CourtListener 10360625•People v. Sanders CA2/1
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Filed 3/20/25 P. v. Sanders CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B333626
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA102299)
v.
EDWARD ANTHONY SANDERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
In a resentencing proceeding under Penal Code section
1172.75,1 the superior court reduced defendant Edward Anthony
Sanders’s aggregate sentence from 22 years eight months to 18
years four months. Sanders committed a series of armed
robberies in 2013, and his original sentence included a now-
invalid one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision
(b) for a prior prison term. At the resentencing hearing, the court
struck that enhancement, as well as a three-year four-month
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Sanders contends we must remand the case for another
resentencing hearing in light of People v. Walker (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1024 (Walker), in which the Supreme Court clarified the
standards for striking or imposing sentence enhancements.
Because the superior court resentenced him before Walker,
Sanders argues that the court did not understand the scope of its
discretion, and he is entitled to a new hearing so that the court
may determine whether to strike additional enhancements from
his sentence. We disagree. Nothing in Walker altered the scope
of the court’s discretion in a way that would benefit Sanders. We
agree with Sanders, however, that the abstract of judgment must
be amended to reflect the correct number of presentence credits.
We affirm the judgment so modified.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Sanders committed three robberies of gas stations and
convenience stores in Diamond Bar and Walnut in the course of
four days in June 2013. On each occasion, Sanders was holding a
1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
gun, and in two of the three robberies, he pointed the gun at a
store employee. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
deputies apprehended Sanders as he was leaving the scene of the
final robbery, searched him, and found a loaded handgun along
with the money stolen from the register. The handgun turned
out to have been stolen, and Sanders was a convicted felon.
The People charged Sanders with three counts of armed
robbery (§ 211), three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), one count of carrying a stolen, loaded
firearm in public (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(2)), and one count of
receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). In addition, the
People charged him with one count of kidnapping for purposes of
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), based on an allegation that during
one of the robberies, the store’s clerk was outside, and Sanders
motioned him to enter the store to open the register. Finally, the
people alleged that Sanders used a firearm in the kidnapping and
in all three robberies (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that he had
served a prison term for a prior offense (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and at the close of the
prosecution’s case, the court granted Sanders’s motion for
acquittal on the kidnapping charge for insufficient evidence. (See
§ 1118.1.) Sanders then pleaded no contest to the remaining
charges in an open plea.
The court imposed the middle term of three years for one of
the robbery counts, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement.
In addition, the court imposed a one-year enhancement for a
prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b). For the
two remaining robberies, the court imposed consecutive sentences
of one-third the middle term, or one year, plus three years four
months for each of the two firearm enhancements. The court
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stayed the sentence on the weapon possession and receipt of
stolen property offenses pursuant to section 654. This yielded an
aggregate sentence of 22 years eight months. In 2016, Sanders
filed a petition under section 1170.18 to reduce his conviction for
receiving stolen property to a misdemeanor. The superior court
granted the petition, but because the court had originally stayed
the sentence for that offense, the change did not reduce the
aggregate length of his sentence.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590), which eliminated the one-
year enhancement for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) except in the case of defendants convicted of
sexually violent offenses. Sanders’s prior prison term was not for
a sexually violent offense. Two years later, the Legislature
created a new law declaring all existing enhancements imposed
under section 667.5, subdivision (b) invalid except when the
enhancements were based on prior sexually violent offenses and
creating a mechanism for eliminating the invalid enhancements
from sentences of defendants in custody. (Sen. Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728).)
In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) placed Sanders on a list of inmates potentially eligible
for resentencing under the new law. Sanders filed a petition in
support of his resentencing, which included an insight statement
taking responsibility for his crimes and explaining how he had
sought to improve his life in prison. He also submitted
documentation of his participation in several rehabilitation
programs, a plan for life after his release, and letters of support
from several family members. The People opposed granting any
relief apart from striking the enhancement under section 667.5,
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subdivision (b), citing Sanders’s conviction for several offenses
between 2000 and 2009, including one count of burglary, as well
as six rules violations while in prison, the most serious of which
was for participation in a riot.
At the resentencing hearing, the court stated that it was
“impressed with [Sanders’s] postconviction behavior while in the
state prison” and decided to reduce his sentence beyond merely
striking the invalid enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). Accordingly, the court struck one of the three-
year four-month firearm enhancements because Sanders’s “use of
a firearm . . . was limited to brandishing only. He did not fire it,
much less injure anyone with the firearm. His motivation behind
. . . the string of robberies—and the court finds it to be sincere—
was . . . to provide necessities for his family, was not for greedy
purposes, in other words.” In addition, the court cited Sanders’s
“willingness . . . to take responsibility for his actions in entering
the open plea rather than forcing a [continuing] trial and
certainly, as the court mentioned, his postconviction efforts to
rehabilitate himself.”
The court “acknowledge[d] its full discretion to strike or
dismiss” the remaining firearm enhancements but “elect[ed] not
to” strike the 10-year enhancement on the principal term
“because of the nature of the robberies that were facilitated with
a firearm.” The court also decided not to strike the final three-
year four-month enhancement because the gun the police found
in Sanders’s possession was “loaded with a live round in the
firing chamber, meaning that the defendant was prepared to use
lethal force if it was necessary; so the mere preparation in using
the weapon to facilitate these robberies indicates a
dangerousness to society.”
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The court left the remaining terms of Sanders’s sentence
unchanged. With the elimination of the three-year four-month
firearm enhancement and the one-year prior prison term
enhancement, Sanders’s aggregate sentence was reduced from 22
years eight months to 18 years four months.
DISCUSSION
A. Background on Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75 states that when a court resentences a
defendant under the statute, “[t]he court shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) “By its
plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not
merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’
enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
402; accord, People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300,
314-315, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189.) Thus, in a case
such as this, “the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify
every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to
the recall.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
Of particular relevance in this case is the superior court’s
power, under section 1385, subdivision (a), “in furtherance of
justice, [to] order an action to be dismissed.” In the case of
sentence enhancements, this includes the “authority to strike the
additional punishment or to strike the enhancement altogether.”
(People v. Barboza (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 955, 965.) Subdivision
(c) of section 1385 directs courts how to apply their discretion to
strike enhancements. It instructs them to “consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
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any of [several] mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof
of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that
the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury
or other serious danger to others.”2 (Id., subd. (c)(2).)
The statute lists nine potential mitigating factors: “(A)
Application of the enhancement would result in a discriminatory
racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of
[s]ection 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
2 The statute was amended to add the requirement to
consider these mitigating factors as a part of Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) which became
effective January 1, 2022. (See People v. Anderson (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 233, 238.) Sanders’s sentencing hearing took place
in 2023, when the new law was in effect.
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convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(I).)
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions, including the
decision whether to strike an enhancement under section 1385,
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 298, citing People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371.)
B. Remand for a New Resentencing Hearing Is Not
Required in Light of Walker
Sanders does not allege that the superior court’s decision to
impose a sentence of 18 years four months was substantively
unreasonable. Instead, he claims we must remand for a new
resentencing hearing because the prior hearing took place before
the Supreme Court released its opinion in Walker, which clarified
the standard courts must apply when deciding whether to strike
enhancements pursuant to section 1385. According to Sanders,
“the record does not conclusively establish that the trial court
would have imposed the same sentence under properly framed
discretion.” We disagree. Nothing in Walker altered the scope of
the superior court’s discretion in a way that could potentially lead
to a reduced sentence for Sanders.
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.
[Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based
on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
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record.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1391.) Under this rule, when the Legislature enacts a new law
that alters sentencing standards after a defendant has been
sentenced but before the case has become final, we must remand
for resentencing “ ‘unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the
trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had
been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431, quoting Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1391.)
The same rule may apply when sentencing standards
change as a result of a judicial decision. Thus, in People v.
Thompson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69, the court held that a
defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th
688, which gave trial courts previously unrecognized authority to
impose uncharged lesser sentence enhancements in place of the
enhancements the jury found true. (Thompson, supra, at pp. 114-
116.)
It does not follow, however, that every Supreme Court case
clarifying the application of a sentencing law requires a remand
for resentencing of every pending case where the defendant was
sentenced prior to the court’s decision. At the time of Sanders’s
resentencing hearing in August 2023, Senate Bill No. 81, which
created the requirement to “afford great weight to evidence . . . of
. . . mitigating circumstances” when deciding whether to strike
sentence enhancements (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)) was already in
effect. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721.) The Courts of Appeal had disagreed
as to how to interpret this provision. Our colleagues in Division
Two of the Second District held that “section 1385’s mandate to
‘afford great weight’ to mitigating circumstances erects a
rebuttable presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the
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enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of that
enhancement . . . would endanger public safety.” (People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391.) In People v. Ortiz (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1087, the Sixth District disagreed, holding that
“the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is
in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement. To be
sure, the Legislature has invested the enumerated mitigating
circumstances with great weight, both in the trial court’s
evaluation of the defendant’s evidence in the first instance and in
the trial court’s consideration of the mitigating circumstance once
established. But this does not preclude a trial court from
determining that countervailing factors—other than the
likelihood of physical or other serious danger to others—may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.” (Id. at p. 1098.)
One year after Sanders was resentenced, the Supreme
Court sided with Ortiz, holding “that a trial court must ‘engage[ ]
in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated
mitigating factors,’ in which the mitigating factors weigh
‘strongly in favor of . . . dismissal’ ” of an enhancement, but with
no formal presumption for dismissing enhancements. (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036, quoting People v. Ortiz, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)
Both before and after Walker, appellate courts agreed that
the amended section 1385 required sentencing courts to show a
preference for striking enhancements when mitigating factors are
present. The disagreement was only as to the degree of that
preference. (See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1035.) There is
no indication in the record that the parties or the superior court
10
at Sanders’s resentencing hearing were confused about how to
apply section 1385, much less that the court’s interpretation of
the statutorily required preference was at odds with the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision in Walker.
Even if we assume some confusion existed about the degree
of preference under section 1385 for striking enhancements when
the court resentenced Sanders, it was immaterial. Of the two
interpretations before the Supreme Court, the defendant in
Walker preferred the one that viewed the statute as creating “a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) The Supreme Court
instead chose an interpretation that allows for the possibility of
“credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1038, quoting People v. Ortiz, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.) In other words, to the extent Walker
altered the scope of courts’ sentencing discretion, it served only to
give courts greater discretion not to strike enhancements.
We do not see how it could benefit Sanders to require the
superior court to conduct a new resentencing hearing with
instructions not to impose a presumption in favor of striking
sentence enhancements. In these circumstances, a remand for
additional resentencing is not required because “it would be idle
to do so.” (People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.)
C. The Record Must be Corrected to Reflect the Correct
Number of Presentence Credits
Sanders argues the superior court miscalculated the
number of days he served from his original 2014 sentencing
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hearing to the 2023 resentencing hearing. The People agree, as
do we. At the resentencing hearing on August 2, 2023, the court
stated that Sanders had served 3,262 days in prison from the
date of his original sentencing on August 26, 2014, not counting
credit for good behavior. When added to the 493 days of credits
he accumulated prior to his original sentencing in 2014, this
yielded a total of 3,755 credits, which is reflected on the amended
abstract of judgment. In fact, there were 3,264 days between
August 26, 2014 and August 2, 2023, and Sanders was entitled to
two more credits. An error in the calculation of credits “is subject
to correction whenever brought to the attention of a court that
has jurisdiction.” (People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 65.)
We will therefore order the superior court to amend the abstract
of judgment to reflect the correct figure.
DISPOSITION
The order sentencing Sanders is affirmed. On remand, the
superior court is directed to correct the number of presentence
credits, to prepare an amended abstract of judgment, and to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
CDCR.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.
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