CourtListener 10367938•Zimmergarger v. Cimbat CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 3/28/25 Zimmergarger v. Cimbat CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LILLIAN ZIMMERGARGER, D084569
Petitioner and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00026316-CU-HR-EC)
FAITH CIMBAT,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Matthew Brower, Judge. Affirmed.
Goldman Legal and Andrew Flores, for Respondent and Appellant.
Lillian Zimmergarger, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent.
Lillian Zimmergarger obtained a three-year civil harassment
restraining order against her next-door neighbor, Faith Cimbat. On appeal,
Cimbat contends her alleged harassment consisted of constitutionally
protected activities or activities with legitimate purposes that were unlikely
to continue in the future such that she was improperly restrained. On the
inadequate record of appeal, we disagree and accordingly affirm the
restraining order.
I.
A.
In April 2024, Zimmergarger and Cimbat lived in adjacent units in a
townhome community, with Zimmergarger in unit 229. One day, Cimbat
posted on the community’s social media page, complaining, “This person that
moved next to me in unit 229 is fucking disgusting.” In the post, she
insinuated Zimmergarger was entertaining other men while her husband was
deployed. Cimbat also stated Zimmergarger was the source of a cockroach
infestation, had a “mental breakdown,” owned “reek[ing]” dogs whose feces
she failed to clean up, and allowed her “autistic son” to “poop” in the front
yard. After several days, the administrator for the community social media
page removed Cimbat’s post. Cimbat tried to repost it, but it was taken down
again.
The post caused Zimmergarger to realize Cimbat was “watching [her]
and [her] family,” likely with the aid of her security cameras.
Throughout the month of April, Cimbat complained to the community’s
management office about noises coming from Zimmergarger’s house during
non-quiet hours and the smell of Zimmergarger’s dogs.
Cimbat also began “putting trash bags full of dirty baby diapers behind
[Zimmergarger’s] back patio gate,” which Cimbat “intentionally” left “open
with the diapers spilled all over where [Zimmergarger] can step on them,”
and “putting a hot barbecue grill behind [Zimmergarger’s] gate so [sh]e would
knock the grill over when [sh]e opened” it.
Cimbat would yell from her property that Zimmergarger “‘should go
back to wherever [she] came from’” and would bang on the walls “throughout
the day.”
2
Around the same time, Cimbat falsely reported to the management
company that Zimmergarger’s and her husband’s cars were inoperable, which
prompted management to send Zimmergarger a violation letter.
Cimbat began parking in the spot directly in front of Zimmergarger’s
house “as a way of trying to intimidate” her, according to Zimmergarger.
Cimbat never before parked there, as she owned two cars and had a two-car
garage. The Zimmergargers, meanwhile, routinely used the parking spot
because they could not fit all three of their cars into their two-car garage.
At the end of May, Cimbat reported to Child Welfare Services that
Zimmergarger’s son “poops outside and is being abused,” prompting a welfare
check during which Zimmergarger’s children were forced to undress to check
for signs of abuse.
B.
When she applied for a civil harassment restraining order against
Cimbat days after the welfare check, Zimmergarger represented “things have
been getting more aggressive and scary,” and she “fe[lt] unsafe in [her] home
and afraid to go outside at all” because Cimbat was “constantly watching
[her] and [she] d[id]n’t know what w[ould] happen next.” A temporary
restraining order issued that day.
Cimbat’s response accused Zimmergarger of making “false
allegation[s].”
After an unreported evidentiary hearing at which both Zimmergarger
and Cimbat testified and “having fully considered the arguments of all
parties, both written and oral, as well as the evidence presented,” the court
issued a three-year civil harassment restraining order against Cimbat that
protected Zimmergarger, her husband, and their children.
3
Cimbat filed an untimely request for a statement of decision. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(n).) None issued.
II.
We first outline the relevant civil harassment law before addressing
Cimbat’s claims on appeal.
A.
Section 527.6 of the Civil Procedure Code allows “[a] person who has
suffered harassment” to “seek a temporary restraining order and an order
after hearing prohibiting harassment.” An order shall issue “[i]f the judge
finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists”
(§ 527.6(i)) and “is likely to recur” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499).
As relevant here, the statute defines “harassment” as “a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The
course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6(b)(3).) “Course of conduct” is
defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however, short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following
or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual,
or sending harassing correspondence to an individual,” but “[c]onstitutionally
protected activity is not included.” (§ 527.6(b)(1).)
We review the findings supporting a restraining order in the light most
favorable to the order for substantial evidence (R.D. v. P.M. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188), “account[ing] for the level of confidence [the clear
and convincing evidence] standard demands” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
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9 Cal.5th 989, 995). Yet whether those facts “are legally sufficient to
constitute civil harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining
order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law” we review de novo.
(R.D., at p. 188.)
We do not reweigh the evidence. (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
688, 699.) Instead, we “give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., 9 Cal.5th at p. 996.)
B.
Cimbat claims the trial court erred in granting Zimmergarger’s
requested civil harassment restraining order because (1) her complaints to
the management office and Child Welfare Services were constitutionally
protected activity and (2) the social media post was the only possible
harassing incident, and a lone event is unable to qualify as a course of
conduct likely to continue absent the issuance of a restraining order. We
conclude, however, Cimbat fails to show entitlement to relief on these claims
given the state of her briefing and the record.
First, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant is
“‘required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and
not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be’”
forfeited. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
Cimbat omits from her opening brief any reference to a significant portion of
her allegedly harassing conduct, like intentionally putting trash bags
overflowing with dirty diapers and a hot barbecue grill near Zimmergarger’s
gate, yelling insults and banging on their shared walls, and attempting to
repost her social media post about Zimmergarger. Accordingly, Cimbat
forfeited her challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.
5
Even absent forfeiture, the deficient record also dooms Cimbat’s appeal.
Where, as here, there is no record of the oral proceedings below, “[t]he
sufficiency of the evidence is not open to review. The trial court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be supported by substantial
evidence and are binding on the appellate court, unless reversible error
appears on the record.” (Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.)
This presumption creates a high hurdle for Cimbat to clear. In issuing
the restraining order, the court implicitly (1) found Zimmergarger’s testimony
and evidence more credible than Cimbat’s and (2) concluded that testimony
and evidence supported each of the elements required for the restraining
order to issue—including that the activities in question were neither
constitutionally protected nor for a legitimate purpose. As we lack any record
of the testimony presented at the hearing, we are unable to assess, and
therefore must presume, the existence and accuracy of those findings and the
facts underlying them. As a result, Cimbat’s only hope is to establish
reversible error on the face of the record.
Cimbat again falls short, as no reversible error appears on the face of
the record. To start, the record does not foreclose finding Cimbat’s actions
not constitutionally protected. The First Amendment right to free speech is
not unqualified. (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1141, 1147.) Defamation is not constitutionally protected. (Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 245-246.) As Cimbat concedes,
defamatory social media posts can be harassing conduct under section 527.6.
(Citing E.G., 105 Cal.App.5th 688.) We presume—as we lack an adequate
record to determine otherwise—the court found Cimbat’s social media post
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false and defamatory and therefore not constitutionally protected.1 To the
extent Cimbat relies on Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94 to argue
her social media post was protected speech, that case, which involved a
lawyer’s e-mails to opposing counsel, is factually distinguishable. (Hansen, at
pp. 104-105.) Similarly, it is illegal for a voluntary reporter to make
knowingly false reports of child abuse. (Pen. Code, § 11172(a).) While
Cimbat claims Zimmergarger “has provided no evidence of the falsity of any
[CWS] report . . . or that [Cimbat] in fact made any report at all,” the state of
the record does not allow us to credit this argument, as the record facially
discloses no reason to disagree with the court’s implicit finding that the
report to CWS was neither constitutionally protected nor for a legitimate
purpose.
Next, Cimbat has not met her burden to show the record precludes
finding a course of conduct. We agree with Zimmergarger that Cimbat
“mischaracterizes her actions and would like this court to believe that there
was only ‘a post’ on the community [social media] page on one day which was
the basis for the permanent restraining order.” Cimbat’s position is belied by
the minute order of the evidentiary hearing. The court noted it “fully
considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, as well as the
evidence presented,” and listed 14 photographs, seven additional pages of
photographs, multiple text messages and social media conversations between
the parties, and screenshots of the social media post as exhibits received into
evidence. As the court provided no reasoning for its ruling, and construing
1 While Cimbat argues “a restraining order is not the venue for a
demand of defamation,” Zimmergarger made no “demand of defamation”;
defamation is simply a basis for concluding the speech in question was not
constitutionally protected, which is a conclusion the trial court was entitled to
make.
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the minute order in favor of the judgment, we must presume the court
considered incidents beyond the social media post in determining the
restraining order was warranted. Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d
1, relied on by Cimbat, is accordingly distinguishable.
Section 527.6 requires only that a course of conduct consist of “more
than one act.” (E.G., 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 699-700, citing § 527.(6)(b)(1).)
“[T]he trial court views the evidence as a whole, including incidents that, if
viewed in isolation, might seem trivial, but cumulatively could constitute a
harassing course of conduct.” (E.G., at p. 700.) Even overlooking activity like
parking in front of Zimmergarger’s house or installing security cameras,
which activities Cimbat claims she “ha[d] every right to do,” and Cimbat’s
complaints to housing management, the alleged acts spanned several months
and were still occurring—indeed, escalating—just days before the temporary
restraining order issued. We presume the testimony at the hearing
established the acts were ongoing. The court did not err in (1) finding that,
considered as a whole, this was a continuing course of harassing conduct, and
(2) implicitly concluding it was likely to continue absent the grant of an
injunction.
III.
We affirm. Zimmergarger is entitled to her costs on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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