People v. Rodriguez CA2/1

CourtListener 10370751Calctapp28 mars 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B336788

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA048797)
v.

JORGE RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed.
James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
After finding him ineligible, the trial court denied
defendant Jorge Rodriguez’s petition pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to recall his sentence and
resentence him. On appeal, the parties agree that although
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), by its express terms, applies only
to defendants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
case law uniformly holds that the statute applies to a defendant
who was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the
possibility of parole. The parties also agree defendant’s 53-year-
to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of a life without the
possibility of parole sentence. We too agree and reverse the trial
court’s order.

BACKGROUND
After a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder,2
the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of
53 years to life. The term consisted of 25 years to life for the
murder, three years for the section 186.22 gang enhancement, 25
years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) gun enhancement.
On June 20, 2023, defendant filed a petition to recall and
resentence him pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). Defendant
averred he was 15 years old at the time of his crime and
committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant and
performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the
potential for rehabilitation. Defendant requested the court

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 The complete jury verdict is not included in the record.

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appoint an attorney to represent him. The court appointed
counsel.
The People argued defendant was not eligible for
resentencing because he had not been sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole. The People further argued defendant
was not serving the functional equivalent of life without the
possibility of parole. According to the People, a youthful offender
is entitled to parole eligibility after 25 years and a 25-year-to-life
sentence is not the functional equivalent of a life without the
possibility of parole sentence. In reply, defendant argued his
sentence was the functional equivalent of life without the
possibility of parole because it was a 53-year-to-life sentence.
Defendant also argued he satisfied the other statutory
requirements for resentencing.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to recall and
resentence him pursuant to section 1170, subdivision(d)(1). The
court found he was ineligible because he was not sentenced to a
life without the possibility of parole sentence or the functional
equivalent of a life without the possibility of parole sentence.

DISCUSSION
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) permits “a defendant who
was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole” and who “has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, . . . [to] submit to the
sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(1)(A).)
In Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, the defendant
committed a drive-by shooting at age 15 and was serving a
sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life for two counts of

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attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (Id. at
p. 612.) The defendant acknowledged that he would receive a
youth offender parole hearing in his 25th year of incarceration
pursuant to section 3051. (Id. at p. 628.) Heard held that to
avoid an equal protection violation, section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) includes defendants sentenced to the functional
equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole as
measured at the time of the defendant’s original sentence. In
other words, the court did not consider the length of the sentence
as modified by section 3051, which permits earlier parole for
certain youthful offenders.3 (Heard, supra, at p. 629.) People v.
Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 439–440 and People v. Bagsby
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054–1057 followed Heard.
Based on Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby, the parties agree the
trial court erred in finding defendant ineligible for resentencing
solely because he was not sentenced to the functional equivalent
of a term of life without the possibility of parole. We reach the
same conclusion, which is also supported by our high court’s
opinion in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras).
In Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349, two 16-year-old
defendants were convicted of kidnapping and sexual offenses.
(Id. at p. 356.) One defendant was sentenced to a term of 50

3 Section 3051, subdivision (b)(3) provides: “A person who
was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when
the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the
sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for
release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the
person’s 25th year of incarceration. The youth parole eligible
date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 25th
year of incarceration.”

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years to life and the other was sentenced to a term of 58 years to
life. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that these sentences
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the
high court held that “a sentence of 50 years to life is functionally
equivalent to” life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at
p. 369.) Here, defendant’s 53-year-to-life sentence is greater than
the 50-year-to-life sentence found functionally equivalent to life
without the possibility of parole in Contreras.
We express no opinion on whether defendant has met
section 1170, subdivision (d)’s other requirements or what relief
the trial court should grant if it finds defendant eligible for
resentencing.

DISPOSITION
The order finding Jorge Rodrigez ineligible for relief under
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.

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