Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC

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Filed 3/5/25; Certified for Publication 4/3/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ALLAN GUMARANG, B323083, B325256

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant
and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV09118)
v.

BRAEMER ON RAYMOND, LLC,
et al.,

Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Respondents.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Affirmed.
Citron & Citron, Thomas H. Citron, and Katherine A.
Tatikian for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Bradley, Gmelich & Wellerstein, Thomas P. Gmelich, Lena
J. Marderosian, Dean A. Reeves, and Mark I. Melo for
Defendants, Cross-complainants, and Respondents Braemer-
Caledonia Company et al.
Tyson & Mendes, David M. Frishman, and Aaron J.
Weissman for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Respondent
Braemer on Raymond, LLC.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and cross-defendant Allan Gumarang appeals
from the trial court’s order granting in part and denying in part
his special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute), 1 directed at the cross-
complaint filed by defendants and cross-complainants Braemer
on Raymond, LLC; Braemer-Caledonia Company; M&A Real
Estate Services, Inc.; and Deanne Cantu. 2 Gumarang also
appeals from the court’s order denying his request for attorney
fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. As we explain, the court
properly denied in part Gumarang’s special motion to strike.
We also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Braemer-Caledonia Company, M&A Real Estate Services,
Inc., and Cantu filed a respondent’s brief addressing both the
court’s order denying in part Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion
and its order denying Gumarang’s attorney fees motion.
Braemer on Raymond, LLC, which dismissed its cross-claims
against Gumarang before the court ruled on his anti-SLAPP
motion, filed a respondent’s brief addressing only the court’s
order denying Gumarang’s attorney fees motion. To avoid
confusion when addressing the two sets of respondents, we refer
to Braemer on Raymond, LLC as “Lessor,” and Braemer-
Caledonia Company, M&A Real Estate Services, Inc., and Cantu
as “Management.”

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denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees. Accordingly, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The lease
In May 2016, Lessor and Gumarang executed a “Standard
Multi-Tenant Shopping Center Lease” (Lease) through which
Lessor agreed to lease to Gumarang commercial property
(Property) in Pasadena for seven years. Gumarang intended to
use the Property to operate an ice cream parlor. Gumarang
personally guaranteed the Lease.
Several provisions of the Lease address the parties’
respective rights and obligations. Under Paragraph 7.2, Lessor
must, among other things, “keep in good order, condition and
repair the foundations, exterior walls, structural condition of
interior bearing walls, exterior roof, fire sprinkler system,
Common Area fire alarm and/or smoke detection systems, fire
hydrants, parking lots, walkways, parkways, driveways,
landscaping, fences, signs and utility systems serving the
Common Areas . . . .”
Paragraph 8.2 requires Gumarang to obtain general
liability insurance with a minimum coverage limit of $1,000,000
to protect himself and Lessor against “claims for bodily injury,
personal injury and property damage based upon or arising out of
the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance” of the property.
Paragraph 8.7 of the Lease, entitled “Indemnity,” provides:
“Except for Lessor’s gross negligence or willful misconduct,
Lessee shall indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the
Premises, Lessor and its agents, Lessor’s master or ground lessor,
partners and Lenders, from and against any and all claims, loss
of rents and/or damages, liens, judgments, penalties, attorneys’

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and consultants’ fees, expenses and/or liabilities arising out of,
involving, or in connection with, the use and/or occupancy of the
Premises by Lessee. If any action or proceeding is brought
against Lessor by reason of any of the foregoing matters, Lessee
shall upon notice defend the same at Lessee’s expense by counsel
reasonably satisfactory to Lessor and Lessor shall cooperate with
Lessee in such defense. Lessor need not have first paid any such
claim in order to be defended or indemnified.”
Paragraph 8.8, entitled “Exemption of Lessor and its
Agents from Liability,” states that notwithstanding Lessor’s or its
agents’ negligence or breach of the Lease, neither Lessor nor its
agents could be held liable for any injury or loss arising on or
from the property, including damage or injury caused by fire.
Instead, Paragraph 8.8 provides, Gumarang’s “sole recourse in
the event of such damages or injury [shall] be to file a claim on
the insurance policy(ies) that [Gumarang] is required to maintain
pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 8.”
2. The fire
In February 2017, after spending approximately eight
months renovating the Property, Gumarang opened his ice cream
parlor. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the Property.
The Pasadena Fire Department investigated the fire and
later released an investigation report. According to the report,
the fire originated in the Property’s rear storage room. There
were no “fire stops” in the walls of that room, and the Property
did not have functioning fire protection or alarm systems.
The report concluded that the fire was accidental and most likely
caused by “a non-specific electrical failure within an interior wall
of the structure.”

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3. Gumarang’s lawsuit
In March 2020, Gumarang filed this lawsuit. In January
2021, he filed the operative second amended complaint against
Lessor, Management, and others to recover damages stemming
from the fire that destroyed the Property. Against Lessor and
Management, Gumarang asserted causes of action for breach of
contract, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, and violations of Business and Professions
Code section 17200 et seq. Gumarang alleged that Lessor and
Management failed to ensure the Property was equipped with,
among other things, electrical and fire prevention systems that
were in good working condition, which caused the fire that
destroyed the Property. Gumarang also alleged that
Management failed to notify him that the Property lacked
adequate electrical wiring and fire prevention systems before he
executed the Lease.
4. Lessor and Management’s demand for defense and
indemnity
In February 2021, counsel for Lessor and Management sent
Gumarang a letter demanding that he “defend and indemnify
them and their agents . . . as required under the terms and
conditions of the [Lease]” and to place his insurance “carrier on
notice of this claim.” Gumarang’s counsel later denied Lessor
and Management’s request, claiming, among other things, that
the Lease’s indemnity clause applied only to claims brought by
third parties.
In March 2021, counsel for Lessor and Management sent a
similar demand letter to Gumarang’s insurance carrier.

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5. Lessor and Management’s answer and cross-complaint
In August 2021, Lessor and Management filed a cross-
complaint against Gumarang, as well as other individuals and
entities not party to this appeal. The cross-complaint asserted
the following causes of action against Gumarang:
(1) comparative indemnity and apportionment of fault; (2) total
equitable indemnity; (3) declaratory relief; (4) contractual
indemnity; (5) breach of contract; (6) declaratory relief; and
(7) declaratory relief.
Lessor and Management’s cross-claim for comparative
indemnity and apportionment of fault alleged that Gumarang
was responsible for causing the damages at issue in his second
amended complaint, and that he should be held liable for the
share of his judgment that is in proportion to his own negligence.
The cross-claim for equitable indemnity alleged that to the extent
Lessor and Management are held liable for the damages at issue
in Gumarang’s second amended complaint, they would be entitled
to complete indemnity from Gumarang because “any liability
would be based solely upon a derivative form of liability not
resulting from [Lessor’s and Management’s] conduct, but only
from an obligation imposed upon [them] by law.” As for their
first declaratory relief cross-claim, Lessor and Management
sought a declaration as to “the rights, responsibilities and
obligations” of Gumarang as to Lessor and Management.
Lessor and Management’s cross-claims for contractual
indemnity, breach of contract, and declaratory relief all arise out
of allegations that Gumarang agreed to defend and indemnify
Lessor and its agents, including Management, against any claims
arising out of his use or occupancy of the Property when he
signed the Lease. The cross-complaint’s fourth and fifth causes of

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action for contractual indemnity and breach of contract alleged
that Gumarang breached the Lease when he refused to defend
and indemnify Lessor and Management from any losses arising
from Gumarang’s occupancy of the Property, including the losses
caused by the fire at issue in Gumarang’s second amended
complaint. The cross-complaint’s sixth and seventh causes of
action for declaratory relief sought declarations from the court
that under the terms of the Lease, Gumarang is obligated to
defend and indemnify Lessor and Management against any
claims, losses, or damages arising out of his occupancy of the
Property.
On the same day they filed their cross-complaint, Lessor
and Management filed an answer to Gumarang’s second amended
complaint. The answer asserted affirmative defenses based on
several theories underlying Lessor’s and Management’s cross-
claims, including apportionment of fault, comparative fault, and
comparative indemnity.
6. Gumarang’s insurance provider agrees to defend
Lessor
In mid-September 2021, Gumarang’s insurance carrier
notified counsel for Lessor and Management that it would defend
Lessor, but not Management, against the claims raised in
Gumarang’s lawsuit because only Lessor was named as an
insured in Gumarang’s insurance policy. After agreeing to
defend Lessor, the insurance carrier provided new counsel to
represent Lessor.
7. Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion
Shortly after his insurance provider agreed to defend
Lessor, Gumarang moved to strike Lessor’s and Management’s
cross-complaint under section 425.16. Gumarang argued each of

7
the cross-complaint’s causes of action arose out of his protected
activity of filing his lawsuit against Lessor and Management.
Gumarang also argued Lessor and Management could not
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on any of their cross-
claims because the Lease’s indemnity provision applied only to
claims brought by third party claims and, in any event, that
provision was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
Management opposed the anti-SLAPP motion.
In October 2021, Lessor dismissed all its cross-claims
against Gumarang.
In June 2022, the court granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP
motion as to the cross-complaint’s first three causes of action for
comparative indemnity and apportionment of fault, total
equitable indemnity, and the first cross-claim for declaratory
relief, and it denied the motion as to the final four causes of
action for contractual indemnity, breach of contract, and the
remaining cross-claims for declaratory relief. As to the latter
group of cross-claims, the court did not reach a conclusion as to
whether they arose out of Gumarang’s protected activity under
section 425.16. Instead, the court found Management was likely
to prevail on those cross-claims because the Lease’s indemnity
provision applied to disputes between the parties to the Lease
and that provision was not unconscionable as applied to
Gumarang.
8. Gumarang’s attorney fees motion
In August 2022, Gumarang moved for $115,328.71 in
attorney fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c).
Gumarang argued he was the prevailing party because the court
granted his anti-SLAPP motion as to three of Management’s
cross-claims. According to Gumarang, he practically benefitted

8
by the court’s ruling on his motion because it “resulted in
significantly fewer factual allegations remaining to be litigated,
discovery and motion practice have been narrowed, future
litigation expenses will be significantly decreased and the parties’
litigation strategy was significantly impacted by the Anti-SLAPP
motion.”
Lessor and Management opposed Gumarang’s attorney fees
motion. Lessor argued Gumarang was not entitled to recover any
attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c) because,
among other reasons, Lessor dismissed its cross-claims against
Gumarang in response to Gumarang’s insurer accepting Lessor’s
tender for defense and indemnity under the Lease, not because of
Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion. Management argued
Gumarang was not entitled to recover attorney fees because he
was not a prevailing cross-defendant, as the practical benefits of
his partially successful anti-SLAPP motion were minimal and
insignificant.
The court denied Gumarang’s motion, finding he was not a
prevailing party for purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (c),
even though he succeeded in dismissing three of Management’s
cross-claims. The court explained that the anti-SLAPP motion
did not practically benefit Gumarang “because the three cross-
claims that were dismissed remain as affirmative defenses in
[Management’s] answer and the possible recovery against
[Management] did not change, nor did the factual allegations
that [Gumarang] must prove to prevail against [Management].”
The court also found that Lessor dismissed their cross-claims
against Gumarang because his insurer accepted Lessor’s tender
for defense and indemnity under the Lease, and not because of
Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion.

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Gumarang appealed from the court’s orders denying in part
his anti-SLAPP motion and denying his attorney fees motion.
We consolidated both appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not err when it denied in part
Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion
Gumarang contends the court erred when it denied his
anti-SLAPP motion as to Management’s cross-claims for
contractual indemnity, breach of contract, and declaratory relief
concerning Gumarang’s obligations under the Lease’s indemnity
provision. According to Gumarang, those cross-claims arise from
his protected activity of filing the underlying lawsuit because
they seek to hold him liable for suing Management to recover
damages from the destruction of the Property. Gumarang also
asserts that Management failed to show a probability of
prevailing on any of those cross-claims because the Lease’s
indemnity provision is unenforceable. As we explain, the court
properly denied Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion because none of
the challenged cross-claims arise from his protected activity.
1.1. Applicable law and standard of review
Under the anti-SLAPP statute, a cross-defendant may
move to strike cross-claims arising from certain speech or
petitioning activity. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson); see also § 425.16, subd. (h) [cross-
complaints are treated the same as complaints, and cross-
defendants are treated the same as defendants].) The statute
creates a two-step process through which the cross-defendant
must first show the challenged causes of action arise from
protected activity, meaning “any act . . . in furtherance of the
[cross-defendant’s] right of petition or free speech . . . in
connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

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To determine whether the challenged causes of action arise from
protected activity, we look at the “pleadings, and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); see also Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Under section 425.16, subdivision (e), an “ ‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Ibid.)
If the cross-defendant succeeds at showing the challenged
cross-claims arise out of its protected activity, the burden shifts
to the cross-complainant to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on those claims; otherwise, the court must strike them.
(Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610,
619–620.) However, if the cross-defendant fails to demonstrate
that any of the challenged cross-claims arise from protected
activity, the trial court may deny the special motion to strike
without addressing whether the cross-complainant has
demonstrated a probability of success on its cross-claims. (C.W.

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Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 698
(Mooradian).)
We independently review an order granting or denying a
special motion to strike under section 425.16. (Wilson, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) We engage in the same two-step process as
the trial court to determine if the parties have satisfied their
respective burdens. (Abuemeira v. Stephens (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1298.) If the moving party fails to show
that the challenged claims arise from protected activity, we may
affirm the trial court’s denial of the special motion to strike and
need not address whether the nonmoving party has demonstrated
a probability of success. (Ibid.)
1.2. Management’s cross-claims do not arise out of
Gumarang’s protected activity
The parties do not dispute that Management’s cross-claims
for contractual indemnity, breach of contract, and declaratory
relief concerning Gumarang’s obligations under the Lease’s
indemnity provision are all premised on common factual
allegations. The parties disagree, however, on what those
common allegations are. According to Gumarang, Management’s
cross-claims arise out of his protected activity of suing
Management to recover damages from the destruction of the
Property. Management, on the other hand, asserts that the
cross-claims arise out of Gumarang’s nonprotected activity of
breaching the Lease’s indemnity provision by refusing to defend
and indemnify Management against any claims, losses, or
damages arising out of his use or occupancy of the Property,
including the damages to the Property at issue in Gumarang’s
lawsuit. As we explain, we agree with Management that its

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challenged cross-claims do not arise out of Gumarang’s protected
activity.
As our Supreme Court explained, a “claim arises from
protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis
for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062 (Park).) To qualify as
protected conduct under section 425.16, the cross-defendant’s act
underlying the challenged cause of action must itself be an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or speech. (City of Cotati v.
Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati).) Put another
way, a “ ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning
activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of
liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
It is not sufficient that the challenged cross-claims were
filed in response to the cross-defendant’s claims. (City of Cotati,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 77.) Likewise, it is not sufficient that the
cross-claims may have been triggered by, or filed in retaliation
for, the cross-defendant’s litigation conduct. (Ibid.) Otherwise,
nearly all cross-claims would satisfy the first prong of the anti-
SLAPP statute’s two-step analysis, regardless of what conduct in
fact forms the basis for the cross-claims. (Id. at pp. 76–77.)
Instead, the focus under section 425.16’s first prong is on the
cross-defendant’s conduct that gives rise to his or her asserted
liability, and whether that conduct constitutes protected speech
or petitioning activity. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063, quoting
Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92.) “In short, in ruling
on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of
the challenged claim and what actions by the [moving party]

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supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.” (Park, at p. 1063.)
Here, all the challenged cross-claims are based on
allegations that the Lease’s indemnity provision requires
Gumarang to defend and indemnify Management against claims
arising out of his use or occupancy of the Property. Express, or
contractual, indemnity “refers to an obligation that arises ‘ “by
virtue of express contractual language establishing a duty in one
party to save another harmless upon the occurrence of specified
circumstances.” ’ ” (Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1151, 1158.) A claim for contractual indemnity is akin
to a claim for breach of contract. (See Mooradian, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.) Thus, a claim for contractual
indemnity and breach of contract based on a refusal to honor an
indemnity provision consist of the same elements: (1) the
existence of an agreement containing a contractual indemnity
provision; (2) the indemnitee’s performance of the relevant
provisions of the agreement; (3) a loss within the meaning of the
indemnity agreement; and (4) damages sustained as a result of
the breach of the indemnity agreement. (Ibid.; see also Four Star
Electric, Inc. v. F&H Construction (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1375,
1380.)
Here, Gumarang’s breach of Paragraph 8.7 of the Lease,
which Management claims requires him to defend and indemnify
Management against any losses or damages arising out of his use
or occupancy of the Property, constitutes the wrongful conduct
alleged in the challenged cross-claims. Specifically, Management
alleges that Gumarang agreed to be bound by Paragraph 8.7
when he signed the Lease. In its cross-claims for contractual
indemnity and breach of contract, Management alleges that

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Gumarang breached that provision by failing to defend and
indemnify Management against any claims arising out of
Gumarang’s use and occupancy of the Property, including those
related to the destruction of the Property at issue in Gumarang’s
lawsuit. In its cross-claims for declaratory relief, Management
alleges that Gumarang was required, under Paragraph 8.7 of the
Lease, to indemnify and defend Management against any claims
arising out of his use or occupancy of the Property.
To be sure, Management references Gumarang’s filing of
the underlying lawsuit in its cross-complaint. But that does not
mean that Management’s cross-claims arise from Gumarang’s
filing of that lawsuit. Rather, those allegations simply support
Management’s claim that Gumarang breached the Lease’s
indemnity provision by refusing to defend and indemnify
Management against any claims arising out of Gumarang’s use or
occupancy of the Property. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060
[“a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity
itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability
or a step leading to some different act for which liability is
asserted”].)
Mooradian, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th and Wong v. Wong
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 358 (Wong), both of which affirmed orders
denying anti-SLAPP motions brought against claims seeking to
enforce indemnity provisions, are on point.
In Mooradian, two homeowners sued several entities and
persons involved with the renovation of their home. (Mooradian,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691–694.) The homeowners alleged,
among other things, that the civil engineer with which they
contracted to perform part of the renovation work was liable for
incorporating into its design certain construction materials that

15
were not approved for use in residential construction within the
homeowners’ city. (Id. at p. 694.) The civil engineer and its
principal filed a cross-complaint against the homeowners,
asserting cross-claims for express indemnity, equitable
indemnity, and contribution. (Id. at p. 695.) Relevant here, the
civil engineer’s express indemnity cross-claim alleged that the
homeowners agreed to indemnification provisions in their
agreement with the civil engineer, which required the
homeowners to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the
engineer for any liability arising from the use of the construction
materials at issue in the homeowners’ lawsuit. (Ibid.) The
homeowners filed an anti-SLAPP motion targeting the civil
engineer’s cross-claims, arguing they arose from the homeowners’
protected activity of filing their complaint. (Id. at p. 696.) The
trial court denied the homeowners’ motion, finding the civil
engineer’s cross-claims did not arise from any protected activity.
(Id. at p. 697.)
The appellate court affirmed. (Mooradian, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 699–704.) It explained that not every
“allegation of protected activity supporting an element of a cause
of action subjects that cause of action to a challenge under section
425.16. . . . [I]n the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, care
must be taken ‘to respect the distinction between activities that
form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the
liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the
claim.’ . . . [T]he Supreme Court in both Park and Wilson made
clear ‘the speech or petitioning activity itself’ must constitute ‘the
wrong complained of.’ ” (Id. at pp. 700–701.)
Applying that analysis, the reviewing court concluded that
the homeowners’ act of filing their lawsuit was not the wrongful

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act forming the basis for their liability as alleged in the civil
engineer’s cross-complaint. (Mooradian, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
p. 701.) Instead, the court explained, the alleged wrongful act
giving rise to the civil engineer’s express indemnity cross-claim
was the homeowners’ failure to indemnify and defend the civil
engineer in breach of the parties’ agreement, including to
indemnify the civil engineer from any liability arising from the
use of the challenged construction materials. (Ibid.)
In Wong, a marital settlement agreement provided that an
ex-husband would transfer to his ex-wife his ownership interest
in an entity that owned commercial property and indemnify her
from “ ‘any liabilities attendant thereto.’ ” (Wong, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 361.) The marital agreement also provided
that the parties would indemnify each other for any undisclosed
liabilities, including costs and attorney fees. (Ibid.) After the ex-
husband and the ex-wife died, the entity that owned commercial
property was required to pay off a $5 million promissory note.
(Id. at p. 362.) That entity sued the ex-husband’s estate to recoup
the $5 million, and the ex-husband’s estate later sued the ex-
wife’s estate for breach of contract and express and equitable
indemnity to require the ex-wife’s estate to indemnify the ex-
husband’s estate for the costs and liabilities stemming from the
entity’s lawsuit. (Ibid.) The ex-wife’s estate filed an anti-SLAPP
motion, claiming that it had directed and funded the entity’s
litigation to recoup the $5 million. (Ibid.) Therefore, the ex-
wife’s estate argued, the indemnity claims brought by the ex-
husband’s estate were based on the ex-wife’s estate’s protected
litigation activity. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP
motion. (Id. at pp. 362–363.)

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The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the ex-wife’s
estate was sued for its breach of the indemnity provision in the
marital settlement agreement, not for its role in pursuing
litigation on behalf of the entity that owned commercial property.
(Wong, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 364–365.) Thus, the claims
brought by the ex-husband’s estate did not arise out of any
protected activity by the ex-wife’s estate. (Id. at p. 365.)
Similarly, in this case, it is not Gumarang’s filing of the
underlying lawsuit that forms the basis of Management’s cross-
claims for contractual indemnity, breach of contract, and
declaratory relief. Rather, it is Gumarang’s alleged breach of the
Lease’s indemnity provision by refusing to defend and indemnify
Management against claims arising out of Gumarang’s use or
occupancy of the Property that gives rise to those claims.
Gumarang relies on Long Beach Unified School Dist. v.
Margaret Williams, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 87 (Williams)
and Lennar Homes of California, Inc. v. Stephens (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 673 (Lennar Homes). Neither decision compels
a different result in this case.
In Lennar Homes, three homeowners—a single buyer and a
married couple—purchased homes from a builder under contracts
that contained indemnity clauses. (Lennar Homes, supra,
232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 677–678.) The single buyer and the
husband, but not the wife, brought a class action in federal court
against the builder, alleging fraudulent nondisclosure and
misrepresentation. (Ibid.) The builder later sued all three of the
homebuyers, including the wife, for express contractual
indemnity, seeking, among other things, to recover attorney fees
and costs from defending the federal lawsuit. (Id. at p. 678.)

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The homebuyers filed an anti-SLAPP motion against the
builder’s claims. (Id. at p. 677.)
The trial court granted the motion, and the reviewing court
affirmed. (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 677.)
Notably, the builder did not dispute that the single buyer and the
husband engaged in protected activity. (Id. at p. 680.) Instead,
the primary issue was whether the wife, who was not a party to
the federal litigation, was on the same footing as her husband.
(Ibid.) The reviewing court concluded, “no matter how the claim
[against the wife] is characterized, it is indisputable that [the
builder’s] claim is ‘based on’ the federal court litigation brought
by [her husband].” (Id. at p. 684.) The court explained, that “but
for” the single buyer’s and the husband’s federal litigation, which
were brought in part on the wife’s behalf, the builder’s claim
“against [the wife] would have no basis.” (Ibid.) The court
concluded “all three defendants adequately showed that [the
builder’s] claim against them arises from protected activity.” (Id.
at pp. 684–685.)
Like Mooradian and Wong, we decline to follow Lennar
Homes, which was decided before the California Supreme Court
clarified in Park and Wilson how to properly determine whether
claims arise out of protected activity under section 425.16.
(Mooradian, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 703; Wong, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 366.) Thus, the court in Lennar Homes did
not employ Park’s elements based analysis, nor did it “consider
whether the wrongful act giving rise to an express indemnity
claim for purposes of the first prong of section 425.16 was the
filing of the underlying action or the refusal to honor the
contractual indemnification obligation.” (Mooradian, at p. 703;
see also Wong, at p. 366.)

19
Williams involved a contract dispute between a school
district and the construction manager it hired. (Williams, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 90–92.) After the district terminated the
contract, the construction manager sued, alleging the termination
was retaliatory. (Ibid.) The district filed a cross-complaint
against the construction manager, claiming the manger breached
the indemnity provision in the parties’ contract when the
manager refused to defend the district against the manager’s
lawsuit. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the construction
manager’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Id. at p. 96.)
Relying on Lennar Homes, the reviewing court affirmed,
concluding the district’s cross-claims for defense and indemnity
“would have no basis without the Underlying Action in which it
seeks to be defended and indemnified.” (Williams, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) Even if the district’s cross-claim did not
arise out of the construction manager’s filing of the underlying
lawsuit, the court in Williams explained, it nevertheless arose out
of the manager’s protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4). (Williams, at pp. 98–99.) Specifically, the
court concluded that the construction manager’s lawsuit involved
a matter of public interest, and the manager’s refusal to fund the
district’s demand for defense and indemnity was conduct in
furtherance of petitioning activity. (Id. at p. 99.)
We also decline to follow Williams. Like Lennar Homes,
Williams did not employ Park’s analysis for determining whether
a claim arises from protected activity. In addition, Williams is
distinguishable from this case. Unlike the construction
manager’s lawsuit in Williams, Gumarang’s claims against
Management do not implicate any matters of public interest.

20
In sum, Management’s cross-claims for contractual
indemnity, breach of contract, and declaratory relief concerning
Gumarang’s obligations to defend and indemnify Management
under the Lease do not arise from protected activity. We
therefore need not decide whether Management demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on those cross-claims.
1.3. Management failed to cross-appeal from the
court’s order granting in part Gumarang’s anti-
SLAPP motion
In its respondent’s brief, Management devotes substantial
discussion arguing the court erred in granting Gumarang’s anti-
SLAPP motion as to Management’s first three causes of action for
comparative indemnity and apportionment of fault, total
equitable indemnity, and the first cross-claim for declaratory
relief. However, Management never filed a cross-appeal from the
court’s anti-SLAPP order. Management, therefore, cannot
challenge the court’s order granting Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP
motion as to the first three causes of action in its cross-complaint.
(Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 665 [to obtain
affirmative relief on appeal, the respondent must file a notice of
appeal and become a cross-appellant].)
2. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Gumarang’s request for attorney fees under
section 425.16
Gumarang next contends the court abused its discretion
when it denied his request for attorney fees under section 425.16,
subdivision (c), after finding he was not a prevailing cross-
defendant under the statute. First, Gumarang argues he is a
prevailing cross-defendant because his anti-SLAPP motion was
partially successful and provided him a practical benefit going
forward in this litigation. Second, Gumarang argues he is

21
entitled to attorney fees because Lessor dismissed all its cross-
claims against him after he filed his anti-SLAPP motion. As we
explain, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Gumarang’s attorney fees motion.
2.1. Appealability
As a threshold matter, Gumarang asserts the order
denying his request for attorney fees against Lessor and
Management is appealable. Lessor and Management do not
address this issue.
Section 425.16, subdivision (i) states that “[a]n order
granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable
under Section 904.1” (Ibid.) Likewise, section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(13), provides that an appeal may be taken from
“an order granting or denying a special motion to strike under
Sections 425.16 and 425.19.” (Ibid.) Neither statute expressly
states that an order denying or granting a motion for attorney
fees under section 425.16 is appealable.
We conclude the order denying Gumarang’s request for
attorney fees in this case is appealable. Generally, an
interlocutory order denying a motion for attorney fees that is
entered after an order denying or granting an anti-SLAPP motion
is not appealable. (Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139,
145–150.) But “ ‘where, as here, the issue of whether the anti-
SLAPP motion should have been granted is properly before the
appellate court, it would be absurd to defer the issue of attorney
fees until a future date, resulting in the probable waste of judicial
resources. When the first issue is properly raised, appellate
jurisdiction over both issues under section 425.16, subdivision (i)
is proper.’ ” (Workman v. Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039,

22
1055, fn. 7, quoting Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 265, 275.)
We therefore turn to the merits of Gumarang’s challenge to
the order denying his request for attorney fees under
section 425.16, subdivision (c).
2.2. Applicable law and standard of review
Under section 425.16, subdivision (c), a prevailing cross-
defendant is “ ‘entitled to recover [its] attorney’s fees and costs.’ ”
The purpose of the attorney fees provision is to “provide the
SLAPP defendant financial relief from the plaintiff’s meritless
lawsuit.” (Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722,
732 (Ross).)
While “ ‘the term “prevailing party” must be “interpreted
broadly to favor an award of attorney fees to a partially
successful defendant[,]” . . . a fee award is not required when the
motion, though partially successful, was of no practical effect.’ ”
(City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782.)
A party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion
generally will be considered a prevailing party “ ‘unless the
results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not
achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.’ ” (Ibid.)
Whether a partially successful cross-defendant achieved a
sufficient benefit to qualify as a prevailing party lies within the
broad discretion of the trial court, and we review that
determination accordingly. (Ross, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 732.) As we explain, the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding Gumarang was not a prevailing cross-defendant under
section 425.16 because he did not receive any practical benefit
from bringing the motion.

23
2.3. Analysis
In denying Gumarang’s attorney fees motion, the court
found Gumarang did not obtain any practical benefit from
dismissing the cross-complaint’s first three causes of action
because the factual landscape of the parties’ litigation and
Gumarang’s possible recovery against Management did not
change. The court also found Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion
did not meaningfully reduce the case’s legal issues because the
legal theories that underpinned the dismissed cross-claims also
support several of the affirmative defenses asserted in
Management’s answer to Gumarang’s second amended
complaint. The record supports the court’s findings.
In its cross-complaint, Management alleges that Gumarang
is liable for the damages from the destruction of the Property
that gives rise to the claims in his lawsuit. The cross-complaint’s
first three causes are premised on legal and equitable principles
independent of the Lease, while the surviving causes of action are
based on the parties’ rights and obligations under the Lease.
Despite these differences, the first three causes of action do not
involve any factual allegations that are not included in the four
surviving causes of action. That is, the surviving four causes of
action incorporate all the factual allegations from the three
causes of action that were dismissed. The only difference
between the two sets of causes of action is that the surviving four
are dependent on the terms of the Lease. Gumarang does not
explain how he narrowed the scope of the factual allegations at
issue in the parties’ litigation by eliminating the cross-
complaint’s first three causes of action. (See Moran v. Endres
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 954–955 [defendants did not obtain a
sufficient benefit from their partially successful anti-SLAPP

24
motion to justify an attorney fee award because “[t]he factual
allegations defendants faced were not changed when the cause of
action for conspiracy was stricken”].)
Gumarang also does not explain in meaningful detail what
other practical benefits he received from dismissing the cross-
complaint’s first three causes of action. For instance, Gumarang
does not assert his potential liability under the cross-complaint
has decreased, or his potential recovery under his second
amended complaint has increased, now that those cross-claims
have been dismissed. Although Gumarang asserts that he “is no
longer subject to an assessment of his alleged Comparative
Indemnity with [Management],” and he is no longer “required to
defend against, or incur liability for, [Management’s] ‘Total
Equitable Indemnity’ . . . Cross-Claim,” he does not explain, in
practical terms, how eliminating those issues will change his
potential liability or recovery, or any other issues involved in the
parties’ litigation.
Indeed, in its answer to Gumarang’s second amended
complaint, Management asserted as affirmative defenses many of
the theories at issue in the dismissed cross-claims, including
apportionment of fault, comparative fault, and comparative
indemnity. Gumarang never demurred to, or otherwise
challenged, Management’s answer. Accordingly, most of the
theories underlying the dismissed cross-claims remain at issue in
this case as potential affirmative defenses to Gumarang’s second
amended complaint.
In addition, Gumarang essentially acknowledges in his
attorney fees motion and his opening brief on appeal that the
dismissal of the cross-complaint’s first three causes of action did
not materially affect the parties’ litigation. That is, in arguing

25
why he should be entitled to recover fees and costs associated
with prosecuting his entire anti-SLAPP motion, Gumarang
asserts that all seven of the cross-complaint’s causes of action
“are ‘so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not
impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and
noncompensable units.’ . . . Except for the Lease, Gumarang
submitted substantially the same evidence as to all cross-claims[,
and] . . . [t]he extensive analyses of California law apply to all
seven cross-claims.”
Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that Gumarang was not entitled to attorney fees because Lessor
dismissed its cross-claims against him while his anti-SLAPP
motion was pending. A court retains discretion to award attorney
fees to a cross-defendant under section 425.16 when a cross-
complainant dismisses its cross-claims before the court rules on
the cross-defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Coltrain v. Shewalter
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 107.) Because the cross-defendant’s
goal in filing an anti-SLAPP motion is to eliminate the cross-
complainant’s claims, ordinarily the cross-defendant will be the
prevailing party in this scenario. (Ibid.) But the cross-
complainant may show that it substantially achieved its goals
through a settlement or for other reasons unrelated to the
probability of success of the cross-defendant’s anti-SLAPP
motion. (Ibid.)
Here, Lessor presented evidence that it dismissed its cross-
claims because Gumarang’s insurer accepted its tender for
defense and indemnity under the Lease. On this record, the court
could find that Lessor achieved what it sought to accomplish
through its cross-claims before the court could rule on
Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court, therefore, did not

26
abuse its discretion when it denied Gumarang’s request for
attorney fees to the extent it was based on Lessor dismissing its
cross-claims while Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion was pending.
In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees under
section 425.16, subdivision (c).
DISPOSITION
The orders denying in part Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion
and denying Gumarang’s request for attorney fees are affirmed.
Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.

27
Filed 4/3/2025
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ALLAN GUMARANG, B323083, B325256

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant (Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV09118)

v. ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION
BRAEMER ON RAYMOND, FOR PUBLICATION
LLC, et al.,
[No change in judgment]
Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Respondents.

THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 5,
2025, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published
in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________
GRIMES, Acting P. J. WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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