Manthey v. Beltran CA4/1

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Filed 3/20/25 Manthey v. Beltran CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JANIECE DARLENE MANTHEY et al. D083701

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIC1902590)

JOSE LUIS CUELLAR BELTRAN et al.

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, Chad
Firetag, Judge. Affirmed.
Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Robert H. Wright; Lagasse Branch
Bell Kinkead, Zubin Farinpour, and Jeffrey Tsao for Defendants and
Appellants.
McGee, Lerer & Associates, Dean Ogrin; Esner, Chang, Boyer &
Murphy, Andrew N. Chang, Stuart B. Esner, and Rowena J. Dizon for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jose Luis Cuellar Beltran got into a serious automobile
accident with plaintiffs Janiece Darlene Manthey and Nathan Drake while
Beltran was driving a semi-trailer truck owned by his employer, defendant
Barillas Trucking, Inc. (Barillas). After a three-week trial, a jury found
Beltran was negligent in the operation of the truck, Barillas was vicariously
liable for Beltran’s negligence, and Manthey was not comparatively negligent
in the operation of her vehicle. The jury awarded $5,310,362 in
compensatory damages to Manthey and $8,650,000 in compensatory damages
to Drake. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs.
The defendants appeal the judgment. They contend: (1) the trial court
erred by admitting evidence of prior automobile collisions involving other
truck drivers employed by Barillas; (2) the court erred by admitting evidence
of Barillas’ postaccident investigation into the collision giving rise to this
case; and (3) insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Manthey
was not comparatively negligent. We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
II

BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
On March 21, 2018, at about 4:45 p.m., Manthey drove her Kia Soul
westbound on the Interstate 10 freeway near Palm Springs. She drove in the

1 “[I]n summarizing the facts on appeal we ‘must consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing part[ies], giving [them] the benefit
of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the
judgment.’ ” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 642,
fn. 3, italics omitted.)
2
number two lane, the second lane from the left, at a speed of 70 to 75 miles
per hour. Her husband, Drake, slept in a reclined position in the front
passenger seat. Another motorist, Karen A., drove a Ford C-Max in front of
Manthey in the number two lane.
Unbeknownst to Manthey and Karen, an aluminum ladder fell off a
vehicle in front of them and obstructed the entire number three lane and a
portion of the number two lane. Traffic came to an immediate halt. Karen
braked hard and safely came to a stop a few feet from the vehicle in front of
her. Manthey also braked and adjusted her vehicle’s position within its lane
to try to avoid the ladder. However, Manthey was unable to come to a full
stop quickly enough and rear-ended Karen in a collision that Manthey
described as being “very light.” According to an accident reconstructionist,
Manthey’s vehicle was traveling at a speed of 11 to 16 miles per hour when it
struck Karen’s stationary vehicle. Neither vehicle’s airbags deployed and
Karen did not sustain any serious injuries from the collision.
Meanwhile, Beltran drove on the freeway behind Karen and Manthey
in a 68,500-pound semi-trailer truck loaded with cargo. Beltran drove the
truck in the course of his regular employment with his employer, Barillas,

which owned the truck.2 Beltran drove in the number three lane, but
abruptly moved into the number two lane to try to avoid the ladder in the
road. Within three seconds of the fender-bender between Manthey and
Karen, Beltran’s truck forcefully collided with Manthey’s vehicle in the
number two lane. According to an accident reconstructionist, the truck was
traveling at a speed of 48 miles per hour when it struck Manthey’s stationary

2 Barillas owned about 25 trucks and employed about 20 drivers at the
time of the automobile collision between Beltran and Manthey.
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vehicle. In Manthey’s words, the impact “felt like an explosion.” Manthey’s
vehicle rolled over 1.75 times and came to a rest on its side.
The plaintiffs suffered grave injuries from the accident. Manthey
sustained multiple fractures on her arm, a dislocated elbow, and a hematoma
across her thigh. Drake sustained a subdural hematoma and severe
traumatic brain injury.
B. Procedural Background
Manthey and Drake sued Beltran and Barillas, alleging Beltran was
directly liable for his motor vehicle negligence and Barillas was vicariously
liable for the negligence of its employee, Beltran.
i. Evidence Spoliation Issues
One of the central disputed issues that arose in the discovery phase of
the case (and at trial) was whether, when, and to what extent Beltran braked
and decelerated his truck prior to the collision. The truck was equipped with
an event data recorder (EDR), known colloquially as a black box, which
recorded key information such as the speed of the truck and whether Beltran
braked in the minute preceding the accident. At his deposition, Barillas’
founder and owner testified that his company had sold the truck after the
collision, leaving the plaintiffs unable to access any of the information
recorded on the black box. As it turns out, Barillas had not sold the truck.
Instead, Barillas was simply involved in sales discussions with a prospective
buyer and the sale never materialized.
Nearly a year later, the plaintiffs—seemingly doubtful that Barillas
had sold the truck—propounded written discovery requesting that Barillas
produce the truck and its black box. Although Barillas still had the truck in
its possession, it did not produce the truck or its black box as demanded.
Instead, within a matter of weeks of its receipt of the discovery requests,

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Barillas sold the truck. In light of Barillas’ discovery conduct and its
potentially willful suppression or spoliation of evidence, the trial court

instructed the jury with CACI Nos. 203 and 204 at trial.3
ii. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
Prior to trial, the plaintiffs advised the defendants and the trial court
they intended to seek leave of court to amend their complaint to assert a
cause of action against Barillas for negligent hiring, training, and

supervision.4 The court did not rule on the amendment request prior to trial.
Rather, it deferred consideration of the request until trial, at which point it
would assess whether to permit amendment to conform to proof.
The issue of amendment next arose after the plaintiffs rested their case
in chief. At that time, plaintiffs’ counsel orally requested leave to amend the
complaint and argued there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Barillas was directly liable for its own negligence, not merely vicariously
liable for Beltran’s negligence. Defense counsel did not oppose and the court
granted the amendment request. In doing so, the court stated, “I will grant
leave to amend to add a second cause of action against Barillas Trucking for
negligent hiring and supervision.” The corresponding minute order for the

3 CACI No. 203 (Party Having Power to Produce Better Evidence)
provides, “You may consider the ability of each party to provide evidence. If a
party provided weaker evidence when it could have provided stronger
evidence, you may distrust the weaker evidence.”
CACI No. 204 (Willful Suppression of Evidence) states, “You may
consider whether one party intentionally concealed or destroyed evidence. If
you decide that a party did so, you may decide that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to that party.”

4 The appellate record does not contain a written motion for leave to
amend the complaint. However, the court and the parties discussed
plaintiffs’ intention to seek leave to amend the complaint prior to the parties’
opening statements on the first day of trial.
5
court hearing stated, “Leave to amend Complaint of JANIECE DARLENE
MANTHEY granted, with 2 days to leave to amend.” Although the plaintiffs
received leave to amend, there is no indication in the record that they filed a
proposed amendment or proposed amended complaint with their request for
leave, or that they filed an amended complaint after the court granted leave
to amend.
The issue of amendment arose one final time at trial. Midway through
the defense case in chief, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that the
plaintiffs no longer intended to pursue a direct negligence cause of action
against Barillas. In response, the court stated, “So I’ll have our minutes
reflect then that the plaintiff[s] will – I guess, again, I don’t know if you
actually – I granted the motion to amend the Complaint, but at this point, I’ll
show that plaintiff has withdrawn their request to amend their Complaint to
include negligent hiring, supervision, or training cause of action. So the only
cause of action will be what it has been, which is motor vehicle negligence.
That’s the only thing it has been this whole time.” The corresponding minute
order states, “Plaintiff has withdrawn request to Amend Complaint, leaving
Motor Vehicle Negligence as the remaining Cause of Action.”
iii. Jury Verdict
At the conclusion of trial, the jury unanimously found Beltran and the
unknown motorist who caused the ladder to fall were negligent, their
negligence harmed the plaintiffs, and Manthey was not comparatively
negligent. It found Beltran was Barillas’ employee and he acted within the
scope of his employment when he caused harm to the plaintiffs. The jury
awarded $5,310,362 in compensatory damages to Manthey, consisting of
$220,362 in past economic damages, $90,000 in future economic damages, $2
million in past noneconomic loss, and $3 million in future noneconomic loss;

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and it awarded $8,650,000 in compensatory damages to Drake, consisting of
$1,800,000 in future economic damages, $2,550,000 in past noneconomic loss,
and $4,300,000 in future noneconomic loss. The jury apportioned fault as
follows: 85 percent to Beltran, 15 percent to the unknown motorist who
caused the ladder to be on the freeway, and 0 percent to Manthey.
The defendants moved for a new trial on grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. The court denied the motion and entered
judgment for the plaintiffs. The court subsequently entered an amended
judgment clarifying that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover 100 percent of
their economic damages and 85 percent of their noneconomic damages from
the defendants.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Have Not Proven The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred by
Admitting Evidence of Accidents Involving Other Barillas Employees
The defendants contend we must reverse the judgment and remand the
matter for a new trial because the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant
evidence of past automobile accidents involving Barillas employees other
than Beltran. As we shall explain, the defendants have forfeited their claim
that the admitted evidence was irrelevant. Further, assuming evidentiary
error, the defendants have not established they suffered prejudice from the
admission of the challenged evidence.
i. Additional Background
Before trial, the defendants filed written motions in limine to exclude
certain evidence at trial. In one or more of these motions in limine, the
defendants sought to exclude evidence that Beltran was involved in an
automobile collision in April 2016, two years before his collision with
Manthey. The defendants did not include their motions in limine in the

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appellate record. However, based on what we can discern from the court’s
statements at trial, it appears the court granted the pertinent motion(s) and
excluded the evidence of Beltran’s prior collision under Evidence Code

section 352.5
On the first day of trial, defense counsel advised the court he “wanted
to just raise a concern” that the plaintiffs may elicit evidence pertaining to
the defendants’ postaccident investigation into the collision between Beltran
and the plaintiffs. This evidence will be discussed later in the opinion. (See
post Part III(B).) After defense counsel argued that the postaccident
investigation evidence was inadmissible, he stated the defense had another
“concern” the plaintiffs may elicit evidence of past automobile collisions
involving Barillas employees other than Beltran. Defense counsel did not
elaborate on the concern, nor did he specifically object to the admission of
evidence concerning other Barillas employees’ automobile collisions.
In reply, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the company’s “investigation
and learning what happened from [past] incident[s] … and [its] training [its]
crew to get better [went] to the heart of the conduct, as well as negligent
training and supervision.” Plaintiffs’ counsel added, “[W]e are alleging sort of
an ostrich putting [its] head in the sand type of situation.” Then, plaintiffs’
counsel stated that defense counsel seemingly believed “the ruling to exclude
Mr. Beltran’s 2016 April prior incident based on improper character evidence
… also [applied] to any other accidents that the company had,” and plaintiffs’
counsel disagreed with defense counsel’s apparent assumption.

5 Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”
8
The trial court responded by stating, “I’m not modifying my ruling with
respect to Mr. Beltran’s incident because I do find, I think under the
circumstances, under 352, for the reasons I stated, it should be excluded. [¶]
But I think as to any others for purposes of establishing your negligent
training and supervision … cause of action, I don’t have a problem
necessarily with bringing up that information. [¶] I think it’s up to the jury
whether … [the] accidents[] would constitute or establish a cause of action for
that. [¶] So at this point – maybe I’ll say this. At this point, not hearing the
evidence, that will come when you seek to amend subject to proof. … [¶] We’ll
wait and see how the evidence plays itself out. So let me say this. By my
ruling, I’m not excluding the prior incidents at this point, only just the
Beltran [accident] … for the reasons that I stated already.”
Ultimately, the plaintiffs elicited trial testimony from Barillas’ trucking
manager, Jacquelin Renteria, that: (1) Renteria had reviewed twelve traffic
collision reports involving Barillas drivers since she started working for the
company in 2012; (2) Barillas relied on its drivers’ statements to assess what
happened during the collisions; and (3) Renteria was aware Barillas had
counseled or disciplined one or two of its drivers about driving safety since
she started working for the company.
ii. Defendants Have Not Preserved Their Appellate Claim of Error or
Demonstrated Prejudice from the Claimed Error
On appeal, the defendants argue the trial court committed prejudicial
error by admitting evidence of prior automobile collisions involving Barillas
employees other than Beltran because such evidence was irrelevant to the
motor vehicle negligence cause of action against Beltran and the proposed
negligent hiring and supervision cause of action against Barillas. Although
the defendants devote the vast majority of their briefing to arguing that such
evidence was irrelevant, they also characterize the evidence in passing as

9
inflammatory “character evidence.” In response, the plaintiffs contend the
defendants forfeited their claim of error by failing to make a timely and
specific objection to the admission of the evidence in the trial court. We agree
with the plaintiffs.
Evidence Code section 353 provides that a judgment may not be
reversed due to the erroneous admission of evidence unless “[t]here appears
of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that
was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection or motion.” (Evid. Code. § 353, subd. (a).) “A proper objection must
‘ “ ‘fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of
the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should
be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and
the court can make a fully informed ruling.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1
Cal.5th 269, 328; People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 207 [“ ‘ “Specificity is
required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the ...
objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in
the evidence.” ’ ”].) “[A party] forfeits an argument on appeal where he fails
to object at all to the evidence in the trial court or when he objects on
substantively distinct grounds.” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686,
726; Jackson, at p. 328 [“ ‘ “[F]ailure to make a timely and specific objection”
on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.’ ”].)
As noted, the defendants did not seek to exclude the evidence of prior
automobile collisions involving other Barillas employees in any of their
motions in limine. They also did not object to the admission of such evidence
or request that the trial court exclude the evidence during their exchange
with the court on the first day of trial. Further, they did not interpose
specific and contemporaneous evidentiary objections at the time the plaintiffs

10
elicited the challenged testimony from Renteria. Instead, on the first day of
trial, defense counsel merely stated the defendants had a concern about the
evidence, without specifying the nature of the concern or identifying the
evidentiary objections the defendants now assert for the first time on appeal.
Defense counsel’s vague articulation of concern was insufficient to preserve
the relevance arguments the defendants now assert on appeal.
Despite the defendants’ failure to object to the evidence or seek its
exclusion, the defendants argue we should address their relevance claim on
appeal because plaintiffs’ counsel supposedly filled in any gaps that the
defense left open with its generic statement of concern. The defendants
emphasize that, after defense counsel stated it had a concern, plaintiffs’
counsel referenced the court’s in limine ruling excluding Beltran’s April 2016
automobile accident as improper character evidence. They argue this
reference shows the trial court and the parties all understood the defendants
were objecting on relevance grounds to the admission of evidence concerning
other employees’ collisions. The defendants’ argument is not persuasive.
“Evidence of a character trait has a ‘tendency in reason’ [citation] to
prove the person’s conduct in conformity with that trait on a particular
occasion. Indeed, the Law Revision Commission comment to Evidence Code
section 1100 notes that ‘[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of his
character is relevant ... when offered as circumstantial evidence of his
conduct in conformity with such character or trait of character.’ [Citation.]
The general rule against its use for this purpose [citation] is founded not on
lack of relevance but on ‘[e]xtrinsic [p]olicies’ [citation] relating to prejudice,
the potential for the jury to be distracted and base its decision on the parties’
characters themselves, and the potential for confusion of the issues and
extended inquiry into collateral matters.” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39

11
Cal.4th 1, 21.) Thus, a party does not preserve for appellate review a claim
that evidence is irrelevant by objecting on the separate basis that the
evidence at issue is improper character evidence, or vice versa. (People v.
Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130 [defendant did not preserve improper
character evidence claim by objecting on grounds the evidence was irrelevant,
cumulative, lacking in foundation, and prejudicial]; Demetrulias, 39 Cal.4th
at pp. 20–21 [relevance objections did not preserve claim that court admitted
improper character evidence].) Applying these principles here, the plaintiffs’
reference to a prior in limine ruling concerning improper character evidence
does not substitute for a specific relevance objection from the defense.
Even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the evidence, the
claimed error was harmless. As noted, the admitted evidence consists of
testimony from Barillas’ trucking manager, Renteria, that she had reviewed
twelve traffic collision reports involving Barillas drivers since she began
working for the company a decade earlier, the company relied on its drivers’
statements to evaluate the collisions, and she was aware the company had
counseled or disciplined one or two of its drivers about driving safety.
Renteria’s testimony was exceedingly brief, constituting a single page
and a half of the 1,614-page trial transcript. The testimony was not only
fleeting, but also innocuous. Indeed, it could not have been especially
surprising or inflammatory for the jury to learn that some of the dozens of
drivers employed by Barillas—a trucking company—were involved in
automobile collisions over the span of a decade. Further, Renteria did not
discuss any specific details about the other Barillas employees’ automobile
collisions, let alone suggest the employees were negligent in connection with
the collisions. Instead, Renteria stated only that she reviewed the traffic
collision reports for collisions involving other employees.

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There was also strong evidence to support the jury’s unanimous finding
that Beltran was negligent in the operation of his truck and that his
negligence harmed the plaintiffs. For example, the plaintiffs elicited expert
testimony that Beltran’s truck was traveling at a high rate of speed when it
collided with Manthey’s vehicle and Beltran failed to pay sufficient attention
to upcoming traffic and road patterns, follow the vehicle in front of him at a
safe driving distance, or regulate his speed properly. Beltran himself
admitted he did not even notice the ladder in the roadway until it was just 40
feet in front of him. The jury also had ample reason to distrust the defense’s
narrative that Beltran acted with reasonable care. Beltran gave conflicting

accounts of his conduct immediately before the collision.6 And, due to the
defendants’ potentially willful spoliation of evidence, the jury was instructed
it could infer the information recorded on the truck’s missing black box would
have been unfavorable to the defense. For all these reasons, the defendants
have not shown “ ‘it is reasonably probable that they would have received a
more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred.’ ” (Mountain View
Police Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480, 506.)
B. Defendants Have Not Proven The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred by
Admitting Evidence of Barillas’ Postaccident Investigation
Next, the defendants argue we must reverse the judgment because the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence of Barillas’ postaccident
investigation into the collision between Beltran and Manthey. In particular,
the defendants argue the court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony from

6 In a postaccident statement to a California Highway Patrol officer,
Beltran admitted he switched lanes from the number three lane to the
number two lane to avoid the ladder in the road. However, at trial, he denied
he changed lanes and testified that Manthey’s and Karen’s vehicles entered
his lane after they collided with one another—testimony that conflicted with
all of the other witnesses’ accounts of the incident.
13
Renteria that Barillas concluded Beltran was not at fault for the collision
with Manthey, Barillas made this conclusion a day after the collision based
on its review of the traffic collision report, and Barillas did not counsel
Beltran after the collision because it believed he had acted properly under

emergency conditions in response to a hazard in the roadway.7
Assuming the defendants’ argument is preserved for our consideration
and meritorious, reversal is unwarranted because the defendants have not
shown the error was prejudicial. Like the testimony pertaining to other
Barillas’ employees’ prior collisions, the testimony concerning Barillas’
postaccident investigation was both limited and harmless. It consumed less
than half of one page of the 1,614-page trial transcript—mere moments in the
context of the overall three-week trial. The testimony was neither
inflammatory nor harmful to Beltran; if anything, it may have helped him by
corroborating the version of events he conveyed to the jury. Further, as
noted, the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of Beltran’s negligence and the
jury was instructed it could draw adverse inferences against the defense
based on Barillas’ potentially willful spoliation of material evidence bearing
on Beltran’s negligence. There is no reasonable probability the jury would
have returned a more favorable verdict for the defense if the court had
excluded Renteria’s brief testimony that Barillas reviewed the traffic collision
report and believed its employee bore no fault for the collision.
C. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding That Manthey was
Not Comparatively Negligent
Finally, the defendants contend we must reverse the judgment because
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Manthey
was not comparatively negligent. We disagree.

7 The defendants do not challenge the admission of any evidence that
Barillas spoliated evidence by selling the truck involved in the collision.
14
California’s “ ‘comparative fault’ doctrine is a flexible, commonsense
concept, under which a jury properly may consider and evaluate the relative
responsibility of various parties for an injury (whether their responsibility for
the injury rests on negligence, strict liability, or other theories of
responsibility), in order to arrive at an ‘equitable apportionment or allocation
of loss.’ ” (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 314.) In a comparative fault
system, “a plaintiff's negligence reduces, but does not totally bar, a plaintiff’s
recovery against a negligent defendant.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019)
6 Cal.5th 817, 827.) Comparative fault presents a question of fact to be
decided by the trier of fact. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 462;
see Williams v. Hilb, Rogal & Hobbs Ins. Services of California, Inc. (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 624, 643 [“findings on questions of fault and comparative
fault … are … quintessentially matters of fact”].)
Generally, the “defendant has the burden of establishing that some
nonzero percentage of fault is properly attributed to the plaintiff, other
defendants, or nonparties to the action.” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.) Therefore, in the present case, the defendants

15
bore the burden at trial of establishing that Manthey had some nonzero

percentage of comparative fault for the injuries the plaintiffs sustained.8
Where, as here, “ ‘ “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly
concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden
and that party appeals,” ’ generally ‘ “the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Phipps v. Copeland Corp.
LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319, 333, quoting Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.
v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
The evidence presented at trial did not compel a finding that Manthey
was comparatively negligent as a matter of law. On the day of the accident,
Manthey drove her vehicle in daytime conditions in the number two lane at

8 In their appellate briefs, the defendants cite a series of decisions
discussing or applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur—Mercer v. Perez
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, Beck v. Kessler (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 331, and Sweeney
v. Pozarelli (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 585—to suggest that an inference or
presumption of comparative fault should have applied because Manthey rear-
ended Karen’s stationary vehicle. However, they never argued that res ipsa
loquitur applied in the proceedings below, nor did they request a jury
instruction on the doctrine. The defendants may not invoke res ipsa loquitur
for the first time on appeal to obtain a reversal of the judgment. (Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548 [“ ‘ “New theories
of defense, just like new theories of liability, may not be asserted for the first
time on appeal.” ’ ”]; see Barrera v. De La Torre (1957) 48 Cal.2d 166, 170
[“[P]laintiffs did not request an instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Under such circumstances they may not argue on appeal that the
court erred in failing to give a specific instruction.”]; Hyde v. Avalon Air
Transport, Inc. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 88, 93 [plaintiff forfeited reliance on
res ipsa loquitur theory by failing to request jury instruction on it].)
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or near the speed limit while wearing her seatbelt. At trial, she testified she
drove with both of her hands placed on the steering wheel. As Karen
explained to the jury, traffic came “to a very quick halt,” and vehicles were
“suddenly slowing down.” According to Manthey, she used her observation
skills to detect this abrupt halt of traffic. She testified that, in response to
the sudden traffic shift, she slowed her vehicle to meet the new traffic
conditions. She testified she then observed the ladder obstructing multiple
lanes of the freeway and tried to avoid the ladder both by slowing her vehicle
further and adjusting its position within the lane. Ultimately, Manthey
collided with the vehicle in front of her, but she described it as a “[v]ery light
collision, [a] fender bender,” with “[n]o real hard impact.”
Faced with this evidence, a rational jury could find that Manthey
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. Because a rational jury
could reach this conclusion from the evidence presented at trial, we reject the
defendants’ argument that Manthey bore comparative fault as a matter of
law for the significant harms the plaintiffs endured.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their appellate
costs.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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