People v. Richardson CA4/3

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Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Richardson CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062822

v. (Super. Ct. No. C-71141)

JOHN MITCHELL RICHARDSON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Lynn E. McGinnis and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
In May 1988, defendant John Mitchell Richardson planned and
assisted in an attempted armed robbery of a check cashing business in Santa
Ana. Evidence shows he gave his accomplice, Gerald King, a gun to use in the
robbery. The evidence also shows Richardson was aware King might shoot
someone. On the day of the attempted robbery, King and the business owner
got into a scuffle. Both men shot each other and died. Richardson was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. He later filed a
petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (since
renumbered to section 1172.6).1 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the resentencing petition on grounds Richardson was a major
participant in the robbery and had acted with reckless indifference to human
life.
Richardson appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition. He
contends there in insufficient evidence to support the court’s reckless
indifference finding. We disagree. The record shows Richardson was one of
the masterminds behind the robbery, he gave King the gun that was used in
the murder, he knew King was capable of violence, and he took no steps to
minimize the risk of violence occurring. Due to these factors, we affirm the
order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE UNDERLYING CRIME
On May 2, 1988, Harley Curtis drove a car carrying Richardson
and King. He parked the car about 75 yards from Cash Unlimited, a check

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

2
cashing business in Santa Ana, sometime around 8:30 a.m. Cash Unlimited
opened at 9:00 a.m. It was located in a downstairs suite of a two-story office
building. The office building had a hallway that divided the downstairs in
half.
After the car was parked, Richardson and King exited the car and
walked to Cash Unlimited together. When they arrived, there were already
three other customers (the customers) waiting outside the office building for
Cash Unlimited to open. Richardson and King initially waited outside the
building with the customers. King then entered the office building, and the
customers followed him inside. Richardson remained outside the building for
a few minutes then also entered. Inside the building’s hallway, King smoked
and paced back and forth. Richardson remained further down the hall from
Cash Unlimited’s door. One of the customers testified at trial that she did not
see Richardson and King talk to each other after they arrived at Cash
Unlimited.
Cash Unlimited was owned by David Brower and his father,
Phillip Brower.2 On May 2, they arrived at Cash Unlimited between 8:55 and
9:00 a.m. Philip was armed with a gun. A witness testified that the customers
had been in the hallway for about 10 minutes before the Browers arrived.
The Browers walked to Cash Unlimited to unlock the door, which had two
locks. When David put his key into the first lock, he saw King’s hand pointing
a gun at him. The gun was close to his body, but it was not touching him.
Phillip was standing next to David. Phillip said, “‘What’s going on
here?’” David heard a voice from behind him respond, “‘just open the damn

2 We refer to these individuals by their first name since they

share a surname, and we refer to them collectively as the Browers.

3
door.’” A witness saw King put his arm around Phillip. She then saw Phillip
turn toward King. Suddenly, there was a short scuffle, and King and Phillip
fired shots at each other. It is unclear who fired first, but multiple witnesses
at trial stated the shooting occurred quickly. Phillip fell backward onto one of
the customers. The customers ran away, and David called the police. Both
King and Phillip died from their respective gunshot wounds.
The evidence at trial showed that Richardson did not say or do
anything to either David or Phillip. It appears he remained near the
customers when King approached the Browers. Richardson ran back to the
car when the shooting started, and he and Curtis sped off together.
Richardson told Curtis he thought King had been shot. Richardson was
arrested later that day and interviewed by police.
In Richardson’s police interview, he initially denied any
involvement in the Cash Unlimited robbery. He also gave a false name
(James Lemar Jones) and told police he was 19 years old (he was 17 years
and 10 months). However, Richardson eventually admitted that he needed
cash, so he and King decided to rob Cash Unlimited. Richardson later spoke
to Curtis on the phone about the idea. Richardson had been to Cash
Unlimited in the past and thought it would be easy to rob. Richardson had a
gun, which he had previously bought for $150. Prior to the robbery,
Richardson gave the gun to King. King purportedly said, “‘I’ll do all the
work.’ . . . You know, you’ve got the gun and I’ll do it . . . .” Richardson said he
saw King loading the gun in the car on the way to Cash Unlimited. He
claimed they had just intended to rob Cash Unlimited and “there wasn’t
suppose[d] to be any shooting.”
Richardson also testified at trial. His trial testimony mostly
matched his police interview. At the time of the robbery, Richardson had

4
known King for about one and a half years, and they had been roommates for
“some time before the robbery.” Richardson admitted that he had told King
he needed money and had suggested that Cash Unlimited “might be easy to
rob.” Richardson knew King was a gang member but denied being in a gang
himself.
Richardson also testified that both he and King planned the
robbery, but it was his idea to recruit Curtis as the getaway driver.
Richardson also admitted to buying the gun that King used during the
robbery and giving that gun to King. Richardson claimed the gun was
unloaded when he gave it to King and that he did not give King the gun to
use in the robbery. Rather, he claimed to have given King the gun to “put it
up inside the apartment.”3
According to Richardson’s trial testimony, he was supposed to
handle crowd control during the robbery. He was tasked with telling the
customers at Cash Unlimited that the business was being robbed and
ensuring that they stayed silent and kept their hands visible. He stated that
he was unarmed during the robbery.
Richardson also claimed that he got cold feet when they arrived
at Cash Unlimited, and he told King that he did not want to go through with
the robbery. King purportedly frowned at him and said, “man, what are you
talking about[?]” Richardson testified he was scared because King had a gun.
He believed that if he did not participate in the robbery, King would think he
was “punking out” and shoot him.

3 Richardson’s testimony was unclear as to when he gave King

the gun.

5
II.
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ROBBERY
The prosecution presented evidence that Richardson and King
had robbed a different check cashing business in Santa Ana on April 4, 1988,
a month prior to the Cash Unlimited robbery. The business owner (the
owner) and his wife arrived at their business at 9:30 a.m., a half hour before
it opened. After they arrived, the wife went into the business to turn off the
alarm and closed the entry door. The owner remained outside the business. A
man, who the owner identified as Richardson, approached him and asked for
the time. The owner then heard something, turned, and saw King pointing a
gun at him. The owner looked back at Richardson and saw he also had gun.
The men instructed the owner to tell his wife to open the entry
door or they would shoot him. The owner knocked on the entry door, and his
wife opened it. Once she opened the door, King pointed a gun at her head and
asked where the money was located. Richardson stayed with the owner and
kept his gun pointed at the owner’s chest. The wife opened the safe and King
took some money. After King took the money, Richardson kept his gun
pointed at the owner and told him not to call the police or they would shoot
him. The men then fled. The robbery lasted about five minutes, and the
robbers took about $6,000 to $7,000. At trial, Richardson denied any
involvement with the April 1988 robbery.
III.
VERDICT AND SENTENCE
In June 1989, a jury found Richardson guilty of (1) the first
degree murder of Phillip Brower (§ 187), (2) the attempted robbery of Cash
Unlimited on May 2, 1988 (§§ 664, 211), and (3) the robbery of the other
check cashing business in April 1988 (§ 211). The jury also found true that

6
Richardson “was armed with a firearm” during the attempted robbery of
Cash Unlimited and “personally used a firearm” during the April 1988
robbery.4 Richardson was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison.
IV.
THE RESENTENCING PETITION
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437).
SB 1437 “amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine for
murder and the felony-murder rule ‘to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] [SB 1437] also provided for
retroactive application of these amendments by creating a process in section
1170.95 [(now § 1172.6)] through which qualifying defendants can have their
murder convictions vacated and be resentenced.” (People v. Cruz (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 740, 746.)
To seek relief under section 1172.6, a convicted murderer must
file a petition that sets forth a prima facie case for relief. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If that standard is met, the trial court issues an
order to show cause. (Ibid.) Generally, this leads to “an evidentiary hearing
at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable

4 It appears the firearm enhancement tied to the Cash Unlimited

robbery was based on vicarious liability. None of the parties have cited any
evidence in the record indicating Richardson carried a firearm during the
Cash Unlimited robbery. Further, this firearm enhancement was charged
under former section 12022, subdivision (a), which “applie[d] ‘“whether or not
such person is personally armed with a firearm.”’” (People v. Ramirez (1987)
189 Cal.App.3d 603, 626.)

7
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under
state law as amended by [SB 1437].” (Id. at pp. 708–709.)
A few weeks after SB 1437 went into effect, Richardson filed a
resentencing petition under former section 1170.95 (the petition). The trial
court initially denied the petition on grounds SB 1437 violated the California
Constitution. This Court reversed that ruling and remanded the petition back
to the trial court.
On remand, the prosecution conceded the petition stated a prima
facie case for relief but objected to resentencing. The trial court issued an
order to show cause, and an evidentiary hearing was held in June 2023. The
court subsequently denied the petition. It found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Richardson could still be convicted of murder today under a felony-
murder theory because he was a major participant in the robbery and acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
Richardson appeals the denial of the petition on grounds there is
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.
DISCUSSION
I.
BACKGROUND LAW
Under current law, “[a] participant in the perpetration . . . of a
[robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for murder” if “[t]he person was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) “Whether [the defendant]
was a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless
indifference to human life is predominantly a factual question reviewable for
substantial evidence.” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480
[discussing the standard of review applicable to a section 1172.6 petition].)

8
“‘In applying the substantial evidence test, we view the facts in
the light most favorable to the [prevailing party], resolving all conflicts in
[its] favor and accepting all reasonable inferences deduced from the
evidence.’” (People v. Shrier (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 400, 412.) “‘[A]n appellate
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. If the
circumstances reasonably justify the [fact finder’s] findings, the reviewing
court may not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the
circumstances might also support a contrary finding.’ [Citation.] We do not
reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the testimony when determining
its legal sufficiency.” (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144–145.
“‘“The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the
most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the
function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.”’” (People v. Johnson &
Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 329.)
A defendant’s culpability for felony murder is judged on a
spectrum. As our state Supreme Court explained in People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788, 799–802 (Banks), two United States Supreme Court cases are
useful in understanding the opposing ends of this spectrum: Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782
(Enmund). Both Tison and Enmund discussed the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty in felony-murder cases. But California courts
have applied their analysis in assessing felony-murder culpability in
noncapital cases. (See, e.g., Banks, at pp. 799–802.)
In Enmund, “defendant Earl Enmund purchased a calf from
victim Thomas Kersey and in the process learned Kersey was in the habit of
carrying large sums of cash on his person. A few weeks later, Enmund drove
two armed confederates to Kersey’s house and waited nearby while they

9
entered. When Kersey’s wife appeared with a gun, the confederates shot and
killed both Kerseys. Enmund thereafter drove his confederates away from the
scene and helped dispose of the murder weapons, which were never found. He
was convicted of robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to death.”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 799.)
“On these facts, the United States Supreme Court reversed
Enmund’s death sentence as prohibited by the federal Constitution. The court
found a broad consensus against imposing death in cases ‘where the
defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing
took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder.’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, it held the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for any
felony-murder aider and abettor ‘who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.’
[Citation.] The intent to commit an armed robbery is insufficient; absent the
further ‘intention of participating in or facilitating a murder’ [citation], a
defendant who acts as ‘the person in the car by the side of the road at the
time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers escape’ [citation] cannot
constitutionally be sentenced to death.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 799.)
The United States Supreme Court revisited this issue again in
Tison. “Prisoner Gary Tison’s sons Ricky, Raymond, and Donald Tison
conducted an armed breakout of Gary and his cellmate from prison, holding
guards and visitors at gunpoint. During the subsequent escape, their car,
already down to its spare tire, suffered another flat, so the five men agreed to
flag down a passing motorist in order to steal a replacement car. Raymond
waved down a family of four; the others then emerged from hiding and
captured the family at gunpoint. Raymond and Donald drove the family into
the desert in the Tisons’ original car with the others following. Ricky and the

10
cellmate removed the family’s possessions from their car and transferred the
Tison gang’s possessions to it; Gary and his cellmate then killed all four
family members. When the Tisons were later apprehended at a roadblock,
Donald was killed and Gary escaped into the desert, only to die of exposure.
[Citation.] Ricky and Raymond Tison and the cellmate were tried and
sentenced to death. The trial court made findings that Ricky and Raymond’s
role in the series of crimes was ‘“very substantial”’ and they could have
foreseen their actions would ‘“create a grave risk of . . . death.”’” (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 799–800.)
“The United States Supreme Court granted Ricky’s and
Raymond’s petitions to consider the application of Enmund to these facts.
The court began by discussing at length and endorsing Enmund’s holding
that the Eighth Amendment limits the ability of states to impose death for
‘felony murder simpliciter.’ [Citation.] Specifically, Tison described the range
of felony-murder participants as a spectrum. At one extreme were people like
‘Enmund himself: the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who
neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.’
[Citation.] At the other extreme were actual killers and those who attempted
or intended to kill. [Citation.] Under Enmund, Tison held, death was
disproportional and impermissible for those at the former pole, but
permissible for those at the latter. [Citation.] The Supreme Court then
addressed the gray area in between, the proportionality of capital
punishment for felony-murder participants who, like the two surviving Tison
brothers, fell ‘into neither of these neat categories.’ [Citation.] Here, the court
announced, ‘major participation in the felony committed, combined with
reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund
culpability requirement.’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 800.)

11
As explained by our state Supreme Court, “Tison and Enmund
establish that a defendant’s personal involvement must be substantial,
greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary
felony murder such as Earl Enmund. The defendants’ actions in [Tison] and
[Enmund] represent points on a continuum. [Citation.] Somewhere between
them, at conduct less egregious than the Tisons’ but more culpable than Earl
Enmund’s, lies the constitutional minimum for” felony-murder culpability.
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 802, 804; § 189, subd. (e)(3).)
We begin by reviewing whether Richardson was a major
participant in the robbery and then assess whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
II.
MAJOR PARTICIPANT
“[A] ‘major participant’ in a robbery is someone whose ‘personal
involvement’ is ‘substantial’ and ‘greater than the actions of an ordinary
aider and abettor . . . .’ [Citation.] However, he or she ‘need not be the
ringleader.’” (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 459.) Factors that
courts consider are (1) “What role did the defendant have in planning the
criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? [(2)] What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? [(3)] What awareness
did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?
[(4)] Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or
inaction play a particular role in the death? [(5)] What did the defendant do
after lethal force was used? No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in determining the

12
ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major.’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn.
omitted.)
Richardson does not appear to contest the trial court’s finding
that he was a major participant in the robbery. His analysis only focuses on
the reckless indifference factors. Nonetheless, we address the relevant factors
below and conclude Richardson was a major participant in the underlying
robbery.
The first and second factors weigh heavily against Richardson.
He could reasonably be characterized as the ringleader of the robbery. He
raised the idea of committing a robbery because he was short on money. He
chose Cash Unlimited as the target, a place he had previously visited. He
recruited Curtis as the getaway driver. He also jointly planned the robbery
with King. Significantly, he gave King the gun used to commit the murder.
While Richardson claimed the gun was unloaded when he gave it to King, a
fact finder could disbelieve this testimony. Besides, even if he gave King an
unloaded gun, Richardson admitted to seeing King load the gun on the way to
Cash Unlimited. Thus, Richardson knew the gun was loaded prior to the
commencement of the robbery.
The third factor also weighs heavily against Richardson.
Richardson had participated in another armed robbery with King a month
prior to the Cash Unlimited robbery. During the prior robbery, Richardson
had pointed a gun at the owner and threatened to shoot him if he called the
police. Likewise, Richardson and King had threatened to shoot the owner if
he did not get his wife to open the door to the business. A fact finder could
reasonably conclude that Richardson and King meant these threats. As such,

13
Richardson knew there was a substantial risk of death during an armed
robbery if someone resisted.
There is also evidence that Richardson was aware King would
shoot someone if confronted during an armed robbery. He knew King was in a
gang. Richardson also stated that he was scared of King and thought King
might shoot him if he “punked out” of the robbery. If Richardson believed
King might shoot him—his roommate who he had known for more than a
year—it can be reasonably inferred he knew King was dangerous and could
shoot a stranger that interfered with the robbery.
The fourth and fifth factors weigh slightly against Richardson.
He was at the scene of the killing. He could have attempted to persuade King
to use an unloaded gun if he was concerned about safety during the robbery.
However, we recognize that the shooting occurred quickly, and Richardson
had little time to intervene once guns were drawn. After lethal force was
used, Richardson fled. He did not attempt to check if the victim was alive or
call for help. Given the presence of the customers, though, Richardson could
reasonably believe one of them would provide aid or call for help. Still, the
fact remains that he did nothing to aid the victim after the shooting. As such,
these factors weigh slightly against Richardson.
All five factors cut against Richardson, with three of them
weighing heavily against him. Based on the evidence discussed above, a fact
finder could reasonably conclude Richardson was a major participant in the
robbery.
III.
RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE
“Reckless indifference to human life ‘requires the defendant be
“subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave

14
risk of death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 807.) There is significant
overlap between the reckless indifference and major participant
requirements. “‘[T]he greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615 (Clark).) In cases where a
defendant is found to be a major participant in a felony, “‘that fact [will] often
provide significant support for [a reckless indifference] finding.’” (Ibid.)
In determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life, courts consider (1) the defendant’s “knowledge of
weapons, and use and number of weapons”; (2) the defendant’s “physical
presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the
victim”; (3) “duration of the felony”; (4) “defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s
likelihood of killing”; and (5) “defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
violence during the felony.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–622,
capitalization & italics omitted.) None of these factors “‘is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient.’” (Id. at p. 618.) However, we note that
“‘[t]he intent to commit an armed robbery’ or ‘[t]he mere fact of a defendant’s
awareness that a gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Bradley (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
1022, 1033 (Bradley).)
The first and fourth factors weigh strongly against Richardson.
As discussed above, Richardson gave King the gun used to commit the
murder. And, even if the gun was unloaded, Richardson saw King loading the
gun in the car. Thus, he knew King was bringing a loaded gun—a gun
supplied by Richardson—to the robbery. “While not sufficient of itself in
determining reckless indifference, the aider and abettor’s awareness that a
firearm will be used in the commission of the underlying felony is

15
nevertheless significant.” (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 749,
771–772.)
As to the fourth factor, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of factors
bearing on a cohort’s likelihood of killing are significant to the analysis . . . .”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. at p. 621.) “A defendant’s willingness to engage
in an armed robbery with individuals known to him to use lethal force may
give rise to the inference that the defendant disregarded a ‘grave risk of
death.’” (Ibid.) Richardson knew King was a gang member. He was also
aware that King was dangerous, as he testified to his fear that King might
shoot him if he “punked out” of the robbery. Yet Richardson still recruited
King to participate in the Cash Unlimited robbery and gave him a gun.
Moreover, in their prior robbery, Richardson saw King point a gun at the
owner and threaten to shoot him if he did not get his wife to open the door.
He had also seen King point a gun at the head of the owner’s wife. Based on
this evidence, it can be reasonably inferred that Richardson knew King might
shoot someone during the course of an armed robbery.
The fifth factor also cuts against Richardson. He argues that he
attempted to minimize the risk of violence by committing the robbery during
daytime business hours. However, this fact could be interpreted to support
the opposite conclusion. For example, in In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
539, 544, the trial court found the defendant had failed to minimize the risks
of a robbery because it “was not planned for after business hours, when fewer
people would be present.” (Italics added.)
Here, three customers were waiting for Cash Unlimited to open
when the Browers arrived. Richardson and King were outnumbered, which
increased the chances of outsider intervention and violence. (See In re
McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013 (McDowell).) The presence of

16
these witnesses also increased the risk that a bystander could be shot. (See
Bradley, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034 [“The jury could reasonably have
concluded the public nature of the robbery and presence of others increased
the risk of someone being injured”].) To minimize the risk of violence,
Richardson could have altered the plan and returned when there were no
customers. He did not. He also could have insisted that King carry an
unloaded gun to eliminate the risk of a shooting. He did not. Nor is there any
evidence in the record showing Richardson and King discussed ways to
minimize violence. (See ibid. [defendants did not attempt to minimize risks of
robbery because they “never discussed whether they should bring firearms,
whether to keep those firearms unloaded, or how to minimize the likelihood
of violence”].)
The second and third factors weigh slightly against Richardson
and are weaker factors in this case. Richardson was present for the entire
robbery. He and King left the car and walked to Cash Unlimited together and
then waited for Cash Unlimited to open. He was also present during the
shooting. Richardson argues that the shooting occurred quickly, and there
was nothing he could do to intervene and prevent its occurrence. We
acknowledge the shooting occurred quickly, and there was little time for
Richardson to intervene once guns were drawn. But Richardson’s argument
also fails to consider that he and King waited for around 10 minutes for Cash
Unlimited to open. They saw the customers waiting. As discussed above, after
seeing the customers, Richardson could have insisted they return when no
customers were present. In other words, Richardson had several minutes to
restrain the crime but did not do so. (See People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 593; Bradley, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.)

17
Richardson also argues that he tried to restrain the crime
because he attempted to call off the robbery after he and King arrived at
Cash Unlimited. But a fact finder could reasonably disbelieve his testimony.
Indeed, an eyewitness testified that she did not see Richardson and King talk
to each other after they arrived at Cash Unlimited.
Finally, while Richardson did not offer any aid or call for help
after the shooting, we acknowledge that he could have been startled or could
have expected other people in the crowd to call for help. Thus, his failure to
provide aid or call for help is not particularly probative here.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly the first,
fourth, and fifth factors, there is sufficient evidence that Richardson acted
with reckless indifference to human life. For example, in McDowell, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th 999, the defendant and his accomplice (the robbers) knocked on a
drug dealer’s door in the middle of the night. The drug dealer was at home
with two other men, and they let the robbers in. The defendant was armed
with a knife. It was unclear whether he knew his accomplice had a gun prior
to the commencement of the robbery. Once inside the house, one of the
robbers demanded that the dealer give them his stash of drugs. The
accomplice then fired a warning shot into the floor next to the dealer. One of
the dealer’s guests then struck the defendant with an object, knocking him
over. The dealer then tried to grab the gun from the accomplice. The
accomplice shot the dealer, and the two robbers fled. The dealer was shot
“only ‘a few seconds’” after the accomplice first shot into the floor, and the
entire incident only lasted around a minute. (Id. at p. 1005.)
The defendant was found guilty of murder. (McDowell, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) He later filed a habeas petition arguing there was
insufficient evidence that he had acted with reckless indifference for human

18
life. (Id. at pp. 1006, 1012.) The trial court disagreed and denied his petition.
First, the defendant was armed with a knife. While there was evidence the
defendant did not know his accomplice had a gun, he became aware of the
gun when the warning shot was fired. (Id. pp. 1005–1006, 1012.) However,
nothing in the record showed the defendant knew of the accomplice’s capacity
for violence prior to the robbery. (Id. at p. 1014.) Second, the defendant made
no attempt to decrease the risks of lethal violence of a home robbery of a drug
dealer. The court noted it was foreseeable that customers might be present.
Further, it was obvious that the robbers were outnumbered when they
entered the house “increasing the chances of resistance,” but the defendant
still proceeded. (Id. at pp. 1013–1014.) Third, the defendant made no attempt
to deescalate the situation after the warning shot. (Id. at p. 1014.)
On balance, we find this case similar to McDowell. Both cases
involved armed robberies gone wrong. In both, the robbers were outnumbered
and caught by surprise by the victim, which caused the accomplice to quickly
shoot the victim. Likewise, in both, the robbers made no apparent attempts to
minimize the risk of violence and could have walked away from the robbery
after seeing they were outnumbered. Both Richardson and the defendant in
McDowell were at the scene of their respective robberies for their entirety
and fled once shots were fired.
There are certainly differences between the two cases. In
McDowell, the defendant was armed with a knife, the robbers targeted a drug
dealer at his home at night, and there were a few seconds to deescalate
things after the accomplice’s warning shot. However, these differences are
offset by several circumstances in this case that were not present in
McDowell. Here, there is evidence showing Richardson (1) armed King with
the gun and knew the gun was loaded prior to the robbery; (2) knew of King’s

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gang affiliation and feared King might shoot him, (3) had seen King threaten
to kill the owner and point a gun at the owner’s wife in their prior robbery;
and (4) had around 10 minutes to observe the customers waiting for Cash
Unlimited and potentially call off the robbery.
Richardson argues the trial court failed to consider how his youth
at the time of the killing—he was 17 years old and 10 months—impacted his
ability to understand the potential risks of the armed robbery. A court may
“consider[] evidence in the record about the defendant’s youth that [bears]
directly” on the above factors. (In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp.
469–470.) However, such evidence must be considered against the totality of
the circumstances. (Id. at p. 470.) Here, the court did consider Richardson’s
age. It acknowledged “that the brain of a child who is a couple months shy of
his 18th birthday on the date of this murder is not fully developed, and that
the hallmark features of youth include immaturity, impetuosity, and failure
to appreciate risks and consequences. [Citation.] The evidence in this case
demonstrates the factors outlined in the Banks and Clark analysis prove that
[Richardson] did act with reckless disregard and was a major participant.”
We find no error in the trial court’s analysis. Richardson contends
his belief that Cash Unlimited “would be ‘easy’ to rob” indicates “he had given
no thought to the possibility of Philip Brower resisting, being armed, or being
willing to fire a gun while a crowd of people surrounded the door to his
business.” But this by itself is insufficient to show his youth is a material
factor here. As set forth above, Richardson was one of the primary planners of
the robbery. He had committed an armed robbery with King a month prior to
the Cash Unlimited robbery in which he had threatened to kill the owner. He
knew King was capable of violence but still gave him a gun prior to the
robbery. He also had several minutes to observe the customers prior to the

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arrival of the Browers. While Richardson may not have been able to
anticipate exactly how the shooting would unfurl, there is enough evidence in
the record to show he was recklessly indifferent to human life.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition is affirmed.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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