectively Nobility) sued Rocher on
January 18, 2023, asserting causes of action for declaratory relief and slander
of title. The complaint generally alleged that, soon after Rocher was
terminated, he “for the first time falsely claimed – and has since continued to
falsely claim – that he is a member of [the LLC].”
In their first cause of action for declaratory relief, Nobility further
alleged: “An actual controversy has developed and presently exists between
[Nobility] and Rocher concerning whether (or not) Rocher is a member of
[the LLC]. [Nobility] assert[s] that Rocher is not a member of [the LLC].

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Rocher asserts – falsely and without any legal or factual basis upon which to
tether such an assertion – that he is a member of [the LLC]. And Rocher
refuses to recant such assertion.” Nobility sought a judgment declaring that
Rocher was not a member of the company.
In their second cause of action for slander of title, Nobility alleged that
“Rocher asserts that he is an owner of a membership interest in [the LLC],
casting doubt on the existing members of [the LLC], as well as the ownership
interests Basile and Wilson hold in [the LLC].” Nobility explained that they
were “compelled to reproduce Rocher’s false statement to investors” and that
“Rocher knows or should know that [they] are obligated” to make such
disclosures. They claimed to suffer financial harm in the form of project
delays and legal expenses.
In the course of discovery, Rocher asked Nobility to “[d]escribe in detail
each and every time Rocher has claimed that he is a member of [the LLC] as
alleged in” the complaint. (Some capitalization omitted.) In response,
Nobility identified: (1) the October 27, 2022 letter from Olsen; (2) subsequent
phone calls between Olsen and Nobility’s counsel; and (3) the January 4, 2023
e-mail from Olsen.
After receiving these discovery responses, Rocher filed an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike the complaint in its entirety. He contended that both causes
of action were solely based upon communications from Olsen to McFaul.
Rocher characterized these as “prelitigation and settlement communications”
made in good faith and in serious contemplation of filing his own lawsuit

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against Nobility.2 Accordingly, Olsen’s communications were statements
made “before” a judicial proceeding or “in connection with an issue under
consideration or review” by a judicial body, qualifying for anti-SLAPP

protection. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2).)3 Rocher further contended that,
because Olsen’s communications were made in good faith and in serious
contemplation of litigation, they were protected by the litigation privilege
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) and therefore could not be used to support
Nobility’s claims. And since both causes of action were based entirely on
those communications, Rocher maintained that Nobility could not
demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.
In opposition, Nobility focused on the October letter. They argued their
claims did not arise from the letter itself, but rather from Rocher’s asserted
interest in the LLC. The fact that Olsen communicated this position in
writing did not “make the subject matter of the dispute ‘protected’ or
‘privileged’ in any fashion.” In their view, this was essentially a property
dispute and Olsen’s letter merely evidenced that dispute. Even assuming

2 One month after filing his anti-SLAPP motion, Rocher (and his wife,
who provided certain services for the LLC after Viveros’s departure) filed a
complaint against Nobility asserting more than a dozen causes of action,
including claims sounding in fraud, breach of contract, and wrongful
termination, as well as Labor Code violations.
3 Rocher also suggested, to the extent that “wrongs committed by
[Nobility] against business partners and employees would be of interest to
those who wished to patronize or work at” the restaurant, Olsen’s statements
furthered his right of petition “ ‘in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest’ ” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
He does not renew that argument on appeal. To the extent he mentions
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) in his reply brief, we consider the argument
untimely and undeveloped. (See People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1218 (Rangel) [“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of
an issue raised initially in the reply brief’ ”].)
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their claims arose from the letter itself, Nobility argued that anti-SLAPP
protection did not apply because the letter did not mention, let alone threaten
or propose, litigation. In supporting declarations, Basile affirmed that
Nobility did not understand the letter to be proposing or threatening
litigation, and McFaul stated that Rocher’s litigation counsel “commented to
[him] that it was likely that Rocher would have simply gone his separate way
had [Nobility] not initiated this action.” For these same reasons, Nobility
argued that Rocher was not entitled to claim the litigation privilege and their
causes of action were otherwise meritorious.
Rocher maintained on reply that Nobility’s causes of action were
necessarily based on Olsen’s communications because he has not asserted a
membership interest in the LLC in any other context. And even though the
October letter and the January e-mail did not use the word “litigation,” the
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the language these
communications did use—such as seeking “assurances” that the LLC will
“comply with its legal obligations,” requesting an “immediate” response from
counsel, and proposing to discuss “other ways to address this situation” if
Nobility did not provide a counteroffer—is that litigation was imminent.
As to the merits, he reiterated that the litigation privilege applied, and
pointed out that Nobility failed to produce admissible evidence of damages
to support their slander of title claim.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion.
As an initial matter, it found that Nobility’s claims were based on the October
letter and the January e-mail. It rejected Nobility’s suggestion to disregard
any communications following the October letter, as the complaint alleged
that soon after Rocher was terminated, he “for the first time falsely claimed –
and has since continued to falsely claim – that he is a member of [the LLC].”

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(Italics added.) But the court declined to analyze the phone calls that took
place between the letter and the e-mail, as Rocher provided inadequate
evidence “as to the content and context” of the calls to determine whether
they contained protected statements.
The court then found that neither the October letter nor the January e-
mail related to litigation that was contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration, as necessary to merit protection under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1) or (2). As to the letter, the court saw no threat or mention
of litigation. The references to a “breach of contract” and a “violation of the
California Corporations Code,” the reservation of rights, and the other
phrases that Rocher highlighted in the letter did not, without more, evidence
a contemplated litigation. The court also noted that Rocher did not file his
own suit against Nobility until six months after the letter.
As to the e-mail, the court again detected no mention or threat of
litigation. The references to settlement discussions and “other ways to
address this situation” were, in the court’s view, “insufficient to convey the
requisite intent to pursue litigation.” On this point, the trial court found
support in Nirschl v. Schiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 386 (Nirschl), where
the appellate court observed that “ ‘statements made in a pre-litigation
negotiation are not automatically protected under the anti-SLAPP law just
because they relate to ‘settlement.’ ” (Id. at p. 404.)
Having decided that Rocher failed to demonstrate that Nobility’s
complaint arose from protected activity, it declined to reach the further issue
whether Nobility had established minimal merit to their claims.

DISCUSSION

Rocher contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike
the complaint. He maintains that both of Nobility’s claims were based on

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Olsen’s communications collectively. Apparently inspired by an earlier
decision of this court—RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc.,
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413 (RGC Gaslamp)—Rocher presents a slightly
different theory on appeal as to why these communications are protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute. In the trial court, he asserted these communications
were made in good faith while seriously contemplating filing his own lawsuit,
which is the test the trial court applied. On appeal, he suggests this was the
incorrect standard. He now seeks to characterize Olsen’s October
correspondence as a “demand letter” which, in his view, means that the letter

itself and the subsequent communications are categorically protected.4
For reasons we explain, we reject Rocher’s reframing, which is
premised on a misapplication of RGC Gaslamp. We otherwise agree with the
trial court that Rocher failed to demonstrate that Nobility’s claims arise from
protected prelitigation activity. We therefore do not reach the question
whether Nobility established minimal merit to their claims, and affirm the
denial of the motion.

A. Anti-SLAPP Motions Generally

“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that

4 We recognize the general rule that new theories not raised in the trial
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. (Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) Of course, the line
between a “new theory” and a “revised” or “enhanced” one is not always clear,
and here Nobility does not appear to assert that this modification of Rocher’s
theory should not be considered. In any event, we would exercise our
discretion to consider the merits of Rocher’s overall argument.
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person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 883–884; see § 425.16.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process.
Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park), quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)
“[T]he Legislature has defined such protected acts in furtherance of speech
and petition rights to include a specified range of statements, writings, and
conduct in connection with official proceedings and matters of public
interest.” (Park, at p. 1062; see § 425.16, subd. (e).) As relevant here, the
anti-SLAPP statute protects any written or oral statement made “before” a
judicial proceeding or “in connection with an issue under consideration or
review” by a judicial body. (Id., subd. (e)(1) & (2).) “If the defendant carries
its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least
‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park, at p. 1061.) The Supreme Court has described “this
second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) “If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1009.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants
from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral, at p. 384.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our
own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.

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In addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts
upon which liability is based. We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but
accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary
evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter
of law.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067, citations omitted.)

B. Declaratory Relief

On appeal, Nobility does not dispute that both of its claims arise from
Olsen’s communications. In our independent judgment, however, the
declaratory relief claim is based on the dispute between the parties as to
whether Rocher holds an interest in the LLC. Olsen’s communications
merely evidence Rocher’s position in that dispute. Because Rocher does not
argue that simply taking a position in a dispute can constitute protected
activity, he has not carried his burden with respect to that claim.
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or
forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) “[A] claim
is not subject to a motion to strike simply because it contests an action or
decision that was arrived at following speech or petitioning activity, or that
was thereafter communicated by means of speech or petitioning activity.
Rather, a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself
is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading
to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Id. at p. 1060.) Thus,
“in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of
the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those
elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063.)
To qualify for declaratory relief, Nobility must demonstrate “two
essential elements: ‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an
actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Nobility’s]

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rights or obligations.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City

(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582; see § 1060.)5 “A controversy regarding
the status of one claiming membership in a corporation is a proper subject of
a declaratory judgment.” (Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan (1944) 23
Cal.2d 719, 731.) “ ‘The “actual controversy” language in . . . section 1060
encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and
duties of the parties.’ It does not embrace controversies that are ‘conjectural,
anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion
from the court.’ Thus, while a party may seek declaratory judgment before
an actual invasion of rights has occurred, it must still demonstrate that the
controversy is justiciable. And to be justiciable, the controversy must be
ripe.” (Wilson & Wilson, at p. 1582, citations omitted.) “ ‘A controversy is
“ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have
sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be
made.’ ” (Id. at p. 1573.)
Other cases involving anti-SLAPP motions to strike declaratory relief
claims are instructive here. In City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th

5 At oral argument, Rocher’s counsel stated that the declaratory relief
issue was “effectively moot” because Rocher no longer claims “that he owns
any piece of the LLC.” We suspect that counsel was referencing a contention
raised in the reply brief. Specifically, in arguing they could prevail on their
declaratory relief claim, Nobility pointed out that Rocher had admitted in a
declaration that “Mr. Basile and Ms. Wilson never fulfilled their promise of
finalizing my membership in [the LLC].” In response, Rocher asserted that
because he conceded he was not a current member, there was no actual
controversy, and therefore Nobility could not prevail on their claim. At the
same time, Rocher plainly requests this court to order the trial court to
dismiss Nobility’s entire complaint. Accordingly, we will not construe
counsel’s remarks at oral argument as an abandonment of his contention
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the declaratory
relief claim.
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69 (Cotati), the city adopted a mobilehome park rent control program. (Id.
at p. 72.) Several owners of mobilehome parks sued the city in federal court
seeking declaratory relief, among other remedies. (Ibid.) In turn, the city
sued the owners in state court, similarly asserting a declaratory relief claim.
(Ibid.) The city alleged that “ ‘[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now
exists between” the city and the owners “ ‘in that [the city] contends that the
[mobilehome park rent stabilization] ordinance and resolution are valid and
enforceable’ ” whereas the owners “ ‘contend that said ordinance, on its face is
unenforceable, invalid, and void as effecting an unconstitutional taking . . . .”
(Ibid.) The owners filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the city’s complaint,
arguing the city’s action arose from the owners filing their federal action,
which constituted protected petitioning activity. (Id. at pp. 72–73.)
The Supreme Court disagreed. It determined that the actual
controversy underlying the city’s action (as well as the owners’ federal action)
was the constitutionality of the rent control ordinance. (Cotati, supra, 29
Cal.4th at pp. 74, 79–80.) Although the owners’ federal action informed the
city of the existence of an actual controversy justifying declaratory relief, and
therefore may have prompted the city to file its action, this does not mean the
city’s declaratory relief claim arose from the federal action. (Id. at pp. 74, 77–
80.) The court thus concluded that the owners failed to meet their burden of
demonstrating the city’s claim arose from protected activity. (Id. at p. 76.)
Similarly, in City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301
(Alhambra), D’Ausilio sued the city for civil rights violations and the parties
settled. (Id. at p. 1303.) The settlement agreement included a provision
(Section 3.8) that prohibited D’Ausilio from representing, participating, or
advocating for city employees in any matter involving the city for a period of
time. (Id. at p. 1304.) One year later, D’Ausilio encouraged members of a

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local firefighter’s organization to join a planned demonstration against the
city, and participated in a protest by city employees against the city. (Ibid.)
The city sued D’Ausilio for declaratory relief, among other claims, alleging
“that an ‘actual controversy has arisen and now exists’ between the parties
‘concerning their respective rights and duties’ under Section 3.8.” (Ibid.) It
sought a judicial determination of the validity of Section 3.8 and whether
D’Ausilio violated that provision. (Id. at pp. 1304–1305.) D’Ausilio filed an
anti-SLAPP motion to strike the declaratory relief claim. (Id. at p. 1305.)
In Alhambra, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, it was undisputed that
D’Ausilio’s alleged activities involving demonstrations against the city
qualified as protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 1307.)
It was also undisputed that his activities triggered the city’s lawsuit. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal determined, however, that the declaratory relief claim
did not arise from those protected activities “but from an actual, present
controversy between the parties regarding the scope and enforceability of
Section 3.8 of the settlement agreement.” (Id. at p. 1307.) The appellate
court elaborated: “While [D’Ausilio’s] protected speech activities may have
alerted the City that an actual controversy existed regarding the legality of
Section 3.8, the speech itself does not constitute the controversy. The City
did not sue [D’Ausilio] because he engaged in protected speech; the City sued
him because it believed he breached a contract which prevented him from
engaging in certain speech-related conduct and a dispute exists as to the
scope and validity of that contract.” (Id. at p. 1308.)
Applying the logic of Cotati and Alhambra here, we reach the same
conclusion. The actual controversy underlying Nobility’s declaratory relief
action is whether Rocher holds a membership interest in the LLC. Indeed,
Nobility alleges that “[a]n actual controversy has developed and presently

17
exists between [them] and Rocher concerning whether (or not) Rocher is a
member of [the LLC]. [Nobility] assert[s] that Rocher is not a member of [the
LLC]. Rocher asserts . . . that he is a member of [the LLC]. And Rocher
refuses to recant such assertion.” (Italics added.) Olsen’s letter and
subsequent communications may have apprised Nobility of Rocher’s
position—that he was entitled to an interest despite his termination—and
apparently prompted Nobility to file suit. But this does not mean its
declaratory relief claim arises from Olsen’s communications. In other words,
Olsen’s communications “may supply evidence of” the fact that Rocher has
taken a position adverse to Nobility “but that does not convert the statements
themselves into the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.)
Because Rocher does not argue that merely taking a position on
whether he is entitled to an interest in the company is, itself, protected
activity (nor can we conceive of such an argument), we must conclude that he
has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that Nobility’s declaratory
relief action arose from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

C. Slander of Title

Unlike the declaratory relief claim, we can accept the premise that
Nobility’s slander of title claim is predicated on Rocher’s expression (through
Olsen) of his position that he holds an interest in the LLC, since slander of
title requires proof of publication. (See Truck Ins. Exchange v. Bennett (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 75, 84 [“Disparagement of title occurs when a person, without
a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to
property and causes pecuniary loss” (italics added)].) Even accepting that
premise, we nevertheless conclude that Rocher has failed to make a prima
facie showing that his assertions are protected prelitigation communications.

18
As discussed above, the anti-SLAPP statute protects any written or
oral statement made “before” a judicial proceeding or “in connection with an
issue under consideration or review” by a judicial body. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)
& (2).) “Although the statutory language refers to litigation then pending, it
has been interpreted to apply to prelitigation statements. Communications
preparatory to, or in anticipation of, bringing an action are within the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 824 (Anapol), citation omitted.)
“But courts have also recognized that expanding anti-SLAPP protection
to any statement that involves potential litigation reaches too far,” as
“[a]lmost any dispute could potentially lead to – and so could be argued to be
in ‘anticipation’ of – litigation.” (Nirschl, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.)
“Protection of prelitigation statements ‘only arises at the point in time when
litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a
proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the

purpose of resolving the dispute.’ ”6 (Nirschl, at p. 401) The “ ‘ “in good faith
and under serious consideration” ’ ” criteria can be helpful in finding the line
between protected and unprotected prelitigation communications (id. at p.
401, fn. 7), particularly in cases where the relevant statements “do not

6 The “in good faith and under serious contemplation” criteria are
borrowed from the caselaw construing the litigation privilege set forth in
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). Our courts have “looked to the
litigation privilege as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) with respect to the first step of the two-step anti-
SLAPP inquiry . . . .” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 (Flatley).)
These are, however, “substantively different statutes that serve quite
different purposes” and are not completely coextensive in scope. (Id. at
pp. 322–323.)
19
intrinsically anticipate litigation.” (RGC Gaslamp, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at
p. 429; see also id. at pp. 429–431 [discussing examples of communications
that intrinsically anticipate litigation].)
As we understand it, Rocher’s principal argument on appeal is that
Olsen sent what amounted to a demand letter intrinsically anticipating
litigation such that the good-faith-and-serious-contemplation test should not
apply. We do not doubt that a true demand letter often or typically qualifies
as protected conduct. (See, e.g., Malin v. Singer (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1283,
1293 (Malin) [“Ordinarily, a demand letter sent in anticipation of litigation is
a legitimate speech or petitioning activity that is protected under section
425.16”]; but see, e.g., Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 305 [anti-SLAPP
statute does not protect a demand letter that constitutes criminal extortion].)
But we do not agree that Olsen’s communications, taken separately or
together, amount to a demand letter that intrinsically anticipates litigation.
The demand letters in the cases that Rocher relies on explicitly
threaten imminent litigation. For instance, in Malin, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th
1283, the defendant’s attorney sent the plaintiff a demand letter stating that
“my client intends to file the enclosed lawsuit against you” unless the dispute
was resolved to her satisfaction within five days and attached a copy of the
proposed complaint. (Id. at pp. 1288–1289.) Upon deciding that the demand
letter did not amount to criminal extortion as a matter of law, the Court of
Appeal easily concluded that the demand letter was protected under the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Id. at pp. 1294, 1300.)
Similarly, in Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903
(Blanchard), defendant DIRECTV sent demand letters to individuals
believed to possess devices used to steal its programming. (Id. at pp. 910–
911.) An initial round of demand letters threatened to “initiate legal

20
proceedings” and “abandon its attempts to negotiate” if the recipients did not
satisfy a list of demands. (Id. at p. 910.) Another round of letters “stated
that, unless the recipient contacted the sender within days, a lawsuit would
be filed based on a draft complaint that was enclosed with the letter.” (Id. at
p. 911.) The plaintiffs effectively conceded that these demand letters were
statements in furtherance of the right to petition. (Id. at pp. 911–912, 918.)
Unlike Malin and Blanchard, Olsen never sent a proposed complaint or
otherwise threatened to initiate litigation unless Nobility satisfied certain
demands. In the October letter, Olsen explained that Rocher retained his
one-third interest in the LLC and his three-percent management fee—
notwithstanding his termination and despite the fact that a revised operating
agreement was never finalized—based on his “substantial contributions” to
the project, his signed employment offer letter, and other promises made by
Basile and Wilson. Olsen did reference a “breach of contract and a violation
of the California Corporations Code”—not in describing legal claims that
Rocher would bring against Nobility in court, but in the context of explaining
why Nobility had no legal basis to deny Rocher his interests. Olsen and
Rocher “fully expect[ed]” Nobility “to comply with [their] legal obligations as
outlined,” “look[ed] forward to [their] assurances that this will be the case,”
and simply “suggest[ed]” that Nobility or their counsel contact Olsen to
discuss matters further. Nowhere in this letter did Olsen threaten or propose
to file suit if Nobility refused to recognize Rocher’s interests in the LLC and
the restaurant.
Based on the responding letter from McFaul, as well as his declaration
supporting Nobility’s opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, we know that
Olsen subsequently made a “settlement demand” for $250,000 over the
phone. We have no evidence, however, that Olsen demanded that Nobility

21
pay this amount or else Rocher would file suit. Rocher did not submit a
declaration from Olsen to support his anti-SLAPP motion, and his own
declaration does not speak to the monetary demand. It is entirely possible
that Olsen gave Nobility two choices that did not involve litigation: either
honor Rocher’s interests or pay him $250,000.
Nobility refused to pay Rocher $250,000, offering instead two “practical
paths” forward: (1) Rocher could receive the rights to his restaurant ideas in
exchange for affirming that he holds no interest in the LLC and a mutual
release of claims; or (2) he could purchase Basile and Wilson’s interests in the
LLC. McFaul specified in his November letter to Olsen that, if Rocher did not
accept either of those two options, Nobility would “be forced to pursue an
immediate action for, at the very least, a declaration that [he] holds zero

membership interest in” the LLC.7
Even at this point, when Nobility raised the possibility of filing suit,
Rocher did not respond in kind. Instead, he continued to pursue ways to
settle the dispute. In Olsen’s January e-mail to McFaul, he clarified that
Rocher was not interested in Nobility’s proposal. He expected Nobility to
come up with “a dollar figure response to the $250,000 offer.” Olsen
concluded the e-mail: “I hope you can now follow up with your client and a
counteroffer is presented. Otherwise, we will need to discuss other ways to

7 Rocher does not argue in his opening brief that Nobility’s threat of
litigation brought Olsen’s subsequent communications within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute. To the extent he touches on this argument in his reply
brief, we again consider the issue untimely and undeveloped. (See Rangel,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1218.) We therefore do not analyze the
communications in this light.
22
address this situation.” The vague reference to “other ways to address this

situation” cannot fairly be construed as an unequivocal threat of litigation.8
In our view, these communications do not clearly and/or intrinsically
anticipate litigation like the demand letters in Milan and Blanchard. They
are more ambiguous, such that the “in good faith and under serious
consideration” criteria and caselaw are useful here. Applying those criteria,
we independently reach the same conclusion as the trial court: Rocher has
failed to make a prima facie showing that Olsen’s communications crossed
the line from unprotected to protected conduct.
Of course, engaging an attorney to send a letter can often be a step
toward litigation. But not every communication from an attorney is protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute; the question remains whether litigation has
become more than a mere possibility. Here, Olsen’s October letter is most
reasonably read as a request for Nobility to comply with its contractual
obligations, as Rocher understood them. In the letter, Olsen tells Nobility
that their “unilateral proclamations”—terminating the “ ‘working
relationship’ ” with Rocher and asserting that he has no rights with the
LLC—did not, in fact, “end the relationship, the LLC’s obligations or
[Rocher’s] right to ownership and compensation.” As discussed, the letter
goes on to explain why Rocher remained entitled to his interests in the LLC
and the management fee, and why Nobility had no grounds to deny him those
interests. The letter ends with a request for “assurances” that Nobility will
“comply with its legal obligations as outlined above.”

8 Rocher points out that “Mediation privileged” is written at the top of
McFaul’s e-mail immediately preceding Olsen’s January e-mail. We are not
convinced that this one errant notation—which does not appear on any
earlier or subsequent e-mails from McFaul to Olsen—means that McFaul
understood Olsen to be threatening litigation.
23
As we read this letter, Rocher initially sought to enforce the agreement
outlined in his employment offer letter and continue his partnership with
Nobility. He hoped to work things out, not litigate. While it was conceivable
that Rocher might resort to litigation if Nobility refused to do so, there is
nothing in the October letter signaling that litigation was anything more
than a theoretical possibility at that point. As the court explained in Anapol,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 809, “[W]here one party to a contract requests the
other party to perform its duties under the agreement,” the “possibility of
litigation in the event of nonperformance is not enough to conclude the
[request] is made in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration.” (Id. at p. 828.)
In phone calls and e-mails over the next few months, the conversation
between Olsen and McFaul evolved into settlement discussions. “Statements
made to try to settle potential litigation (i.e., a dispute that has not yet
ripened into an actual lawsuit) may, depending on context, be protected by
the anti-SLAPP law. However, such statements are not automatically
protected just because the context might be called ‘settlement negotiations.’ ”
(Nirschl, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) As discussed, Rocher’s assertions
(through Olsen) that he maintained an interest in the LLC were made
primarily to urge Nobility to honor that interest, but alternatively to demand
a settlement payment of $250,000. The negotiations were geared toward
continuing the business relationship or resolving the dispute outside of court.
Nowhere in these communications does Olsen suggest or propose Rocher
filing suit.
At oral argument, Rocher implored this court to look beyond Olsen’s
statements, and focus on his own declaration filed in support of his anti-
SLAPP motion. He highlights Osborne v. Pleasonton Automotive Co., LP

24
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361, where the court observed—in the context of
deciding whether the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s claims at the
second step of an anti-SLAPP analysis—that a defendant’s declaration can be
“particularly probative” of their “state of mind regarding contemplation of
litigation.” (Id. at pp. 382, 384.) In the same breath, it noted that “a court is
not bound by such a declaration and must consider other relevant evidence,
including circumstantial evidence, bearing on the defendant’s state of mind,
and such evidence might corroborate or might undermine the defendant’s
sworn statement.” (Id. at p. 384.) Here, we have considered Rocher’s
declaration and it fails to show he was seriously contemplating litigation
before Nobility filed its lawsuit.
In his declaration, Rocher averred that he hired Olsen to pursue claims
for unlawful termination and breach of contract, among other claims, and
that he authorized Olsen to send the October letter “in good faith pursuit of
my claims and in anticipation that we would file a lawsuit if my claims were
not resolved.” (Italics added.) Rocher thus confirms that litigation was only
a possibility when he engaged Olsen. (See Nirschl, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 402 [where litigation will occur “ ‘only if negotiations fail, then future
litigation is merely theoretical rather than anticipated and the conduct is
therefore not protected prelitigation activity’ ”].) If Rocher began to seriously
contemplate filing suit at some point during the next few months, there is no
evidence that belief was ever expressed. (See, e.g., Anapol, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [defendant’s “self-serving declaration that, in his own
mind, at the time he submitted the claims, his mindset was that the claims
would likely be denied and litigation would be necessary . . . is insufficient to
establish a prima facie showing’ ”].)

25
To the contrary, other evidence strongly suggests that Rocher did not
seriously consider initiating litigation until after Nobility filed their lawsuit
against him. According to McFaul’s declaration, Rocher’s litigation counsel
“commented to [him] that it was likely that Rocher would have simply gone

his separate way had [Nobility] not initiated this action.”9 Moreover, as the
trial court noted, Rocher did not file his complaint until May 2023—roughly
six months after the first letter to Nobility, and four months after
negotiations with Nobility proved unsuccessful. We appreciate that, during
some of this time, Rocher was preparing his anti-SLAPP motion in response
to Nobility’s complaint. Still, the delay is further circumstantial evidence
that Rocher was not yet seriously considering litigation between October
2022 and January 2023, when the statements at issue were made.
On this record, we conclude that Rocher has failed to make a prima
facie showing that when he claimed his interest in the LLC (through Olsen),
the prospect of filing his own lawsuit had ripened into proposed litigation
actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.
Accordingly, Rocher has not shown that these assertions were protected

petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.10
Finally, our decision in RGC Gaslamp, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 413, on
which Rocher heavily relies, does not compel a different result. In that case,
the defendant recorded a mechanic’s lien to recoup payment due for sheet
metal work done on the plaintiff’s hotel project. (Id. at pp. 417–418.)

9 Rocher asserted on reply that this comment was “false” and
“unsupported” but he did not submit a declaration from his attorney who was
the other party to this phone call.
10 For the same reason, even if we had agreed that Nobility’s declaratory
relief claim was based on Olsen’s statements themselves, we would still
conclude that the claim did not arise from protected activity.
26
After the plaintiff secured a bond to release the lien, the defendant filed three
additional, duplicative liens, prompting the plaintiff to sue the defendant for
slander of title, among other claims. (Id. at pp. 417–419.) The trial court
granted the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike. (Id. at p. 417.) It was
undisputed that the plaintiff’s action arose out of the filing of the fourth lien.
(Id. at p. 425.) And the plaintiff acknowledged that recording a mechanic’s
lien was, in the abstract, protected activity. The plaintiff maintained,
however, that the defendant could not have filed repetitive liens in good faith
while seriously contemplating litigation. (Id. at pp. 419, 421, 426.)
We rejected the argument. As we explained, recording a mechanic’s
lien constitutes protected prelitigation activity because recording the lien is
a statutory prerequisite to bringing a foreclosure action. (RGC Gaslamp,
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 426, citing § 8460.) “It is not a prerequisite for
contractual performance or anything else.” (RGC Gaslamp, at p. 430.) In
other words, recording the lien intrinsically anticipates litigation. (See id.
at pp. 429–430.) We held this was sufficient for the defendant to carry its
burden of showing the action arose from protected activity. (Id. at p. 430.)
In arguing that the defendant needed to show that it recorded the
fourth lien in good faith while seriously considering litigation, the plaintiff
was really arguing that the defendant needed to prove it had good reason to
file a duplicative lien. (See RGC Gaslamp, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 426.)
We deemed this additional showing unnecessary and improper because, as
the Supreme Court has made clear, the defendant’s burden in the first step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis is to establish that its activity is protected by the
statute, not that its activity is ultimately lawful, valid, or properly motivated.
(Id. at pp. 425–427, 429; see also Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94;
Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 887–888.) “Any claimed illegitimacy of the

27
defendant’s acts is an issue that must be raised and supported by the plaintiff
in discharging its burden on” step two. (RGC Gaslamp, at p. 426.)
We cautioned that “[r]equiring a moving defendant to affirmatively
show that its statements were made in good faith while litigation was
seriously contemplated” could, at least in some contexts—such as in cases
where the prelitigation communication intrinsically anticipates litigation—
effectively shift the merits burden from the plaintiff to the defendant. (RGC
Gaslamp, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 429.) At the same time, however, we
recognized that the good-faith-and-serious-consideration test “may be helpful
in evaluating prelitigation statements that do not intrinsically anticipate
litigation.” (Ibid.)
In this case, as we have explained, Olsen’s communications do not
intrinsically anticipate litigation. And Nobility is not contending that these
communications would constitute protected activity but for the fact that they
were made for some illegitimate reason. RGC Gaslamp is therefore
distinguishable, and our concerns there are not implicated here.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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