People v. Henry CA1/1

CourtListener 10365663Calctapp27 mars 2025

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Filed 3/27/25 P. v. Henry CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170490

v. (Alameda County
BOBBY HENRY, Super. Ct. No. 611302)
Defendant and Appellant.

After Bobby Henry pleaded guilty to murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187,
subd. (a)) pursuant to a negotiated agreement, he was sentenced to 25 years
to life in prison. In this appeal, Henry challenges the superior court order
denying his section 1172.6 resentencing petition for Henry’s failure to make a
prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Specifically, Henry argues
the court erred by relying on the reporter’s transcript of Henry’s preliminary
hearing in making that prima facie determination. Guided by our Supreme
Court’s recent decision in People v. Patton (Mar. 3, 2025, S279670) __ Cal.5th
__ [2025 Cal. Lexis 1165; 2025 WL 666005] (Patton), we disagree and affirm
the order accordingly.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
The resentencing petition was a preprinted form on which Henry
checked boxes alleging that he met the requirements of former
section 1170.95,2 subdivision (a) and requesting the appointment of counsel.
Upon receiving the petition, the superior court appointed counsel for Henry
and sought the prosecutor’s response.
The prosecutor’s first response averred that Henry had made the
requisite prima facie showing under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). But in a
later, supplemental response, the prosecutor withdrew that concession in
light of People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158 (Mares), review granted
May 1, 2024, S284232 (rejecting a defendant’s contention that the superior
court erred in relying on a preliminary hearing transcript in the prima facie
stage of § 1172.6 proceedings). According to the supplemental response, the
prosecutor had proceeded at the preliminary hearing on a theory that Henry
“was the actual killer through testimony of live witnesses and video
evidence,” and no evidence undercut that theory. Moreover, the
supplemental response noted that Henry’s counsel at the preliminary hearing
had argued that Henry should only “be held to answer . . . for voluntary
manslaughter,” along with Henry’s stipulation to preliminary hearing
evidence for the factual basis of his guilty plea.
In his reply, Henry took “the position that he ha[d] met the very low
standard for making a prima facie showing,” arguing (inter alia) that the
prosecution’s supplemental reply had failed to support its actual-killer
contentions with any “specific citations to the record of conviction.” In turn,
the prosecutor filed a second supplemental response, citing Henry’s

2 In 2022, former section 1170.95 became section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)

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stipulation to the factual basis for his plea, and preliminary hearing
testimony that, according to the second supplemental response, supported the
prosecution’s theory that Henry was the actual killer. Henry then filed a
supplemental reply, contending that counsel’s argument regarding voluntary
manslaughter at the preliminary hearing did not foreclose the possibility that
Henry was entitled to resentencing, but neglecting to address either the
stipulated factual basis for Henry’s plea or the preliminary hearing testimony
cited by the prosecutor’s second supplemental response.
At the hearing on the petition, the superior court found that Henry had
not made the requisite prima facie case for relief. In explaining that
conclusion, the court compared Henry’s case to People v. Estrada (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 328 (Estrada), which distinguished Mares, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th 1158, review granted, from cases in which “evidence
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript” does not conclusively
foreclose “the possibility that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid
theory of liability” (Estrada, at p. 340): “It said in Estrada there were other
factors that suggested other people here, but in my view, nothing like that is
present in this preliminary hearing testimony,” and the closing argument of
Henry’s counsel at the preliminary hearing was, “to me . . . a form of
admission that there really is nothing else here other than Mr. Henry was
the actual killer.”
In the trial court as well as on appeal, the parties aligned themselves
on each side of a split in California’s decisional law as to whether courts may
review preliminary hearing transcripts to determine prima facie evidence for
relief under section 1172.6. As anticipated by the parties during this appeal,
that question was answered by the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Patton.

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DISCUSSION
Henry contends the superior court erred by relying on the preliminary
hearing transcript at the section 1172.6 pleading stage. He views the trial
court’s consideration of the transcript as “impermissible factfinding” by the
court. Patton now instructs that—as applied to this case—this view is
incorrect. (See Patton, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2025 Cal. Lexis 1165 at
pp. *1–*2].) Where, as here, the court is not using the transcript to resolve
disputed facts, “the record of conviction the parties may consult at the prima
facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.”
(Id. at p. *24.) The superior court, “in determining at the prima facie stage
whether a petitioner was convicted under a now-invalid theory,” may “rely on
unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript
to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations.” (Id. at p. *17.) Doing so “over
contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is not ‘ “factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. *20.) It is instead “a determination that the petition’s allegations are
legally deficient, ‘not a ruling on the merits of the issues which petitioner has
attempted to raise.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, Henry’s petition comprised conclusory,
checkbox allegations, and none of his filings below challenged any of the
preliminary hearing testimony cited by the prosecutor. Even in this appeal,
Henry refrains from arguing that resentencing relief is not foreclosed by the
facts established by the preliminary hearing testimony and Henry’s
stipulation to the factual basis for his guilty plea. In short, he has adduced
no error in the court’s reliance on the preliminary hearing transcript.
Finally, we reject Henry’s suggestion that the superior court
impermissibly relied on the closing argument defense counsel had made at
Henry’s preliminary hearing (asking the magistrate to hold Henry to answer

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for the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter). The superior court referred
to that closing argument in distinguishing Henry’s case from People v.
Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at page 340, where the preliminary hearing
“evidence contain[ed] testimony that could potentially suggest multiple
perpetrators were involved.” Here, the superior court concluded that
“nothing like that is present in this preliminary hearing testimony,” and then
observed that this conclusion was also implicit in the closing argument:
That, “to me, [was] a form of admission that there really is nothing else
here”—in the preliminary hearing testimony—“other than Mr. Henry was the
actual killer.” The observation may have been superfluous, but when read in
context, it does not suggest any impermissible reliance on the closing
argument.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.

SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

A170490
People v. Henry

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