CourtListener 10357293•People v. Coleman CA2/6
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Filed 3/17/25 P. v. Coleman CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B326894
(Super. Ct. No. 1288180)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
RODERICK COLEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Roderick Coleman appeals from an order resentencing him
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1.1 He raises two issues.
First, he argues prosecutors failed to meet the stricter
evidentiary standard required to prove special gang allegations
under section 186.22, subdivision (b), as amended by Assembly
Bill 333 (AB 333). (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)
Second, he contends the trial court erred by imposing the upper
term of six years on his robbery conviction.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
As to appellant’s first contention, the Attorney General
initially argued that amended section 186.22 did not apply at
resentencing because appellant’s conviction was final as of the
effective date of AB 333. Our Supreme Court decided People v.
Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez) after the parties completed
briefing. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties
discussing the effect of the case on this appeal. The Attorney
General now concedes AB 333 applies retroactively to appellant
and requires prosecutors to prove the gang enhancements under
the amended statute’s stricter standard of proof. We agree.
As to appellant’s second contention, we conclude remand is
required to conduct proceedings in accordance with section 1170
subdivision (b). We leave to the trial court’s discretion what term
it will impose for robbery.
Accordingly, we will reverse the order, vacate the gang
enhancements on all counts, and remand for possible retrial and
resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Robbery and Rape of Doe
Appellant and Patrick McMillan were members of the
Central Coast Crips gang. In 2008, they broke into the house
Jane Doe shared with her boyfriend and two children in Lompoc.
Doe and the children were alone because her boyfriend was
working that evening. Appellant wore a gorilla mask and carried
a gun and baseball bat. McMillen wore tights over his face. They
entered Doe’s room. McMillan put his arm around her neck and
demanded the cash and marijuana they suspected her boyfriend
kept in the house.
Doe initially denied knowing where her boyfriend kept cash
or drugs. McMillan choked her harder, then forced her to kneel
beside her bed. One of the attackers pulled down her pants,
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raped her, and stuck something into her vagina. Doe then
relented and told them where to find what they wanted. They
retrieved marijuana from her car and $1,100 in cash from the
room of her toddler-aged son. They took Doe to the room of her
boyfriend’s five-year-old daughter, bent Doe over the bed, and
told her to count to 1000 before getting up. Appellant and
McMillan fled but were arrested later that month.
Conviction and Original Sentencing
A jury convicted appellant in 2010 of one count of first
degree residential robbery (§ 211; count one); one count of first
degree burglary (§ 459; count two); one count of forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count three); one count of forcible sexual
penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1); count four);
and two misdemeanor counts of cruelty to child by endangering
health (§ 273a, subd. (b); counts five and six). The jury found
true allegations that appellant committed the offenses “for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that he personally used a
firearm (§12022.53, subd. (b)).
The trial court imposed an aggregate determinate term of
26 years for robbery (count one)—the upper term of six years plus
ten-year terms each for the gang and firearm enhancements. It
imposed the same term for burglary (count two) but stayed the
sentence under section 654. It imposed indeterminate terms of
25 years to life for both rape (count three) and forcible
penetration (count four) but ran the latter concurrently with the
former.
The record contains conflicting information about the
enhancements imposed on the rape and forcible penetration
counts. The reporter’s transcript shows the trial court imposed
10-year gang and firearm enhancements on both, then ran the
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forcible penetration count’s enhancements concurrently with
those imposed on the rape count. This would have resulted in an
aggregate determinate term of 46 years—26 years for robbery
plus the two ten-year enhancements. The minute order and
abstract of judgment, in contrast, show the trial court imposed
gang enhancements (but not firearm enhancements) on the rape
and forcible penetration counts, and ran them concurrently with
the gang enhancement imposed on the robbery count. This
resulted in an aggregate determinate term of 26 years instead of
46 years.
We affirmed appellant’s conviction on direct appeal.
(People v. Coleman (March 7, 2012, B224305) [nonpub. opn.].)
Our opinion recited the sentence stated in the minute order and
abstract of judgment, i.e., an indeterminate term of 25 years to
life plus an aggregate determinate term of 26 years.
CDCR Requests the Trial Court Review Appellant’s File
for Sentencing Error
In September of 2020, the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the trial court a letter stating: “The
Abstract of Judgment and the Minute Order reflect two PC
186.22(b)(1)(C) enhancements, tied to Counts 3 and 4, with 10
years imposed for each concurrent to the PC 186.22(b)(1)(C)
enhancement tied to Count 1. Pursuant to PC 186.22(b)(1), the
punishment for this enhancement shall be an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment. Additionally, please be
advised that enhancements must be sentenced consecutive to or
concurrent with the count to which they are attached and they
may not be sentenced consecutive to or concurrent with other
enhancements.” CDCR requested the trial court review
appellant’s file “to determine if a correction [was] required.” The
letter identified no other sentencing errors.
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Resentencing Proceedings
Prosecutors moved to recall and resentence appellant under
section 1172.1, which they described as “the cleanest method of
conferring jurisdiction on the Court to correct the sentence.”2
They recommended leaving the rape sentence (25 years to life,
plus 20 years) intact. They recommended reimposing the upper
term of six years for robbery but acknowledged the court had
discretion to strike the punishment on the two 10-year
enhancements attached to that count.
Appellant sought the low term of three years for robbery.
He requested the trial court exercise its discretion to strike the
firearm and gang enhancements on all counts. In addition, he
argued that AB 333’s recent amendments to section 186.22
applied retroactively to his case under In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) and required prosecutors to retry the gang
enhancements under the amended statute’s more exacting proof
requirements. Prosecutors argued the amendments did not apply
retroactively because judgment on appellant’s conviction became
final long before the effective date of AB 333. Section 1172.1
conferred the court with jurisdiction to resentence appellant on
the enhancement, they argued, but not to reverse the jury’s
findings on the special allegations.
The trial court sided with prosecutors. It reimposed a 25-
years-to-life term for rape plus two 10 year enhancements. It
likewise reimposed the upper term of six years for robbery, but
struck the two 10-year gang and firearm enhancements. This
meant appellant received the same sentence reflected in the
2 Prosecutors originally moved to strike the punishment on
the gang enhancements as to the rape and forcible penetration
counts under section 186.22, subdivision (h), formerly subdivision
(g).
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original minute order and abstract of judgment—a 26-year
determinate term followed by an indeterminate term of 25 years
to life.3 The court again stayed the sentences for burglary and
forcible penetration pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
Criminal Street Gang Enhancement
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), provides a 10 year
sentence enhancement for “a person who is convicted of a felony
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.” AB 333
modified the law on gang charges and enhancements in several
respects. Relevant here, it amended section 186.22 to increase
the evidentiary burden necessary to prove a gang-related
enhancement by requiring the charged offense and any predicate
offenses benefit the gang in a way that “is more than
reputational.” (§ 186.22, subds. (e)(1) & (g).) It also amended the
definition of a “‘pattern of criminal gang activity’”—an element of
proving the enhancement—to mean two or more predicate
offenses, the last of which “occurred . . . within three years of the
date the current offense is alleged to have been committed,” (id.,
subd. (e)(1)) and precluded use of the currently charged offense to
establish a pattern. (Id., subd. (e)(2).)
Appellant contends prosecutors did not meet this stricter
evidentiary standard at resentencing. He requests we reverse his
sentence and remand the case. (See People v. Clark (2024) 15
Cal.5th 743, 764 [reversing judgment as to gang enhancement
3 The court also sentenced appellant to jail terms of 180
days on the two child cruelty convictions, running concurrently
with the prison terms. This part of the sentence is not at issue in
this appeal.
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and remanding for further proceedings at which prosecutors
could “offer additional evidence to satisfy the newly enacted
requirements of section 186.22”].)
The Attorney General initially argued AB 333 did not apply
because appellant’s conviction was final long before the law’s
effective date, i.e., January 1, 2022. (See Estrada, supra, 63
Cal.2d at p. 745 [ameliorative amendments “can be applied
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the
judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final”].) It
now concedes, and we agree, the amended statute applies
retroactively. “We review questions of retroactivity de novo.” (In
re A.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 557, 565.)
For decades, the Supreme Court extended Estrada
retroactivity only to cases pending on direct appeal. (See People
v. Mitchell (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1144 (conc. opn. of
Poochigian, J.) [“the finality of the guilt aspect of the judgment
(i.e., a conviction) was not affected merely because the penalty
aspect of the judgment (i.e., the sentence) was reopened”].)
People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 broke course with this
interpretation of Estrada by applying Proposition 57’s
ameliorative amendments to a defendant whose conviction was
vacated not on direct appeal, but on habeas corpus. “When a
defendant’s sentence has been vacated,” Padilla noted, “the
parties’ interests in repose and finality are necessarily
diminished; at that point, the countervailing interest in
effectuating current legislative policy decisions may
appropriately control.” (Id. at p. 168.)
The Supreme Court echoed this holding in Lopez. Lopez’s
conviction was originally affirmed on appeal with directions to
consider striking certain enhancements on remand. AB 333 went
into effect soon after. The trial court declined to apply amended
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section 186.22 because it considered the Lopez’s conviction final
for all purposes other than resentencing. The Supreme Court
later reversed. It rejected the Attorney General’s argument that
a judgment could have both final and non-final parts: “‘[T]here is
no “judgment of conviction” without a sentence.’ [Citation.]
Thus, when any aspect of a case is on appeal from sentencing, the
‘case’ or ‘prosecution’ has not been reduced to final judgment for
Estrada purposes.” (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 397, quoting
People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46.)
We requested supplemental briefing on the effect of Lopez
here. The Attorney General now acknowledges amended section
186.22’s ameliorative benefits apply to appellant. We agree.
Padilla and now Lopez have all but erased the line that once
existed between conviction and penalty. (See People v. Mitchell,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144-1145 (conc. opn. of Poochigian,
J.) [“In the present era of recurring sentence-altering legislation,
removal of these constraints means that changes in substantive
criminal law (not just ameliorative sentencing legislation) can
reverberate backwards to crimes committed many years before
the change in law”].) The Courts of Appeal are following suit.
(See People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380, quoting
People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 47-48 [defendant’s
resentencing under section 1172.1 meant “his criminal judgment
was ‘no longer final’” for purposes of Estrada retroactivity];
People v. Trent (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 33, 44 [same for defendant
resentenced under section 1172.6]; see also In re A.M., supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 568-571 [vacating gang-murder special
circumstance where evidence insufficient to sustain allegations
under amended section 186.22].)
Having decided the amended law applies retroactively, we
next review the jury’s findings for harmless error under
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Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].
“Under Chapman, vacating the jury’s finding is “required unless
‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the [finding] would
have been the same” under current law.” (In re A.M., supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 570, quoting People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1207.) “If “there is any reasonable possibility that the error
might have contributed to the” finding, vacatur is required.”
(Ibid., quoting People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 887.)
We conclude a reasonable doubt exists whether the jury would
have found the gang enhancement allegations true under the
current law.
Amended section 186.22 subdivision (e)(1) requires the last
predicate offense to have occurred “within three years of the date
the current offense is alleged to have been committed.”
Prosecutors introduced evidence of six predicate offenses at trial.
The last of these offenses resulted in a conviction in January of
2006 but arose from a crime that occurred in September of 2005.
This falls outside subdivision (e)(1)’s three-year window because
the currently charged offenses occurred in October of 2008.
AB 333 also amended the statute so that “[t]he currently
charged offense shall not be used to establish the pattern of
criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2).) The prosecutor
stated on the record he was using the current offense for this
purpose. He said the following in a colloquy with the court
following an evidentiary objection by the defense: “Judge, the
current crime is also being offered by the people to prove the
pattern of criminal activity and is in its own right a predicate as
is always the case when there’s a 186.22 [enhancement] alleged.”
He could not do so under the amended law.
We also cannot say the jury would have found the special
allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt under the new law.
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Proving predicate crimes under amended section 186.22
subdivision (b) requires showing “a connection between the
predicate offenses and the organizational structure, primary
activities, or common goals and principles of the gang.” (People v.
Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p 749.) Here, one predicate offense
involved a member of the Central Coast Crips who assaulted his
cell mate in jail. One involved a member who brandished a
firearm during a bar fight. One involved a member found with a
gun in his car. The other three involved narcotics convictions.
Prosecutors tied these crimes to individual members of the
Central Coast Crips but stopped short of explaining how they
benefitted the gang in a way that was “more than reputational.”
Lastly, it is not clear prosecutors could now prove the gang
allegations on the rape and forcible penetration counts under
current law. A prosecution expert testified that sexual assaults
are not considered “respectable or good crimes in the gang world,”
and, unlike robbery, would not benefit the Central Coast Crips.
This did not matter, however, because it was enough that
appellant committed the crime “in association with” the gang.
The amended statute forecloses this interpretation of the statute.
The currently charged offense—whether committed “for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with” a gang—
must now be committed “with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) This means “to provide a common benefit
to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than
reputational.” (Id., subd. (g).) Evidence appellant’s offense was
“associated” with a gang does not establish he harbored such
intent.
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Upper Term on Robbery Conviction
Appellant asserts the trial court erred by imposing the
upper term of six years for his robbery conviction. We agree
remand is necessary to comply with section 1170 subdivision (b).
Former section 1170, subdivision (b) gave trial courts
discretion to decide which of the three terms specified for an
offense would best serve the interests of justice. Senate Bill No.
567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended the statute to require
imposing the middle term as the presumptive sentence effective
January 1, 2022. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3.) A court may now impose the upper term only if “there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Remand is required “unless the
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the
aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the
upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise
proved true in compliance with the current statute.” (People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 743.) The record must “clearly
indicate that the court would have found an upper term justified
had it been aware of its more limited discretion.” (Ibid.)
At appellant’s original sentencing, the trial court cited
several aggravating factors as justifying the upper term for
robbery. “[T]he circumstances here were egregious,” the court
stated, “that it was at home, it was at night, that it was planned,
that it was in concert, that it represented a further escalation of a
long criminal history as well.” The trial court’s view did not
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change at resentencing. The same bench officer found the victim
was “particularly vulnerable” because there were children in her
home who needed protection. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
4.421(a)(3).) In addition, it properly relied—without objection—
on appellant’s convictions and probation status as aggravating
factors. (Id., rule 4.421(b)(2), (4) & (5); § 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
We also have no difficulty concluding a jury would have found
Jane Doe “particularly vulnerable” beyond a reasonable doubt.
Courts have recognized the vulnerability of those attacked while
in their own home. (See, e.g., People v. Hall (1988) 199
Cal.App.3d 914, 922.) We cannot, however, conclude that the
record clearly indicates the court would have imposed the upper
term “under the weight of the presumptive middle term
maximum sentence that currently exists.” (People v. Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) The amendments to section 1170
subdivision (b) were in effect at the time of resentencing.
Appellant argued the low term was presumed due to his age and
lack of adult record “under the current law.” The trial court,
however, stated “I do think that the – the new laws are not
applicable to the sentence that was imposed then, and there were
aggravating factors that [the prosecutor] describes.” Either the
court did not understand its resentencing authority under section
1170 subdivision (b) or it believed it was bound by prior law in
effect when appellant was originally sentenced. Either way, the
record does not indicate the court “exercised its ‘“‘informed
discretion.’”’” (Lynch, at p. 773.) Remand is required to conduct
proceedings in accordance with section 1170 subdivision (b).4
4 We also note that the resentencing court did not
recalculate custody credits and instead calculated only time in
county jail and delegated to CDCR the obligation to recalculate
credits as of the date of resentencing. This was error. On
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DISPOSITION
The jury’s “true” findings on the gang enhancement
allegations are vacated. We vacate appellant’s sentence and
remand to allow the People the option of retrying the gang
allegations under amended section 186.22, subdivision (b) and
the parties the option of introducing additional evidence relevant
to sentencing under section 1170 subdivision (b). Upon
conclusion of any retrial on the gang allegations and trial on
aggravating factors, or if no trial occurs, the trial court shall
proceed to a full resentencing and calculate custody credits as of
that date. The clerk of the court shall then prepare a new
abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. BALTODANO, J.
remand the trial court is required to recalculate custody credits.
(§ 2900.5, subd. (d); People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20,
29.)
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Jed Beebe, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Diane E. Berley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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