People v. Davis CA2/6

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Filed 4/4/25 P. v. Davis CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333584
(Super. Ct. No. BA371110)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

LORENZO DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Lorenzo Davis appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95) concerning his 2011 voluntary
manslaughter conviction by plea. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957, 960, 971.) Davis contends, among other
arguments, that the court erred by relying upon the preliminary
examination transcript and engaging in impermissible
factfinding. We conclude that the preliminary examination
transcript conclusively establishes as a matter of law that Davis

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
is ineligible for resentencing. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th
549, 565-566 [“Where facts from the record of conviction are
undisputed, accepting them over contrary legal allegations that
are merely conclusory is not ‘ “factfinding involving the weighing
of evidence or the exercise of discretion” ’ ”].) We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal concerns crimes committed in Los Angeles by
Davis, an East Coast Crips criminal street gang member, against
three strangers walking to a neighborhood liquor store. Davis
wore gloves and held a firearm; one victim was shot and killed as
he fled through a hospital parking lot. Within minutes, police
officers located and detained Davis based upon a description of
his height and clothing (white T-shirt and black pants with
stripe). When detained, Davis had no firearm and a later test of
his hands for gunshot residue was inconclusive. Police officers
found 13 shell casings of the same caliber at the scene of the
shooting. The shell casings had no fingerprints. A surviving
victim identified Davis at a field show-up and at the preliminary
examination, however, as the lone shooter.
Preliminary Examination Transcript
Joe Flores and Joe Pineda testified at the preliminary
examination in the prosecution against Davis. On May 7, 2010,
Flores, Pineda, and Arturo Segura walked to a liquor store near
South Main Street in Los Angeles. An African-American man
driving a red-colored four-door Pontiac shouted at the three men
“to get off the street.” There were no passengers in the vehicle.
The driver identified himself as an East Coast Crips gang
member, made derogatory comments about a rival gang, and
asked the three men if they were from the rival gang. Flores and
his companions replied that they were not gang members and

2
were there to buy beer. The driver stopped his vehicle and
threatened to shoot the men. He reached under his shirt near his
belt as though he had a firearm but never produced one. Flores
testified that the driver “had his hand under his shirt” and “was
holding his belt pretending that he had a gun.” Flores and his
companions ignored the driver and continued to walk to the
liquor store.
After the driver of the red Pontiac drove away, two men left
a nearby barbershop and asked Flores and his friends if they
were from the neighborhood. The three men replied that they
were walking to the liquor store to buy beer. The barbershop
men identified themselves as East Coast Crips street gang
members.
Flores and his friends purchased beer at the liquor store
and walked toward home. The driver of the red Pontiac returned,
this time with a front-seat and a rear-seat passenger. Flores
could not see or describe the front-seat passenger. Flores and his
friends ran though a hospital parking lot. The driver of the
Pontiac followed and the rear-seat passenger left the vehicle. He
was wearing gloves and held a firearm.
As Flores was running, he heard more than four or five
gunshots, some whizzing by his head. He thought the bullets
were fired from a single firearm. Flores turned around and saw
that Segura had been shot. Flores turned back to help Segura
but saw the rear-seat passenger run toward him. Flores was
“pretty sure” that the rear-seat passenger was still armed. Flores
feared that he would be shot, and therefore ran toward the
hospital entrance.
The rear-seat passenger approached Segura and punched
and kicked him as he lay on the ground. The passenger then

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returned to the red Pontiac rear-seat and the driver drove away.
Flores called for police assistance and officers soon arrived. They
located and detained Davis based upon Flores’s description of the
shooter’s clothing. When placed in the patrol vehicle, Davis
asked if this was “about a shooting or something.”
In a field show-up and again at the preliminary
examination, Flores identified Davis as the shooter; he was
certain that Davis was “the guy.” Flores described the shooter as
tall, skinny, light-skinned, and weighing 145 pounds; he stated
that he saw the shooter’s face and his clothing during the crimes.
Segura died from a gunshot wound to his chest.
Nolo Contendere Plea
On November 21, 2011, Davis pleaded nolo contendre to
voluntary manslaughter and two counts of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm. (§§ 192, subd. (a), 245, subd. (b).) He
also admitted that he personally used a firearm and committed
the crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. (§§ 12022.5, subd.
(b), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)2 Through counsel, Davis stipulated
to a factual basis for the plea based upon the police reports and
the preliminary examination transcript. He did not admit,
however, that he was the sole or actual shooter or admit the legal
theory or theories upon which the conviction rested. Pursuant to
a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of 35
years.

2
As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor amended the
information to charge voluntary manslaughter instead of murder,
and personal weapon use pursuant to section 12022.5,
subdivision (b) instead of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)-(e).

4
Resentencing Petition
On January 6, 2022, Davis filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing alleging that he was convicted pursuant to
theories of imputed malice.3 The prosecutor opposed the petition
and submitted the transcripts of Davis’s preliminary examination
and plea reflecting that Davis was the sole and actual shooter.
The trial court concluded that Davis did not establish a prima
facie case, and it denied the resentencing petition without issuing
an order to show cause. The trial judge stated: “[T]he
undisputed facts at the preliminary hearing . . . were that Mr.
Davis was the shooter in this instance and . . . that’s how the case
was prosecuted.”
Davis appeals and contends that the trial court erred by
relying upon the preliminary examination transcript and
engaging in impermissible factfinding. The Attorney General
supports Davis’s arguments in part. We disagree with both
parties.
DISCUSSION
Davis argues that his record of conviction does not
establish that he was the actual shooter and that the prosecutor
could have pursued a theory of accomplice liability.
Section 1172.6 was enacted to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) Section 189, subdivision (e)(3), as amended,
now provides that in cases where a death occurs during the

3 Davis checked each checkbox allegation on the pre-printed

section 1172.6 resentencing form.

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perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), a person is liable for murder only if
the person was the actual killer, the person acted with intent to
kill in aiding, assisting, or soliciting the killer, or if the person
“was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Section 1172.6 provides a procedure to petition for
resentencing for those who could not be convicted of murder
pursuant to sections 188 and 189, as amended, effective January
1, 2019. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) If a
defendant’s petition is facially sufficient, the trial court must
appoint counsel, entertain briefing, and proceed to the order to
show cause hearing to determine whether defendant has made a
showing of eligibility under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
(Lewis, at pp. 957, 960, 971.) At this stage, “[t]he record of
conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at
p. 971.) The trial court may deny the petition at the prima facie
state of the proceedings only when the facts in the record of
conviction conclusively refute the allegations of the petition. (Id.
at p. 974 [petition may be dismissed if allegations are “clearly
meritless” in light of the record of conviction].) It must do so
without factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 972.) Prima facie determination
is a question of law that we review independently. (People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
The preliminary examination transcript is part of the
record of conviction. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,

6
989, fn. 11.) Until recently, there was disagreement among the
appellate courts whether a trial court may consider the
preliminary examination transcript at the prima facie stage when
a conviction rests upon a plea. Our Supreme Court resolved that
disagreement in People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549. Patton
held that a petitioner’s conclusory allegations of entitlement to
resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.6 are insufficient to
make a prima facie showing where uncontroverted facts related
at the preliminary examination show that the petitioner was
convicted under a still-valid theory of liability. (Id. at p. 557.)
Accepting undisputed facts from the record of conviction does not
constitute factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 563.)
The purpose of a section 1172.6 prima facie inquiry is to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
“clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.)
Here the transcript of the preliminary examination reflects that
Davis was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as the sole and
actual shooter of victim Segura. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, 233 [as petitioner was the only participant in the
killing, he was not convicted under an invalid theory and could
not have made a prima facie showing of relief].) Davis’s
contention that other men present in the red Pontiac may have
been armed and may have shot Segura is speculative and not
supported by the uncontroverted evidence. (People v. Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, 567 [“mere latent, speculative possibilities
. . . a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured
from thin air”].) Davis’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to
make a prima facie showing pursuant to section 1172.6.

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Moreover, the trial court did not deny Davis due process of
law by the summary denial of his section 1172.6 resentencing
petition. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588-589.)
Davis is not being prosecuted for additional crimes and is not
being subject to additional punishment. (Id. at p. 588 [a section
1172.6 resentencing proceeding is not a criminal prosecution].)
He is merely seeking leniency for a valid conviction. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying the resentencing petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

CODY, J.

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Lisa B. Lench, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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