People v. Cheng CA3

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Filed 3/25/25 P. v. Cheng CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099399

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos.
STKCRFE19960016394,
v. SP060461B)

SAMBAN CHENG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Samban Cheng is serving 25 years to life in prison after pleading guilty
to first degree murder for the shooting death of the victim during an attempted carjacking.
He appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing in which the court found that defendant

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could still be convicted of murder because he was a major participant in the offenses and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.1
On appeal, defendant argues insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s major
participant and reckless indifference findings. Finding no merit to these contentions, we
affirm the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges, Defendant’s Plea, and Sentencing
In 1996, defendant and codefendant Anouthinh Pangthong were jointly charged
with the murder (§ 187) and attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a)) of Doug
Thornton. It was alleged that the murder was committed during a robbery or attempted
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). For both offenses, it was alleged that Pangthong
personally used a firearm (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)), and, as to
defendant, that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)). Defendant,
who was 17 years old at the time of the crimes, was found unfit for juvenile court and
was tried as an adult.
In November 1996, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder.2 The prosecutor
dismissed the attempted carjacking count, the court struck all enhancements, and the
following month, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant filed his
resentencing petition under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6, with no relevant
change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For ease of reference, we cite to section 1172.6
throughout this opinion.
2 Codefendant Pangthong also pled guilty to first degree murder and the remaining
counts and enhancements were dismissed. Pangthong received 25 years to life in prison.

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During the plea hearing, counsel stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript as
the factual basis for defendant’s plea. The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed
the following:
Thirteen-year-old George Onesavanh, who was also charged with Thornton’s
murder but agreed to plead guilty to being an accessory to an attempted carjacking,
testified that on March 18, 1996, he was hanging out at the Tyrol Village apartments in
Stockton with Lonely (later identified as defendant), Joker (later identified as
codefendant Pangthong), Toddler (Onesavanh’s cousin Chentra), Bullet (Onesavanh’s
other cousin Chamrearn), and Ricky. At the time, Onesavanh was an admitted Loc Town
Crip gang member.
According to Onesavanh, the group left the apartments to look for cars to “steal”
to “go cruising.” Defendant had a .22-caliber revolver, which was operable, and
Pangthong had a .357 revolver, which did not work. Defendant gave the working gun to
Pangthong and took the gun that did not work. The group walked to a nearby 7-Eleven
convenience store, and, as they stood near the parking lot, Thornton drove his red truck in
and parked. Pangthong asked the group if they wanted to carjack the red truck, and they
all responded, “go ahead.” Pangthong then told the group what he was going to do if “he
be move or try – like don’t – like move or try to run or something, he’s going to shoot
them.”
Onesavanh and Ricky broke off from the group and went to a nearby alley while
the others walked towards the red truck.3 Onesavanh heard one gunshot. Onesavanh and
Ricky then left and went back to the Tyrol Village apartments where he met up with
defendant, Pangthong, Toddler, and Bullet. Pangthong said he had “shot that dude.”

3 This testimony contradicted Onesavanh’s earlier statement to police claiming that he
was at the red truck when Thornton was shot.

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Pangthong told Onesavanh that he had asked the victim for his keys and then shot him
when Thornton refused. Thornton died from a single bullet wound to the head.
D. Avery was with Thornton at the time of the shooting. Avery waited in the
passenger seat of Thornton’s red truck while Thornton went inside the convenience store.
While he waited, he saw four Asian males between the ages of 15 and 20 walk past the
truck, stop and talk, and then walk back towards the truck and out of sight. Thornton
returned to the truck to grab something and then walked back towards the store. As
Thornton passed the front left side of the truck, Avery heard someone say, “give me your
keys.” Thornton looked back, but kept walking; Avery heard Thornton say, “ ‘what,’ ”
like “what do you mean,” and then saw one of the Asian males raise his arm and shoot
Thornton in the back of the head. The group of males ran off as Avery tried to tend to
Thornton. Avery later identified defendant in a photographic lineup, saying he was
present and was standing next to Thornton when the shooting occurred, although Avery
could not recall if he was the shooter.
Another eyewitness told officers that he heard a loud pop and saw four Asian
males running in the direction of the Tyrol Village apartments. And Pangthong’s brother,
although he denied it during the preliminary hearing, told officers that Pangthong had
claimed to have shot someone in the back of the head at a 7-Eleven and killed him.
B. Petition for Resentencing
In 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, asserting he
could no longer be convicted of murder after changes made by Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to sections 188 and 189. The People filed an
informal response to the petition, but the brief is not included in the record.
In a reply brief, defendant argued that he had made a sufficient prima facie
showing because he was convicted as an aider and abettor on a felony-murder theory and
he did not intend to kill, was not a major participant in the crimes, and did not act with
reckless indifference to human life as those factors had been clarified by our Supreme

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Court in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). He claimed he was youthful when he agreed to participate in the
planned carjacking and did not expect anyone to be harmed. While he did give
Pangthong the weapon used to kill Thornton, the shooting happened quickly, and he had
no opportunity to stop it.
At a hearing in March 2023, the trial court found defendant had made a prima
facie showing. The court issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
In May 2023, the prosecution filed a formal opposition brief, arguing defendant
could still be convicted of murder under current law because he was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecutor cited the preliminary
hearing transcript, the probation report, a July 2016 parole hearing transcript, and a parole
comprehensive risk assessment. The prosecutor also asked the court to take judicial
notice of the preliminary hearing transcript, the change of plea transcript, the information,
the probation officer’s report, and all other records in defendant’s case.
During the parole hearing, defendant, who was then 37 years old, said he was
introduced to gang culture at a young age by his older brother, who was eventually killed
from gang violence. On the day Thornton was killed, defendant was hanging out with a
bunch of guys when someone in the group said that a cousin wanted a ride to go get some
guns. Although defendant already had a working gun, he saw this as an opportunity to
boost his reputation in the gang, so he agreed to help steal a car in exchange for getting a
second gun. Defendant gave his loaded .22-caliber revolver to Pangthong because
Pangthong wanted to be the shooter when taking the car, and Pangthong gave defendant a
.357 revolver that did not have a firing pin. Pangthong had previously told defendant that
he had used the .357 revolver to rob a man near a grocery store.
As the group passed the 7-Eleven, they saw Thornton’s red truck and Pangthong
said he wanted it; according to defendant, he told Pangthong not to do it because the

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truck was out in the open, but Pangthong did not hear him. When Thornton emerged
from the 7-Eleven, Pangthong asked him for a smoke and Thornton gave him one.
Pangthong then asked for a light and as Thornton reached to get a lighter, Pangthong
pointed defendant’s loaded gun at him and demanded his truck. Defendant stood nearby
with Pangthong’s inoperable gun in his waistband. Defendant thought he saw the
passenger in Thornton’s truck reaching for something under the seat that appeared to be a
gun, so defendant pulled out the inoperable gun and pointed it at the passenger. He heard
Thornton say something like, “don’t do this,” and then saw Thornton turn and run.
Pangthong shot Thornton in the back of the head.
Although a police report stated that during the initial investigation, defendant had
caused some confusion because he was telling people that he was responsible for the
shooting to gain respect for self-protection, during the parole hearing defendant denied
ever telling anyone that he was the “actual shooter” as a means of gaining respect in his
gang. He admitted that he associated with gang members, committed crimes, and
terrorized the community, because he had no regard for others. He continued to hang out
with gang members in prison from age 17 to 34. He denied being under the influence of
alcohol or other substances at the time of the crime.
When a parole commissioner asked defendant why he gave his loaded gun to
Pangthong and why it was necessary to carry a loaded weapon to rob someone of their
car, defendant responded that they were going to kill the victim, no matter who he was.
The commissioner then asked if the plan was to “intentionally kill” the victim and
defendant responded, “Yes, sir.” Defendant acknowledged that “the intent all along” was
“[t]o carjack and kill.”
On September 5, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court admitted the
preliminary hearing transcript, the parole hearing transcript, and the parole risk
assessment as evidence.

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Based on that evidence, the prosecution argued that although Pangthong had shot
and killed Thornton, the evidence showed defendant was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life during the attempted carjacking and killing.
Defendant supplied the loaded murder weapon to Pangthong, was present at the scene of
the shooting, pointed a gun at Thornton’s passenger during the incident, failed to render
aid to Thornton while he lay dying, later claimed that he was the actual shooter, and,
during a subsequent parole hearing, admitted that he knew the group’s plan was to
carjack and kill whoever he and his cohorts selected as their victim.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant
admitted that at the time of the incident he was in a gang. The day of the shooting, he
was hanging out with several other gang members, including Ricky, Bullet, and
Pangthong about two blocks from the 7-Eleven where Thornton was shot. Someone
showed up and told the group his cousin wanted to pick up some guns in Lodi.
Defendant and the others planned to find a car to steal to give the cousin a ride to Lodi to
retrieve the guns. In exchange for obtaining the car, the cousin was supposed to give
defendant more guns.
Contrary to his parole hearing testimony, defendant denied that there was ever an
intent to shoot and kill anyone during the planned carjacking. He claimed he only told
the parole board that the plan was to carjack and kill the selected victim because he
wanted the parole board to believe he was taking accountability for the crime and not
minimizing his role, making it more likely that the parole board would not automatically
deny him parole. Defendant also claimed that Onesavanh lied during his preliminary
hearing testimony.

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Defendant admitted giving Pangthong a loaded and operable firearm.4 Defendant
knew the gun worked because he had fired it a few days prior to the killing. According to
defendant, he had only known Pangthong for about a week before the murder, and he was
not aware that Pangthong had used guns. At the time, Pangthong was about 14 years old,
and defendant was the oldest of the group at 17.
Defendant further testified that as they waited for Thornton to emerge from the 7-
Eleven, he told Pangthong not to go through with the carjacking. Defendant initially
testified that he stood near the truck behind Pangthong and saw Thornton reach for
something under the seat, but later said it was actually the passenger and not Thornton
who reached for something under the seat. He said he tried to scare the passenger by
pulling out the gun. After Pangthong shot Thornton, defendant froze in shock while
everyone else ran off; he stood near the body and then fled with the others. He admitted
that he never called anyone to help Thornton. Defendant testified that he did not expect
Pangthong to shoot and kill Thornton, although he was sober and knew exactly what was
going on. Defendant denied that he had ever bragged about being the shooter.
At the conclusion of defendant’s testimony, defense counsel conceded defendant
was a major participant in the crimes, but argued that the only real evidence that showed
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life was his testimony to the parole
board that the group always planned and intended to kill the carjacking victim. Counsel
urged the court to disregard the parole testimony given that defendant said he lied about
the intent to kill plan to increase his chance of being paroled. He asserted Thornton was
shot in a store parking lot where others were present to provide aid, and that defendant
had only known Pangthong a short time and did not expect him to kill Thornton.

4 According to defendant, Pangthong initially gave his inoperable .357-caliber gun to
Bullet and then asked defendant for his working .22-caliber gun; defendant gave
Pangthong his gun, and then defendant asked Bullet for the .357 gun.

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After considering the evidence, the trial court denied defendant’s section 1172.6
petition. The court found, based on defendant’s parole hearing testimony, as well as on
the circumstantial evidence and defendant’s own testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
that defendant was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
In so ruling, the court noted that defendant provided Pangthong with the loaded weapon
used to kill Thornton and pulled out his own weapon and pointed it at Thornton’s
passenger thereby raising the stakes during the deadly attempted carjacking.
Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill 1437 and Standard of Review
Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, “to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 achieved these
goals by amending section 188 to require that a principal act with express or implied
malice (§ 188, as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2), and by amending section 189 to
state that a person can be liable for felony murder only if: (1) the “person was the actual
killer”; (2) the person, with an intent to kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of
murder in the first degree; or (3) the “person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended
by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Where, like here, the trial court issues an order to show cause and holds an
evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the
changes to section 188 or 189 made effective by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd.

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(d)(3).) The parties may offer evidence from a prior trial, or new or additional evidence
at the hearing. (Ibid.)
We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing
for substantial evidence. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “Our job
on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial
judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is
to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finders’ findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We examine “ ‘the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit
credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Pham (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925.)
B. Banks/Clark Factors
When “Senate Bill 1437 amended . . . section 189 to incorporate major
participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of
those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 710.)
Banks considered “under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent
to kill may qualify as a major participant.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) The
high court identified various factors that should be considered in making the
determination, including: “What role did the defendant having in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying

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or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Id.
at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The Banks court recognized that “[n]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor
is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Instead,
all of the factors “may be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether the
defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’
[citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’ ” (Ibid.; see also Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 139-142, 151-152 [brothers who helped break father and
cellmate out of prison and who helped flag down a car with a family of four who father
and cellmate later murdered played a significant role in crimes and could have foreseen
that their actions created a grave risk of death]; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782,
784-785, 788 [defendant who drove accomplices to the victims’ home for armed robbery
during which he remained in the car could not constitutionally be sentenced to death
where driver did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place during the
robbery and he was not present when the killing took place].)
Applying these factors, the Banks court found the evidence was insufficient to
show the defendant there—a getaway driver for an armed robbery of a medical marijuana
dispensary—was a major participant, where there was no evidence establishing his role in
planning the robbery or procuring weapons, and no evidence he was present for the
robbery or played a role in instigating the shooting. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 794-
795, 805, 807-808.)
Our Supreme Court considered the “reckless indifference” element in Clark.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-623.) Reckless indifference to human life is

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“ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death.’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that
death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.)
Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks
known to him. (Ibid.) Objectively, recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s conduct
“ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in
the actor’s situation would observe.’ ” (Ibid.) The fact that a robbery involved a gun or
carried a risk of death is insufficient, by itself, to support a finding of reckless
indifference. (Id. at pp. 617-618; see also In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
[“ ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force
might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life”].)
Clark, like Banks, identified various factors to be considered in determining
whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 618-623.) These include: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used
during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant
physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime
or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of
the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did
the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in Clark, supra, at pp. 618-
623].) Applying these factors, the Clark court found the evidence was insufficient to
show the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life in the armed robbery of
a computer store, where he planned the robbery but was not armed or physically present

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in the store when the victim was shot, did not have the intent to kill, and attempted to
minimize the likelihood of violence by timing the robbery for a time when fewer people
would be present and using an unloaded gun. (Clark, supra, at pp. 611, 618-623.)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that no one of the above major
participant or reckless indifference factors is necessary, nor is any of them necessarily
sufficient. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) With
these concepts in mind, we turn to defendant’s evidentiary challenge.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends insufficient evidence showed he was a major participant in the
attempted carjacking and killing or that he acted with reckless indifference to human life
during the crimes. We are not persuaded.
1. Major Participation (Banks)
At the outset, we note that defendant’s argument on appeal that he was not a major
participant under Banks, contradicts defense counsel’s concession below that defendant
was a major participant in the crimes. Even if we were to disregard the concession,
however, sufficient evidence shows defendant helped plan and agreed to the crime,
supplied the lethal weapon used during the attempted carjacking, used a second gun
during the incident to help further facilitate the crimes, knew the weapon he gave
Pangthong was operable and loaded, and was present at the scene and did nothing to help
Thornton either before or after he was shot; instead fleeing with the others to avoid
detection. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 794-795, 805, 807-808.)
We reject defendant’s contention that little weight should be given to his sworn
parole testimony that the group always planned to carjack and kill the selected target,
even if it is admissible. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 586, 590.) The
trial court, as the trier of fact at the evidentiary hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)), was free to
discount defendant’s conflicting testimony during the evidentiary hearing that he only
said the group intended to kill the victim at the parole board hearing in hopes of securing

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parole. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (d)(3) [parole board shall consider signs
of remorse, including that a defendant understands the “nature and magnitude of the
offense”].) Notably, at the time of the parole hearing defendant was 37 years old, and he
swore to tell the truth at the hearing. The trial court reasonably could conclude that
defendant, as an adult who had matured over time, told the truth at the parole hearing and
that he only now at the evidentiary hearing changed his testimony to improve his chances
of having his murder conviction vacated after parole had already been denied.
To the extent defendant argues that no other evidence supports his statements at
the parole hearing that the group planned to kill their selected victim, we disagree. Based
on Onesavanh’s preliminary hearing testimony, the trial court reasonably could find that,
before approaching Thornton’s truck, Pangthong told the group that, if Thornton moved
or tried to run, he intended to shoot him. Defendant was present for this conversation,
and no evidence showed he objected to Pangthong’s statement. (People v. Ramirez
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1115 [“Evidence of an out-of-court statement may be admitted for
the nonhearsay purpose of showing its effect on the listener so long as that effect is
relevant to an issue in dispute”].) Such evidence thus supports the reasonable inference
that the group did in fact plan to kill their intended victim just as defendant testified at the
parole hearing.
The remaining evidence satisfies several of the Banks factors, which further
supports our conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding defendant was a major
participant in the underlying crimes. For the first Banks factor, we look to defendant’s
role in planning the criminal enterprise. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Here,
defendant himself admitted that he agreed to participate in the planned carjacking to steal
a car for someone’s cousin so that they could drive to Lodi to retrieve weapons, thereby
gaining respect from other gang members and additional guns for himself. Before
leaving the apartments in search of a victim, Pangthong asked defendant for defendant’s
loaded, operable gun and defendant gave it to him knowing that Pangthong wanted to be

14
the “shooter” during the carjacking. Pangthong had told defendant he had used the gun
he traded with defendant in an earlier robbery near a grocery store. Despite defendant’s
parole hearing testimony that he told Pangthong not to carjack Thornton because the red
truck was out in the open, there was contradictory evidence that when the group stopped
at the 7-Eleven and Pangthong picked Thornton’s red truck to carjack, everyone in the
group—including defendant—agreed on the selected target. From this evidence, a
rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that defendant played an integral part in the
planning and execution of the attempted carjacking, which led to Thornton’s murder.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, then, the first Banks factor weighs in favor of
defendant being a major participant.
Defendant concedes substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
second Banks factor—supplying or using lethal weapons—was present. We agree.
Defendant admitted he gave Pangthong a loaded gun that he knew worked since he had
shot the gun days earlier. And defendant used the gun that Pangthong had given him
during the attempted carjacking. Although defendant did not fire the weapon, he pointed
it at Thornton’s passenger, presumably to scare him and prevent him from intervening on
Thornton’s behalf.
For the third Banks factor, we consider defendant’s awareness of the dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, the weapons used, or the past experience or conduct of
the other participants. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) The trial court implicitly
found that defendant was aware of the danger posed by the armed carjacking, and
substantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence support this implied
finding.
Before walking over to Thornton’s truck, the trial court could reasonably find,
based on the preliminary hearing testimony, that Pangthong announced his intention to
shoot the driver if he resisted or attempted to run away. Having been present for this
conversation, defendant then accompanied Pangthong and two others over to the truck

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and stood behind Pangthong as reinforcement. When Pangthong demanded Thornton’s
truck and pulled out the loaded gun and pointed it at him, defendant pulled out his gun
and pointed it at Thornton’s passenger to prevent him from grabbing something that
might have helped Thornton. There was also evidence that, although defendant may not
have known Pangthong long, he had learned that Pangthong had, in a prior robbery, used
the firearm he provided to defendant during the attempted carjacking. And, as previously
noted, Pangthong had specifically asked defendant for his loaded, operable weapon
because he wanted to be the “shooter” during the carjacking. Defendant thus was aware
of Pangthong’s propensity to use a firearm to rob and steal from innocent victims, and
that he intended to be the shooter during the planned carjacking.
The fact that the group did not capture, bind, or take Thornton to a remote
location, as occurred in other cases defendant cites (see e.g., Tison v. Arizona, supra,
481 U.S. at pp. 139-141 [victims captured, removed to remote location and then
executed]; People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 285 [participants captured
multiple victims, bound and robbed them, detained them for several minutes, and
sexually assaulted the female victim]), does not mean defendant was unaware of the
dangers posed by the nature of the crimes here.
Similarly, defendant’s reliance on a multitude of other cases with diverse facts also
does not compel a conclusion that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
“When we decide issues of sufficiency of the evidence, comparison with other cases is of
limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on its own facts.” (People v. Thomas
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) In any event, contrary to the record here, the defendant in In
re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, stayed behind while his cohort committed the
actual robbery and there was no indication that he knew his cohort would kill. (Id. at
pp. 390-391, 404-405.) In In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, there was no
indication that the defendant knew his compatriots were dangerous and he waited across
the street while the robbery took place. (Id. at pp. 1020-1021.) Here, by contrast,

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defendant was present and participated in the attempted carjacking, knew that Pangthong
was armed with a loaded and operable firearm that defendant had given him, knew that
Pangthong said he was willing to fire the gun if they met any resistance, and defendant
himself used a gun to help facilitate the attempted carjacking and support Pangthong.
For the fourth Banks factor (presence at the scene and in a position to facilitate or
prevent the killing) (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803) defendant was standing mere feet
from Pangthong when he fired the fatal shot. At the time, defendant had drawn his
weapon to hold Thornton’s passenger at bay, helping further facilitate the carjacking and
killing. No evidence showed that defendant told Pangthong to stop or drop his weapon.
This evidence supports a finding that defendant’s presence at the scene and actions during
the incident were more than minor.
For the final Banks factor, we focus on what defendant did after lethal force was
used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) After Thornton was shot, defendant did not
render aid or otherwise help the dying man. Instead, he fled with the others. There was
also evidence, although disputed, that he bragged about being the actual killer to gain
respect in his gang.
Based on the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that defendant was more than a passive participant in the attempted
carjacking and killing. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 [not all Banks factors are
necessary to find a defendant acted as a major participant during a felony murder].)
Defendant’s youth at the time of the crimes does not compel a contrary finding.
While it is true that both defendant and Pangthong were relatively young at 17 and 14
years of age, respectively, and some courts have found that youthfulness is a proper
consideration under Banks and Clark (see e.g., In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
467-468 [citing cases]), the evidence here shows that defendant, who was the oldest in
the group, was well aware of the dangers posed by using loaded firearms during criminal

17
activities as his own brother had been killed in a gang-related shooting, something that
defendant said deeply impacted him. (Id. at pp. 470-471 [noting that prior court found
the nearly 17-year-old defendant “ ‘ “certainly had an appreciation for the risks and
consequences of what goes on in a criminal behavior, because one of his very best friends
was killed at age 14 in a drive-by shooting, and he said he missed his friend greatly” ’ ”].)
Thus, he did not lack the experience, perspective, or judgment to adequately appreciate
the risk of death posed by a person with a loaded gun who told him he wanted to be the
“shooter” during the planned carjacking and then subsequently announced in defendant’s
presence his intention to in fact shoot the victim if he resisted.
And, despite defendant’s contentions, we do not interpret the absence of any
reference to defendant’s youthfulness when the trial court ruled to mean that the court
failed to consider his youth and immaturity at the time of the shooting when making the
major participant and reckless indifference determinations. Defendant himself repeatedly
raised the youthfulness issue below and nothing shows the trial court did not consider the
issue. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and
followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
But even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the trial court’s silence
indicates it failed to consider defendant’s youthfulness as defendant alleges, we find any
error harmless. In In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pages 470-472, for example,
the appellate court found that even if the nearly 17-year-old defendant’s youth at the time
of a murder committed by his two accomplices during a store robbery could properly be
considered as decreasing his culpability under Banks and Clark, that factor in no way
undermined its conclusion that the defendant was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The youthful defendant in Harper willingly chose to
participate in the robbery, was aware of the accomplice’s violent tendencies, supplied the
gun to the shooter, told the other accomplice who slit the victim’s throat where to retrieve

18
a knife during the incident, stole money from the cash register, provided no aid to the
victim after hearing the gunshot, and then later bragged about the crimes. (Ibid.)
The same rationale applies here. Much like the defendant in In re Harper,
defendant willingly participated in the attempted carjacking to increase his gang
reputation and to obtain more firearms. He knew what was going to occur if the group’s
intended victim resisted—that Pangthong would shoot him. He was aware that
Pangthong’s gun was operable and loaded because defendant actually gave Pangthong the
weapon to use as the “shooter.” Instead of objecting when Pangthong announced his
intention to shoot the victim before the group approached the truck, defendant said
nothing. During the attempted carjacking, defendant even pulled out a second gun and
pointed it at Thornton’s passenger who appeared to be reaching for something that might
have helped Thornton. Defendant fled after Thornton was shot in the head, offering no
aid, and then, according to police, later bragged about being the shooter to boost his
reputation in his gang. And defendant admitted during the parole hearing that the group
always intended to kill the selected victim. On this record, we cannot say defendant’s
youth precluded him from being a major participant in the crime.
2. Reckless Indifference to Human Life (Clark)
There is a recognized overlap between being a major participant and having a
reckless indifference to human life. As our Supreme Court acknowledged in Clark, “ ‘the
greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
Applying the Clark factors, we conclude the totality of the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant acted with reckless indifference to Thornton’s life.
While evidence of the third Clark factor relating to the duration of the felony was
absent, since the evidence showed the group shot Thornton shortly after approaching his
truck in the 7-Eleven parking lot (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620), substantial evidence

19
of the remaining Clark factors was presented below. (Id. at pp. 619-622.) The first Clark
factor (knowledge of weapons and use and number of weapons) (id. at p. 618) favors
finding defendant recklessly disregarded Thornton’s life during the crime. While the
mere fact of a defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient
to establish reckless indifference, it is significant that defendant gave Pangthong the
loaded weapon used to kill Thornton, which defendant knew worked since he had
previously fired the gun. Moreover, defendant brought another gun to the carjacking,
which he pointed at Thornton’s passenger to prevent him from intervening. “A
defendant’s use of a firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim . . . , can be
significant in the analysis of reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.)
For the second Clark factor (presence at the scene and opportunity to prevent or
mitigate the crime or aid the victim) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619), as previously
discussed, not only was defendant present at the scene when Thornton was killed but he
also actively pointed a gun at Thornton’s passenger. It is reasonable to infer that his use
of his gun, even if he did not fire it, stopped the passenger from helping Thornton. And
defendant did nothing to stop the deadly attack. No evidence showed he told Pangthong
to lower his weapon or not shoot; instead, he stood silently by with his gun drawn as
Pangthong shot Thornton in the back of the head when Thornton attempted to escape the
dangerous situation. Defendant, moreover, agreed with the group that Pangthong should
carjack Thornton’s red truck and did not object when Pangthong threatened to shoot the
driver if he resisted or attempted to run away.
For the fourth Clark factor (knowledge codefendant was likely to kill) (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621), defendant’s close proximity to the murder and the events
leading up to it are relevant as to whether defendant was aware of the likelihood
Pangthong might kill their intended target. Again, Pangthong asked for defendant’s
loaded and operable weapon because Pangthong wanted to be the shooter and told the
group he intended to shoot if there was resistance. Given this evidence, it may be

20
inferred that such conduct and statements reasonably suggested to defendant that
Pangthong was willing to use lethal force. Rather than acting as a restraining influence
on the younger Pangthong, however, defendant did nothing to prevent the situation and
instead willingly gave Pangthong a loaded and operable firearm to use in the carjacking.
The final Clark factor (minimizing the risks of violence during the felony) (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621-622) also weighs against defendant. There is nothing in the
record indicating that defendant did anything to lessen the risk of violence during the
crime. Rather, as the trial court recognized, defendant’s actions of arming Pangthong
with a loaded and working weapon and using a second gun to subdue the victims during
the attempted carjacking escalated the dangerousness of the encounter and heightened the
risk of violence to Thornton.
To the extent defendant argues that different inferences more favorable to him can
be drawn from the evidence, defendant misapprehends the applicable sufficiency of the
evidence standard of review on appeal. Defendant cannot successfully challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence merely by offering “competing inferences he wishes the [trial
court] had drawn.” (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 827, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.)
Accordingly, we conclude from the totality of the evidence and reasonable
inferences from the evidence that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
that defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.

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III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

EARL, P. J.

/S/

DUARTE, J.

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