CourtListener 10357218•Stow v. B-East CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 3/17/25 Stow v. B-East CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHERYL STOW et al., D083518
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00005794-CU-NP-CTL)
B-EAST, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kenneth J. Medel, Judge. Affirmed.
Giovanniello Law Group, Alexander F. Giovanniello and Daniel J. Kim,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Niddrie Addams Fuller Singh and John S. Addams; Pick Law, Lukas I.
Pick, Casey M. Moore; Elder Law & Advocacy and Andrew A. Thompson, for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
B-East, LLC—which owns and operates Amaya Springs Healthcare
Center, a nursing facility—appeals an order denying its petition to compel
arbitration of claims brought by decedent Charles Stow, Jr.’s successors in
interest Respondents Cheryl Stow, Richard Stow, and David Stow relating to
B-East’s care of decedent. B-East claims on appeal the trial court erred in
ruling (1) decedent did not sign an arbitration agreement, because that
decision was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the arbitration
agreement did not bind Respondents as non-signatories. We find this matter
appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion (see generally People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847) and affirm.
I.
As a preliminary matter, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of
Court states an appellate brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in
the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears.” B-East’s near failure to cite the record is grounds to
decline to consider its noncompliant contentions (Rybolt v. Riley (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 864, 868), but in our discretion we overlook this shortcoming
and decide this appeal on the merits.
On May 8, 2022, decedent was admitted to B-East, a nursing facility in
Spring Valley, California, for rehabilitation following ankle surgery. On
June 7, decedent was discharged from B-East for hospital care. On June 18,
B-East readmitted decedent.
Decedent required assistance with basic daily living activities because
of the surgery and diabetes. In October, decedent was found unresponsive
and was transferred to a hospital for emergency care. Decedent was
dehydrated, malnourished, and septic, and he had pressure ulcers. Decedent
never recovered, and he passed away.
Respondents filed a lawsuit on decedent’s behalf alleging statutory
elder abuse (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.), negligence, and violation of
the Patient’s Bill of Rights (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430). Respondents also
brought individual wrongful death claims.
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B-East petitioned to compel arbitration based on an arbitration
agreement it claimed decedent electronically signed in-person at its facility
on June 15. Respondents disputed decedent signing the agreement because
(1) decedent was not in the B-East facility on that date; (2) a declaration by
Kathryn Rivera, the B-East employee responsible for obtaining signatures,
claimed B-East did not travel outside the B-East facility to obtain signatures
and only e-mailed forms to people located outside of the United States; and
(3) Rivera could not explain how decedent signed the agreement while in
hospital care outside the facility. Respondents further argued the arbitration
agreement did not apply to the wrongful death claims brought in their
individual capacity because they did not sign the arbitration agreement.
In October 2023, the trial court denied B-East’s petition, ruling B-East
failed to meet its burden to show decedent signed the arbitration agreement.
The court further ruled Respondents could not be compelled to arbitration
because they did not sign the agreement.
II.
B-East claims the trial court erred in denying its petition to compel
arbitration because it proved a valid arbitration agreement. We disagree.
No uniform standard of review governs the evaluation of an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration. (Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense,
Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 630.) If a trial court’s order rests on a
matter of law, our review is de novo. (Ibid.) If the order is based on a
decision of fact, we review for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) When, as here,
the court’s order is based on the court finding the petitioner failed to carry its
burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding
is erroneous as a matter of law. (Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979.) The question then becomes whether the
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appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.” (Id. at p. 979 [cleaned up].)
When a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by
prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the
trial court must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense
to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. (Espejo v. Southern
California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057.)
Since the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting
the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) If the party opposing the petition
raises a defense to its enforcement, then that party must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to the defense. (Ibid.) If
the opposing party does so, the burden shifts back to the petitioner to
establish the authenticity of the agreement. (Id. at p. 1059.) The trial court
sits as the trier of fact in weighing the evidence to reach its final
determination. (Id. at pp. 1057-1058.) An appellate court may not reweigh
the evidence. (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1111, 1124.)
An electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of
the person. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9(a).) “The act of the person may be shown in
any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure
applied to determine the person to which the electronic . . . signature was
attributable” (ibid.), or “by presenting evidence of the contents of the contract
in question and the circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution”
(Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1068). It is
not sufficient to summarily assert a person signed a binding agreement.
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(Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843-844.) A
party must establish the person “could have only” placed the electronic
signature rather than someone else. (Fabian, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
Here, B-East met its initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate
by attaching a copy of the agreement to its petition, which purportedly bears
decedent’s electronic signature dated June 15, 2022. (Espejo,
246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) Respondents, however, met their subsequent
burden by raising the defense that decedent did not sign the agreement
because (1) he was not in B-East’s facility to sign on June 15 and (2) B-East
did not obtain his signature outside of the facility. The burden then shifted
back to B-East to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the signature was
authentic. (Id. at p. 1059.) Yet B-East failed to carry its burden, as the trial
court ruled the moving papers did not show decedent signed the agreement
given the issues with the date and lack of support in Rivera’s declaration.
While B-East claims the signature is authentic because evidence
suggests decedent signed the arbitration agreement, B-East’s evidence was
contradicted by the Respondents’ evidence decedent did not sign the
agreement. Given the deferential standard of review applicable here, this
contradiction alone is reason for us to conclude B-East is not entitled to
appellate relief. (Juen, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.) The trial court considered
and resolved these conflicts in the evidence, which we may not reweigh.
(Trinity, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.)
Nor was B-East’s evidence of such character and weight as to compel a
finding in its favor. (Juen, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.) Namely, the evidence
did not establish only decedent could have signed the agreement. (Fabian,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.) B-East relied on Rivera’s declaration claiming
decedent signed the agreement on June 15, 2022, but Rivera’s unsupported
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assertion is insufficient. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 843-844.) B-East also
relied on Rivera’s deposition, during which she claimed to remember seeing
decedent sign the agreement using an electronic tablet. Rivera stated (1) she
was always present when patients signed such agreements, (2) she usually
explained to them what arbitration was, and (3) the tablet sometimes
recorded the wrong date. Rivera, however, could not explain how decedent
could have signed the agreement in-person on a date when he was not in the
facility. B-East also did not offer evidence explaining how the electronic
signature was unique and could only be accomplished by the act of decedent.
(Fabian, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
As B-East fails to establish its evidence was uncontradicted and
compelled a finding in its favor as a matter of law, we conclude the trial court
did not err in denying its motion to compel arbitration.
Nor were Respondents bound to arbitrate their individual claims. None
of them signed the arbitration agreement. Generally, a party cannot be
compelled to arbitrate a dispute it has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.
(Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674, 680.)
California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act creates a limited
exception to this general rule under which a patient can bind heirs to
arbitrate wrongful death claims. (Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838,
849.) If, however, there is no valid arbitration agreement, the heirs cannot be
so bound. (Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center, LLC (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1010, 1022.) Because there was no valid arbitration
agreement between decedent and B-East, decedent could not have bound
Respondents to arbitrate their wrongful death claims.
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III.
We affirm. B-East shall bear Respondents’ costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DO, J.
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