CourtListener 10372378•Conservatorship of M.C. CA4/3
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Filed 4/3/25 Conservatorship of M.C. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
Conservatorship of the Person of
M.C.
ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC G063844
GUARDIAN,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
Petitioner and Respondent, 01353455)
v. OPINION
M.C.,
Objector and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Mena Guirguis, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to Dismiss denied.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Andrea Coller and Janice L. Fay,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
After a jury found M.C. was “gravely disabled” within the
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meaning of Welfare & Institutions Code section 5008, subdivision(h)(1)(B),
the court ordered that he be placed in a “public locked facility.” M.C. appeals,
contending the court erred in denying his request to be placed in a “private
locked facility” due to the lengthy wait for an opening at a public locked
facility. As discussed below, we find no error because the relevant statutory
provision permits placement in a “public locked facility” and the trial court’s
decision to choose that placement over others is reasonable and supported by
substantial evidence. We thus affirm the judgment. However, the underlying
issue implicated in this appeal—indefinite detention of a mentally ill person
in jail while waiting for openings at mental health facilities—is an ongoing
concern, and we note this issue may need to be addressed by filing for
reconsideration with the trial court or via a petition for a writ.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 27, 2020, the Orange County District Attorney filed a
felony complaint charging M.C. with attempted murder and assault with a
deadly weapon. On September 8, 2021, the trial court found M.C.
incompetent to stand trial and committed him to a state institution for two
years pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.
On September 28, 2023, the Orange County Public Guardian
(Public Guardian) petitioned the court to reappoint it as the Conservator for
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All further statutory references are to the Welfare &
Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
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M.C., who was presently confined in Orange County jail, and establish a
conservatorship pursuant to section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B). Following a
jury trial on the petition, on February 22, 2024, a unanimous jury found M.C.
was “gravely disabled” within the meaning of section 5008, subdivision
(h)(1)(B).
Subsequently, the Public Guardian submitted a proposed
judgment that, among other things, authorized placement of M.C. in “a
medical, psychiatric, nursing, or other state licensed facility or state hospital,
county hospital, hospital operated by the Regents of the University of
California, United States government hospital, or other nonmedical facility
approved by the state Department of Social Services or an agency accredited
by the state Department of Health Care Services pursuant to . . . Section
5358[(a)(2)],” that is, in a “‘public locked facility.’” Counsel objected and
suggested placement in a “‘private locked facility.’” In response, the Public
Guardian argued a private placement would be inappropriate because the
private institution could reject the placement. The trial court granted the
Public Guardian’s request to authorize placement in a public locked facility.
It stated it was open to reconsidering placement if there were no changes
over the following year.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION TO DISMISS
The Public Guardian contends this court should dismiss the
instant appeal as moot because M.C. seeks only placement in a private locked
facility and it has “received a conditional acceptance for placement of [M.C.]
in a private, locked facility.” (Italics added.) M.C. opposes dismissal, arguing
he has not yet been placed in a private locked facility and “[t]here is no
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guarantee [he] would be transferred to a private, locked facility and receive
treatment” in a timely manner.
As of the time this matter was submitted, M.C. had not been
placed in a facility. After the case was submitted, the Public Guardian
informed this court that M.C. has been placed in a private locked facility.
Moreover, the challenged placement order has been replaced with a new
placement order due to the expiration of the conservatorship. Although the
case is technically moot, we exercise our discretion to resolve the issue raised
in this appeal as it involves a matter of continuing public interest that is
likely to recur while evading appellate review. (See, e.g., People v. Cheek
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897-898 [concluding the appeal of an expired
commitment order was moot, but addressing the issue raised because it was
“likely to recur while evading appellate review” and “involve[d] a matter of
public interest”]; People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1381 [declining
to dismiss appeal for mootness because issue of the sua sponte duty of trial
court in mentally disordered offender proceeding to consider suitability for
outpatient treatment is an issue of public interest that is capable of
repetition, yet evading review].). We thus deny the motion to dismiss.
II.
PLACEMENT ORDER
A. Applicable Law
“The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act [the LPS Act] governs the
involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California. Enacted by the
Legislature in 1967, the act includes among its goals ending the
inappropriate and indefinite commitment of the mentally ill, providing
prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders,
guaranteeing and protecting public safety, safeguarding the rights of the
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involuntarily committed through judicial review, and providing
individualized treatment, supervision and placement services for the gravely
disabled by means of a conservatorship program.” (Conservatorship of Susan
T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008-1009.) “The act authorizes the appointment of
a conservator for up to one year for a person determined to be gravely
disabled as a result of a mental disorder and unable or unwilling to accept
voluntary treatment.” (Id. at p. 1009, fn. omitted.)
“There are two categories of conservatorships under the LPS Act
based on its definition of gravely disabled: (1) an ‘LPS conservatorship’
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); and
(2) a ‘Murphy conservatorship’ pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B). [Citation.] A Murphy conservatorship may be
established if a person is criminally charged with a felony offense, has been
found mentally incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code section 1370,
and all of the following conditions exist: (1) the charges include a felony
involving death, great bodily harm, or a serious threat to the well-being of
another person; (2) there has been a probable cause determination and the
charges have not been dismissed; (3) as a result of a mental health disorder,
the person is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
against them and to assist counsel in their defense in a rational manner; and
(4) the person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by
reasons of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.” (In re Lerke (2024) 107
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Cal.App.5th 685, 697 (Lerke).)
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A “Murphy conservatorship” is named after the legislator who
sponsored the legislation. (Conservatorship of Lee C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
1072, 1085 (Lee C.).)
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“The person for whom the conservatorship is sought has the right
to a jury trial on the issue of whether the person is gravely disabled.
[Citation.] The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The
Murphy conservatorship expires after one year and the conservator may
petition for reappointment for a succeeding one-year period. [Citation.]” (Lee
C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086.)
“When ordered by the court after the hearing required by this
section, a conservator . . . shall place his or her conservatee as follows: [¶] . . .
[¶] (B) For a conservatee who is gravely disabled, as defined in subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (h) of Section 5008, in a placement that
achieves the purposes of treatment of the conservatee and protection of the
public.” (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1).) “The placement may include a medical,
psychiatric, nursing, or other state-licensed facility, or a state hospital,
county hospital, hospital operated by the Regents of the University of
California, a United States government hospital, or other nonmedical facility
approved by the State Department of Health Care Services or an agency
accredited by the State Department of Health Care Services, or in addition to
any of the foregoing, in cases of chronic alcoholism, to a county alcoholic
treatment center.” (§ 5358, subd. (a)(2).)
B. Analysis
M.C. contends his placement in a “public locked facility” violated
the LPS Act “as he would have no chance of being transferred from jail to the
court’s designated placement for the entire duration of his one-year Murphy
conservatorship.” His contention implicates two issues: (1) Whether
placement in a “public locked facility” is permissible under the LPS Act?; and
(2) Whether placement in a “public locked facility” as opposed to a “private
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locked facility” is reasonable in light of the backlog to transfer into the “public
locked facility”? We address each issue in order.
First, a conservatee in a Murphy conservatorship may be placed
in a “public locked facility” or a “private locked facility” or other appropriate
facility at the discretion of the court. The relevant statutory provision states
that “[p]lacement may include a medical, psychiatric, nursing, or other state-
licensed facility, or a state hospital, county hospital, . . . or other nonmedical
facility approved by the State Department of Health Care Services or an
agency accredited by the State Department of Health Care Services.” (§ 5358,
subd. (a)(2).) Both a “public locked facility” and a “private locked facility” fall
within the permissible placements allowed under the statutory provision.
Thus, placement in a “public locked facility” is permissible under the LPS
Act.
Second, in light of the “may” language in the placement
provision, the trial court has discretion to determine the placement. Here,
after hearing argument, the trial court determined placement in “a public
locked facility” was the most appropriate placement because as stated by the
Public Guardian, a private institution may reject the transfer due to M.C.’s
criminal history. M.C. does not dispute a private institution may reject the
transfer. Nor has he produced any evidence that placement in a “private
locked facility” would be materially better than a “public facility,” especially
in reducing any delay in the transfer. More important, the trial court stated
it was open to reconsideration of placement due to changing circumstances.
Accordingly, M.C. has failed to show any abuse of discretion in ordering
placement in a “public locked facility.”
M.C.’s related contention that placement in a “public locked
facility” violates his due process rights is meritless. In Conservatorship of
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Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, the California Supreme Court held the LPS
statutory scheme complies with all constitutional due process requirements.
(See id. at p. 183 [“Appellant’s due process rights are not jeopardized by our
interpretation”]; see also Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235
[“The due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to
conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act”].) As discussed above, that
statutory scheme permits placement in a “public locked facility.” M.C. was
given notice the Public Guardian would seek a Murphy conservatorship, a
unanimous jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was “gravely
disabled,” and he was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings,
including at the hearing on placement. He thus received all process due to
him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s placement order.
Although we affirm the placement order, we acknowledge the
concern that underlies this appeal and trial counsel’s objection. County jail is
not a legally valid placement for a conservatee in a Murphy conservatorship
under the relevant statutory provisions. (See Lerke, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th
at p. 699.) To the extent the lack of available openings in appropriate treatment
facilities is causing conservatees (and, specifically, M.C.) to languish in jail for
long periods of time awaiting transfer, that concern is properly addressed in the
first instance by the trial court, which is precisely what the court here suggested
when it invited M.C.’s counsel to come back to it and petition for relief if M.C. had
not received a transfer to a public locked facility in several months. Such a request
to the trial court might take the form of a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus; we offer no opinion on the proper procedural next
step. But until some form of relief is sought in the first instance from the trial
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court based on a developed factual record of what has actually transpired in M.C.’s
case, it is premature to ask this court for relief. The issue is not ripe for our review.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J., ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
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