CourtListener 10370756•People v. Dunham CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Dunham CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A170566
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Del Norte County Super. Ct.
No. CRF 22-9071)
LINDSEY DUNHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Defendant Lindsey Dunham appeals following her plea of guilty to one
count of theft by a public officer under Penal Code section 424, subdivision
(a).2 The trial court found the plea agreement to be in the interests of justice
and sentenced her to a stipulated maximum term of two years in state prison.
Dunham’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and Dunham did not file a
supplemental brief. Having conducted an independent review of the record
pursuant to the holding in that case, we affirm.
An information charged Dunham with one count of theft by a public
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it raises no
substantial issue of fact or law. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
officer. (§ 424, subd. (a).) Dunham initially entered a plea of no contest and
agreed to a sentence of two years of felony probation and up to 30 days in
county jail. In its presentence report, the probation department
recommended that the trial court reject the plea because of the nature of the
crime and Dunham’s deceitful responses during her interview with the
probation officer. The report also noted that Dunham was presumptively
ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203, subdivision (e)(7).3
Accordingly, the court rejected the plea agreement.
Dunham then entered into a new plea agreement in which she pled
guilty to theft by a public officer and agreed to a sentence ranging from a
grant of probation to a maximum term of two years in state prison. The
probation department filed a supplemental report which recommended that
the trial court impose the maximum two-year prison term. The report again
noted that Dunham was presumptively ineligible for probation pursuant to
section 1203, subdivision (e)(7) and that no circumstances existed to
overcome this presumption.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that he was
concerned about Dunham’s mental state because she apparently believed
that her maximum sentence was only one year under the terms of the plea
agreement. Defense counsel asked the trial court to “appoint a doctor to
evaluate [Dunham’s] mental status pursuant to [section] 1368.” The
prosecution opposed this request. After speaking with Dunham during a
recess, defense counsel retracted his request and stated that he did not
3 As relevant here, section 1203, subdivision (e)(7) states that probation
shall not be granted, “[e]xcept in unusual cases in which the interests of
justice would best be served if the person is granted probation,” to “[a]ny
public official . . . who, in the discharge of the duties of public office or
employment . . . embezzled public money.”
2
believe that his client met the requirements for an evaluation under section
1368. However, he asked the court to appoint another attorney to review the
plea in light of Dunham’s apparent confusion. The court agreed and
appointed a second attorney to determine whether a motion to withdraw the
plea was appropriate.
At the continued sentencing hearing, the second attorney stated that
she had reviewed the plea agreement and transcript and would not be
moving to withdraw the plea. The trial court instructed that both counsel
speak with Dunham about the plea. After a brief recess, defense counsel
confirmed that Dunham understood the second attorney’s reasons for not
withdrawing the plea and was prepared to move forward with sentencing.
The prosecutor agreed that Dunham was presumptively ineligible for
probation but argued that even without the presumption, the court should
deny probation based on the applicable criteria identified in California Rules
of Court, rule 4.414.4 Defense counsel responded that the plea agreement
should be “null and void from its inception” if probation was never a
possibility. The prosecutor countered that section 1203, subdivision (e)(7)
merely creates a presumption and not “an absolute ban” against probation.
In denying probation, the trial court first analyzed the factors for
overcoming the presumption of probation ineligibility under rule 4.413,
subdivision (c) and concluded that Dunham did not overcome the
presumption. The court then analyzed whether Dunham would have
qualified for probation under rule 4.414’s criteria and held that “the
unfavorable factors outweigh the favorable and [Dunham] would not be a
proper candidate for probation regardless [of] whether she qualified or not.”
The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Dunham to the
4 Further references to “rules” are to the California Rules of Court.
3
maximum stipulated term of two years in state prison. It awarded Dunham
one day of custody credit and ordered that she pay a restitution fine of
$300.00. The court then set the matter for a separate restitution hearing.
The Wende brief filed by Dunham’s counsel does not draw our attention
to any issues under Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744. Dunham
was apprised of her right to file a supplemental brief but did not file one.
Following Wende guidelines, we have conducted an independent review of the
record and conclude that there are no meritorious issues to be argued on
appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CHOU, J.
We concur.
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A170566)
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