In re A.D. CA1/1

CourtListener 10356357Calctapp13 mars 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 3/13/25 In re A.D. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.D., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169677, A170451
v.
(Alameda County
P.W.,
Super. Ct. No. JD-035710-01)
Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT:

The petition for rehearing filed on March 11, 2025, is denied.

It is ordered that the opinion filed February 26, 2025, be modified as
follows:

On page 16, insert new footnote at the end of the first complete
paragraph (following the sentence “This was certainly substantial evidence
that Mother disturbed the minor’s peace.”) that reads as follows:

“For the first time in her reply brief, Mother argues that requiring only
proof that a party disturbed a minor’s peace is incompatible with common law
and the constitutional rights and privileges of parenthood. As this argument
was raised belatedly in the reply brief, we need not consider it. (Heiner v.

1
Kmart Corp. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335, 351; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative
Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10;
Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.)”

There is no change in judgment.

Date: ___________________ _____HUMES_________________
Presiding
Justice

2
Filed 2/26/25 In re A.D. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.D., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169677, A170451
v.
(Alameda County
P.W.,
Super. Ct. No. JD-035710-01)
Defendant and Appellant.

Shortly after appellant P.W. (Mother) took her son, A.D., to an office of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to ask them to investigate an
injury that there was no evidence the minor had actually suffered, the son
was removed from her care. The juvenile court ultimately issued a
restraining order prohibiting Mother from most contact with the minor,
sustained jurisdictional allegations that Mother’s mental health prevented
her from adequately caring for her son, and limited Mother’s educational
rights. In these consolidated appeals, Mother claims that there was
insufficient evidence to support these orders. We disagree and affirm.

1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Mother was born in India and came to the United States in 2006. She
was a social person but started exhibiting signs of mental distress at the
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic when she was unable to go out with
friends. She also lost around 30 pounds in a short period of time.
According to Mother, the then five-year-old minor told her he hit his
head in late November or early December 2020 while at a park. Minor’s
father (Father, who is not a party to this appeal) was not aware of any such
incident and testified that the minor never suffered a head injury. According
to Mother, though, she started noticing physical changes in the minor, such
as restlessness, trouble listening, and a sore throat. She also observed that
the minor’s speech “completely changed” such that it was less “kiddish” and
“more thinner,” and he was able speak a Hindi dialect he was previously
unable to articulate. He also became more skilled at karate the same month
of the incident at the park, according to Mother. Mother also became
concerned that after the minor hit his head, his feet did not grow for the
following two years.
According to Mother, the minor had “[n]ever in his life” experienced
bruising before his head trauma, but after the incident bruises started to
appear “all over the [minor’s] body [in] unusual spots.” Also according to
Mother, the minor sometimes did not recognize her, and she had trouble
getting his attention. After she saw fresh blood in the minor’s left ear, she
made an appointment with an ear specialist in April 2021.
At another doctor’s appointment, Mother raised the possibility of the
minor undergoing an MRI, but the doctor said that would involve placing the
minor under anesthesia and was unnecessary. The doctor also told Mother it

2
was unnecessary for the minor to receive neurological imaging because he
showed no signs of neurological dysfunction. The doctor asked to meet with
Father to check whether he agreed with Mother’s assessment that the minor
needed an MRI, and Father told the doctor that the minor was “perfectly
fine.” Father also told the doctor that he was concerned that Mother might
be having delusions and that she sometimes slept in their garage wearing a
helmet.
A pediatrician who first examined the minor in November 2021 saw
what appeared to be eczema on the minor’s skin, and she also noticed
“developmentally appropriate” bruises on the minor’s shins. The doctor told
Mother that it was normal for active boys such as the minor to get bruises on
their shins. Father likewise believed that the minor’s bruises were not out of
the ordinary for a child who spent hours at a time at the park. He also did
not believe that there was a connection between a head injury and the
bruising the minor sometimes experienced. Father did not always attend the
minor’s doctor’s appointments since he did not believe the minor was
suffering serious issues. Despite her conclusion that the minor appeared
healthy, the new pediatrician ordered a lab test to see if the minor was
susceptible to easy bruising or bleeding. After Mother later requested that
the doctor perform additional lab tests on the minor, the doctor canceled the
original lab order because she apparently received information that Mother
was possibly “over-medicaliz[ing]” the minor.
In January 2022 the pediatrician met again in person with Mother and
the minor, with Father on the phone, and explained that it was unnecessary
to conduct lab work on the minor. Mother, however, was “fixated” on lab
work and “very, very insistent” that lab tests be conducted. The pediatrician
ultimately conducted the requested tests. They revealed that the minor’s

3
vitamin D was low, but other results were in the normal range. The
pediatrician recommended that the minor take a supplement and eat more
foods containing vitamin D. During subsequent appointments, Mother “very
frequently” sought to have the minor undergo an MRI.
At one point Father went to the Fremont police department and was
told that they could not take action regarding Mother if no one was being
physically hurt. When Father asked if he could take the minor somewhere
else, police told him that would be a crime. Later, Father called the police to
the family home after he heard the minor crying because Mother was talking
to him to the point he (the minor) could not sleep after his bedtime. Mother
and Father started to argue when Father told his wife to stop talking to the
minor. Father called 911 because Mother was yelling so loudly.
Mother reportedly reached the point where she was telling her son he
was a “robot,” and she started scheduling “excessive medical appointments”
for him. Respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency)
became aware of the family around the beginning of 2022, when the minor
was six years old. Mother was reportedly taking him out of school frequently
for unnecessary medical appointments and restricting what he could eat at
school. The Agency offered informal family maintenance services to Mother
and Father starting in January 2022, but the family refused voluntary
services and they were terminated.
Mother, Father, and the minor visited the minor’s pediatrician again in
March 2022. The doctor observed that the minor’s eczema was healing.
Mother, though, was “very concerned about his skin” and worried that there
were unexplained “injection marks” on him even though the doctor tried to
explain that what she was seeing was most likely eczema.

4
In May 2022 Mother noticed “a lot” of bruises on the minor’s legs and
chest while she was giving him a bath after school. She called 911, and police
came to their house and took pictures of the minor’s bruises but told Mother
they (the bruises) were not related to abuse. Mother also took the minor to
the pediatrician to discuss new bruising on the minor. The doctor noticed
large bruises on the minor’s shin and chest. The doctor was not concerned
about the bruise on the minor’s shin but was somewhat concerned about the
bruise on the chest, which could possibly be the result of non-accidental
trauma. Mother expressed concern that someone was cutting out the minor’s
muscles and replacing them in order to conduct research, and she asked that
an MRI be done on him. The doctor was concerned that Mother was possibly
having delusions. She (the doctor) did not think that Mother’s descriptions
were reliable, and she asked that Father be present at the next appointment,
which occurred two days later. Father explained that the bruise on the
minor’s chest was the result of him being pushed at school.
Later that year, starting in around August 2022, Mother became
concerned about the minor experiencing gastrointestinal issues, such as
diarrhea, stomach cramps, and blood in his stool. She started taking pictures
of the food she gave him, and she kept records of everything he ate. Mother
also brought the minor to two different doctors about the stomach issues.
She eliminated gluten from his diet, and she later testified that she did this
at the recommendation of a doctor. Mother had a celiac test done on the
minor in September that revealed he did not have celiac disease. She
continued to restrict gluten from the minor’s diet because she was concerned
it was causing the minor to suffer eczema, boils, and fungal infections. She
also was concerned that after the minor ate school lunches that contained
gluten, he had blood in his stool. She sometimes tracked his bowel

5
movements and took pictures of them. Mother also restricted dairy in the
minor’s diet even though testing revealed that he did not suffer lactose
intolerance. She was concerned that eczema caused by allergies made the
minor’s lips change shape. Around this time she told the minor’s pediatrician
that she believed a birthmark on the minor was disappearing.
Father continued to be concerned about Mother’s mental health but did
not attend all the minor’s medical appointments even though a family safety
plan called for him to be present. A physician spoke with a social worker in
November 2022, raising concerns that Mother was scheduling multiple
unnecessary appointments for the minor, requesting invasive and
unnecessary tests for him, and appearing significantly paranoid during visits.
Father also was concerned about the doctor’s visits because the minor “was
fine,” and Father “didn’t want him to go . . . all the time to [the] doctor just
for small, small things. And especially not to . . . [the] emergency room, or
specialized doctors, like brain surgeon, neurosurgeon, or something like that.
Not to those kinds of doctors, because if there’s any problem, I would have
known if there’s any problem with him.”
Also around this time, Mother went to the Fremont police department
with the minor to ask if they had any reports from the park near the time the
minor purportedly suffered an injury. Mother had heard that “a big fight
happened” that involved children at the park, but the police “didn’t share
anything” with her. After she did not receive a response from the police that
satisfied her, Mother contacted U.S. marshals about her “civil rights,” and
the marshals told her she could bring her complaints to state or federal
authorities. She contacted the state Attorney General’s Office, and they told
her to contact a private attorney.

6
Then in November 2022 Mother took the minor to the San Francisco
office of the FBI to report that the minor had unexplained injuries and had
suffered severe memory loss since being hurt in the park. She also raised
concerns with the FBI about some of the minor’s friends and their parents as
well as “political” concerns she had about some of them.1 Mother also told the
FBI she wanted to know why parents were complaining about the minor.
She felt it was her job “to bring all the loose threads which I know to give it to
them,” and it was the FBI’s job to “investigate.” After Mother’s visit to the
FBI, police conducted a welfare check on the family home.
The Agency filed a dependency petition in December 2022 alleging that
the minor was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300,2 subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional
damage). At the time the petition was filed, Mother was alleged to have
taken the minor to 18 medical appointments in the previous year despite
doctors saying there was “no medical necessity” and the minor was healthy.
The minor was ordered detained and placed with a paternal aunt.
Mother declined to participate in an initial team meeting in
January 2023. Father participated. He said he would take care of the
minor’s future medical appointments, and he also said he would encourage
Mother to get therapy.

1 The Agency reported that Mother told the FBI that the minor was

having brain research conducted on him without her permission. County
counsel and the juvenile court questioned her at length about this topic.
Mother first testified that “I never said that like the way you [county counsel]
are describing” but acknowledged that she discussed research being
conducted on the minor. Under questioning by her attorney, Mother testified
that one of the minor’s doctors had suggested that she enroll him in a study
at Stanford University.
2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

7
Following various continuances and witness testimony taken over
several court days, it took a year for the case to reach disposition. Early in
the case, the Agency obtained the minor’s voluminous medical records dating
back around four years.
One of the first visits supervised by the relative caregiver reportedly
went well, except Mother started checking the minor for rashes, bumps, and
bruises as the visit was about to end. She continued to check the minor and
take pictures of him even after he protested and the caregiver asked her to
stop. At another visit Mother started shouting when she was asked not to
take pictures of the minor’s skin, but Mother calmed down and the rest of the
visit went fine. But at a subsequent visit to a bowling alley and restaurant,
Mother again became agitated over what she claimed were rashes and
bruises on the minor. The caregiver ultimately asked that she not be the one
to supervise visits since Mother would yell at her and accuse her of being a
criminal when the caregiver asked Mother to stop examining the minor’s
arms and legs for rashes when they were in public.
During a February 2023 phone call with the social worker, Mother said
no doctor had ever told her to stop bringing her son to medical examinations
or that she was seeking unnecessary treatment. At an in-person meeting
with social workers that same month, Mother provided a detailed history of
the minor’s medical history and explained she was skeptical of doctors’
explanations that her son’s bruises were caused by play. At a separate team
meeting in February, Mother said she did not need therapy or a mental-
health assessment.
The Agency learned that Mother had visited the minor’s school in
March 2023. The social worker tried to speak with the school principal about
the incident but was not able to reach her before the filing of a March 2023

8
addendum report. The social worker spoke instead with a member of the
front office staff who said she saw Mother on school grounds the previous day
and that Mother spoke with the principal “outside in front of the school.” The
staff member also said that Mother “ha[d] come by periodically since [the
minor] ha[d] been placed in the home of the paternal aunt. . . . [and] ha[d]
‘walked by’ while [the minor] and his class [were] outside at recess after
lunch,” apparently viewing him from a public park. The staff member
reported that before Agency intervention, Mother “would sit on the benches
every day and watch her son at recess,” an account that was confirmed by the
minor’s teacher. Apparently after the minor’s removal from the family home,
Mother “ha[d] only ‘walked by’ when [the minor was] outside at recess.”
Mother later testified that it was “[her] neighborhood,” that when she was in
the area “I cannot close my eyes while walking [next to the school],” and that
“I will definitely look around.” The minor apparently later changed schools.
Before Agency intervention, Mother instructed the minor’s school not to
feed the minor school lunches because of allergies, but after the minor started
living with his aunt he ate school lunches with no issues. The minor’s
teacher reported that the minor was “like a different child” after being
removed from his parents’ care, because he was “happier, more engaging,
able to concentrate and has focus in class.” The minor improved academically
and also made a group of friends.
Around this same time, Mother returned to the FBI office in San
Francisco to ask for follow up on her concerns. She discussed whether
“government agencies” might be causing her son’s bruises, along with other
topics.
Father secured separate housing, and the Agency requested at a
hearing in March 2023 that he be permitted to have a 14-day trial overnight

9
visit with the minor. The juvenile court was concerned that a safety plan
first be put into place. The court made clear that Mother should not have
access to the minor even though he would be living with Father. Addressing
Mother, the court stated, “You can’t just show up. And if you do, that means
I have to remove [the minor] again, which will be more traumatic for him and
cause him more harm. So I want to be really clear about what that means for
both of you [Mother and Father]. . . . [¶] So if the Agency finds that that
discretion should be used, and dad brings [the minor] into his home and
allows mom to have unfettered or unsupervised access to him, or mom keeps
showing up at the house and the Court finds out, it will be an automatic I’m
ordering the Agency to remove [the minor] from your care.” The court was
further concerned with Mother’s conduct at the hearing, since she (Mother)
appeared to lack understanding about court directives, and she talked over
people.
The Agency submitted a proposed safety plan that called for Father to
reside at a residence separate from Mother and to keep the address of the
new residence confidential from Mother. The plan also contemplated Father
obtaining a stay-away restraining order protecting the minor from Mother
and directing that she stay away from the minor’s residence and school.
Consistent with the plan, Father submitted a request for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) protecting both him and the minor, which the
juvenile court granted.
At a hearing in late March 2023, the juvenile court granted the Agency
discretion to place the minor with Father in light of the safety plan and the
TRO, and the minor was placed with Father around this time. The court
then scheduled a hearing on the permanent restraining order. Before the
start of the hearing on whether to grant a permanent restraining order, the

10
TRO was modified so that it covered only the minor so that the parents could
communicate without violating an order.
The Agency recommended in April 2023 that Father and the minor
receive family maintenance services and that Mother be provided with
informal child welfare services. At a brief hearing in May 2023, the juvenile
court ordered that the Agency provide an opportunity for Mother to undergo a
psychological evaluation, but Mother said she was unwilling to undergo one.
The contested hearing on jurisdiction/disposition and the restraining
order began in June 2023 and was held over several days in June, July,
August, September, November, and December 2023. County counsel
questioned Mother about her perceptions of the minor’s medical needs, as set
forth above. Mother denied that she believed that experiments were being
conducted on the minor. She acknowledged that she had taken the minor to
several medical appointments between March 2021 and November 2022, and
that she took the minor out of school six times to attend appointments.
Father and the assigned social worker also testified.
Before a continued hearing began in late June, Mother’s counsel
requested that Mother’s visitation be increased from twice a week to four
times a week. In opposing the request, county counsel reported that Mother
had declined family counseling, individual therapy, or any type of psychiatric
evaluation. The juvenile court denied the request.
At a brief hearing in October 2023, the juvenile court ordered the
Agency to make a referral for Mother to receive a psychiatric evaluation, and
Mother apparently said she was willing at that time to receive one. Mother
also was referred for therapy and parenting classes. As of a hearing held in
late November 2023, though, Mother apparently had declined the
psychological evaluation and therapy.

11
In closing arguments, county counsel focused on the reasons the
juvenile court should take jurisdiction. The minor’s counsel agreed that the
court should sustain the allegations of the dependency petition. The court
asked counsel to confirm whether the minor also requested a restraining
order, and counsel confirmed the request in order to protect the minor from
harassment. Counsel argued that the restraining order was requested
because of concerns over Mother showing up at the minor’s school
“[e]xcessively” both before and following removal. Counsel stressed that the
behavior stopped only after the minor was placed with Father in a
confidential location “and moved to a confidential school.” Mother’s counsel,
by contrast, argued that Mother entered school grounds only once after
removal. Father’s counsel’s brief closing argument did not focus on the
restraining order.
Following closing arguments, the juvenile court observed that although
there was no formal evaluation of Mother, “her behaviors are so outside of the
normal that I think it would be easy for a Court, a trier of fact, whether it be
a jury or a Court, to find that the mother[ is] suffering from some level of [a]
mental health issue.” The court concluded that based on the minor’s medical
records alone, there was “no question” that taking jurisdiction was
appropriate. That task was “even easier,” according to the court, because
“[w]hether it be on the stand, or sitting across from me next to her attorney,
. . . the behavior she exhibits makes it clear that there is a mental health
diagnosis that she’s unwilling to deal with.” The court observed that “I think
that there’s not really a Judge that I’ve met that wouldn’t do the same thing
I’m doing based upon the evidence I have in front of me” and that “this
doesn’t get better unless you [Mother] seek assistance or help.”

12
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was a
child described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c). The court also
found by clear and convincing evidence that it was necessary to remove the
minor from Mother’s care. The minor was to remain in Father’s care, with
the Agency to provide family maintenance services.
As for a permanent restraining order, the juvenile court entered one
“based upon the evidence heard during the course of these proceedings.” The
order directs that Mother stay at least 100 yards away from the minor as well
as his home, school, or childcare. The restraining order was to remain in
place until December 18, 2026. Mother was permitted to have supervised
visitation with the minor at least once a week. Mother appealed.
(No. A169677.) Neither the minor nor Father has filed a brief in this court.
Meanwhile in the juvenile court, the minor’s counsel sought to limit
Mother’s educational rights. At the time of the hearing on the request,
Mother apparently had not taken any steps to address her mental health
challenges, as called for in the Agency’s case plan.
At the hearing on the motion, Father reported that after he did not
trim the minor’s fingernails, the minor cut himself under his nose, and it took
about a week to heal. Mother characterized this as a “complete lie” and said
it was “not a scratch” because the minor had been bleeding for nine days.
The court asked Mother to leave the courtroom after she told the judge that
the judge needed “treatment,” “ha[d] delusion[s],” and was “mentally sick.”
After Mother left the courtroom, the juvenile court stated, “I think we should
be cognizant of the fact that the mother’s mental health is deteriorating. It
has gotten worse than the last time we were here, which was about maybe
three months ago. That level of spiral makes me uncomfortable, even
potentially with the visitation.” The court further observed that “it is clear to

13
me that the mother is having some level of disconnect from reality at this
point, or psychotic break.”
The court stated that Mother’s behavior “just ma[de] it a much easier
decision” regarding limiting educational rights, because it did not appear
“that she can handle herself emotionally and mentally such that she should
be involved in [the minor’s] educational decisions.” The juvenile court issued
an order maintaining Father’s educational rights but limiting those of
Mother. Mother appealed.3 (No. A170451.) This court consolidated A169677
and A170451.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Restraining Order
(No. A169677).

Mother argues in her first appeal that the juvenile court erred when it
issued the three-year restraining order protecting the minor. Although this
case presents a close question, we affirm.
The restraining order was issued under section 213.5. Subdivision (a)
of the statute permits a juvenile court in a dependency action to enjoin a
person from, among other things, “harassing” or “disturbing the peace of [a]

3 The juvenile court later dismissed dependency proceedings and

granted legal and physical custody to Father. Mother’s appeal from the
dismissal order is pending in this court. (No. A171683.)

14
child.”4 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630 [juvenile court’s authority to
issue restraining order].) While evidence that a restrained person previously
has inflicted harm on a minor is sufficient to justify a restraining order under
section 213.5, “issuance of a restraining order does not require such evidence.
[Citations.] Nor does it require evidence of a reasonable apprehension of
future physical abuse. [Citations.] There need only be evidence that the
restrained person ‘disturbed the peace’ of the protected child.” (In re
Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997.) “In this context, disturbing the
peace means ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
As both parties observe, different courts have applied different
standards of review when reviewing a restraining order in a dependency
action. (Compare In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 (B.S.)
[reviewing issuance of restraining order for substantial evidence] with In re
Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866 [factual findings supporting
restraining order reviewed for substantial evidence, while issuance of order
reviewed for abuse of discretion].) The approach in Carlos H. is consistent
with our Supreme Court’s approach to reviewing decisions made under the
dependency statute governing selecting a permanent plan (§ 366.26). In In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, the court held that the factual elements of

4 The court may (1) enjoin a person from “molesting, attacking,

striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls
as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying the personal
property, contacting, either or directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise,
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child or
any other child in the household; and (2) exclude[] a person from the dwelling
of the person who has care, custody, and control of the child.” (§ 213.5,
subd. (a).)

15
the beneficial-relation exception to adoption are reviewed for substantial
evidence, while weighing the various factors of applying the exception is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) A similar approach is
appropriate here, where the basis for a restraining order involves “essentially
a factual determination,” and the decision to impose a restraining order
involves “a delicate balancing of these [factual] determinations as part of
assessing the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently uncertain.”
(Ibid.) And, in any event, “the practical difference between the standards is
not likely to be very pronounced.” (Id. at p. 641.)
Mother first contends that there is insufficient evidence that without
an injunction the minor’s “safety would be jeopardized.” The juvenile court
considered abundant evidence that Mother’s perception of the minor’s heath
was disconnected from reality; that she discussed those views in the minor’s
presence in the family home, at doctor’s appointments, and during a visit to
the FBI; that she withheld certain foods from him despite being told it was
unnecessary to do so; that she inspected the minor for perceived health
problems during visits even after she was asked to stop—conduct that caused
the minor distress; and that Father on one occasion called police to the home
because of Mother’s behavior in front of the minor. This was certainly
substantial evidence that Mother disturbed the minor’s peace.
Mother seems to suggest that the juvenile court was required to have
evidence that the minor would suffer physical abuse absent a restraining
order. She relies on In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460 (N.L.), where the
juvenile court issued a restraining order protecting a father and his child
after the child’s mother threatened the father, hit and scratched him, pulled
his hair, and threatened to kill him. (Id. at pp. 1463, 1465.) The N.L. court
affirmed the restraining order as to the father but reversed it as to the minor

16
since there was no evidence that the mother had engaged in any violent
threats or conduct toward the minor, no such threats or conduct had taken
place in the minor’s presence, and visits between the mother and her
daughter went well. (Id. at pp. 1468–1469.) In other words, in N.L. there
was no underlying justification to protect the minor, whereas here there was
evidence that Mother was disturbing the peace of the minor (§ 213.5,
subd. (a)).
Mother claims this case is analogous to N.L. because in both cases
there was evidence that the visits with the minor went well. (N.L. supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1468–1469.) But, as N.L. itself acknowledged,
“[m]onitored visitation of a child is not incompatible with a restraining
order.” (Id. at p. 1466; see also B.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 188
[upholding restraining order that called for no contact except as required for
visitation].) The juvenile court considered evidence that Mother was
preoccupied with the food the minor ate at school and showed up at the school
to ask about it. Although supervised visitation may have gone well, that did
not preclude concern that Mother would continue to interfere with the
minor’s school day or otherwise seek out the minor to oversee his diet.
We are sympathetic to Mother’s argument that the physical danger
posed to the minor was less pronounced than that present in other cases that
upheld restraining orders. (E.g., B.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 186
[father threw mother on top of their baby, hit the mother in the eye, and
threatened to kill her]; In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512
[grandmother concealed herself at scheduled visitation, hired a private
detective to spy on minors, and showed up unannounced at minors’ schools to
try to make unauthorized contact with them]; In re Cassandra B. (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 199, 204–205 [mother called home of daughter’s caretaker so

17
frequently she filled voicemail system, went to minor’s residence and school,
and yelled at daughter, who said she was afraid of her mother].) But
throughout the proceedings below, the juvenile court expressed its concern
about Mother’s inability to follow directions or to appreciate the effect that
her behavior was having on her son. Under these particular circumstances,
imposing a restraining order did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
We are not persuaded by Mother’s reliance on In re C.Q. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 355 (C.Q.). There, the social services agency became
involved with a family after a report of domestic violence between a mother
and father in front of their 12-year-old daughter, while their other three
daughters also were in the home. (Id. at p. 357.) The father reportedly
struck the mother with a closed fist, and the 12 year old tried to intervene
but was not injured. (Id. at p. 358.) The daughters became upset when the
mother reported the domestic violence because they did not want their father
to have to leave the family home or go to jail. (Id. at pp. 357–358.) An
investigation revealed previous incidents of domestic violence and reports of
the mother frequently having bruises. (Id. at pp. 359–361.) The juvenile
court issued a restraining order protecting the mother and her three minor
daughters. (Id. at pp. 361–363.) The appellate court reversed the order as to
the daughters since the children said they wanted visits with the father and
were not afraid of him, and there had been no further reports of domestic
violence, which meant there was insufficient evidence that the daughters’ (as
opposed to the mother’s) safety might be in jeopardy. (Id. at p. 364.)
Mother here argues that her situation is analogous to the one
presented in C.Q., but we disagree. First, we question whether C.Q. truly
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent (C.Q., supra,
219 Cal.App.4th at p. 364), since there was evidence that supported the

18
restraining order as to the daughters. But in any event, the court noted that
the father did not challenge the portion of the restraining order that required
him to stay away from the mother and the family home where mother and
the children lived. (Id. at p. 364.) Here, by contrast, there would be nothing
preventing Mother from contacting the minor since the protective order does
not cover Father, the minor’s primary caretaker.
Although a different juvenile court might have reached a different
conclusion in this case, we cannot say that the imposition of a restraining
order was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, or that under all the
evidence no judge could reasonably have imposed the restraining order. (In
re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional
Findings (No. A169677).
Mother next argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the minor
was a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c). We must
affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the court’s order. (In re A.G.
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 682 (A.G.).) That is, we must affirm if there is
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the order,
resolving all conflicts in favor of the order and deferring to the juvenile
court’s determination of credibility. (Id. at pp. 682–683.) “ ‘When a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor
comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can
affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of
the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for
jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,

19
773.) Because we conclude that substantial evidence supported jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), we affirm. (See In re A.J. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103 [affirming jurisdictional order after considering
one of two grounds upon which juvenile court took jurisdiction].)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), provides that the juvenile court may
take jurisdiction of a minor where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” as
a result of the inability of the parent to provide regular care for the child due
to the parent’s mental illness. “There are three elements to jurisdiction
under section 300: ‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified
forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the minor,
or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’ ” (In re Travis C. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225.) “The third element ‘effectively requires a
showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at
substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing
a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).’ ” (In re James R.
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
The juvenile court here sustained allegations that Mother had
significant mental-health needs that put the minor at risk of suffering
“emotional harm and/or general neglect,” as shown by Mother taking him to
multiple doctors 18 times in the previous year and requesting “invasive and
unnecessary medical tests”; taking him out of school early for doctor
appointments, causing the minor to be sad; and taking him to the FBI and
making claims that were not supported by evidence. These findings have
overwhelming support in the record.
Mother focuses narrowly on whether the requested diagnostic tests and
procedures caused, or could cause, the minor harm. Because procedures

20
deemed medically unnecessary were never actually performed on the minor,
and any harm from future procedures done as a result of future medical
appointments is wholly speculative, Mother posits, there is insufficient
evidence to support the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b). But
the harm the minor suffered was connected, not so much to the requested
tests, but to the fact that he was frequently taken out of school to attend
doctor’s appointments where the tests were requested, Mother’s perceptions
of her son’s medical needs did not appear connected to reality to the point
where she took him to the FBI to discuss her concerns, and his parents fought
over how Mother handled the minor’s needs. After the minor was removed
from Mother’s care, his teacher reported that he was “like a different child”
and was “happier, more engaging, [and] able to concentrate and has focus in
class,” a sign he suffered harm when in Mother’s care.
True enough, the fact that Mother struggles with her mental health “is
not the end of the story” because the Agency “ ‘ha[d] the burden of showing
specifically how the minor[] ha[s] been or will be harmed and harm may not
be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness of a parent.’ ” (A.G., supra,
220 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.) Here, the Agency proved that Mother’s mental-
health struggles caused disruption to the minor and led him to miss school.
This case is thus distinguishable from A.G. and other cases that Mother
relies on where a parent was shown to have a mental illness, but not that the
condition affected their children. (A.G. at p. 684 [no harm to minors when
they were left alone with mentally ill mother and father was able to protect
them from her]; In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003 [mother’s
drug use did not support jurisdiction where only possible effect on minor was
school tardiness, a speculative result that did not amount to serious risk of
harm]; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388–389 [petition alleged

21
that mother had mental problems and failed to ensure children’s regular
school attendance, which did not amount to risk of serious physical harm or
illness].)
We disagree with Mother’s contention that this case is similar to In re
Phoenix B. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 787. There, a social services agency took
custody of a minor after her mother was involuntarily hospitalized following
a nervous breakdown. (Id. at pp. 789–790.) While the mother was still
hospitalized, the father—who was never married to the mother—came
forward to take care of the minor and moved out-of-state with her. (Id. at
p. 790 & fn. 3.) The juvenile court later granted a request to dismiss the
petition, and the appellate court affirmed. (Id. at pp. 789–791.) The court
concluded that the agency had properly concluded that there were no
conditions that warranted continuing detention, and the mother’s remedy
was to seek custody through family-law proceedings. (Id. at pp. 794–795.)
True, Father here was ultimately able to take custody of the minor and
adequately provide for his care. But this was accomplished only after he
moved to a new residence apart from where he had been living with Mother,
and after the Agency put into place a safety plan to ensure that he did not
bring the minor into contact with Mother except during approved visitation.
The case is thus distinguishable from Phoenix B., where the father had not
been coparenting the minor and there was thus no need for juvenile-court
oversight.
We agree with respondent that this case is more akin to In re Travis C.,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 1219. There, the mother suffered “serious mental
health problems, including psychotic episodes,” which “caused her to become
delusional and paranoid and act in ways that scared [her] children.” (Id. at
p. 1221.) Although the mother apparently never physically hurt her children,

22
she once threatened suicide while they were in her care, and the maternal
grandparents were concerned that the mother sometimes drove the children
alone in her car while she was showing symptoms of her mental illness. (Id.
at pp. 1221–1222.) In affirming jurisdictional findings, the court noted that it
was unnecessary for the juvenile court and the social-services agency “to
precisely predict what harm will come to [the minors] because Mother has
failed to consistently treat her illness. Rather, it is sufficient that Mother’s
illness and choices create a substantial risk of some serious physical harm or
illness.” (Id. at pp. 1226–1227.) Likewise here, given Mother’s past over-
medicalization of the minor and failure to grasp the effect this had on her
son, sufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings.
Finally, Mother argues that if we reverse the jurisdictional order, we
must also reverse the dispositional order. Because we affirm the
jurisdictional order, we affirm the dispositional order as well.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Limited
Mother’s Educational Rights (A170451).
In appeal No. A170451, Mother argues that if the jurisdictional order is
reversed in A169677, the order limiting her educational rights must be
reversed as well. Again, because we affirm in A169677, we affirm in A170451
as well.
Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing
the education of their children, but a juvenile court may limit the educational
rights of the parent of a dependent minor (§ 361, subd. (a)(1)). (In re R.W.
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.) We review the juvenile court’s order
limiting Mother’s education rights for abuse of discretion (id. at p. 1277) and
find no such abuse since the order was entered consistent with the orders we
already have affirmed.

23
III.
DISPOSITION
In A169677, the protective order and jurisdictional and dispositional
findings are affirmed.
In A170451, the order limiting Mother’s educational rights is affirmed.

24
_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

In re A.D. A169677, A170451

25

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.