People v. Moreno CA2/2

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Filed 3/13/25 P. v. Moreno CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B328870

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA488780-01)
v.

GEORGE MORENO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Following a jury trial George Moreno was convicted of
murdering Omar Nieves and of attempted murder and assault
with a semiautomatic firearm on Jorge Arias. On appeal he
contends that sheriff’s detectives employed impermissibly
suggestive means to obtain an identification by an eyewitness,
and that the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing a
prior strike offense before calculating Moreno’s sentence.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Murder of Omar Nieves
On the evening of July 10, 2020, Omar “Guero” Nieves was
talking with David Gomez near the corner of Marianna and
Augusta Avenues in East Los Angeles. Nieves lived in a van in a
nearby homeless encampment; Gomez in an RV parked at the
corner of Marianna and Augusta. A black Ford Explorer circled
the block and stopped near where Nieves stood. Nieves
approached the car and spoke to the driver, who was alone in the
vehicle. It sounded to Gomez as though Nieves and the driver
were arguing, and Nieves appeared to be angry. The Explorer
drove off, but returned a few minutes later. Nieves resumed his
argument with the driver. Gomez saw the driver rack and fire a
pistol through the open front passenger window. After lighting a
cigarette and taking a few puffs, Nieves cried out “I’ve been hit!
I’ve been hit!” before collapsing to the ground. The Explorer
drove swiftly away.
Neighbors gathered at the scene to offer help. Gomez
recognized the shooter and pointed out the house where he lived.
Onlookers called the sheriff’s office and an ambulance was
summoned. Nieves was pronounced dead at 9:00 p.m. of a
gunshot wound to the abdomen.

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Investigating detectives began interviewing witnesses,
including Gomez. With his consent he was sequestered in the
back seat of a patrol car while detectives secured the crime scene.
Gomez was interviewed by the detectives, and a sheriff’s deputy
acted as interpreter. Gomez informed the detectives that he saw
the driver of the Explorer and recognized him as someone who
lived at a nearby home. Gomez had seen the Explorer driving
around the neighborhood. Gomez did not know the driver’s name
but knew he lived in the garage apartment behind the home in
question because he had seen him there washing the car. Gomez
described the driver as Hispanic, short, thin and bald.
Later that night Gomez was interviewed a second time by
detectives. During this interview detectives showed Gomez a
photograph of Moreno. When asked “Do you know that person
right there?” Gomez answered, “He is the one who shot.” Asked if
he was “100 percent sure” of his identification, Gomez answered
“Yes. Yes . . . I was – I saw him because I saw him up close.”
Gomez added that Moreno is “a little older now” than in the
photograph, but reiterated he was “100 percent sure” the
individual shown in the photograph had shot Nieves that night.
B. The Shooting of Jorge Arias
While sheriff’s deputies and detectives were arriving at the
scene of Nieves’s murder, Moreno contacted Jorge Arias, whose
wife is Moreno’s cousin. At the time of Moreno’s trial Arias had
known Moreno for 24 years. Moreno told Arias that his car was
damaged and had a flat tire. After driving around looking for
Moreno, Arias met Moreno at a local market and offered to help
him with his car. Instead, Moreno asked Arias to drive to an
address in Monterey Park or Alhambra, where Moreno’s wife was
visiting her brother. When they arrived, Moreno left the car and

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spoke with his wife while Arias waited. When Moreno returned
to the car, Arias drove while Moreno called friends, looking for a
place to stay. Moreno seemed to be “stressed, anxious and upset.”
Eventually Moreno gave up telephoning and he and Arias
drove to a liquor store before returning to Arias’s house. The two
men sat outside in the side yard while they talked and drank.
Moreno told Arias he was “stressed out” and “going through a lot
of stuff.” Eventually Moreno asked Arias to drive him to
Alhambra to pick up Moreno’s wife, but Arias’s car only had two
seats. Moreno asked to borrow the car, but Arias refused because
he needed it to go to work in the morning. Moreno grew upset,
and Arias offered to drive Moreno to his car and help him fix it.
Arias drove to where Moreno said he had left his car, but it was
not there and the two men could not find it. Moreno again asked
to borrow Arias’s car, and “was getting aggressive” when Arias
refused. Finally, Moreno asked Arias to stop and let him out of
the car, and while leaving the car asked if Arias had ever been
shot before. When Arias said he had not, Moreno drew a pistol
and shot Arias in the right thigh. Arias had worked as a security
guard and recognized Moreno’s gun as a nine-millimeter Glock.
After he was shot Arias sped away, leaving Moreno behind.
Arias tried to call for help, but the bullet had struck his cell
phone. He also called out for help, without success. When he
arrived at his home, Arias’s neighbor was outside and called 911.
Arias told the responding officers where he had been shot, and
detectives located a nine-millimeter casing, but Arias did not tell
them that Moreno had shot him because he was concerned that
his wife and family might be in danger. After his wife persuaded
him, Arias contacted the police in late August and identified
Moreno as the individual who shot him.

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C. Moreno is Arrested in Las Vegas
On August 12, 2020, Moreno was arrested in Las Vegas,
where he was living with his wife and children. Sheriff’s deputies
traveled to Las Vegas that day and interviewed Moreno at the
Clark County Correctional Facility. The jury was given a
transcript and listened to a recording of that interview. Moreno
told the deputies that he used to live on Marianna Avenue at his
parents’ house, and that he had a black Ford Explorer with the
license plate “Geodian.” He told deputies he did not drive the
Explorer because he did not have a license. He and his wife had
moved to Las Vegas because the nearby homeless encampment
was the scene of drug dealing and fights, and his family and
children no longer felt safe. Moreno denied knowing anyone
named Omar Nieves. Shown a photograph of Nieves, Moreno
stated “It looks like some guy but I don’t know him by his name.”
Asked about Nieves’s murder, Moreno insisted he was innocent
and that “it’s impossible” his Explorer was in the neighborhood at
the time of the shooting. Shown video footage of the black
Explorer taken from neighborhood security cameras, Moreno
continued to insist the vehicle shown was not his Explorer.
A preliminary hearing was held beginning December 12,
2020. Gomez testified as the first witness for the prosecution.
He identified Moreno, who was in court wearing a blue jail
uniform. Asked by defense counsel whether detectives had
shown him a photo of Moreno, Gomez answered, “I don’t know
the name of the person. I don’t know the name. I just know it by
sight.” Gomez also testified that Moreno was alone in the
Explorer when Nieves was shot and that he saw Moreno “rack”
the handgun before shooting Nieves. He reiterated that he knew
Moreno by sight but not by name. He also confirmed that he was

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not shown a photograph of Moreno until the second interview
with detectives. Arias also testified for the prosecution and
related the details of his encounter with Moreno leading up to his
being shot, as well as details of his injuries. At the end of the
preliminary hearing, Moreno was bound over for trial on the
murder, attempted murder and assault charges.
D. Moreno Unsuccessfully Moves to Exclude Gomez’s
Identification at Trial
Prior to trial Moreno’s counsel filed a motion to exclude
Gomez’s identification on the ground that it was the product of
“impermissibly suggestive” conduct by the investigating
detectives. Moreno argued that Gomez only identified Moreno as
the shooter because “everyone is saying [the shooter] is Javier’s
son,” that the detectives coerced Gomez by sequestering him in a
patrol car for several hours while securing the crime scene, and
that showing Gomez a single photograph of Moreno was so
unduly suggestive as to violate Moreno’s right to due process.
In a supplemental filing prior to the hearing on the motion to
exclude, Moreno argued that the identification procedure did not
comply with Section 859.7.1
In opposition, the prosecution argued that Gomez made a
positive identification, that there was nothing inherently
suggestive in the single-photograph procedure employed because
“all of this conversation and all of these answers took place prior
to a photograph ever being shown to the witness, Mr. Gomez,”
and that regardless of the procedure used, the Gomez’s
identification of Moreno was sufficiently reliable to be admitted
at trial. Responding to Moreno’s argument that Gomez identified
him only because others said he was the shooter, the prosecutor

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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argued that “He didn’t know the individual by name. So he
couldn’t say the person’s name. But he, in a very colloquial
sense, as they were standing out there says, ‘they’re saying it’s
Javier’s son.’ And he’s saying he doesn’t know who Javier is.
He doesn’t know – I mean, he knows who Javier is by sight,
I suppose. But he does not know these individuals by name.
He just recognizes them from the neighborhood and the house
with which they live in.” Elsewhere, she argued, “Mr. Gomez is
rightfully saying, ‘I’m not saying whose son it is . . . ’ He’s
correctly trying to say, ‘I don’t know his name. Like, I don’t know
Javier. I just know he’s the younger guy who lives in that
house.’ ” As for section 859.7, the prosecutor argued that even if
it applied, subdivision (d) of the statute provides that “[n]othing
in this section is intended to preclude the admissibility of any
relevant evidence or to affect the standards governing the
admissibility of evidence under the United States Constitution.”
The trial judge noted that he spoke Spanish and pointed
out instances where Moreno’s argument was based on an
inaccurate translation of Gomez’s statements by a sheriff’s
deputy on the scene. After lengthy oral argument, the court
denied Moreno’s motion to suppress, ruling that the procedure
used was not so impermissibly suggestive as to deprive Moreno of
due process, finding that “the one photograph identification given
the totality of the circumstances was fair and that the resulting
identification from the photograph and also in court at
preliminary hearing was fair, not unduly suggestive.”
E. The Trial and Sentencing
In an amended information, Moreno was charged with
murder of Nieves (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), attempted

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willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Arias (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a); count 3), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm on
Arias (§ 245, subd. (b); count 4). The information further alleged
that Moreno personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subds. (a) & (d)), that Moreno caused great bodily injury to Arias
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that Moreno suffered prior serious or
violent felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
By the time of Moreno’s trial, Gomez had become a
reluctant witness. He told a neighbor that he wanted to evade
service in order to avoid having to testify because he felt sorry for
Moreno and did not want to add to his troubles. A sheriff’s
department investigator brought Gomez to court. Called to the
stand, Gomez testified he identified Moreno as the shooter only
because others in the neighborhood said so. Likewise, he testified
he identified Moreno at the preliminary hearing based on what
he heard around the neighborhood. The jury heard recordings of
Moreno’s prior statements identifying Moreno, and they were
provided a transcript of his prior statements.
Gomez was not the only witness whose testimony linked
Moreno to Nieves’s murder. Another neighbor, Eulalia Gamez,
testified that prior to the murder she saw Moreno driving his
black Explorer, which she recognized by its personalized license
plate. Moreno was alone in the vehicle when she saw the SUV
stop, heard gunshots and observed a man fall to the ground.
The black Explorer drove away and Gamez did not see it return.
Moreno also took the stand and testified in his defense.
He told a very different story than what he had related to
detectives on the drive back from Las Vegas. Moreno testified
that on the night of the murder, he was getting into the Explorer
when another car pulled up nearby. A man who was bald,

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skinny, tattooed and slightly taller than Moreno got out and
approached Moreno, brandishing a chrome handgun and asking,
“Where you from.” Moreno believed this was a challenge from a
gang member and responded, “nowhere,” indicating he was not
from a rival gang. According to Moreno, the man was angry and
looking for someone. He told Moreno to get into the Explorer and
drive while the gunman hid in the back seat, concealed behind
tinted windows. At the gunman’s direction, Moreno drove to
where Nieves and Gomez were standing. The gunman lowered
the back window and spoke with Nieves. Moreno drove away and
told the gunman that the police were coming. The gunman
instead directed Moreno to go around the block and return to
Nieves. This time, the gunman shot Nieves through the open
front passenger window. Moreno sped away but when he stopped
at a red light, the gunman fled, leaving his gun in the back seat.
After the gunman fled, Moreno testified, he called Arias,
uncertain of what to do next. He showed the gun to Arias and
told Arias what had happened. The two men drank and Arias
used methamphetamine before driving Moreno back to his car.
Because both Arias and Moreno were drunk, they could not find
Moreno’s car, so Moreno asked to be dropped off. The gun was
lying on the center console of Arias’s car, and when Moreno
picked up the gun while leaving the car, the gun discharged
accidentally. Arias drove off without Moreno knowing he had
been shot. Moreno threw the gun on the roof of a nearby house
before leaving the scene. He admitted he had not told this story
to the Los Angeles detectives who interviewed him following his
arrest in Las Vegas.
The jury found Moreno guilty of first-degree murder of
Nieves, of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and of

9
attempted murder of Arias, and of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm on Arias.2 The jury also found true allegations that
Moreno personally used and discharged a firearm and inflicted
great bodily injury on Arias. Moreno waived a jury trial on prior
convictions and aggravating factors allegations. The court found
true, in aggravation, that Moreno’s crime involved a high degree
of cruelty, viciousness or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)), that Moreno used a weapon in the commission of the
crime (id., rule 4.421(a)(2)), and that Moreno took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence to commit the crime (id., rule
4.421(a)(11)). The court found no factors in mitigation.
The prosecution filed a sentencing memo recommending
Moreno receive a sentence of 29 years plus 64 years to life in
state prison based on, in part, a prior strike offense for assault
with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision
(a)(1). In response, Moreno’s counsel filed a memorandum
requesting Moreno be sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for
the murder of Nieves with the sentences on the other counts
running concurrently. Defense counsel calculated the
recommended sentence, in part, on the court disregarding
Moreno’s prior strike as the basis for a sentence enhancement.
The trial court declined to dismiss Moreno’s prior strike on the
ground that doing so was not consistent with public safety.
The court sentenced Moreno as follows: 25 years to life for
the murder of Nieves, doubled to 50 years to life, plus 10 years for

2 An amended minute order dated September 12, 2020,
prior to Moreno’s trial, states that Moreno pleaded no contest to
count 4 (§ 245, subd. (b), assault with a semiautomatic firearm)
and was found guilty by the court. This discrepancy does not
affect the outcome of Moreno’s appeal.

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the firearm enhancement; a consecutive sentence of seven years
to life, doubled to 14 years to life, for attempted murder of Arias;
for a total of 74 years to life. The remaining sentences for the
other counts were either run concurrent or stayed.3
Moreno filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Suggestive Identification: Legal Standard and
Standard of Review
“Identification evidence can offend a defendant’s due
process rights if the identification procedure is unduly suggestive
and unnecessary.” (People v. Mejia (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 921,
932.) A procedure is unfair if it suggests in advance the identity
of the person police suspect. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th
353, 413 (Ochoa).)
“To determine whether the admission of identification
evidence violates a defendant’s due process rights, the court asks
two questions. First, the court asks whether the identification
procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary. [Citation.]
‘Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase
the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive
ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased
chance of misidentification is gratuitous.’ [Citation.] Second,
even if the lineup was unnecessarily suggestive, the court asks
whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the
totality of the circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 901.) Only where circumstances present a

3 Moreno received a concurrent sentence of three years,
doubled to six years, for being a felon in possession of a firearm;
and nine years, doubled to 18 years but stayed pursuant to
section 654, for assault on Arias.

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“substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” will a
reversal be warranted. (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S.
98, 104–107.) “But if the indicia of reliability are strong enough
to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged
suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily
will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its
worth.” (Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. 228, 232.)
Moreno has the burden to show that the identification
procedure used by the deputies was constitutionally
impermissible. (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.)
On appeal, we give deference to “ ‘the trial court’s findings of
historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility
determinations, but we independently review[4] the trial court’s
ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a pretrial
identification procedure was unduly suggestive.’ [Citation.]
‘Only if the challenged identification procedure is unnecessarily
suggestive is it necessary to determine the reliability of the
resulting identification.’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th
846, 902.) “ ‘[I]f we find that a challenged procedure is not
impermissibly suggestive, our inquiry into the due process claim
ends.’ [Citation.]” (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 412.)

4 “When courts engage in independent review, they should be
mindful that ‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de
novo review. . . .” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not simply
second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s
own observations.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527.)

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B. Gomez’s Identification of Moreno Was Neither
Unduly Suggestive nor Unreliable
“[F]or a witness identification procedure to violate the due
process clauses, the state must, at the threshold, improperly
suggest something to the witness—i.e., it must, wittingly or
unwittingly, initiate an unduly suggestive procedure.” (Ochoa,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 413.) Here, the identification used by the
responding deputies was the opposite of “suggestive.” Gomez
“identified” the shooter in all but name before he was shown a
photograph5 of Moreno. Specifically, Gomez gave a physical
description of the individual who shot Nieves, told the officers
where the shooter lived and what kind of vehicle he drove, and
even distinguished him from a brother who lived at the same
address. Only after receiving this information did the detectives
show Gomez Moreno’s photograph and ask “Do you know who
this individual is right here?,” to which Gomez replied that
Moreno was the unnamed individual he had seen shoot Nieves.
By the time he was shown Moreno’s photograph, Gomez had
“identified” Moreno in all but name. Showing him Moreno’s
photograph did not “suggest” anything that Gomez had not
already told the detectives.
Our conclusion that the procedure employed here was not
unduly suggestive because Gomez identified Moreno before being
shown his photograph is consistent with recent cases decided by
our Supreme Court under analogous circumstances. In Ochoa,
for example, an eyewitness asked to see a profile picture after
tentatively identifying a suspect from a photo lineup. (Ochoa,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 412.) In response to that request, police

5 The photograph itself was a bare photo of Moreno, without
any writing or indication that Moreno had a criminal record.

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showed the witness a profile image of Ochoa, but not of any other
individuals whose pictures were in the lineup. After seeing
Ochoa’s profile the eyewitness confirmed her identification.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the procedure used was
not unfair because it did not suggest the suspect’s identity in
advance of the witness’s identification of the suspect. (Id. at
p. 413.) More recently, in People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, the Supreme Court found no
unfairness where an eyewitness, who tentatively identified a
suspect from a photographic lineup, asked to see a different
photograph of the suspect and confirmed the identification after
being shown a newspaper photo. The procedure did not violate
due process because, “[a]s in Ochoa, police did not suggest
McClain’s identity before Pina identified him.” (12 Cal.5th at
p. 770.)
Moreno also argues that the identification was suggestive
because the investigating officers essentially locked Gomez in the
back of a patrol car for several hours, during which, Moreno
contends, Gomez was intimidated into identifying Moreno as the
shooter. This contention, too, does not bear scrutiny. In the first
place, nothing in the record supports Moreno’s contention that
Gomez’s identification was compromised by his being sequestered
in the back of a patrol car. Moreno’s counsel questioned Gomez
on this point at the preliminary hearing, asking Gomez whether
he was “afraid that they were going to maybe arrest you or do
something to you,” to which Gomez responded, “No, because the
officer who placed me in the car said that they were just doing an
investigation.” Second, Moreno does not explain what should
have been done differently. Assuming Gomez was intimidated by
sitting in a patrol car, it is hard to believe he would have found it

14
less intimidating to be transported to a sheriff’s station for
questioning. We also see a contradiction in Moreno suggesting
that Gomez was influenced by being sequestered in a patrol car,
while at the same time arguing that he was influenced by the hue
and cry of onlookers insisting that the shooter was “Javier’s son.”
“Only if the challenged identification procedure is
unnecessarily suggestive is it necessary to determine the
reliability of the resulting identification.” (People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 125.) Having agreed with the trial
court that the procedure used by the investigating officers was
not unduly suggestive, we need not address the reliability of
Gomez’s identification of Moreno. We note, however, that Gamez
also identified Moreno as the sole occupant of the black Explorer
at the time Nieves was shot and killed. More important, by
admitting at trial he was driving the Explorer when Nieves was
shot, Moreno blunted much of the force of his argument that
Gomez’s identification was so flawed as to violate due process.
Moreno’s admission he was driving the Explorer let the jury
choose whether to believe an individual who supposedly looked
similar to Moreno forced his way into Moreno’s Explorer,
concealed himself in the vehicle, shot and killed Nieves without
being seen by any bystanders, then escaped the vehicle
unobserved while leaving his gun behind. The prosecutor
emphasized this point in her rebuttal closing argument: “Now,
what Mr. Gomez was always certain about, when he talked to the
police that night, when he testified at prelim, and when he
testified here at trial, that there was one person in that SUV,
one. Only the driver [¶] . . . [¶] And there’s just been a lot of
trying to muddy up the waters for that, which makes a lot of
sense when this whole case revolves around Mr. Gomez’s

15
testimony as the only witness who saw him pull the trigger.
But now the defendant has taken the stand and admitted to you
that he was in that driver’s seat.”
This is not to say that Gomez was an ideal witness for the
prosecution. He was not. The inconsistencies between his initial
statements and his trial testimony do not, however, establish a
violation of Moreno’s right to due process. “The
Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a conviction based
on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting
introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant
means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be
discounted as unworthy of credit.” (Perry v. New Hampshire,
supra, 565 U.S. at p. 237.) “[E]vidence with some element of
untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are
not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the
weight of identification testimony that has some questionable
feature.” (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 116.)
“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested.” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 316.) It is
undisputed that “[t]he circumstances of the identification were
disclosed to the defense [and] they were the subject of thorough
cross-examination.” (People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 903.) The jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to afford their testimony, and Moreno is bound by the
jury’s decision to credit Gomez’s initial statement to investigating
officers.

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C. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion Not to
Dismiss Moreno’s Prior Strike
Moreno’s final contention on appeal is that the court
abused its discretion by not disregarding his prior felony
conviction under the three strikes law. The court may strike a
prior conviction. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) “We review the denial of a motion to
dismiss a strike allegation for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029.)
The People argue that Moreno forfeited this argument by
not making a specific request under section 1385, subdivision (a)
to dismiss Moreno’s prior strike for purposes of the three strikes
law, as opposed to arguing in his sentencing memo that it should
not be considered as a sentence enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c).
We decline to find this contention forfeited for three
reasons. First, it is clear from the record that the trial court
deemed Moreno to have made a request to dismiss his prior
strike, denied that request on the merits. For example, during
the sentencing hearing the court stated to Moreno’s counsel,
“Oh, you did argue, Mr. Goalwin, that I should not apply the
strike because it’s more than five years old, but isn’t that also a
situation where, if I find that doing so would endanger public
safety, I should not do that?” Second, both sides have briefed the
issue on the merits, and we see no prejudice to the People by
addressing the issue. Third, in our review of the record we
cannot see where the prosecutor objected to the court addressing
whether to dismiss Moreno’s prior strike.
Without endorsing the procedure Moreno followed, we have
reviewed the order refusing to dismiss a prior strike, and we find

17
no abuse of discretion. As our Supreme Court observed in People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377-378, “a trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it. [¶] . . . [¶] [i]t is
not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about
whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.”
Moreover, the trial court “is presumed to have considered all of
the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the
contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
A trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to dismiss a
prior strike only in limited circumstances, such as when it was
not aware of its discretion to dismiss, where it considered
impermissible factors in refusing to dismiss, or where the
resulting sentence leads to an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd result. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.)
None of these factors appears on the record. It is obvious from
the quoted language above that the trial court was aware that it
had the power to dismiss a strike. In refusing to dismiss
Moreno’s prior strike on the ground that doing so would endanger
public safety, the court cited Moreno’s “callous and cold and cruel
actions in shooting at these two victims,” which are properly
considered in deciding a Romero motion. (See, e.g., People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 640 [no abuse of discretion,
citing defendant’s “continuous history of criminal conduct”]
People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170 [no abuse of
discretion although refusal to strike two prior convictions
resulted in sentence of 85 years to life]; People v. Humphrey
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing dismissal of prior
strike where defendant “led a continuous life of crime after the
prior”].)

18
On the record before us, the trial court’s decision not to
disregard Moreno’s prior felony conviction was neither irrational
nor arbitrary. To the contrary, in his opening brief Moreno
“acknowledges that his prior record raises the inference of
accelerating violence,” but argues that the trial court should have
credited “significant evidence that . . . Moreno has a serious issue
with addiction and mental health.” Moreno, however, waived a
jury trial on aggravating and mitigating factors, and the
weighing of evidence of those factors was left to the trial court’s
discretion. “Generally, where a trial court has discretionary
power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to
substitute its judgment of the proper decision for that of the trial
judge.” (In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673,
682.) Moreno’s acknowledgement that his record could be viewed
as one of accelerating violence confirms that the trial court’s
exercise of discretion was not arbitrary or irrational, but was
within the range of outcomes based on the evidence before the
court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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