People v. Alatriste CA2/2

CourtListener 10361077Calctapp21 mars 2025

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Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Alatriste CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B338283

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA344055)
v.

JOSE ARMANDO ALATRISTE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
At 18 years of age, Jose Alatriste was convicted of offenses
including second degree murder and sentenced to 77 years to life
in prison. In 2023, he unsuccessfully moved for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (§ 1170(d)).1
On appeal, he argues (and the People agree) the trial court erred
by not treating his sentence as equivalent to a sentence of life
without parole (LWOP). We reverse the order denying relief and
remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury found Alatriste guilty of second degree murder of
Primo Garcia (§ 187, subd. (a)), of attempted murder of
Wenceslao Valenton (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and of assault with a
semi-automatic firearm on both Garcia and Valenton (§ 245,
subd. (b)). The jury found true, in connection with the murder
and attempted murder counts, that Alatriste personally used and
intentionally discharged a handgun proximately causing great
bodily injury and death (former § 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)), and in
connection with the assault counts that Alatriste personally used
a handgun and inflicted great bodily injury (former §§ 12022.5 &
12022.7, subd. (b)). The jury also found true that all these
offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
with the specific intent to promote criminal conduct by gang
members (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The trial court sentenced Alatriste to 15 years to life for
murder, plus a 25 year firearm enhancement, to a consecutive
sentence of seven years for attempted murder, plus a 20-year
firearm use enhancement, and an additional 10 years for the
criminal gang enhancement, for a total sentence of 77 years to
life. The Court of Appeal affirmed Alatriste’s conviction and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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sentence. (People v. Alatriste (Dec. 6, 2011, B233020)
[nonpub. opn.].)
On May 9, 2023, Alatriste filed a pro se petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The form petition alleged
that Alatriste was convicted of murder under a theory of imputed
malice, or of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences theory, and that he “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
Alatriste requested the court appoint counsel to represent him in
connection with his petition. On May 11, 2023, the trial court
entered an order reciting that Alatriste had been tried on the
theory that he shot Garcia, that the jury was not instructed on
imputed malice, and that the jury’s true finding on firearm use
showed Alatriste was the actual killer. Nonetheless, the trial
court appointed counsel to represent Alatriste and ordered the
parties to brief the merits of his petition.
On December 14, 2023, with the assistance of counsel
appointed to represent him on his 1172.6 petition, Alatriste filed
a petition for recall of his sentence under section 1170(d)(1).2
In support of his petition Alatriste alleged he was 16 years old
when he murdered Garcia and that he had been imprisoned for
15 years. He further argued that he was entitled to be
resentenced because his education and discipline record while
incarcerated “indicate[d] rehabilitation or the potential for
rehabilitation”, and he had “learned and grown” and was “deeply
ashamed of the harm that [he has] caused other people.” In an
accompanying memorandum, Alatriste’s counsel argued that

2 Shortly after filing this petition, Alatriste withdrew his
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.

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“[t]he imposed sentence of 77 years to life is a de facto LWOP
sentence,” and cited People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608,
631 (Heard), arguing that section 1170(d)(1) had been extended
“to all those individuals sentenced to the functional equivalent”
of LWOP.
The People’s memorandum opposing Alatriste’s petition
conceded that “Alatriste’s sentence satisfies the requirements
laid out in Heard,” but opposed granting relief. First, the
prosecutor argued that Alatriste’s sentence was not the
equivalent of LWOP because, under section 3051, “he is eligible
for parole in 7 years.” Thus, he argued, “the motion should be
denied because Heard is predicated upon the nonexistent legal
fiction that there is such a thing as the ‘functional equivalent’ of
LWOP for juveniles.” In addition, the prosecutor argued that
Alatriste failed to demonstrate “any real remorse for the
incalculable damage he inflicted upon the victims and their
families,” and that as a practical matter resentencing under
section 1170(d)(1) would result in Alatriste’s immediate release
from custody “having not been rehabilitated.” In a supplemental
memorandum, the prosecution characterized Heard as “erroneous
and absurd, in its rationality and in its effect.”
Following oral argument, the trial court denied the
petition, finding that “Mr. Alatriste received a life sentence with
the possibility of parole, and therefore falls outside the ambit of
[§ 1170(d)(1)].” The court rejected Alatriste’s contention that his
sentence was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life
without parole and concluded that section 3051 provided
adequate relief because it “effectively extended to every affected
juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity for parole no matter
his actual sentence, and, in doing so, eliminated constitutional

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concerns that juveniles in California could receive a de facto
LWOP sentence masquerading as a lengthy life sentence that
only speciously offered a chance at parole.”
Alatriste filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
denying his petition, and argues that the trial court erred by
finding he was not sentenced to the equivalent of life
imprisonment without parole, and was therefore ineligible for
resentencing under section 1170(d). The People now “agree[] that
[Alatriste’s] sentence of 77 years to life is the functional
equivalent of an LWOP sentence, and thus the superior court
erred by denying relief and declining to follow [Heard].” This
concession is not binding on us and does not limit the scope of our
review of the order denying Alatriste’s petition. (Money v. Krall
(1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 378, 393 [“ ‘The mere fact that respondent
is now willing to have the order reversed would not justify this
court in rendering a judgment of reversal. A judgment or order
will not be reversed unless the record shows some legal ground
for reversal’ ”].)
After reviewing the record, we agree with the parties that
the trial court erred when it denied Alatriste’s petition on the
ground that he was not sentenced to LWOP, and that the order
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings. Our review of the trial court’s order is limited to
whether Alatriste’s sentence makes him eligible to petition for
resentencing under section 1170(d). We need not, and do not,
address whether Alatriste proved by a preponderance of the
evidence any of the grounds for relief listed in subdivision (d)(2).

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DISCUSSION
A. The Legal Standard and Standard of Review
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part that
“[w]hen a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant
may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing.” Subdivision (d)(2) sets out four possible grounds
for relief,3 one of which the court must find to be “true” by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to grant the petition.
(§ 1170(d)(5).)
The trial court denied Alatriste’s petition on the ground
that he was not sentenced to LWOP and thus was statutorily
ineligible for resentencing under section 1170(d). It did not reach
the question whether Alatriste proved any of the four factors
under subdivision (d)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Whether [Alatriste’s] sentence is the functional equivalent of
LWOP presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we
independently review.” (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 791, 800.)

3 These are (1) the defendant “was convicted pursuant to
felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law”;
(2) the defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for
assault or other violent felonies prior to the offense that resulted
in the sentence being considered for recall; (3) the defendant
committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant; or
(4) the defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate
rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation.
(§ 1170(d)(2)(A)–(D).)

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B. Denying Alatriste’s Petition Was Error
1. Section 1170(d) applies to offenders sentenced to
the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Although Alatriste was 16 years old when he murdered
Primo Garcia, and he has been in prison since 2007 or 2008,4 the
trial court is correct that on its face, subdivision (d) of section
1170 limits relief to juvenile defendants who were either
originally sentenced to LWOP or resentenced to LWOP upon
petitioning for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).
(§ 1170(d)(1)(A) & (10).) However, in Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th 608, the Court of Appeal held that the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the United States and California
Constitutions require that the right to petition for relief under
section 1170(d)(1) be extended to juveniles originally sentenced to
the functional equivalent of LWOP.5 (Heard, at pp. 627-628.)
The defendant in Heard had been sentenced to a term of 23 years
plus 80 years to life. Like Alatriste, his petition for resentencing
under section 1170(d)(1) was denied on the ground the statute
was limited to juveniles who were sentenced to explicit LWOP
terms. Reversing, the Court of Appeal held that it could
“conceive of no legitimate reason for making juvenile offenders
sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek

4 Alatriste was sentenced on March 10, 2010, at which time
he had already been in custody for 972 days, indicating he was
arrested on July 12, 2007, three days after Primo Garcia was
murdered.

5 A sentence is the “functional equivalent of LWOP” if the
release date “is near or beyond the juvenile’s life expectancy.”
(People v. Carter (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 985, 995.)

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resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the
equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” (Heard, at p. 631.)
Cases decided after the trial court denied Alatriste’s
petition add weight to our conclusion that the court erred when it
declined to follow Heard. In People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto), decided four months after the order
denying Alatriste’s petition, the trial court had denied an 1170(d)
petition “on the ground that [defendant] had not been sentenced
to an explicit LWOP term.” (Sorto, at p. 440.) Rejecting the
Attorney General’s arguments that “Heard was wrongly decided
and is contrary to California Supreme Court precedent” – the
same arguments the trial court adopted here – our colleagues in
Division Three reversed the order denying relief, holding that
“offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP
terms . . . are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection” and that “parole
eligibility under section 3051 does not render those offenders
ineligible for relief under section 1170(d).” (Sorto, at p. 440.)
Still more recently, the court in People v. Bagsby (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1063 (Bagsby) declined an invitation by
the Attorney General to reconsider Heard, concluding instead
that the holding was both correct and consistent with existing
case law.
2. Alatriste’s sentence was the functional equivalent
of LWOP.
The trial court’s second reason for denying Alatriste’s
petition was that his sentence of 77 years to life was not the
“ ‘functional equivalent’ of an LWOP sentence.” The court
specifically noted that “[f]rom a purely quantitative perspective,
defendant’s sentence, although substantial, is not even remotely

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as lengthy, and is therefore not comparable,” to the sentence
under scrutiny in Heard. Again, the trial court’s conclusion was
inconsistent with case law in effect at the time of the hearing.
For example, our Supreme Court has held “that a sentence of
50 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP.” (People v.
Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369; see also People v. Garcia
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316, 326 [juvenile sentence of 50 years to
life is the equivalent of LWOP].)6 In light of these authorities,
the trial court’s conclusion that a sentence of 77 years to life is
not the functional equivalent of LWOP is unsustainable.
3. The availability of a parole hearing under section
3051 does not bar Alatriste from seeking relief
under section 1170(d).
The final reason cited by the trial court for denying
Alatriste’s petition was that section 30517 “adequately
address[es]” Alatriste’s concerns by affording him an opportunity
to be considered for parole after serving 25 years of his sentence.
The trial court elected instead to follow other appellate decisions
it characterized as “reject[ing] claims such as Mr. Alatriste’s as

6 In fact, at the time of the hearing on Alatriste’s petition,
the policy of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office was that,
in the context of a petition for resentencing under section
1170(d)(1)(a) “[a] de facto life without parole sentence is any
sentence imposed that was 50 years-to-life or more.”

7 Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to
conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” during the 15th, 20th,
or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration. (§ 3051,
subd. (b).) The date of the hearing depends on the offender’s
“ ‘[c]ontrolling offense,’ ” which is defined as “the offense
or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the
longest term of imprisonment.” (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).)

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having been mooted by Penal Code § 3051.” We have reviewed
each of the cases cited by the trial court8 and conclude that none
of them is authority for denying Alatriste’s petition on the ground
his sentence rendered him ineligible to petition for relief under
section 1170(d). In particular, none of these cases involved a
petition for relief under section 1170(d), and none held that an
offender entitled to a parole hearing under section 3051 was
ineligible to file a petition for resentencing under section1170(d).
The trial court’s conclusion that section 3051 barred
Alatriste from pursuing a petition for resentencing under section
1170(d) is at odds with case law interpreting these statutes.
Section 3051 “change[s] the manner in which the juvenile
offender’s original sentence operates by capping the number of
years that he may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for
release on parole . . . with no additional resentencing procedure
required.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 278-279.)
By contrast, at resentencing under section 1170(d), “a trial court
has broad discretion to select the term of imprisonment, run
sentences concurrently or consecutively, and strike or dismiss
enhancements. [Citations.]” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
p. 449.) Thus, “section 1170(d) plainly has potential to grant
meaningful relief to functionally equivalent LWOP
offenders . . . even after the Legislature enacted section
3051. . . [T]he simple fact that offenders . . . have filed petitions
under section 1170(d) – after already [receiving] relief under
section 3051 – would seem to refute” any contention to the
contrary. (Sorto, at p. 449.)

8 In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439; People v. White (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1229; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427; and
People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080.

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A similar argument was also considered and rejected in
Bagsby. There, the Attorney General argued, inter alia, that
section 3051 rendered section 1170(d) superfluous, such that
“striking the resentencing provision would be ‘fitting’ . . . because
‘there exists another law, [section 3051, subdivision (b)(4)], which
has been found to conform to current case law, and largely fulfills
the legislative purpose of [section 1170(d)(1)(A)].’ ” (Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) Rejecting this argument,
Bagsby noted that “[t]he Legislature has amended section 1170
several times since 2017 [Citations.] And yet it has never
repealed the section 1170(d) resentencing provision, despite its
presumed awareness of . . . subdivision (b)(4) of section 3051.
[Citation.] Had the Legislature truly preferred for . . . the
amendment of section 3051 [] to result in the elimination of
subdivision (d)(1)(A) from section 1170, it could have done so
itself on one of these occasions. But it did not.” (Bagsby, at
p. 1062.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Alatriste’s petition for relief
under section 1170(d). On remand, the court shall reconsider
Alatriste’s petition in accordance with this opinion. Nothing in
this opinion should be construed as expressing a view as to the
merits of Alatriste’s petition, nor the relief the court should grant
if it determines Alatriste is eligible for resentencing.

RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J.

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